The Aceh Peace Process: Why it Failed - East-West Center
The Aceh Peace Process: Why it Failed - East-West Center
The Aceh Peace Process: Why it Failed - East-West Center
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Policy Studies 1<strong>The</strong> <strong>Aceh</strong> <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong>:<strong>Why</strong> <strong>it</strong> <strong>Failed</strong>Edward Aspinall and Harold Crouch<strong>East</strong>-<strong>West</strong> <strong>Center</strong>Washington
<strong>East</strong>-<strong>West</strong> <strong>Center</strong><strong>The</strong> <strong>East</strong>-<strong>West</strong> <strong>Center</strong> is an internationally recognized education andresearch organization established by the U.S. Congress in 1960 tostrengthen understanding and relations between the Un<strong>it</strong>ed States andthe countries of the Asia Pacific. Through <strong>it</strong>s programs of cooperativestudy, training, seminars, and research, the <strong>Center</strong> works to promote astable, peaceful and prosperous Asia Pacific commun<strong>it</strong>y in which theUn<strong>it</strong>ed States is a leading and valued partner. Funding for the <strong>Center</strong>comes for the U.S. government, private foundations, individuals, corporationsand a number of Asia Pacific governments.<strong>East</strong>-<strong>West</strong> <strong>Center</strong> WashingtonEstablished on September 1, 2001, the primary function of the <strong>East</strong>-<strong>West</strong> <strong>Center</strong> Washington is to further the <strong>East</strong>-<strong>West</strong> <strong>Center</strong> missionand the inst<strong>it</strong>utional objective of building a peaceful and prosperousAsia Pacific commun<strong>it</strong>y through substantive programming activ<strong>it</strong>iesfocused on the theme of conflict reduction in the Asia Pacific regionand promoting American understanding of and engagement in AsiaPacific affairs.
Policy Studies 1<strong>The</strong> <strong>Aceh</strong> <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong>:<strong>Why</strong> <strong>it</strong> <strong>Failed</strong>Edward Aspinall and Harold Crouch
Copyright © 2003 by the <strong>East</strong>-<strong>West</strong> <strong>Center</strong> Washington<strong>The</strong> <strong>Aceh</strong> <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong>: <strong>Why</strong> <strong>it</strong> <strong>Failed</strong> by Edward Aspinall andHarold CrouchISBN 1-932728-01-5 (online version)ISSN 1547-1330 (online version)For Printed version contact:Ed<strong>it</strong>or, Policy Studies<strong>East</strong>-<strong>West</strong> <strong>Center</strong> Washington1819 L Street NW, Su<strong>it</strong>e 200Washington, DC 20036Tel: (202) 293-3995Fax: (202) 293-1402Email: AsianSecur<strong>it</strong>y@<strong>East</strong><strong>West</strong><strong>Center</strong>Washington.orgWebs<strong>it</strong>e: http://www.eastwestcenterwashington.orgThis publication is a product from the <strong>East</strong>-<strong>West</strong><strong>Center</strong> Washington’s Project on Internal Conflicts.For details, see pages 67-71
ContentsList of AcronymsExecutive SummaryvixIntroduction 1<strong>The</strong> Prelude 5A New President and the Opening of Negotiations 8<strong>The</strong> Human<strong>it</strong>arian Pause: May 2000 14<strong>The</strong> Renewed Mil<strong>it</strong>ary Offensive: April 2001 20<strong>The</strong> Special Autonomy (NAD) Law 24Renewed Talks: 2002 26<strong>The</strong> Government’s Ultimatum 30<strong>The</strong> Agreement 32Heading Toward Breakdown 34Collapse of the Talks 43Lessons 45
Prospects 50Endnotes 55Bibliography 63Project Information: <strong>The</strong> Dynamics and Managementof Internal Conflicts in Asia• Project Purpose and Outline 65• Project Participants List 69• Background of the <strong>Aceh</strong> conflict 72• Map of <strong>Aceh</strong>, Indonesia 74
List of AcronymsAGAMASNLFBrimobbupatiCOHADOMDPRDPRDGAMGolkarHDCJSCKBAKKBMKAngkatan GAM (GAM’s mil<strong>it</strong>ary wing)Acheh-Sumatra National Liberation Front(official name for GAM)Brigade Mobil (Police Mobile Brigade)administrative head of rural districtCessation of Hostil<strong>it</strong>ies Framework Agreement(signed December 9, 2002)Daerah Operasi Mil<strong>it</strong>er (Mil<strong>it</strong>ary Operations Zone)Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People’s RepresentativeCouncil; national parliament)Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (local parliament)Gerakan <strong>Aceh</strong> Merdeka (Free <strong>Aceh</strong> Movement)pol<strong>it</strong>ical party of the former Suharto regimeHenry Dunant <strong>Center</strong> (later renamed the Centrefor Human<strong>it</strong>arian Dialogue)Joint Secur<strong>it</strong>y Comm<strong>it</strong>teeKom<strong>it</strong>e Bersama Aksi Kemanusiaan (JointComm<strong>it</strong>tee on Human<strong>it</strong>arian Action)Kom<strong>it</strong>e Bersama Modal<strong>it</strong>as Keamanan (JointComm<strong>it</strong>tee on Secur<strong>it</strong>y Modal<strong>it</strong>ies)
viEdward Aspinall & Harold CrouchKodamKodimKopassusKoramilKoremKostradLIPIMPRMuhammadiyahNADKomando Daerah Mil<strong>it</strong>er (Regional Mil<strong>it</strong>aryCommand)Komando Distrik Mil<strong>it</strong>er (District Mil<strong>it</strong>aryCommand)Komando Pasukan Khusus (Army Special Forces)Komando Rayon Mil<strong>it</strong>er (Subdistrict Mil<strong>it</strong>aryCommand)Komando Resort Mil<strong>it</strong>er (Subregional Mil<strong>it</strong>aryCommand)Komando Strategis Cadangan Angkatan Darat(Army Strategic Reserve Command)Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (IndonesianInst<strong>it</strong>ute of Sciences)Majelis Permusyawarahan Rakyat (People’sConsultative Assembly; Indonesia’s supremelegislative body)modernist Islamic organizationNanggroe <strong>Aceh</strong> Darussalam (the province of <strong>Aceh</strong>as renamed by the Special Autonomy Law of 2001)Nahdatul Ulama trad<strong>it</strong>ionalist Islamic organizationNKRI Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (Un<strong>it</strong>aryState of the Republic of Indonesia)PANPartai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party)PDI-PPartai Demokrasi Indonesia—Perjuangan(Indonesian Democracy Party—Struggle)PKBPartai Kebangk<strong>it</strong>an Bangsa (National AwakeningParty)PolriKepolisian Republik Indonesia (Indonesian NationalPolice)RATA Rehabil<strong>it</strong>ation Action for Torture Victims in <strong>Aceh</strong>SIRASentral Informasi Referendum <strong>Aceh</strong> (<strong>Aceh</strong>Referendum Information <strong>Center</strong>)TMMK Tim Mon<strong>it</strong>oring Modal<strong>it</strong>as Keamanan (Secur<strong>it</strong>yModal<strong>it</strong>ies Mon<strong>it</strong>oring Team)TNITentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Mil<strong>it</strong>ary)UNPO Unrepresented Nations and People’s Organization
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong>viiwalikotawali nanggroeadministrative head of urban district (mayor)head of state
xEdward Aspinall & Harold Crouchtion of the conflict. <strong>The</strong> pact provided for internationally mon<strong>it</strong>oreddemil<strong>it</strong>arization of the terr<strong>it</strong>ory to be followed by a dialogue “reflectingthe views of all elements” of <strong>Aceh</strong>nese society and finally “a free and fairelectoral process.” Although the agreement led to a sharp decline inarmed conflict, the peace process did not proceed smoothly. When GAMrefused to compromise on <strong>it</strong>s demand for independence, the Indonesianmil<strong>it</strong>ary began to undermine the agreement by encouraging demonstrationsagainst the international mon<strong>it</strong>ors and making preparations for arenewed mil<strong>it</strong>ary campaign. <strong>The</strong>n the Indonesian government presentedan ultimatum that GAM rejected at a final meeting in Tokyo on May18, 2003. At midnight the government declared a mil<strong>it</strong>ary emergency in<strong>Aceh</strong> and mil<strong>it</strong>ary operations commenced soon after. <strong>The</strong>re seems to bel<strong>it</strong>tle prospect of an early renewal of talks.<strong>The</strong> peace process broke down because the two parties were unableto agree on the fundamental issue dividing them: whether <strong>Aceh</strong> wouldbecome an independent nation or remain an integral part of theIndonesian state. Leaders in Jakarta were determined to maintainIndonesia’s terr<strong>it</strong>orial integr<strong>it</strong>y and prevent “national disintegration.” ButGAM leaders were equally adamant that <strong>Aceh</strong> had an incontrovertibleright to independence. <strong>The</strong> strategy of the peace process, as conceived by<strong>it</strong>s Geneva-based mediator, was to bridge the gap between the two sidesby shifting the focus away from incompatible goals toward more immediateconcerns such as reduction in hostil<strong>it</strong>ies, disarmament, reconstruction,and the like. It was hoped that the two sides would be able todevelop greater confidence in one another and perhaps eventually comeup w<strong>it</strong>h unexpected and creative means to resolve the underlying pol<strong>it</strong>icaldifference. In other words: the idea was to develop a pol<strong>it</strong>ical frameworkfor resolving the conflict by peaceful rather than violent means.Real<strong>it</strong>y proved to be very different. Not only were the two sidesrarely able to put aside their differences over first principles, but ne<strong>it</strong>herevinced an unreserved comm<strong>it</strong>ment to the peace process as the primarymeans for resolving the conflict. Although the peace process was in<strong>it</strong>iatedby the Indonesian government, significant Indonesian groups were e<strong>it</strong>herprofoundly ambivalent or openly hostile whereas GAM leaders never lostsight of their ultimate goal of independence. Both sides viewed theprocess primarily in tactical terms—as a means to undermine their opponents,force their surrender, or gain some other short-term advantage.Far from building trust, the process served ultimately to entrench thepos<strong>it</strong>ions of the two sides and deepen the division between them.
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong>xiEven so, we conclude that the Indonesian government’s currentresort to a mil<strong>it</strong>ary solution is unlikely to resolve the conflict and mayultimately prove counterproductive. Moreover, “special autonomy” isunlikely to satisfy <strong>Aceh</strong>nese aspirations unless accompanied by majoreconomic and pol<strong>it</strong>ical reforms. Eventually a return to negotiations—notnecessarily w<strong>it</strong>h GAM alone—will be necessary. In drawing lessons fromthe achievements and failings of the 2000–2003 peace process, we drawparticular attention to the unrealistic expectations for rapid progresstoward a “final” solution. Rather than seek an immediate resolution <strong>it</strong>might have been better to concentrate, as proposed by the mediator, onpreserving the “cessation of hostil<strong>it</strong>ies” and maintaining peaceful cond<strong>it</strong>ions.A “delayed settlement” approach may have been preferable—postponingsubstantive discussions about the ultimate pol<strong>it</strong>ical status of <strong>Aceh</strong>while offering GAM incentives to abandon <strong>it</strong>s armed struggle and participatein conventional pol<strong>it</strong>ical activ<strong>it</strong>ies. Such a delay would also havegiven the central government time to improve <strong>it</strong>s own image among<strong>Aceh</strong>nese. To achieve such an outcome in the future, however, both sideswill need to recognize that their mil<strong>it</strong>ary options are truly exhausted.
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Aceh</strong> <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong>:<strong>Why</strong> <strong>it</strong> <strong>Failed</strong>On May 18, 2003, peace negotiations in Tokyo between the Indonesiangovernment and the Free <strong>Aceh</strong> Movement (Gerakan <strong>Aceh</strong> Merdeka;GAM) finally collapsed. 1 <strong>The</strong> GAM negotiators had rejected anIndonesian ultimatum requiring them to abandon their goal of independencefor <strong>Aceh</strong>, accept autonomous status for the terr<strong>it</strong>ory w<strong>it</strong>hinIndonesia, and immediately lay down their arms. <strong>The</strong> government hadwarned that refusal to comply would mean a renewed mil<strong>it</strong>ary offensiveand an end to the peace process. Malik Mahmud, the top GAM leader atthe talks, told journalists that “the Indonesian government wishes tocontinue <strong>it</strong>s war on the <strong>Aceh</strong>nese.” He added: “We shall fight. We areready. We have been fighting for twenty-seven years.” 2<strong>The</strong> government’s response to GAM’s rejection of the ultimatum wasimmediate and unequivocal. W<strong>it</strong>hin hours, President MegawatiSukarnoputri signed a decree placing <strong>Aceh</strong> under martial law. <strong>The</strong> mil<strong>it</strong>arycommander in chief, General Endriartono Sutarto, ordered the tensof thousands of troops assembled in the province to launch a “Secur<strong>it</strong>yRestoration Operation” aimed at “destroying GAM forces down to theirroots.” <strong>The</strong>ir job, he said, was simple: “<strong>The</strong>y have the task of finishingoff, killing, those who still engage in armed resistance.” 3<strong>The</strong> declaration of martial law marked the end of a process that hadbegun early in 2000. Since then cease-fire agreements had twice brought<strong>Aceh</strong> several months of relative calm that ended w<strong>it</strong>h the renewal of mili-
2 Edward Aspinall & Harold Crouchtary operations. Although both sides made important tactical concessions,ne<strong>it</strong>her the Indonesian government nor GAM had been willing to compromiseon what both saw as the fundamental issue: would <strong>Aceh</strong> becomean independent nation or would <strong>it</strong> remain an Indonesian province?<strong>The</strong> national government, reflecting the sentiments of manyIndonesians, upholds a vision of a multiethnic and multicultural nationconsisting of the regions inher<strong>it</strong>ed from the Dutch <strong>East</strong> Indies.Comm<strong>it</strong>ted to defending <strong>it</strong>s inher<strong>it</strong>ed borders,the government realizes that holding a referendumon <strong>Aceh</strong>’s future, let alone granting independence,might stimulate similar demands inother regions and, in a worst-case scenario,could even lead to the breakup of the country.<strong>Aceh</strong>, of course, is also valuable to Indonesia foreconomic reasons—particularly as an exporterof oil and natural gas. Public opinion in Indonesia is overwhelminglyopposed to independence for <strong>Aceh</strong> and generally supports “firm measures”against GAM.Nevertheless, compared to the unrelenting pos<strong>it</strong>ion of the Suhartogovernment, the post-1998 governments made substantial concessionsaimed at addressing at least some of the grievances of <strong>Aceh</strong>’s people. Atthe core of the government’s approach was the concept of “specialautonomy”—proposed under President B. J. Habibie, passed by parliamentunder President Abdurrahman Wahid, and signed into law byPresident Megawati. Special autonomy provides a huge boost to provincialand district government revenue that could be used to improve thewelfare of the <strong>Aceh</strong>nese people. <strong>The</strong> law also paves the way towardgreater local participation in government including the eventual directelection of the heads of provincial and district governments. But on thefundamental issue of independence, Jakarta was adamant that <strong>it</strong> wouldmake no concession at all.<strong>The</strong> most important oppos<strong>it</strong>ion to the peace process came from w<strong>it</strong>hinthe Indonesian mil<strong>it</strong>ary (Tentara Nasional Indonesia; TNI), which wasreluctant even to begin talking w<strong>it</strong>h separatist rebels. PresidentAbdurrahman Wahid in<strong>it</strong>iated talks during a brief window of opportun<strong>it</strong>ywhen the TNI was on the pol<strong>it</strong>ical defensive; indeed a major cause for thebreakdown of the process in subsequent years was the reconsolidation ofthe mil<strong>it</strong>ary’s pol<strong>it</strong>ical pos<strong>it</strong>ion. For the TNI the bottom line was alwaysWould <strong>Aceh</strong> become anindependent nationor remain anIndonesian province?
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong> 3that GAM should accept <strong>Aceh</strong>’s status as a province w<strong>it</strong>hin the “Un<strong>it</strong>aryState of the Republic of Indonesia” (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia;NKRI). Most mil<strong>it</strong>ary officers believe that concessions will only encouragefurther resistance; many have l<strong>it</strong>tle understanding of the concept of“winning hearts and minds.” But the mil<strong>it</strong>ary had another reason to bewary of peace talks. It is usually estimated that the national budget providesonly about 30 percent of the financial requirements of the secur<strong>it</strong>yforces—which means they must find the other 70 percent themselves.<strong>Aceh</strong>’s oil and natural gas industries are a source of such funds. Large paymentsare made to the mil<strong>it</strong>ary while soldiers are hired out as privatesecur<strong>it</strong>y guards. Mil<strong>it</strong>ary and police personnel also take advantage of disturbedcond<strong>it</strong>ions to involve themselves in illegal logging and the marijuanatrade while ordinary soldiers, as well as police, regularly impose illegaltolls on traffic along major highways. <strong>The</strong> secur<strong>it</strong>y forces thereforehave an interest in keeping the conflict going at a level high enough tomake enterprises feel vulnerable and in need of protection.<strong>The</strong> Special Autonomy Law provides a further incentive for themil<strong>it</strong>ary to retain a substantial presence in <strong>Aceh</strong>, as <strong>it</strong>s financial provisionshave made the provincial government suddenly awash w<strong>it</strong>h fundsand therefore vulnerable to pressure to share <strong>it</strong>s affluence w<strong>it</strong>h the mil<strong>it</strong>ary(Mietzner 2003). <strong>The</strong> mil<strong>it</strong>ary, and also the police, have thereforebeen unenthusiastic about talks that might lead to a peace settlementwhich would result in the reduction of the mil<strong>it</strong>ary and police presenceand the creation of cond<strong>it</strong>ions that would make <strong>it</strong> more difficult toextract protection money (ICG 2001a). For this reason, successful resolutionof the <strong>Aceh</strong> conflict may in the long run depend not so much onthe negotiations themselves as on broad pol<strong>it</strong>ical and mil<strong>it</strong>ary reformw<strong>it</strong>hin Indonesia.<strong>The</strong> government has been divided between hawks and doves on <strong>it</strong>sstrategy toward <strong>Aceh</strong>. It was not only the mil<strong>it</strong>ary that adopted a hawkishstance toward negotiations. Most members of the national parliament—in which President Megawati’s Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle(Partai Demokrasi Indonesia—Perjuangan; PDI—P), President Suharto’sold Golkar Party, and appointed mil<strong>it</strong>ary and police representatives occupiedmore than 60 percent of the seats—were generally opposed to makingsubstantial concessions. <strong>The</strong> gradual reconsolidation of the TNI’spol<strong>it</strong>ical pos<strong>it</strong>ion during the three years of the peace process contributedto a hardening of the government’s approach and eventually undermined
4 Edward Aspinall & Harold Crouchthe remaining doves. In any case, at no time did the doves envisage allowing<strong>Aceh</strong> to secede. <strong>The</strong> government adopted a dual-policy frameworkthat combined mil<strong>it</strong>ary operations and peace talks—w<strong>it</strong>h the emphasischanging according to cond<strong>it</strong>ions on the ground and the shifting balanceof forces w<strong>it</strong>hin the government. In contrast to the doves, who at leastkept open the prospect of a negotiated settlement, the mil<strong>it</strong>ary hawksbelieved that peace could only be restored by annihilating GAM.On the GAM side, divisions between soft and hard-line factionswere not obvious. After all, GAM <strong>it</strong>self represented the most hard-lineand intransigent element w<strong>it</strong>hin <strong>Aceh</strong>nese society. GAM’s leadersbelieved that they represented the leg<strong>it</strong>imate government of the state of<strong>Aceh</strong> and that <strong>Aceh</strong>nese independence was already established de jure.(On GAM claims see Aspinall 2002.) Before 2000 the GAM leadershipin-exilein Sweden maintained <strong>it</strong>s hard-line pos<strong>it</strong>ion, but in the exceptionalcircumstances prevailing at the end of 1999 they responded toPresident Abdurrahman’s inv<strong>it</strong>ation to negotiate. GAM’s leaders, however,did not seriously believe they would be able to persuade Indonesia toconcede independence through negotiations. <strong>The</strong>ir immediate aimsappear to have been to secure greater international recogn<strong>it</strong>ion and totake advantage of the opportun<strong>it</strong>y that a cease-fire would provide tobroaden GAM’s support base and consolidate <strong>it</strong>s mil<strong>it</strong>ary forces.If GAM’s leaders did not expect to win independence through negotiations,what was their strategy? GAM’s mil<strong>it</strong>ary forces numbered only afew thousand poorly armed men. Its leaders, therefore, were under noillusion that they would one day defeat the TNI on the battlefield.GAM’s mil<strong>it</strong>ary goal was simply to retain a significant presence as a resistanceforce. Having survived successive mil<strong>it</strong>ary operations for over twentyyears, GAM’s leaders seemed confident that the organization could w<strong>it</strong>hstandany future mil<strong>it</strong>ary onslaught simply by w<strong>it</strong>hdrawing to the hinterland.4 Ultimately they expected their future would be determined not somuch in <strong>Aceh</strong> as in Indonesia <strong>it</strong>self. In interviews w<strong>it</strong>h one of the authorsin Stockholm in July 2002, exiled GAM leaders expressed their confidencethat “Indonesia-Java” would soon collapse under the weight of <strong>it</strong>saccumulated problems. 5 In interviews w<strong>it</strong>h the other author in Banda<strong>Aceh</strong> in March 2003, one of GAM’s negotiators acknowledged that GAMcould never secure a mil<strong>it</strong>ary victory over the TNI and could not expectindependence through negotiations but was convinced that Indonesiasooner or later would disintegrate. 6 Another GAM negotiator concurred:
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong> 5“Indonesia’s cancer has already spread too far for <strong>it</strong> to recover.” 7 Suchviews imply that whether or not there is an agreement between GAM andthe government, GAM only needs to survive and wa<strong>it</strong> for Indonesia tofall apart like the USSR. Now let us trace the history of the negotiationsin some detail before examining why they ultimately failed.<strong>The</strong> Prelude<strong>The</strong> fall of President Suharto’s author<strong>it</strong>arian New Order regime in 1998lifted the lid on social and pol<strong>it</strong>ical protest not only in <strong>Aceh</strong> butthroughout Indonesia in circumstances where the new governmentlacked author<strong>it</strong>y and capac<strong>it</strong>y to impose <strong>it</strong>s will. Resentment against rulefrom Jakarta had long been festering in <strong>Aceh</strong>. In the 1950s the IslamicDarul Islam rebellion had broken out in the province but was eventuallyresolved by a combination of mil<strong>it</strong>ary action and negotiations that recognized<strong>Aceh</strong> as a “special terr<strong>it</strong>ory.” But GAM, which emerged in the1970s, was primarily driven not by Islamic aspirations but by <strong>Aceh</strong>nesenationalism. Many ethnic <strong>Aceh</strong>nese, who make up about 75 percent ofthe province’s population, have a strong sense of their distinct ident<strong>it</strong>yderived from the history of the precolonial sultanate and the resistance tothe Dutch mil<strong>it</strong>ary campaign that finally conquered the terr<strong>it</strong>ory at thebeginning of the twentieth century. Today the extreme alienation thatunderpins the GAM insurgency is largely a reaction to the policies andbehavior of the Suharto regime (Kell 1995; Robinson 1998; Aspinall2002). <strong>The</strong> development of major natural resource industries in the1970s, especially the massive Arun gasfields, created a widespread perceptionthat <strong>Aceh</strong>’s natural resources were being explo<strong>it</strong>ed for the benef<strong>it</strong>of outsiders rather than the local population. When <strong>Aceh</strong>nese resentmentled to rebellion, the Jakarta government sent troops whose brutal practicesonly exacerbated anti-Jakarta sentiment.GAM was formed in 1976 when Teungku Hasan di Tiro, descendantof a famous ulama who led the nineteenth-century resistance to theDutch, launched a challenge to Jakarta rule. (For a detailed discussion ofGAM see Schulze forthcoming.) <strong>The</strong> small-scale in<strong>it</strong>ial revolt was quicklysuppressed and most of the leaders were killed or arrested, althoughHasan di Tiro and a few others managed to escape overseas. A largerrebellion in 1989 was met by a harsh counterinsurgency operation thatturned <strong>Aceh</strong> into a “Mil<strong>it</strong>ary Operations Zone” (Daerah Operasi Mil<strong>it</strong>er;DOM) where the mil<strong>it</strong>ary became in effect an unrestrained occupying
6 Edward Aspinall & Harold Crouchpower. Estimates range from 1,000 to 3,000 killed and as many as 1,400missing as a result of DOM operations (ICG 2001a: 3). Although theGAM insurgency was largely defeated by 1992, troops remained in theprovince and antagonism toward Jakarta became deeply entrenched inthe local population.<strong>The</strong> collapse in the author<strong>it</strong>y of the central government following thefall of President Suharto in May 1998 perm<strong>it</strong>ted a sudden upswing inopen antimil<strong>it</strong>ary and anti-Jakarta sentiment in <strong>Aceh</strong>. In an effort torestore public confidence in the central government, the mil<strong>it</strong>ary commanderin chief, General Wiranto, announced in August 1998 the liftingof <strong>Aceh</strong>’s DOM status and even felt compelled to apologize personally forthe behavior of “individual soldiers.” 8 In March 1999, Suharto’s successoras president, B. J. Habibie, vis<strong>it</strong>ed <strong>Aceh</strong> where he too apologized “forwhat has been done by the secur<strong>it</strong>y forces, by accident or deliberately,”and announced the release of pol<strong>it</strong>ical prisoners. 9Meanwhile President Habibie had taken an extraordinary in<strong>it</strong>iativeto resolve another separatist conflict. On January 27, 1999, heannounced his offer of a referendum (although he used the term popularconsultation) to determine the future of <strong>East</strong> Timor. Although Habibiemade <strong>it</strong> clear that a similar offer would not be made to <strong>Aceh</strong>, hisannouncement had an immediate impact in that province where inFebruary students formed the <strong>Aceh</strong> Referendum Information <strong>Center</strong>(Sentral Informasi Referendum <strong>Aceh</strong>; SIRA) to demand a referendum onindependence for <strong>Aceh</strong>. When the governor, Syamsuddin Mahmud,attempted to undercut the movement by calling for a federal system andthe implementation of Islamic law in <strong>Aceh</strong>, he was answered by ademonstration of tens of thousands of students demanding independence.Habibie’s vis<strong>it</strong> the following month was similarly met by thousandsof student demonstrators.Apart from the growing demand for a referendum, the period fromlate 1998 also saw the rapid growth of GAM. By the middle of 1999 themovement was better organized and in control of a greater proportion ofthe <strong>Aceh</strong>nese countryside than ever before. One sign of this reconsolidationwas a series of assassinations of cuak, <strong>Aceh</strong>nese who had worked asinformers for the mil<strong>it</strong>ary. <strong>The</strong>re were attacks on police and mil<strong>it</strong>aryposts, too, as well as murders and kidnappings of officers. FromNovember 1998 clashes between GAM and the secur<strong>it</strong>y forces becamecommon. And under the unprecedented cond<strong>it</strong>ions of press freedom
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong> 7obtained in the aftermath of Suharto’s fall, the views of GAM leaderswere for the first time quoted extensively in the national and local press.Although GAM’s growth was encouraged by the general breakdownof government author<strong>it</strong>y in the province, <strong>it</strong> was also assisted by therelease of several dozen GAM detainees as part of the government’samnesty for pol<strong>it</strong>ical prisoners as well as the return to <strong>Aceh</strong> of GAMfighters from Malaysia and elsewhere. Many of these men had receivedmil<strong>it</strong>ary and ideological training in Libya during the 1980s. As a result,an experienced and well-trained force of cadres was on hand to resurrectGAM’s organizational infrastructure and oversee recru<strong>it</strong>ment of newfighters. Anti-Jakarta sentiment was further aggravated during 1999 byseveral atroc<strong>it</strong>ies comm<strong>it</strong>ted by the secur<strong>it</strong>y forces against ordinary c<strong>it</strong>izens.It was reported that during the seventeen months after the lifting ofDOM in August 1998, some 447 civilians and 87 members of the secur<strong>it</strong>yforces had been killed while another 144 were missing. 10Disaffection from Jakarta—as well as intimidation by GAM—wasshown by the low turnout in the 1999 general election, especially in thethree north-coast districts where GAM had strong roots. In North <strong>Aceh</strong>the turnout was only 1.4 percent, in Pidie 11 percent, and in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Aceh</strong>50 percent. 11 <strong>The</strong>n the pro-referendum movement organized a series ofmassive strikes and rallies in late 1999. A two-day strike paralyzed Banda<strong>Aceh</strong>, Lhokseumawe, and other towns on August 4–5. On November 8a massive protest virtually took over Banda <strong>Aceh</strong>—although the numberparticipating was surely much less than the claimed two million. Eventhe provincial governor and the provincial parliament (DewanPerwakilan Rakyat Daerah; DPRD) were unable to resist pressure toissue statements supporting a referendum.Although the referendum movement was led by students from <strong>Aceh</strong>’surban areas, in rural <strong>Aceh</strong> <strong>it</strong> was sometimes difficult to distinguish <strong>it</strong>from the upsurge in support for GAM. Certainly GAM flags and “Free<strong>Aceh</strong>” slogans were frequently visible at referendum rallies and motorcycleconvoys. GAM’s growing strength was further indicated when the callto commemorate the twenty-third anniversary of the foundation ofGAM on December 4, 1999, attracted such widespread support that thegovernment, mil<strong>it</strong>ary, and police made no effort to prevent <strong>it</strong>. 12 Not onlywas the commander of GAM’s mil<strong>it</strong>ary forces, Teungku AbdullahSyafi’ie, perm<strong>it</strong>ted to appear three times on television to appeal to hisfollowers to remain calm, but the police chief gave people permission to
8 Edward Aspinall & Harold Crouchraise the GAM flag provided they did not pull down the Indonesiannational flag at government offices. In many parts of Pidie, North <strong>Aceh</strong>,and <strong>East</strong> <strong>Aceh</strong>, local government was hardly operating as governmentemployees stopped going to their offices e<strong>it</strong>her in protest or as a result ofintimidation.By late 1999 the government had lost much of <strong>it</strong>s author<strong>it</strong>y in<strong>Aceh</strong>. Nevertheless, desp<strong>it</strong>e the widespread resentment against Jakarta, <strong>it</strong>had so far coalesced only into a call for a referendum. For many, probablymost, “referendum” was really code for “independence.” But thegovernment in Jakarta could still hope that pol<strong>it</strong>ical and other concessionswould win back much of the population. On September 22,1999, the national parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat; DPR) passeda law granting the provincial government author<strong>it</strong>y to determine <strong>it</strong>sown policies in the fields of religion, custom,and education and acknowledgingthe formal role of the ulama in governmentpolicymaking. In October thePeople’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawarahan Rakyat;MPR) adopted a decree that specifically recognized “special autonomy”in <strong>Aceh</strong> (and Papua). <strong>The</strong>se measures seem to have had l<strong>it</strong>tle impact in<strong>Aceh</strong>, however, where anti-Jakarta feeling continued to intensify. It wasin these circumstances of impending crisis that the new government ofAbdurrahman Wahid, elected in October 1999, decided to move towardnegotiations w<strong>it</strong>h GAM.For many, “referendum”was code for “independence”A New President and the Opening of Negotiations<strong>The</strong> peace talks would never have begun w<strong>it</strong>hout a fortu<strong>it</strong>ous confluenceof events that produced a watershed in Indonesia’s pol<strong>it</strong>ical life. <strong>The</strong> mil<strong>it</strong>arywas still reeling in the aftermath of the collapse of the Suhartoregime and the international opprobrium that followed <strong>it</strong>s handling ofthe <strong>East</strong> Timor referendum. In <strong>Aceh</strong> <strong>it</strong>self, the growing pro-referendumcampaign and the reawakening of the GAM insurgency demonstratedthat the Jakarta government was losing <strong>it</strong>s grip. Meanwhile the erraticbut reformist Abdurrahman Wahid—leader of the trad<strong>it</strong>ionalist Muslimorganization Nahdatul Ulama and founder of the Democracy Forumthat had opposed Suharto’s author<strong>it</strong>arian rule—was elected president inOctober 1999. This unusual combination of circumstances gaveAbdurrahman, a man w<strong>it</strong>h a philosophical comm<strong>it</strong>ment to the peaceful
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong> 9resolution of communal conflict and a deep suspicion of the mil<strong>it</strong>ary, awindow of opportun<strong>it</strong>y to in<strong>it</strong>iate negotiations w<strong>it</strong>h GAM.A month before his election, on a vis<strong>it</strong> to <strong>Aceh</strong>, Abdurrahman hadresponded to a statement by five hundred ulama supporting a referendumby asserting that “for a long time I have said that I agree w<strong>it</strong>h a referendumfor <strong>Aceh</strong>.” But he also warned that the lesson of <strong>East</strong> Timorshould be understood and a hasty referendum should be avoided. 13 Aspresident, Abdurrahman’s penchant for off-the-cuff comments causedmuch confusion about the government’s pos<strong>it</strong>ion on the <strong>Aceh</strong> question.In<strong>it</strong>ially he raised the hopes of the pro-referendum movement while provokingalarm among the nationalists. “If we can do that in <strong>East</strong> Timor,why can’t we do that in <strong>Aceh</strong>?” he asked foreign journalists. He added:“<strong>The</strong> question is, if there is a referendum, when?” During a SoutheastAsian tour in November he then made a series of confusing commentson the topic. In Manila, for example, he explained he was only offering areferendum on three options—“total autonomy,” a 75–25 distribution ofrevenue between <strong>Aceh</strong> and Jakarta, and special-province status—but noton the question of independence. 14 In Jakarta, the bewildered minister ofdefense, Juwono Sudarsono, told the national parliament that “the last Iheard from the president” was that the government had agreed to a referendumon whether to implement Islamic law. 15 By the end of November,Abdurrahman was telling <strong>Aceh</strong>nese vis<strong>it</strong>ors that he personally did notobject to a referendum on independence but had to take account of theopinions of the DPR, MPR, and mil<strong>it</strong>ary. Finally, at a meeting of DPRleaders, the president declared that he would not tolerate the separationof <strong>Aceh</strong> from Indonesia. 16<strong>The</strong> president’s willingness to consider a referendum did not reflectthe views of Indonesia’s pol<strong>it</strong>ical el<strong>it</strong>e. No major pol<strong>it</strong>ical party expressedsupport for a referendum; the mil<strong>it</strong>ary was totally opposed. Indeed themil<strong>it</strong>ary seems to have been convinced that a referendum in <strong>Aceh</strong> wouldproduce a result similar to the one in <strong>East</strong> Timor. <strong>The</strong> regional armycommander for North Sumatra (including <strong>Aceh</strong>), Major General AbdulRahman Gaffar, stated that the people of <strong>Aceh</strong> would support independenceif the choice were given. 17 <strong>The</strong> mil<strong>it</strong>ary spokesman, Major GeneralSudradjat, argued that if a referendum were to be held, the other twentysixprovinces should also participate because “<strong>Aceh</strong> is the property of theentire Indonesian nation.” 18 Although a special comm<strong>it</strong>tee of the DPRexamining the <strong>Aceh</strong> question had recommended studying the possibil<strong>it</strong>y
10 Edward Aspinall & Harold Crouchof a referendum, the full DPR made <strong>it</strong>s pos<strong>it</strong>ion clear by removing allreference to a referendum in <strong>it</strong>s final resolution.Abdurrahman then turned his mind to the prospect of holding talksw<strong>it</strong>h GAM. Prior to that time, senior officials of the Indonesian government,as well as GAM leaders, had rejected this possibil<strong>it</strong>y. 19 Althoughthe president claimed on several occasions that he was already in informalcommunication w<strong>it</strong>h GAM leaders, <strong>it</strong> was not clear whom hemeant—whether GAM leaders in Sweden, or in <strong>Aceh</strong> <strong>it</strong>self, or even adissident faction in Malaysia. 20 Meanwhile a representative of the newlyestablished Henry Dunant <strong>Center</strong> (HDC) had met the president inJakarta and suggested that <strong>it</strong> might be able to help in facil<strong>it</strong>ating contacts.21 Flying in the face of nationalist and mil<strong>it</strong>ary oppos<strong>it</strong>ion to “foreigninterference” in an internal matter, Abdurrahman then met officialsof the HDC on January 30, 2000, during a vis<strong>it</strong> to Geneva and asked <strong>it</strong>to play a mediating role in talks. 22 <strong>The</strong> HDC defines <strong>it</strong>s mission in termsof the “new prevention” philosophy of mediated negotiation in search ofpeaceful solutions for intrastate conflicts. Although <strong>it</strong> was a new organizationand the <strong>Aceh</strong> conflict was <strong>it</strong>s first significant mediation attempt,<strong>it</strong>s staff—even though lacking Indonesian experience—did have extensiveinvolvement in UN-organized human<strong>it</strong>arian operations in many ofthe worst conflict zones around the world. 23Negotiations were always going to be difficult. After all, GAMspokespeople repeatedly insisted they would settle for nothing less thanindependence and Indonesian leaders were equally adamant that negotiationshad to occur w<strong>it</strong>hin the framework of the un<strong>it</strong>ary state. But theHDC hoped that dialogue focusing on the human<strong>it</strong>arian issues at thecore of the conflict could <strong>it</strong>self build trust between the two parties andbring them together in possibly unexpected ways. While their pos<strong>it</strong>ionsappeared to be irreconcilable at the outset, the organization thought thenegotiation process <strong>it</strong>self could produce confidence-building measuresand prepare the way for a permanent resolution. <strong>The</strong> HDC’s in<strong>it</strong>iativewas broadly supported by the international commun<strong>it</strong>y, particularly theUn<strong>it</strong>ed States and the European Union.One problem in starting negotiations was the physical location ofthe GAM leadership: Hasan di Tiro and other leading members ofGAM’s founding generation had been living in exile in Sweden foralmost two decades; 24 GAM’s fighters in the field were of course locatedin <strong>Aceh</strong>. <strong>The</strong>re was considerable uncertainty about the degree to which
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong> 11GAM possessed a coherent organizational structure—and even whetherthe movement was responsible for most of the violent attacks beinglaunched in the province. Although the leaders of GAM’s mil<strong>it</strong>ary wingconstantly asserted their loyalty to the leaders inStockholm, there were doubts about the extent towhich those leaders really exercised control overarmed un<strong>it</strong>s in the field. <strong>The</strong>re were alreadyreports that at least some of the violence in <strong>Aceh</strong>was being conducted by opportunistic criminalelements who used the GAM name for private prof<strong>it</strong>eering. Indeed, oneof the most troubling elements of the <strong>Aceh</strong> conflict has been the frequentdifficulty of identifying which group—the mil<strong>it</strong>ary, the police,GAM, or some other group—was responsible for particular acts of violence.Complicating the picture even further was the presence of a dissidentfaction of GAM based in Malaysia.After several false starts, the Indonesian ambassador to the UN inGeneva, Hassan Wirajuda, met Hasan di Tiro in Geneva on January 27,2000. <strong>The</strong> two Hassans, having participated in several public debates onthe <strong>Aceh</strong> issue in Europe, already knew each other. According to HassanWirajuda, he acknowledged that the government could not crush GAMmil<strong>it</strong>arily but pointed out to Hasan di Tiro that GAM had no prospect ofdefeating the Indonesian mil<strong>it</strong>ary. W<strong>it</strong>h both sides conceding that theyfaced a mil<strong>it</strong>ary stalemate, they decided to have further meetings. 25 Whilethe Indonesian ambassador in Geneva maintained contact w<strong>it</strong>h the GAMleadership in Europe, Abdurrahman sent the acting state secretary,Bondan Gunawan, to meet GAM’s on-the-ground leaders in <strong>Aceh</strong>. OnMarch 16, Bondan entered a GAM-dominated area in <strong>Aceh</strong> where he hada brief informal discussion w<strong>it</strong>h GAM’s overall mil<strong>it</strong>ary commander,Abdullah Syafi’ie—the first open contact between a government officialand a GAM commander in the field. On his return to Jakarta, Bondanexplained that “I only explored what they really want.” 26 GAM’s response,however, was cool. A spokesman claimed that Bondan had joined a groupof NGO activists for the meeting and that the GAM leaders had not realizeda senior government official was among the group. 27GAM had reason to be cool. On January 10, the president hadannounced that he had ordered the commander in chief of the TNI andthe chief of the national police (Kepolisian Republik Indonesia; Polri) toguarantee the safety of Abdullah Syafi’ie so that he could participate in aOne problem was thephysical location ofGAM’s leadership
12 Edward Aspinall & Harold Crouchdiscussion w<strong>it</strong>h other <strong>Aceh</strong>nese leaders to be held in Banda <strong>Aceh</strong> onJanuary 25. 28 On January 16, however, army troops laid siege toAbdullah’s headquarters in an isolated part of Pidie w<strong>it</strong>h the aim of capturinghim. 29 Troops again conducted raids in the area in search ofAbdullah Syafi’ie during the night following Bondan’s vis<strong>it</strong>. 30Desp<strong>it</strong>e <strong>it</strong>s lack of confidence in the government, GAM had animmediate interest in participating in negotiations—regardless of theoutcome. GAM’s aim was to internationalize the issue in the hope thatWashington and Europe could be persuaded to put pressure onIndonesia to release <strong>Aceh</strong>. GAM also saw the negotiations as an opportun<strong>it</strong>yto expose internationally the abuses that were taking place in <strong>Aceh</strong>.GAM had long sought recogn<strong>it</strong>ion in the international arena as the leg<strong>it</strong>imaterepresentative of the <strong>Aceh</strong>nese people and had endeavored to interestthe Un<strong>it</strong>ed Nations and other international bodies in the <strong>Aceh</strong> conflict.As Abdullah Syafi’ie repeatedly put <strong>it</strong>: GAM relies only 20 percenton armed struggle but 80 percent on diplomatic struggle. 31 <strong>The</strong> mostthat Hasan di Tiro and other GAM leaders had h<strong>it</strong>herto been able toachieve, however, was entry into the outermost fringes of the internationalsystem via such bodies as the Unrepresented Nations and PeoplesOrganization (UNPO). Although GAM leaders probably overestimatedthe importance of the HDC, they believed that participation in negotiationsw<strong>it</strong>h the Indonesian government, under the auspices of a majorinternational agency in the very heartland of the international system atGeneva, would support GAM’s claim to equal footing w<strong>it</strong>h theIndonesian government. As a corollary to <strong>it</strong>s aim of gaining internationalrecogn<strong>it</strong>ion as the leg<strong>it</strong>imate representative of the <strong>Aceh</strong>nese, GAM in<strong>it</strong>iallyopposed the participation of other actors, such as leaders of<strong>Aceh</strong>nese civil society, in the negotiation process. 32<strong>The</strong> commencement of negotiations w<strong>it</strong>h the government might alsohave strengthened the author<strong>it</strong>y of the GAM leadership in Stockholmover the movement in <strong>Aceh</strong>. <strong>The</strong>y acquired greater leg<strong>it</strong>imacy in the eyesof many <strong>Aceh</strong>nese by virtue of their recogn<strong>it</strong>ion by the Indonesian governmentand the various international players. <strong>The</strong> negotiations alsorequired that the leaders-in-exile establish effective communications w<strong>it</strong>htheir commanders in <strong>Aceh</strong> who previously had lacked such basic equipmentas fax machines and satell<strong>it</strong>e phones. More broadly, the opening ofnegotiations also made <strong>it</strong> necessary for GAM leaders in <strong>Aceh</strong> to ensure ahigher level of coordination between local un<strong>it</strong>s that had previously
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong> 13tended to act independently of each other.On the other side, manifest disun<strong>it</strong>y characterized the Indonesiangovernment’s pos<strong>it</strong>ion. <strong>The</strong> president and some of his ministers, especiallythose w<strong>it</strong>h NGO backgrounds, were keen to begin talks—confidentthat a resolution could be achieved w<strong>it</strong>hout the separation of <strong>Aceh</strong> fromthe republic. <strong>The</strong>ir willingness to talk was supported by strong pressurefrom w<strong>it</strong>hin <strong>Aceh</strong> <strong>it</strong>self and from Jakarta-based <strong>Aceh</strong>nese. Moreover, asthe mil<strong>it</strong>ary remained on the pol<strong>it</strong>ical defensive and was highly vulnerableto accusations of human rights abuses, the time was ripe. ForAbdurrahman Wahid, too, the prospect of negotiating an agreement on<strong>Aceh</strong> offered an opportun<strong>it</strong>y to demonstrate his author<strong>it</strong>y over a recalc<strong>it</strong>rantmil<strong>it</strong>ary. Adopting a conciliatory approach on <strong>Aceh</strong> also allowedthe new Indonesian government to show the world that <strong>it</strong> was seriousabout dealing w<strong>it</strong>h human rights abuses and civil conflict at a time when<strong>it</strong>s international reputation was seriously damaged by events in <strong>East</strong>Timor. In these circumstances, President Abdurrahman grasped theopportun<strong>it</strong>y to in<strong>it</strong>iate the process. Although his intervention wasmarked by his customary clumsiness, there was no doubt that his intentionswere genuine.<strong>The</strong> president’s in<strong>it</strong>iative, however, dismayed many mil<strong>it</strong>ary officerswho continued to adhere to the New Order philosophy that the onlyway to deal w<strong>it</strong>h separatists was to crush them mil<strong>it</strong>arily. <strong>The</strong> mil<strong>it</strong>aryspokesman, Major General Sudrajat, and the national police chief,General Roesmanhadi, both said that a mil<strong>it</strong>ary emergency should bedeclared in the more disturbed districts of <strong>Aceh</strong>. 33 Already alienated byAbdurrahman’s dismissal of General Wiranto from his cabinet followingaccusations that he was responsible for violence in <strong>East</strong> Timor—as wellas his support for trials of mil<strong>it</strong>ary officers accused of violations in Timorand his accommodating approach to separatists in Papua as well as<strong>Aceh</strong>—the mil<strong>it</strong>ary was in no mood to support talks w<strong>it</strong>h “band<strong>it</strong>s.”As a result of this dissension, the Indonesian side went into thenegotiation process w<strong>it</strong>h deep reservations. From the start, governmentspokespeople from the president down re<strong>it</strong>erated that Indonesian sovereigntyover <strong>Aceh</strong> was sacrosanct. Reflecting widespread views in theDPR, <strong>it</strong>s speaker and chairman of Golkar, the second largest party,Akbar Tanjung, welcomed the dialogue provided that <strong>it</strong> did not touchon “matters of principle, that is, the existence of the un<strong>it</strong>ary state of theRepublic of Indonesia.” 34 Government spokespeople were adamant that
14 Edward Aspinall & Harold Crouchparticipation in the negotiations did not const<strong>it</strong>ute formal recogn<strong>it</strong>ion ofGAM as a leg<strong>it</strong>imate actor in the international arena. <strong>The</strong> most thatForeign Minister Alwi Shihab, a senior leader in the president’s ownparty, the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangk<strong>it</strong>an Bangsa; PKB),was prepared to adm<strong>it</strong> was that “we acknowledge GAM as one forcepresent in <strong>Aceh</strong> that has been disturbing stabil<strong>it</strong>y in the province andstopping the <strong>Aceh</strong>nese from living normally.” 35<strong>The</strong> talks between the government and GAM focused on ways toreduce the conflict on the ground. But for the government they werealso part of a broader strategy involving the provision of “special autonomy,”as mandated by the MPR at <strong>it</strong>s session in 1999. In March 2000,the governor of <strong>Aceh</strong>, Syamsuddin Mahmud, subm<strong>it</strong>ted a draft bill tothe DPR that promised to give <strong>Aceh</strong> far more extensive autonomy thanthe already qu<strong>it</strong>e radical 1999 Regional Government Act, which appliedto all provinces. <strong>The</strong> government’s aim was to undercut GAM’s base ofsupport by addressing at least some of the grievances of the <strong>Aceh</strong>nesepeople. It was perhaps also hoping to spl<strong>it</strong> GAM by enticing <strong>Aceh</strong>-basedsections to abandon Hasan di Tiro and accept a compromise solution.Perhaps aware of this, Abdullah Syafi’ie had insisted to BondanGunawan that only Hasan di Tiro, not Abdullah as mil<strong>it</strong>ary commander,had author<strong>it</strong>y to make pol<strong>it</strong>ical comm<strong>it</strong>ments. 36<strong>The</strong> Human<strong>it</strong>arian Pause: May 2000Although the peace talks had been in<strong>it</strong>iated by President Abdurrahmanand his own circle of confidants, the negotiations received a cool receptionfrom many in the government and TNI. Thus even though the talksresulted in a lim<strong>it</strong>ed agreement labeled the“Human<strong>it</strong>arian Pause,” the cease-fire did notrest on firm foundations. <strong>The</strong> pause was a significantachievement, but <strong>it</strong> also set a patternthat was to be replicated throughout the followingyears of the peace process. Agreementsreached in negotiations were vulnerable to thedivisions and reservations marking both sides.In <strong>Aceh</strong> the agreement was not fully accepted by the secur<strong>it</strong>y forces andviolations soon took place. GAM, too, seems to have used the lull in fightingto regroup and consolidate <strong>it</strong>s forces. In the field, ne<strong>it</strong>her side behavedas if <strong>it</strong> believed the cease-fire would last. Eventually clashes became com-Though the talks resultedin a Human<strong>it</strong>arian Pause,the cease-fire did not reston firm foundations
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong> 15monplace and pressure built up w<strong>it</strong>hin the mil<strong>it</strong>ary for a new offensive.After Hassan Wirajuda’s meeting w<strong>it</strong>h Hasan di Tiro on January 27and President Abdurrahman’s meeting w<strong>it</strong>h HDC officials on January 30,the HDC facil<strong>it</strong>ated further unpublicized meetings in Geneva on March24 and April 14–17 that culminated in the signing on May 12 of a “JointUnderstanding on Human<strong>it</strong>arian Pause for <strong>Aceh</strong>.” (<strong>The</strong> government resistedcalling <strong>it</strong> a cease-fire because this term might be seen as const<strong>it</strong>utingrecogn<strong>it</strong>ion of GAM as an equal belligerent.) <strong>The</strong> agreement came intoeffect on June 2 and aimed, among other things, to allow for the deliveryof human<strong>it</strong>arian assistance to the population and to promote “confidencebuildingmeasures toward a peaceful solution to the conflict s<strong>it</strong>uation in<strong>Aceh</strong>.” Relatively simple mechanisms were established to implement theHuman<strong>it</strong>arian Pause. In add<strong>it</strong>ion to the continuing negotiations takingplace through a joint forum in Geneva, the core inst<strong>it</strong>ution on theground in <strong>Aceh</strong> was the Joint Comm<strong>it</strong>tee on Secur<strong>it</strong>y Modal<strong>it</strong>ies (Kom<strong>it</strong>eBersama Modal<strong>it</strong>as Keamanan; KBMK). This body was stationed inBanda <strong>Aceh</strong> (eventually at the Kuala Tripa Hotel) and included representativesappointed by GAM and the Indonesian government. Its tasksincluded “reduction of tension and cessation of violence,” preparation of“ground rules” for the pause, and provision of a “guarantee of the absenceof offensive mil<strong>it</strong>ary actions.” 37 A Joint Comm<strong>it</strong>tee on Human<strong>it</strong>arianAction (Kom<strong>it</strong>e Bersama Aksi Kemanusiaan; KBAK) was established tocoordinate the distribution of funds for human<strong>it</strong>arian, rehabil<strong>it</strong>ation, anddevelopment projects that would collectively const<strong>it</strong>ute a kind of “peacedividend” for the <strong>Aceh</strong>nese population. Finally, a Secur<strong>it</strong>y Modal<strong>it</strong>iesMon<strong>it</strong>oring Team (Tim Mon<strong>it</strong>oring Modal<strong>it</strong>as Keamanan; TMMK) wasestablished. Consisting of appointees chosen by each side and approvedby the other, <strong>it</strong>s task was to evaluate the implementation of the accordand investigate violations of <strong>it</strong>. 38<strong>The</strong>re was considerable optimism in <strong>Aceh</strong> at the time of the signingof the Geneva accord and significant goodwill from both sides.Moreover, the process was endorsed by governments and internationalorganizations. <strong>The</strong> secretary general of the Un<strong>it</strong>ed Nations, Kofi Annan,praised the agreement. <strong>The</strong> Un<strong>it</strong>ed States and various countries of theEuropean Union followed su<strong>it</strong>. International agencies, both governmentaland nongovernmental, channeled substantial funds toward programsdesigned to build confidence in the Human<strong>it</strong>arian Pause. USAID as wellas the Norwegian government, for example, provided considerable fund-
16 Edward Aspinall & Harold Crouching to support the comm<strong>it</strong>tees that oversaw the pause, including moneyfor offices, vehicles, and other basic infrastructure.In Jakarta, however, the government was sharply cr<strong>it</strong>icized because ofwhat was seen as implied recogn<strong>it</strong>ion of GAM. <strong>The</strong> speaker of the DPR,Akbar Tanjung, charged: “<strong>The</strong> House can understand the agreement, but<strong>it</strong> was not necessary to sign <strong>it</strong> abroad, and not by an Indonesian ambassador,a high official representing the Indonesian government.” 39Muhaimin Iskandar, a deputy speaker of the DPR representingAbdurrahman Wahid’s PKB, warned that the DPR would reject anyagreement made between the government and GAM rather thanbetween two parties both subordinate to the government. 40 Thirteenscholars at the Indonesian Inst<strong>it</strong>ute of Sciences (Lembaga IlmuPengetahuan Indonesia; LIPI) warned against creating a precedent thatmight implic<strong>it</strong>ly recognize GAM as an “international actor.” 41 Such concernswere expressed w<strong>it</strong>hin the mil<strong>it</strong>ary as well. A document producedby the Department of Defense listed among the weaknesses of the agreementthat <strong>it</strong> “pos<strong>it</strong>ioned AGAM [GAM’s mil<strong>it</strong>ary wing] as on the samelevel and equal to (sejajar dan setara) TNI–Polri” and, w<strong>it</strong>h the <strong>East</strong>Timor experience still fresh in their minds, warned that if the processfailed to provide greater secur<strong>it</strong>y <strong>it</strong> might “inv<strong>it</strong>e international forces tointervene.” <strong>The</strong> report concluded that the agreement would “not guaranteea reduction in demands for Free <strong>Aceh</strong> or efforts to internationalizethe <strong>Aceh</strong> problem.” 42 <strong>The</strong> coordinating minister of pol<strong>it</strong>ical and secur<strong>it</strong>yaffairs, Lieutenant General (ret.) Surjadi Soedirdja, was no less pessimistic:he warned that if the agreement “falters, we will take them onagain. It is only natural to make sure that <strong>Aceh</strong> will not break away.” 43From the start there were problems w<strong>it</strong>hin the structures establishedto organize and mon<strong>it</strong>or the Human<strong>it</strong>arian Pause. For one thing, GAMand government representatives were unable to agree on basic issues likethe defin<strong>it</strong>ion of the cease-fire and whether flying GAM flags const<strong>it</strong>uteda breach. Although the government agreed not to launch major offensivesor sweeping operations, the major sticking point throughout theentire process was the Indonesian side’s insistence that secur<strong>it</strong>y forcescould still engage in routine patrols and other police functions. Indeedthe Joint Understanding document <strong>it</strong>self stated that one aim was to“ensure the continuing of normal police functions for the enforcement oflaw and the maintenance of public order, including riot control and prohib<strong>it</strong>ionof the movement of civilians w<strong>it</strong>h arms.” 44 <strong>The</strong> government also
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong> 17resisted GAM’s demands for the cantonment of Brimob and the w<strong>it</strong>hdrawalof TNI troops to their barracks.Soon Indonesian mil<strong>it</strong>ary and pol<strong>it</strong>ical leaders began to cr<strong>it</strong>icize thepeace process. In add<strong>it</strong>ion to concerns about “internationalization,” someIndonesian officials also claimed that the Human<strong>it</strong>arian Pause was benef<strong>it</strong>ingGAM by leg<strong>it</strong>imating <strong>it</strong> and sidelining other actors (hence calls fornegotiations not just w<strong>it</strong>h GAM but w<strong>it</strong>h “all components” of <strong>Aceh</strong>nesesociety). Most important, mil<strong>it</strong>ary and police officers on the ground saidthat by preventing offensive action, the pause enabled GAM to extend<strong>it</strong>s operations. Certainly there were many reports that GAM made use ofthe lull in hostil<strong>it</strong>ies to expand recru<strong>it</strong>ment and training and to collect“taxes” in areas under <strong>it</strong>s control. <strong>The</strong>re were also increasing reports ofthe emergence into the open throughout much of rural <strong>Aceh</strong> of a GAMshadow civil administration that was assuming many local governmentfunctions (registration of land sales and marriages and the like) in thevacuum created by the paralysis of inst<strong>it</strong>utions of the Indonesian state. 45<strong>The</strong> cr<strong>it</strong>icisms from human rights NGOs in <strong>Aceh</strong>, from student andyouth groups, and from figures associated w<strong>it</strong>h GAM were the reverse ofthis. Unanimously they thought the process was too weak. Most fatally,they believed that the comm<strong>it</strong>tee structures lacked any author<strong>it</strong>y toenforce the Human<strong>it</strong>arian Pause or punish those responsible for violating<strong>it</strong>. 46 Such groups called repeatedly for a beefed-up international role inthe mediation process—preferably involving some form of UN presence—inorder to mon<strong>it</strong>or, enforce, and punish violations of the pause.Indonesian government and mil<strong>it</strong>ary spokespersons, by contrast, arguedthat the <strong>Aceh</strong> conflict was purely a domestic affair. Blaming UN perfidyfor the recent loss of <strong>East</strong> Timor, many were especially hostile to the ideaof UN involvement.Almost as soon as the Human<strong>it</strong>arian Pause started there were reportsof clashes between Indonesian secur<strong>it</strong>y forces (usually Brimob) andGAM combatants. Typically these clashes would take place when Brimobtroops made “routine patrols” through rural areas known to be controlledby GAM. According to one member of the mon<strong>it</strong>oring teamestablished as part of the pause process, from a relatively early phaseordinary soldiers and officers stationed in conflict zones would openlytell team members that the pause was “generals’ business” (urusan jenderal)and had nothing to do w<strong>it</strong>h them. 47 <strong>The</strong> police continued to pursuetheir Cinta Meunasah (Love the Village Mosque) operation, which
18 Edward Aspinall & Harold Crouchaimed to restore secur<strong>it</strong>y and disarm “civilians” in the terr<strong>it</strong>ory. AlthoughGAM launched attacks on the mil<strong>it</strong>ary and police, <strong>it</strong>s leaders generallyclaimed (when adm<strong>it</strong>ting to attacks) that these were in self-defense.Nevertheless, the introduction of the pause was followed by a noticeabledecline in violence. During <strong>it</strong>s first three months, some sixty-nine civiliansand fourteen members of the secur<strong>it</strong>y forces were killed in <strong>Aceh</strong>, 48 aconsiderable drop compared to around 300 during the first four monthsof the year. 49Violence escalated seriously in late August and early September2000, however, as the in<strong>it</strong>ial three-month phase of the Human<strong>it</strong>arianPause drew to an end. Both sides delayed in<strong>it</strong>iating dialogue in Genevafor a resumption of the pause, and senior government ministers publiclyfloated the possibil<strong>it</strong>y that <strong>it</strong> might not be extended at all. Local mil<strong>it</strong>arycommanders suggested that if the pause failed, then a civil emergencycould be declared and mil<strong>it</strong>ary operations would escalate. Two daysbefore <strong>it</strong> was due to expire, Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab stated that thegovernment was willing to extend the Human<strong>it</strong>arian Pause, but only ifGAM agreed to certain cond<strong>it</strong>ions (such as ending attacks on secur<strong>it</strong>yforces). 50 On the very day of <strong>it</strong>s expiration, President Abdurrahmanapproved a further extension until January 15, 2001, w<strong>it</strong>h the foreignminister announcing there would be no further extension thereafter.During the latter part of 2000 the formal continuation of theHuman<strong>it</strong>arian Pause bore less and less relation to cond<strong>it</strong>ions on theground. Reports of armed clashes, disappearances, summary executions,and other forms of violence increased. In mid-November, troops fired ongroups of civilians who were attempting to make their way to Banda <strong>Aceh</strong>to attend a pro-referendum rally organizedby SIRA. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Aceh</strong> branch of the NationalHuman Rights Commission said that thirtywere killed. 51 While most victims were casualtiesof mil<strong>it</strong>ary and police actions, somewere killed by GAM. <strong>The</strong>re was much speculationthat the top GAM leadership wasunable to exercise full control over <strong>it</strong>s forces in the field. Similar claimswere made about rogue TNI and police un<strong>it</strong>s carrying out operations ontheir own in<strong>it</strong>iative. And there was talk that some of the violence was dueto “third forces”—band<strong>it</strong>s, smugglers, mil<strong>it</strong>ary deserters, and so on—whobenef<strong>it</strong>ed financially from continuing violence. <strong>The</strong> deterioration of secu-By 2001 the Human<strong>it</strong>arianPause bore less and lessrelation to cond<strong>it</strong>ions onthe ground
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong> 19r<strong>it</strong>y also prevented the various Human<strong>it</strong>arian Pause comm<strong>it</strong>tees from carryingout their functions—impeding mon<strong>it</strong>oring efforts and the flow ofhuman<strong>it</strong>arian assistance. On March 30, 2001, Teungku Kamal, a memberof the TMMK for South <strong>Aceh</strong>, was killed along w<strong>it</strong>h his driver and ahuman rights lawyer. 52 Mil<strong>it</strong>ary spokespersons and other hard-liners likeDefense Minister Mahfud Mohammad frequently predicted that openmil<strong>it</strong>ary operations would be launched if the talks did not produceresults. 53 <strong>The</strong> government said that future talks would involve the entire<strong>Aceh</strong>nese commun<strong>it</strong>y, not just GAM. Meanwhile GAM and civil societygroups increased their calls for international parties to intervene and verifywho was violating the agreements.Indeed the s<strong>it</strong>uation deteriorated to such an extent that in the firsthalf of 2001 most of the major international agencies found <strong>it</strong> impossibleto function (or at least to carry out program work in the field). Sincemid-2000, assassinations had become common. On December 6, forinstance, three volunteers from Rehabil<strong>it</strong>ation Action for Torture Victimsin <strong>Aceh</strong> (RATA), an NGO funded by the Danish government, weremurdered. According to the testimony of one volunteer who escaped, themil<strong>it</strong>ary officers who comm<strong>it</strong>ted the killings accused their victims notonly of sympathy for GAM but also providing information on violationsof the Human<strong>it</strong>arian Pause to observers. 54 Other assassinations, especiallyof members of regional legislative assemblies, were blamed on GAM.Amid reports of intimidation directly aimed at international human<strong>it</strong>arianworkers, such organizations as Oxfam, USAID, Médecins SansFrontières, and Save the Children all drastically scaled back programactiv<strong>it</strong>ies in the terr<strong>it</strong>ory, in most cases closing offices or pulling out staff.<strong>The</strong> Un<strong>it</strong>ed Nations Development Program (UNDP), which had managedthe major trust fund set up to provide human<strong>it</strong>arian aid and operationalsupport for the peace process, was forced to close <strong>it</strong>s operations in<strong>Aceh</strong> after the Indonesian government failed to extend <strong>it</strong>s contract. 55Nevertheless, the formal dialogue process continued. AlthoughGAM had boycotted a meeting on November 16–18 in protest againstmil<strong>it</strong>ary violence, a new round of talks was held on January 6–10, 2001.This meeting of the joint forum in Sw<strong>it</strong>zerland produced a further agreementthat the HDC would facil<strong>it</strong>ate talks on substantive issues to “seek aformula for a lasting and comprehensive solution to the conflict in<strong>Aceh</strong>.” <strong>The</strong> four broad areas to be covered by such discussions werehuman rights and human<strong>it</strong>arian law, socioeconomic development, secu-
20 Edward Aspinall & Harold Crouchr<strong>it</strong>y arrangements, and, most remarkably, “democratic processes.” Listedunder this last heading were <strong>it</strong>ems like “democratic consultations,” “freeand fair elections for <strong>Aceh</strong> government,” “cond<strong>it</strong>ions under which GAMand supporters of independence may participate fully in the pol<strong>it</strong>icalprocess,” and “cond<strong>it</strong>ions under which GAM would transform theirmeans of achieving their pol<strong>it</strong>ical objectives in a democratic way.” 56 Forthe first time, even though government and GAM spokespeople continuedto insist their claims of sovereignty were nonnegotiable, there was ahint of a real breakthrough.<strong>The</strong>re was much speculation about what this agreement mightmean—including the possibil<strong>it</strong>y that GAM might transform <strong>it</strong>self into apol<strong>it</strong>ical party in the context of a radically restructured pol<strong>it</strong>ical frameworkw<strong>it</strong>hin <strong>Aceh</strong>. In this view, GAM might participate in local electionsat least as an interim solution. This process was also viewed by at leastsome in the government as converging w<strong>it</strong>h the continuing debate overthe draft Special Autonomy Law in the DPR. Local and central governmentofficials said the law would be an important way to respond to<strong>Aceh</strong>nese grievances and encourage compromise from GAM. 57 <strong>Aceh</strong>nesemembers of the DPR encouraged this view. Some welcomed the conceptof GAM participation in local elections and suggested that Hasan di Tirowould be an appropriate candidate as first figurehead wali nanggroe(head of state) of <strong>Aceh</strong> under the new arrangements.<strong>The</strong> Human<strong>it</strong>arian Pause was extended for a further month inJanuary, though now <strong>it</strong> was called a “moratorium.” Desp<strong>it</strong>e severe violenceon the ground, talks continued during February and March, resultingin agreement to extend the moratorium “indefin<strong>it</strong>ely” and to rename<strong>it</strong> as “peace through dialogue” (damai melalui dialog). In what appearedto be a promising development, four meetings took place in Februaryand March between GAM and Indonesian secur<strong>it</strong>y commanders in <strong>Aceh</strong><strong>it</strong>self. <strong>The</strong>y agreed on a four-point code of conduct and decided to establish“zones of peace” in North <strong>Aceh</strong> and Bireuen. None of these agreements,however, had any effect in stopping violence in the field.<strong>The</strong> Renewed Mil<strong>it</strong>ary Offensive: April 2001Though the continuing dialogue in Sw<strong>it</strong>zerland and the otherworldlyatmosphere of Banda <strong>Aceh</strong>’s Kuala Tripa Hotel gave a tantalizing hintof an eventual solution, they increasingly bore no relationship to thes<strong>it</strong>uation in the field or to the rhetoric emanating from Jakarta and
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong> 21from GAM field commanders. In 2001, the dialogue on <strong>Aceh</strong> wasbeing overwhelmed by the unfolding presidential crisis in Jakarta. Asthe oppos<strong>it</strong>ion to Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidency mounted, he desperatelyreached out for potential allies wherever he could find them—including the mil<strong>it</strong>ary (ICG 2001b; 2001c). In his personal fight forpol<strong>it</strong>ical survival, the fate of <strong>Aceh</strong> was far from his mind. Thus the mil<strong>it</strong>aryand others who thought Abdurrahman had gone too far inaccommodating GAM now saw an opportun<strong>it</strong>y to regain control of<strong>Aceh</strong> policymaking.<strong>The</strong> signs that a change of approach was imminent became increasinglyclear. As the January round of negotiations went forward, mil<strong>it</strong>aryspokespersons announced that the number of army and police troops in<strong>Aceh</strong> was being increased to 30,000. 58 Prior to the February talks,Indonesian officials, including the new coordinating minister for pol<strong>it</strong>icaland secur<strong>it</strong>y affairs, General (ret.) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, whohad been seen as a strong supporter of the negotiations, flagged an endto HDC involvement in the process. In late February, as talks betweenfield commanders were going ahead in Banda <strong>Aceh</strong>, Defense MinisterMahfud announced that the government had had enough of talks: “Afterwe hold talks, their aspirations are still to separate from Indonesia, and ifthat remains so by next week we will prepare tougher actions.” 59 InMarch the cabinet officially pronounced GAM to be “separatist”—amove correctly interpreted by all parties as presaging a renewed mil<strong>it</strong>aryassault. Meanwhile GAM <strong>it</strong>self adopted a more combative stance byincreasing the tempo of assaults on mil<strong>it</strong>ary and police posts, especiallyaround the ExxonMobil Arun gasfields in North <strong>Aceh</strong>, leading to theclosure of the plant in March.<strong>The</strong> suspension of the ExxonMobil operations especially alarmed theUn<strong>it</strong>ed States—the home of ExxonMobil—and Japan and South Korea,the major importers of natural gas produced by the plant. <strong>The</strong> enforcedclosure of a major export-earning industrial project not only increasedthe nervousness of foreign investors in general but also had immediateimplications for the Indonesian economy. Although the governmentquickly blamed GAM, an alternative explanation suggested that mil<strong>it</strong>aryelements themselves may have been responsible for threats toExxonMobil as a means of convincing the Un<strong>it</strong>ed States that <strong>it</strong>s assetswere endangered and thus win American approval for renewed mil<strong>it</strong>aryaction (ICG 2001a: 8).
22 Edward Aspinall & Harold CrouchAt the end of March the DPR gave full support to operations to “restoresecur<strong>it</strong>y.” In late April the government again offered to continue talks andproposed Tokyo as the s<strong>it</strong>e. Bambang Yudhoyono proposed three cond<strong>it</strong>ions:GAM must “really want a dialogue” and be prepared to discuss substantialpol<strong>it</strong>ical issues; <strong>it</strong> had to stop violent actions; and ExxonMobil and “v<strong>it</strong>alobjects” should not be continuously disturbed. 60 GAM then imposed <strong>it</strong>s owncond<strong>it</strong>ion: all “nonorganic troops” (that is, troops from outside <strong>Aceh</strong>) shouldbe w<strong>it</strong>hdrawn. <strong>The</strong> government, however, had been bringing Kostrad andother troops into <strong>Aceh</strong> in preparation for an offensive. 61Marking the formal commencement of a new approach, on April11 the beleaguered president signed a Presidential Instruction (Inpres4/2001) on Comprehensive Measures to Resolve the <strong>Aceh</strong> Problem.Reflecting the thinking of General Yudhoyono, the instruction providedfor broad policies in six fields: pol<strong>it</strong>ical; economic; social; legal andpublic order; secur<strong>it</strong>y; and information and communications.Yudhoyono (2001: 16) argued that “<strong>it</strong> is clearly wrong to view the<strong>Aceh</strong> problem purely from a secur<strong>it</strong>y point of view and <strong>it</strong> is extremelydangerous to give prior<strong>it</strong>y to mil<strong>it</strong>ary methods. That is why we havedeveloped comprehensive measures.” But in the absence of effectivegovernment control in much of <strong>Aceh</strong>, in fact <strong>it</strong> was mainly secur<strong>it</strong>ymeasures that were implemented. 62<strong>The</strong> months following the presidential instruction saw an almostcomplete breakdown of secur<strong>it</strong>y cond<strong>it</strong>ions in <strong>Aceh</strong>. As the TNIlaunched a series of attacks on GAM bases, local human rights groupsreported that cond<strong>it</strong>ions were now worse than during the height of thenotorious DOM period. According to the human rights organizationKontras, 539 people were killed in 193 clashes between April and August2001 compared to 256 killed in 79 clashes between January and April(moreover local human rights activists now suggested that many villagersno longer reported deaths to the police or media). 63 Although most ofthe violence was publicly attributed to ubiqu<strong>it</strong>ous “unknown persons,” <strong>it</strong>was clear that the major<strong>it</strong>y of those killed were victims of operations carriedout by the secur<strong>it</strong>y forces. Indeed, Indonesian forces appeared lessconcerned than ever about concealing their involvement in the killing ofcivilians. 64 Meanwhile GAM increased <strong>it</strong>s operations against theIndonesian forces and civilians considered to be supporting Jakarta.<strong>The</strong> peace process seemed to have come to an end when, followinganother meeting in Geneva on June 30–July 1, the chief government
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong> 23negotiator, Hassan Wirajuda, announced on July 5 that the governmenthad “frozen” the KBMK. Hassan explained: “We . . . demanded thatGAM publicly announce that they would guarantee the secur<strong>it</strong>y ofExxonMobil Oil Indonesia, but they could not see their way to meetingthis request.” Indonesia also wanted the GAM mil<strong>it</strong>ary commander,Abdullah Syafi’ie, to participate personally in the local secur<strong>it</strong>y dialogue.When local talks between the two sides at the Kuala Tripa Hotel inBanda <strong>Aceh</strong> on July 16–18 produced no agreement, local police, claimingthat secur<strong>it</strong>y guarantees were no longer valid following the “freezing”of the KBMK, immediately arrested the six members of the GAM negotiatingteam. <strong>The</strong> arrests took place on Friday, July 20, the eve of thespecial session of the MPR called to impeach President Abdurrahman. 65Although the six were charged w<strong>it</strong>h makar (rebellion), all but one, whowas add<strong>it</strong>ionally accused of a passport offence, were later released. 66 Itwas not clear whether the local police were acting independently or onorders from Jakarta.<strong>The</strong> accession of Vice-President Megawati Sukarnoputri to the presidencydid not raise hopes of an early resumption of the peace talks.Megawati’s rhetoric as vice-president had placed her closer to the generalsthan to Abdurrahman. As president she announced a list of sixnational goals—and the maintenance of national un<strong>it</strong>y was placed in toppos<strong>it</strong>ion. Although in her unsuccessful presidential election campaign in1999 she had promised, referring to <strong>Aceh</strong>,that “I will not allow one drop of the people’sblood to touch the earth in a land thatgave great service in achieving a FreeIndonesia,” 67 she showed no signs of condemningthe mil<strong>it</strong>ary campaign launchedseveral months earlier. Her promise to takelegal action against violations of humanrights “outside the battlefield” seemed to imply immun<strong>it</strong>y for violationscomm<strong>it</strong>ted during mil<strong>it</strong>ary operations. 68 Although Megawati and othersenior officials, including Hassan Wirajuda who had been appointed asthe new foreign minister, stated that the government remained comm<strong>it</strong>tedto dialogue as the chief means for resolving the conflict, other ministers,such as the new minister for home affairs, Lieutenant General (ret.)Hari Sabarno, declared that dialogue w<strong>it</strong>h GAM was no longer possible.In November, Bambang Yudhoyono reaffirmed that there would be “noMegawati announced alist of six national goals—w<strong>it</strong>h national un<strong>it</strong>yplaced at the top
24 Edward Aspinall & Harold Crouchmore compromise w<strong>it</strong>h separatism” and no more dialogue w<strong>it</strong>h GAM. 69In this environment, mil<strong>it</strong>ary commanders became more confidentand belligerent. Increasingly they employed the blunt secur<strong>it</strong>y language ofthe past. <strong>The</strong> Kostrad commander, for example, Lieutenant GeneralRyamizard Ryacudu, complained: “For two years we [the mil<strong>it</strong>ary] havebeen pushed around all the time and have not been able to move. It is asif our feet are tied but GAM’s are not and our men are slaughtered andkilled. . . . In any country those who are terrorists or armed insurgentswill be eliminated. How can we make peace w<strong>it</strong>h them? Two offers ofpeace are enough. How could we offer peace three times? If they don’twant peace, that’s enough. . . . How can we negotiate a thousand times?” 70<strong>The</strong> mil<strong>it</strong>ary offensive inflicted increased casualties on GAM andforced many of <strong>it</strong>s fighters to w<strong>it</strong>hdraw into remote areas in the interior.In July 2002, the <strong>Aceh</strong> regional army commander claimed that 947 “suspected”GAM members had been killed since the launch of the mil<strong>it</strong>aryoffensive in May 2001. 71 Casualties among civilians increased, too, particularlyamong people accused of being associated w<strong>it</strong>h GAM. ButGAM continued to be a significant fighting force. In the first year of theoffensive, 75 Indonesian soldiers were killed and another 136 wounded. 72<strong>The</strong> Special Autonomy (NAD) Law<strong>The</strong> government’s strategy, however, was not lim<strong>it</strong>ed to <strong>it</strong>s mil<strong>it</strong>arycampaign. <strong>The</strong> mil<strong>it</strong>ary offensive was accompanied by the ba<strong>it</strong> of “specialautonomy,” which the government hoped would win over publicopinion in <strong>Aceh</strong>. Instead of continuing what <strong>it</strong> saw as a fru<strong>it</strong>less dialoguew<strong>it</strong>h GAM, the government opted for unilateral concessions inthe form of the law on Nanggroe <strong>Aceh</strong> Darussalam (NAD—the<strong>Aceh</strong>nese term for the province). If GAM wished to return to talksw<strong>it</strong>h the government, <strong>it</strong> would have to be on the basis of the newSpecial Autonomy Law.In 1999 the MPR had required the DPR to adopt laws on “specialautonomy” for <strong>Aceh</strong> and Papua by May 1, 2001. After a drawn-outprocess of negotiations between the provincial government, <strong>Aceh</strong>nesemembers of the DPR, the Department of Home Affairs, and the DPR asa whole, the DPR failed to meet <strong>it</strong>s May deadline. Nevertheless theNAD law was finally passed on July 19—coincidentally a few daysbefore Abdurrahman’s fall—and signed by the new president, Megawati,on August 9.
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong> 25Unlike the general regional autonomy laws of 1999 that weakenedthe provincial governments by devolving powers primarily to more thanthree hundred districts throughout Indonesia, the NAD law preservedthe province as the regional focus of author<strong>it</strong>y. In an attempt to ameliorateresentment against central “explo<strong>it</strong>ation” of <strong>Aceh</strong>’s natural resources,the law provided for the return of 80 percent of petroleum and naturalgas revenues to the province in contrast to only 15 percent of petroleumrevenue and 30 percent of natural gas revenue granted to other regions(except Papua). <strong>The</strong> law also provided for the direct election of the governorand the district heads (bupati and walikota) in contrast to the indirectelections through regional assemblies applying in other regions,although, in the case of the governor, only five years after adoption ofthe law. On secur<strong>it</strong>y matters, the governor was given author<strong>it</strong>y to vetothe appointment of the regional chief of police, who is obliged to coordinatesecur<strong>it</strong>y policy w<strong>it</strong>h the governor, while the recru<strong>it</strong>ment of policewould take account of “local law, culture, and custom.” <strong>The</strong> governorwas also given the author<strong>it</strong>y to reject the regional head of the prosecutor’soffice. <strong>The</strong> law also gave the <strong>Aceh</strong> government the author<strong>it</strong>y toimplement Islamic law in the province—a right not given to any otherregion. Finally, the law provided for a symbolic head of state, the walinanggroe (the same phrase used by GAM to refer to Hasan di Tiro), anda deliberative council of commun<strong>it</strong>y leaders, the Tuha Nanggroe, as asymbol of culture and custom.Some of the <strong>Aceh</strong>nese legislators and intellectuals involved in thedrafting process viewed elements of the law as means to accommodateGAM. Some said that Hasan di Tiro might be persuaded to become thefirst Wali Nanggroe. Teuku Syaiful Achmad (a PAN member of theDPR) explained: “We’ve held numerous informal dialogues w<strong>it</strong>h GAM’smil<strong>it</strong>ary wing.” 73 But the government, in the form of the Department ofHome Affairs, had also insisted upon provisions that seemed deliberatelydesigned to exclude GAM from the pol<strong>it</strong>ical process in <strong>Aceh</strong>. <strong>The</strong> lawstates clearly that one of the regional parliament’s obligations is to“defend and preserve the un<strong>it</strong>y of the Un<strong>it</strong>ary State of the Republic ofIndonesia.” This wording is presumably designed as a safeguard againstthe eventual<strong>it</strong>y that local elections might one day produce an independence-inclinedlegislature. Among the qualifications required of candidatesfor the pos<strong>it</strong>ions of governor and deputy governor, two are especially relevanthere: they should “never have been involved in treacherous activi-
26 Edward Aspinall & Harold Crouchties against the Un<strong>it</strong>ary State of the Republic of Indonesia” and theyshould never have been c<strong>it</strong>izens of other countries. In the eyes of thegovernment, of course, GAM members had been involved in treacherousactiv<strong>it</strong>ies and several of the exiled GAM leaders, including Hasan diTiro, had become c<strong>it</strong>izens of Sweden or other foreign countries.<strong>The</strong> Special Autonomy Law was hardly sufficient to persuade GAMand <strong>it</strong>s supporters to give up their struggle. Nor did <strong>it</strong> deal w<strong>it</strong>h many ofthe root causes of <strong>Aceh</strong>nese alienation from Jakarta. Desp<strong>it</strong>e <strong>it</strong>s significantfinancial concessions, the law seemed to entrench the incumbentGolkar-led pol<strong>it</strong>ical el<strong>it</strong>e, regarded as totally corrupt by many <strong>Aceh</strong>nese.<strong>The</strong> pol<strong>it</strong>ical arrangements envisaged by the law did not affect separatenational election laws, which made no allowance for regional pol<strong>it</strong>icalparties and therefore prevented GAM supporters from forming a pol<strong>it</strong>icalparty to contest the promised elections. Nor did the law deal w<strong>it</strong>h thelarge mil<strong>it</strong>ary presence in the province and the issue of past human rightsabuses perpetrated by the mil<strong>it</strong>ary and police. Some figures in thenational government, however, did not regard the NAD law as final butrather as a framework for further negotiations. If GAM had been willingto abandon <strong>it</strong>s independence goal, <strong>it</strong> is likely that the government wouldhave been prepared to amend the law.Renewed Talks: 2002Government officials now believed that developments during 2001 hadstrengthened their pos<strong>it</strong>ion. Certainly the mil<strong>it</strong>ary offensive had inflictedsubstantial losses on GAM and forced <strong>it</strong> to w<strong>it</strong>hdraw from some areaswhere <strong>it</strong> had set up de facto village administrations. 74 <strong>The</strong> NAD law was aconcrete concession that the government expected would address keygrievances of the people of <strong>Aceh</strong> and thus undermine GAM’s support.But the benef<strong>it</strong>s flowing from the NAD law would not be felt fully solong as the mil<strong>it</strong>ary conflict continued. <strong>The</strong> government’s strategy, therefore,was to continue offensive mil<strong>it</strong>ary operations in the expectation thata demoralized GAM could eventually accept “real<strong>it</strong>y” and engage in seriousnegotiations on the government’s terms. Accordingly 2002 was characterizedby continued mil<strong>it</strong>ary operations, the reopening of negotiations,and increasingly insistent demands from Jakarta that GAM had to acceptautonomy w<strong>it</strong>hin the “un<strong>it</strong>ary state” for the peace process to survive.Desp<strong>it</strong>e the mil<strong>it</strong>ary campaign and the negative statements of governmentand mil<strong>it</strong>ary leaders, the apparatus of the peace process, includ-
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong> 27ing the secretariat at the Kuala Tripa Hotel and the mon<strong>it</strong>oring teams,remained in place—indicating that the government was still open to therenewal of talks. <strong>The</strong> HDC meanwhile continued <strong>it</strong>s efforts to revive theprocess and was supported in this endeavor by various foreign governments.Through 2001 and 2002 ambassadors of the Un<strong>it</strong>ed States andseveral EU countries made well-publicized vis<strong>it</strong>s to <strong>Aceh</strong>, urging the twosides to continue negotiations. In May 2001, for instance, just daysbefore President Abdurrahman signed Presidential Instruction 4 allowingfor the mil<strong>it</strong>ary offensive, U.S. Ambassador Robert Gelbard vis<strong>it</strong>ed <strong>Aceh</strong>and declared that “only dialogue” could lead to a resolution of the conflict.75 International support was shown again in the middle of 2001when the HDC formed a team of “wise men” consisting of retired dign<strong>it</strong>arieswhose international stature could reinforce <strong>it</strong>s work. Eventually theIndonesian government, now headed by President Megawati, approvedthe proposal and perm<strong>it</strong>ted the “wise men” to participate in new talks asmediators—on the understanding that they were not regarded as representingtheir countries. <strong>The</strong>y were retired U.S. Marine General AnthonyZinni, former Thai Foreign Minister Surin P<strong>it</strong>suan, and the formerYugoslav ambassador to Indonesia, Budimir Loncar. Later they werejoined by a former Swedish diplomat, Bengt Soderberg. Lord Aveburyfrom Br<strong>it</strong>ain was not formally a member of the group but worked w<strong>it</strong>hthem. 76 <strong>The</strong> presence of high-profile international mediators made <strong>it</strong> easierto persuade GAM to resume the talks.Believing that <strong>it</strong> now had the upper hand, the government exploredthe possibil<strong>it</strong>y of reopening talks. For GAM there were two key cond<strong>it</strong>ions:continued international involvement and insistence that talks takeplace outside Indonesia. Senior officials, however, now argued that theconflict was a domestic matter that should be resolved in Indonesia <strong>it</strong>self.<strong>The</strong> home affairs minister, Hari Sabarno, even said that talks w<strong>it</strong>h GAMshould be conducted not by the government of Indonesia but by theprovincial government of <strong>Aceh</strong>. Following this line, the <strong>Aceh</strong> governor,Abdullah Puteh, sent a note to the GAM commander, Abdullah Syafi’ie,proposing province-level talks, but this suggestion was rejected on theusual ground that pol<strong>it</strong>ical issues were handled by the GAM leadershipin Sweden. Three days later, on January 22, 2002, troops surroundedAbdullah Syafi’ie’s home and killed him, his wife, and several bodyguards.<strong>The</strong> killing of Syafi’ie, whose whereabouts had apparently beenconfirmed during the governor’s approach, may have been intended to
28 Edward Aspinall & Harold Crouchdemonstrate that the government’s forces could eliminate senior GAMleaders at will, but <strong>it</strong> hardly assured GAM of the government’s goodwill.More likely, <strong>it</strong> simply demonstrated the lack of coordination between themil<strong>it</strong>ary and civilian administrators and may even have been a deliberatemove by elements in the mil<strong>it</strong>ary to sabotage the peace process.GAM’s options were lim<strong>it</strong>ed and w<strong>it</strong>hin a week <strong>it</strong> had agreed to newtalks in Geneva. 77 <strong>The</strong> talks were held on February 2–3, 2002, after a gapof seven months. This time the Indonesian delegation was headed bySastrohandoyo Wiryono, a retired diplomat who had served asIndonesia’s ambassador to France and Australia and had also played amajor role in mediating the 1996 “autonomy” agreement in thePhilippines between the government and the Moro National LiberationFront. <strong>The</strong> talks, now in the presence of the international “wise men,”were exploratory and did not result in a joint statement. But a summaryof “Points for Further Consultation” prepared by the HDC noted thatalthough GAM did not accept the NAD law as such, <strong>it</strong> had accepted <strong>it</strong>as a “starting point” for further discussions.A new round of talks was scheduled for April 25–26 but was delayedwhen GAM demanded an internationally supervised cease-fire as a precond<strong>it</strong>ion.As the Indonesian strategy required increasing mil<strong>it</strong>ary pressureon GAM and aimed to minimize international involvement, Jakartarejected the demand. GAM soon dropped <strong>it</strong>s precond<strong>it</strong>ion and talkswere held in Geneva, on May 8–9, again attended by the “wise men.”<strong>The</strong> meeting resulted in a joint statement containing two points. First:“On the basis of the acceptance of the NAD law as a starting point,” theHDC would facil<strong>it</strong>ate “a democratic all-inclusive dialogue involving allelements of <strong>Aceh</strong>nese society.” This process would “review elements ofthe NAD law” and “lead to the election of a democratic government inAcheh, Indonesia [sic].” Second: because such a dialogue could not takeplace amid mil<strong>it</strong>ary clashes, “both parties agree to work w<strong>it</strong>h all speed onan agreement on cessation of hostil<strong>it</strong>ies w<strong>it</strong>h an adequate mechanism foraccountabil<strong>it</strong>y.” A cessation of hostil<strong>it</strong>ies would also perm<strong>it</strong> the provisionof “much needed socioeconomic and human<strong>it</strong>arian assistance.” 78Desp<strong>it</strong>e the apparent breakthrough signaled by GAM’s acceptance ofthe NAD law as a “starting point,” the statement was greeted w<strong>it</strong>h caution.W<strong>it</strong>hin days the GAM leadership in Sweden released a statementstressing that the movement “has always maintained that <strong>it</strong> will nevergive up the struggle for independence. . . . <strong>The</strong>re is a lim<strong>it</strong> to our will-
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong> 29ingness in that we will never accept NAD or any other form of settlementthat is not compatible w<strong>it</strong>h the aspiration of the Achehnese peoplewho have sacrificed so many lives and suffered so much hardship for solong in their struggle for independence.” 79 <strong>The</strong> Indonesian negotiator,Wiryono, pointed out that the statement <strong>it</strong>self was not an agreement on“cessation of hostil<strong>it</strong>ies,” let alone disarmament, but only a promise towork toward a cessation of hostil<strong>it</strong>ies. 80 Foreign Minister HassanWirajuda welcomed the statement but warned that GAM’s acceptance ofthe NAD law only as a “starting point” was not sufficient. 81 <strong>The</strong> fundamentaldifference was symbolized by the reference to “Acheh,Indonesia”—w<strong>it</strong>h GAM rejecting the current Indonesian spelling of theterr<strong>it</strong>ory’s name and the Indonesian side demanding the inclusion of theword “Indonesia.”Like the “Human<strong>it</strong>arian Pause” the previous year, the sentimentsexpressed in Geneva did not guide behavior on the ground. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Aceh</strong>regional commander, Major General Djali Yusuf, stated that mil<strong>it</strong>aryoperations would continue until he received instructions to stopthem. 82 Violence persisted unabated—human rights groups claimingthat in the latter part of the month nineteen people had been foundmurdered. 83 Meanwhile, senior mil<strong>it</strong>aryofficers now openly indicated their oppos<strong>it</strong>ionto continuing talks w<strong>it</strong>h GAM. <strong>The</strong>army chief of staff, General RyamizardRyacudu, declared: “Dialogue for a thousandyears hasn’t brought results.” 84 WhenGeneral Yudhoyono told General Zinni that talks would continue,Ryamizard responded: “Fundamentally, there is no dialogue.” 85 <strong>The</strong>TNI commander in chief’s public comments were only slightly moremoderate. General Endriartono Sutarto said that dialogue is not thebusiness of the army but of the government. “If the government wantsto hold a dialogue, go ahead,” he declared, but there must be a timelim<strong>it</strong>. 86 <strong>The</strong> regional army commander denounced the HDC, which in<strong>it</strong>s preparations for the “all-inclusive dialogue” had held discussionsw<strong>it</strong>h local NGOs. “What business does HDC have in calling NGOsto <strong>it</strong>s secretariat?” he asked. <strong>The</strong> provincial police chief, InspectorGeneral Yusuf Manggabarani, even suggested that HDC personnelmight be spies. 87 Instead of dialogue, mil<strong>it</strong>ary leaders called for theimpos<strong>it</strong>ion of emergency rule. 88Instead of dialogue,mil<strong>it</strong>ary leaders calledfor emergency rule
30 Edward Aspinall & Harold CrouchEven Bambang Yudhoyono, the main government leader supportingthe dialogue process, dismissed the oppos<strong>it</strong>ion of the governor and the <strong>Aceh</strong>provincial parliament to emergency rule: “<strong>The</strong>ir stance is against thedemands of most <strong>Aceh</strong>nese people who have urged us to restore secur<strong>it</strong>y inthe region. . . . <strong>The</strong>y told me they are tired of GAM, and urged the governmentto bring peace to their area.” 89 Following the lack of progress after theGeneva talks in May, Yudhoyono adopted an even stronger line. He hadbeen the main author of the series of presidential instructions emphasizing“comprehensive measures.” But this policy had failed to resolve the conflictpartly because only <strong>it</strong>s mil<strong>it</strong>ary prong had been implemented. Now he wasunder pressure not only from his mil<strong>it</strong>ary colleagues but also from sectionsof the national parliament to take “resolute” action against GAM. In JuneYudhoyono ordered that secur<strong>it</strong>y operations should be intensified anddescribed GAM as a “terrorist organization,” presumably hoping that theUn<strong>it</strong>ed States would place GAM on <strong>it</strong>s list of terrorist organizations.<strong>The</strong> Government’s Ultimatum<strong>The</strong> government’s resort to increased mil<strong>it</strong>ary pressure was still intendedto force GAM to accept a negotiated resolution, and Yudhoyono was infact resisting pressure from mil<strong>it</strong>ary hard-liners to introduce martial law.On August 19, Yudhoyono announced the government’s “final offer.” Itwould give GAM until the end of the month of Ramadan (which in2002 fell on December 6) to continue the dialogue “w<strong>it</strong>hin the frameworkof special autonomy and the cessation of hostil<strong>it</strong>ies.” If GAM didnot respond pos<strong>it</strong>ively, the government would take “tough and appropriate”measures, including “the intensification of operations to restore secur<strong>it</strong>yand defend the sovereignty and un<strong>it</strong>y of the Republic of Indonesia.” 90Intensive contacts between the two sides via the HDC continuedduring the next few months. By early November the government hadaccepted eleven revisions to the draft agreement, but the GAM leaders inSweden still hes<strong>it</strong>ated. At this time the HDC arranged for a group of sixprominent <strong>Aceh</strong>nese civil society leaders, led by the chairman of theprovincial Muhammadiyah, Imam Suja’, to meet the GAM leaders inGeneva. Imam Suja’s mission is widely seen as having persuaded theGAM leaders to continue negotiations. Imam Suja’ emphasized that <strong>it</strong>was the people of <strong>Aceh</strong>, rather than GAM <strong>it</strong>self, who would suffer mostif peace was not achieved—w<strong>it</strong>h the implication that GAM might losepublic sympathy if <strong>it</strong> were seen as obstructing a peace agreement.
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong> 31Imam Suja’s argument seems to have had some impact on the GAMleaders, but during November they continued to hold out on two keyissues. <strong>The</strong> first involved disarmament of GAM in the form of the “storage”of <strong>it</strong>s weapons. <strong>The</strong> proposal was that GAM should hand over <strong>it</strong>sweapons to a “third party” for storage at ten locations designated byGAM. Each storage center would have two keys—one held by GAMand the other by the third party—and the storage center would beguarded by troops from GAM and the third party. 91 This prospect causedGAM much concern. As <strong>it</strong>s chief negotiator, Zaini Abdullah, said: “Thismeans that the <strong>Aceh</strong>nese State Army or GAM will surrender. . . . Armsare GAM’s secret key.” 92 <strong>The</strong> second issue was the role of the police—particularly the paramil<strong>it</strong>ary Brimob, which was seen by GAM and manyordinary <strong>Aceh</strong>nese as a main perpetrator of human rights abuses.According to Imam Suja’, GAM leaders were worried that their membersmight be hunted down during the cease-fire. GAM demanded thatBrimob be w<strong>it</strong>hdrawn from the province; the government proposed that<strong>it</strong>s duties be changed from those of a paramil<strong>it</strong>ary force to ordinarypolice functions and that <strong>it</strong> no longer be armed w<strong>it</strong>h mil<strong>it</strong>ary weapons.While GAM was debating the details of the draft agreement, the mil<strong>it</strong>aryincreased the pressure on the ground. On October 28, some 1,200to 1,400 troops, including Kostrad and Kopassus forces, 93 surrounded anarea in North <strong>Aceh</strong> used by GAM as a camp. <strong>The</strong> camp was located in amarsh—about 8 kilometers long and 2 kilometers wide—near the villageof Cot Trieng. It seems that the TNI believed that GAM’s new mil<strong>it</strong>arycommander, Muzakkir Manaf, was at the camp w<strong>it</strong>h several dozen troops.On November 4—the beginning of Ramadan—GAM declared a unilateralcease-fire but General Endriartono warned that “if the peace agreementis not signed by the deadline, yes, we will attack.” 94 Ryamizarddeclared: “If they don’t surrender, I will order my men to finish things.” 95GAM responded by threatening that “if the troops are not w<strong>it</strong>hdrawn,GAM will react in other areas throughout <strong>Aceh</strong>.” 96 In fact, mil<strong>it</strong>ary troopsconducted sieges of GAM bases in other areas. However, <strong>it</strong> was widelybelieved that the GAM forces allegedly surrounded at Cot Trieng graduallyslipped away. When the siege was finally lifted, GAM soldiers werenowhere to be seen.Meanwhile the international commun<strong>it</strong>y had stepped in. Japan, theUn<strong>it</strong>ed States, the European Union, and the World Bank cosponsored aPreparatory Meeting on <strong>Peace</strong> and Reconstruction in <strong>Aceh</strong> that was
32 Edward Aspinall & Harold Crouchattended by thirty-eight countries in Tokyo on December 3. Not only didthe meeting agree to provide support for human<strong>it</strong>arian programs and rehabil<strong>it</strong>ationif an agreement were signed, but Australia and Canada comm<strong>it</strong>tedfunds to support the mon<strong>it</strong>oring of the agreement while Norway,Sweden, and the Un<strong>it</strong>ed States would continue to support the HDC.As the apparent siege at Cot Trieng continued, the HDC announcedthat both sides were ready to sign an agreement on December 9 (a fewdays after the end of Ramadan). Feeling pressed by Indonesia’s ultimatum,Zaini Abdullah said that GAM had agreed only to “a further meeting”on December 9. A few days later, however, he said that GAMwould be willing to sign provided outstanding issues were resolved. 97 <strong>The</strong>Indonesian mil<strong>it</strong>ary offensive had inflicted losses on GAM, but the seriesof Indonesian ultimatums also reportedly greatly antagonized the GAMleadership. In the end, rather than risk a larger depletion of <strong>it</strong>s mil<strong>it</strong>aryresources, GAM agreed to the “cessation of hostil<strong>it</strong>ies” in December2002. Although the agreement saved GAM from further battering, infact <strong>it</strong> brought the movement no closer to <strong>it</strong>s ultimate goal.<strong>The</strong> Agreement<strong>The</strong> Cessation of Hostil<strong>it</strong>ies Framework Agreement (COHA) was finallysigned, as planned, on December 9, 2002. <strong>The</strong> agreement was only thefirst stage in a confidence-building process, however, and did notattempt to resolve the crucial issues dividing the two sides. Only afterhostil<strong>it</strong>ies had been reduced would <strong>it</strong> be possible to move on to the nextstage in the process—the all-inclusive dialogue—at which substantiveissues would be addressed.<strong>The</strong> cessation of hostil<strong>it</strong>ies involved two major demil<strong>it</strong>arizationmeasures. GAM agreed to designate “placement s<strong>it</strong>es” where “<strong>it</strong>sweapons, arms, and ordinance” would be gradually placed during afive-month period beginning two months after the signing of theagreement. (In an explanatory note attached to the agreement, theHDC explained that <strong>it</strong> understood that “GAM will not be able tomove the weapons that have been placed in the designated s<strong>it</strong>es w<strong>it</strong>houtthe consent of HDC” and “GAM has to comply w<strong>it</strong>h the requestof HDC to conduct no-notice inspections at any time.”) On theIndonesian side, the government agreed to “a simultaneous phasedrelocation of TNI forces which will reformulate their mandate from astrike force to a defensive force.” In add<strong>it</strong>ion, “the mandate and mis-
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong> 33sion of Brimob will be reformulated to strictly conform to regularpolice activ<strong>it</strong>ies and as such will no longer in<strong>it</strong>iate offensive actionsagainst members of GAM not in contravention of the agreement.”<strong>The</strong> agreement provided for the reactivation of the Joint Secur<strong>it</strong>yComm<strong>it</strong>tee (JSC) that was established during the Human<strong>it</strong>arian Pause.<strong>The</strong> JSC would consist of up to five representatives each of the government,GAM, and the “third party” (HDC). <strong>The</strong> JSC’s functions includedoverall implementation of the agreement, mon<strong>it</strong>oring the secur<strong>it</strong>y s<strong>it</strong>uation,investigating secur<strong>it</strong>y violations, determining sanctions to beapplied to violations, and designing and implementing a mutually agreedprocess of demil<strong>it</strong>arization. But the first task of the JSC would be toestablish “peace zones” in areas where conflict had been severe and thusfacil<strong>it</strong>ate human<strong>it</strong>arian aid. In the case of violations, the JSC’s role waslim<strong>it</strong>ed to recommending sanctions that would be imposed by the twosides on their own personnel.In a major concession, the government agreed to the presence of internationalmon<strong>it</strong>ors. <strong>The</strong> JSC would be assisted by a mon<strong>it</strong>oring team (orteams) consisting of representatives of the secur<strong>it</strong>y forces of the governmentand GAM together w<strong>it</strong>h a “senior third-party mil<strong>it</strong>ary officer agreedupon by both sides.” In a separate agreement <strong>it</strong> was decided to askThailand and the Philippines to provide mon<strong>it</strong>ors who would not representtheir countries but serve as individuals responsible to the HDC. AThai mil<strong>it</strong>ary officer, Major General Tanongsuk Tuvinun, was appointedto chair the JSC w<strong>it</strong>h Brigadier General Nogomora Lomodag of thePhilippines as his deputy. Fifty HDC mon<strong>it</strong>ors would work in teamsalongside fifty mon<strong>it</strong>ors each from the Indonesian secur<strong>it</strong>y forces andGAM. <strong>The</strong> HDC would provide necessary funds and logistical andadministrative facil<strong>it</strong>ies. 98 <strong>The</strong> agreement also provided for the establishmentof a Joint Council consisting of “the most senior representatives” ofthe government, GAM, and the HDC to resolve disputes arising fromimplementation of the agreement. <strong>The</strong> members of the council were SusiloBambang Yudhoyono representing the Indonesian government, MalikMahmud representing GAM, and Martin Griff<strong>it</strong>hs, director of the HDC.<strong>The</strong> next phase in the process would be the holding of an “all-inclusivedialogue” after “the necessary secur<strong>it</strong>y and freedom of movement forall participants” had been established. 99 <strong>The</strong> all-inclusive dialogue “willseek to review elements of the NAD law.” Both the government andGAM “agree to a process which leads to an election in 2004 and the sub-
34 Edward Aspinall & Harold Crouchsequent establishment of a democratically elected government in Acheh,Indonesia.” <strong>The</strong> government would “ensure” and GAM would “support”“a free and fair electoral process.”As <strong>it</strong>s t<strong>it</strong>le indicates, this was a framework agreement that left manyissues unresolved. Although GAM had accepted the NAD law as a “startingpoint,” the negotiations did not produce an explic<strong>it</strong> common understandingabout what this meant. Nor was there agreement on the natureof “the election of a democratic government in Acheh, Indonesia.” <strong>The</strong>specific implementation of the “cessation of hostil<strong>it</strong>ies,” as we shall see,was another issue open to wide differences in interpretation. <strong>The</strong> agreementenvisaged that demil<strong>it</strong>arization would begin after a confidencebuildingphase of two months. (<strong>The</strong> Indonesian side had in<strong>it</strong>ially wantedone month.) Demil<strong>it</strong>arization, therefore, was due to begin on February9, 2003, and according to the agreement would be completed fivemonths later on July 9.Heading Toward Breakdown<strong>The</strong> announcement of the agreement was greeted w<strong>it</strong>h much popularenthusiasm in <strong>Aceh</strong>, as well as in Jakarta and even internationally. TNIand GAM commanders immediately ordered their troops to cease offensiveactions, and leaders of both groups made highly optimistic statementsabout the prospects for peace. GAM leaders attended some well-publicizedmeetings w<strong>it</strong>h Indonesian officials designed to “socialize” the agreement.Government officials, and some mil<strong>it</strong>ary officers, warmly praisedGAM’s willingness to sign the peace agreement and called them “brothers.”100 After all, ordinary c<strong>it</strong>izens in <strong>Aceh</strong> were highly supportive of theagreement. Thanksgiving prayer meetings were held in mosques throughout<strong>Aceh</strong>, and people could go about their daily business in ways that hadbeen impossible when fighting and mil<strong>it</strong>ary sweeps were routine. Desp<strong>it</strong>ethe agreement, isolated clashes continued to occur. <strong>The</strong> number of casualties,however, dropped drastically. According to the HDC, during the firsttwo months after the agreement the average number of civilians killed permonth had dropped to 12 compared to 87 before the pact. Only 9 membersof GAM were killed compared to 102 per month and only 4 membersof TNI/Polri compared to 45 per month before the agreement. 101<strong>The</strong> new atmosphere perm<strong>it</strong>ted the establishment of the “peace zones”mentioned in the agreement. <strong>The</strong> first zone was inaugurated on January27, 2003, at Indrapuri, a subdistrict about 24 kilometers from Banda
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong> 35<strong>Aceh</strong> w<strong>it</strong>h fifty-two villages and a population of 16,500. 102 Members ofboth the mil<strong>it</strong>ary/police and GAM were perm<strong>it</strong>ted to enter the peacezones but were not allowed to carry arms. In February and March ten furthersubdistricts were designated as peace zones.Desp<strong>it</strong>e the relative peace on the ground, there were many worryingsigns. W<strong>it</strong>hin a week of the agreement being signed each side was accusingthe other of major violations. Senior mil<strong>it</strong>ary officers on theIndonesian side publicly indicated their displeasurew<strong>it</strong>h the agreement. As usual, themost outspoken was Army Chief of StaffRyamizard, who during the agreement’sfirst week made a series of statementsdeclaring that TNI’s duty remainedunchanged: “We will take firm action against all rebels in this country. .. . GAM’s weapons must be taken away from them. If all people cancarry weapons any old how and we are not allowed to arrest them, thenwhat has happened to law enforcement in this country?” 103 He alsoridiculed the idea that TNI be asked to w<strong>it</strong>hdraw or disarm. <strong>Aceh</strong> ispart of Indonesia, he argued: “If one million soldiers are there, there isno use questioning <strong>it</strong>. <strong>The</strong> place for the soldiers is right there.” 104No less ominous, the atmosphere in the talks between the two sidessoon deteriorated. W<strong>it</strong>hin days of the signing of the agreement, leaders onboth sides were putting forward conflicting interpretations of what wasexpected in the forthcoming “election in 2004.” For Indonesia, the electionwas the five-yearly election due in Indonesia in 2004 to elect the presidentand the national and regional legislatures. So far as <strong>Aceh</strong> was concerned,Bambang Yudhoyono explained, this means “the election of thegovernor, the election of bupatis, the mayors, and the DPRD.” Crucially,he explained, the phrases local elections and local parties were “not knownin Indonesia.” He thus ruled out GAM transforming <strong>it</strong>self into a contestantfor pol<strong>it</strong>ical power at the local level. GAM’s perception of the electionwas very different. According to Zaini Abdullah: “<strong>The</strong> election that isintended is a special election in <strong>Aceh</strong>. Not a national election like that inIndonesia. This election is to elect the leaders of the <strong>Aceh</strong>nese nation.” 105And Zaini believed they would then opt for independence.<strong>The</strong> government, echoing claims <strong>it</strong> had made at the time of theHuman<strong>it</strong>arian Pause, also accused GAM of using the cease-fire to consolidate<strong>it</strong>s forces and conduct a pol<strong>it</strong>ical campaign for independence.W<strong>it</strong>hin a week, each sidewas accusing the other ofmajor violations
36 Edward Aspinall & Harold CrouchBambang Yudhoyono claimed that GAM was holding public rallies and“shows of force” in which <strong>it</strong> provided “inaccurate information” and“propaganda conflicting w<strong>it</strong>h the spir<strong>it</strong> of the agreement.” Among otherthings, he alleged that GAM was claiming that the final goal of the peaceprocess was to achieve independence for <strong>Aceh</strong>, that the all-inclusive dialoguewould take the form of a referendum, and that UN forces wouldreplace the army and the police. 106 This behavior, he said, violated theagreement that comm<strong>it</strong>ted both sides “to exercise the utmost restraint bynot making any public statement that would inflame the feeling and sentimentof the other side.” 107 <strong>The</strong> agreement, however, had not specificallyrequired GAM to stop campaigning peacefully for independence.<strong>The</strong> government also accused GAM of rebuilding <strong>it</strong>s governmentalstructure. On January 25, for example, GAM held a ceremony to installa new mil<strong>it</strong>ary commander and a governor in the district of Pidie. 108Moreover, the government accused GAM of recru<strong>it</strong>ing new fighters andforcing people to pay taxes to GAM—which the government called“extortion” but GAM called a leg<strong>it</strong>imate “Nanggroe tax.” BambangYudhoyono said that intelligence sources had detected that GAM hadbeen acquiring new weapons since the signing of the agreement. 109<strong>The</strong> government was in fact worried that GAM was expanding <strong>it</strong>sinfluence outside the main towns. Although government officials weresent to the district centers to explain the details of the agreement,according to reports they rarely attracted audiences of more than a fewhundred while thousands were listening to GAM leaders. Part of thegovernment’s problem was that the infrastructure of local governmentoutside the main urban centers was not working effectively. As a result,government functions were often administered by GAM. 110 <strong>The</strong> <strong>Aceh</strong>provincial chief of police, Inspector General Bahrumsyah Kasman, estimatedthat GAM controlled at least 40 percent of the province’s villagesand subdistricts. 111 <strong>The</strong> governor, Abdullah Puteh, later described localgovernment as “virtually paralyzed.” In many areas, he said, “GAMalready collects property taxes, vehicle taxes, and arranges driving licenses.Even in matters involving marriage in the village, the people prefer todeal w<strong>it</strong>h GAM rather than the local Religious Affairs Office.” 112Government officials apparently feared they were losing the propagandawar. Bambang Yudhoyono called on the HDC to explain to the<strong>Aceh</strong>nese public “that the cessation of hostil<strong>it</strong>y agreement is not, Irepeat, is not heading toward independence but toward special autono-
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong> 37my.” 113 Eventually, David Gorman of the HDC complied and held apress conference in Banda <strong>Aceh</strong> where he explained that “the agreementdoes not discuss independence and <strong>it</strong> does not discuss a referendum.” 114General Endriartono told the press that the process was only aimed at“acceptance of special autonomy in the form of the NAD law.” At most<strong>it</strong> envisaged direct elections of bupati and other local government officials,not a “special election or a referendum in <strong>Aceh</strong>.” 115 <strong>The</strong> governmentalso resorted to arresting popular speakers at rallies—including the SIRAleader, Muhammad Nazar, who was accused of saying that the peaceagreement opened the way to an independence referendum and callingfor a UN investigation of human rights abuses. 116 GAM, however, maintainedthat in signing the COHA agreement <strong>it</strong> had not comm<strong>it</strong>ted <strong>it</strong>selfto abandoning <strong>it</strong>s goal of independence.At the core of the problem was the interpretation of GAM’s “acceptanceof the NAD law as a starting point.” Following the signing of theCOHA agreement, the government implied that GAM had given up <strong>it</strong>sdemand for independence. Government officials and mil<strong>it</strong>ary officersthus depicted continued GAM campaigning for independence as a violationthat effectively nullified the agreement. As General Endriartono put<strong>it</strong>: “If all they talk about is independence, we can’t continue this [peacedeal].” 117 GAM, however, argued that the agreement was only a startingpoint that would lead to the all-inclusive dialogue and, in the words ofthe agreement, “the subsequent establishment of a democratically electedgovernment in Acheh, Indonesia.” For GAM “a free and fair electoralprocess” meant the election would be tantamount to a referendum on<strong>Aceh</strong>’s future status in which pro-independence candidates and presumablya GAM party would be allowed to run. Furthermore, GAM leadersviewed the agreement’s reference to a review of “elements of the NADlaw” as perm<strong>it</strong>ting <strong>it</strong>s rejection at the all-inclusive dialogue.Meanwhile local negotiations continued at the Kuala Tripa Hotel inBanda <strong>Aceh</strong> on the “demil<strong>it</strong>arization” phase due to commence onFebruary 9. <strong>The</strong> agreement required the “phased placement” of GAM’s“weapons, arms, and ordinance in the designated s<strong>it</strong>es” together w<strong>it</strong>h the“simultaneous phased relocation of TNI forces” and their adoption of adefensive, as opposed to offensive, pos<strong>it</strong>ion as well as the “reformulation”of Brimob’s role. <strong>The</strong> specific details of the “placement,” “relocation,” and“reformulation” were not determined in the agreement but were to be discussedin subsequent negotiations. Agreement had not been reached by
38 Edward Aspinall & Harold CrouchFebruary 9, however, when demil<strong>it</strong>arization was due to commence.GAM fighters were naturally reluctant to hand over their weapons solong as armed soldiers and police remained in <strong>Aceh</strong>. GAM’s main bargainingchip was <strong>it</strong>s capac<strong>it</strong>y to return to armed struggle. Complete surrenderof <strong>it</strong>s weapons would deprive <strong>it</strong> of that option. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Aceh</strong> policechief, Bahrumsyah, told the press that GAM would have to disarm first:“If GAM warehouses <strong>it</strong>s weapons and leaves the location, then TNI willadjust by w<strong>it</strong>hdrawing <strong>it</strong>s troops.” 118 GAM, however, rejected the conceptof “warehousing” <strong>it</strong>s arms. As <strong>it</strong>s negotiator, Sofyan Ibrahim Tiba, asked:“Where are the warehouses in the jungles or the mountains?” 119 InsteadGAM agreed to “placement” under the HDC’s supervision but insistedthat the placement of <strong>it</strong>s weapons would only proceed simultaneouslyw<strong>it</strong>h the relocation of the TNI’s forces. If the TNI carried out 20 percentof <strong>it</strong>s relocation, GAM would carry out the placement of 20 percent of <strong>it</strong>sarms. 120 Government negotiators then asked how they would know whatproportion of GAM’s arms had been placed if they did not know howmany arms GAM had to start w<strong>it</strong>h. “Twenty percent of how many?”asked General Endriartono. 121 Eventually a meeting between the governmentand HDC accepted that the only practical solution was to wa<strong>it</strong>until July 9 when all of GAM’s arms should have been “placed.” 122According to the agreement, both sides would be relocated in such away as “to separate the forces of both parties w<strong>it</strong>h sufficient distance toavoid contact or confrontation. Forces of both parties will refrain fromoperations, movements, activ<strong>it</strong>ies, or any provocative acts that could leadto contact or confrontation w<strong>it</strong>h each other.” GAM understood relocationto require that troops at each level of the mil<strong>it</strong>ary’s terr<strong>it</strong>orial structurebe based at their “normal” un<strong>it</strong> headquarters and not spread out in“posts” at schools, clinics, houses, and other buildings. Thus the army’sterr<strong>it</strong>orial troops would be w<strong>it</strong>hdrawn to permanent terr<strong>it</strong>orial commandheadquarters—Kodam at the provincial level, Korem at the subprovinciallevel, Kodim at the district level, and Koramil at the subdistrict level—while combat troops brought from outside <strong>Aceh</strong> would be placed at theirbattalion or company headquarters. 123 <strong>The</strong> mil<strong>it</strong>ary, however, had establishedsome 220 “temporary” posts that <strong>it</strong> considered essential to containGAM. Far from w<strong>it</strong>hdrawing from these posts, the <strong>Aceh</strong> Kodam commander,Major General Djali Yusuf, declared: “We plan to increase thenumber of posts to help the people to develop <strong>Aceh</strong>.” 124 According toGAM negotiator Teuku Kamaruzzaman, by April the mil<strong>it</strong>ary had
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong> 39already set up fifty new posts since December 9. 125 Under these cond<strong>it</strong>ions,believing that the TNI was preparing for a new offensive, GAMcommanders were increasingly reluctant to disarm.<strong>The</strong> Indonesian side contended that the mil<strong>it</strong>ary and police shouldcontinue to carry out “normal” functions. <strong>The</strong> agreement <strong>it</strong>self recognizedthat “the maintenance of law and order in Acheh [sic] will continueto be the responsibil<strong>it</strong>y of the Indonesian Police.” Immediately afterthe signing of the agreement, General Endriartono implied a lim<strong>it</strong>ationon the extent of relocation when he declared that the TNI would continue“to secure public places, public buildings, and v<strong>it</strong>al facil<strong>it</strong>ies.” 126 In thecase of Brimob, the national chief of police, General Da’i Bachtiar, saidthat Brimob would no longer be armed w<strong>it</strong>h mil<strong>it</strong>ary weapons but onlypistols like ordinary police. 127 It was also announced that 3,000 Brimobmembers would be retrained for their new role. 128 <strong>The</strong> brutal reputationof Brimob in <strong>Aceh</strong>, however, was such that few <strong>Aceh</strong>nese expectedBrimob members to behave like “ordinary police.”<strong>The</strong> COHA agreement entrusted the JSC to investigate violations.Tripart<strong>it</strong>e teams consisting of Indonesian, GAM, and internationalmon<strong>it</strong>ors (mostly Thai but including a few Filipinos) were stationedthroughout the province. <strong>The</strong> first investigation of violations blamedGAM for two incidents. In one clash at Lokop in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Aceh</strong> onJanuary 14, a soldier was killed and several were wounded; in anotherat Lamno in <strong>West</strong> <strong>Aceh</strong>, a soldier was severely wounded. <strong>The</strong> JSC alsocr<strong>it</strong>icized Indonesian secur<strong>it</strong>y forces for intimidating a GAM memberof the JSC who was observing a conflict between Brimob and demonstratorsat Bireuen on January 14. 129 In February the results of a secondset of investigations were announced. This time the Indonesianside was found to have comm<strong>it</strong>ted two “very serious” and one “serious”violation of the accord while GAM was responsible for one “veryserious” violation. 130 This decision of the JSC (which as a tripart<strong>it</strong>ebody included an Indonesian government representative) elic<strong>it</strong>ed astrong protest from the Indonesian side. General Endriartono acceptedone of the findings against the TNI but claimed that the other twoinvolved the killing of ordinary criminals and had nothing to do w<strong>it</strong>hthe peace agreement. In the end, after some soul searching, the JSCagreed to annul <strong>it</strong>s findings in the two cases. A few days after thesanctions against the TNI were annulled, GAM too rejected JSC decisionsunfavorable to GAM.
40 Edward Aspinall & Harold CrouchIn response to these developments, as well as alleged violations byGAM, senior government officials and mil<strong>it</strong>ary officers reverted to thepattern of threats that had preceded the collapse of the Human<strong>it</strong>arianPause in 2000. Repeatedly they warned that the government couldalways return to a harder line and abandon the negotiation process. Aftera cabinet meeting in mid-January, for example, both Yudhoyono andEndriartono said that if GAM persisted in violating the agreement, thenthe Indonesian government would w<strong>it</strong>hdraw from <strong>it</strong> unilaterally. 131 Inearly February, General Endriartono announced that the TNI had a contingencyplan in case the peace process failed; 132 in March, he told theDPR that he planned to mobilize a large number of troops to be sent to<strong>Aceh</strong>. 133 In a newspaper article presumably reflecting the views of manyin the officer corps, the former army deputy chief of staff, LieutenantGeneral Kiki Syahnakri, compared the peace process in <strong>Aceh</strong> to the1980s in <strong>East</strong> Timor when “Xanana shifted the emphasis from armedstruggle to the arena of diplomatic pol<strong>it</strong>ics, in other words, from the jungleto the c<strong>it</strong>ies.” Reminding his readers of the success of the <strong>East</strong>Timorese clandestine movement, he warned that GAM had been given a“golden opportun<strong>it</strong>y” to carry out their activ<strong>it</strong>ies “nakedly and freelybefore our very eyes.” He complained that “after the peace agreement—when they no longer face pressure from TNI/Polri—their access to thepeople of <strong>Aceh</strong> is wide open.” Kiki argued that “diplomatic negotiationsalone will not be effective but will meet failure—in the sense that ourinterests will be defeated—when not accompanied by mil<strong>it</strong>ary action andsecur<strong>it</strong>y operations that strengthen our bargaining pos<strong>it</strong>ion at the negotiatingtable . . . which is the vehicle to formulate a final solution.” 134<strong>The</strong> mil<strong>it</strong>ary’s desire to terminate the peace process became moreapparent in March when a series of “spontaneous” demonstrations tookplace at JSC field mon<strong>it</strong>oring offices. <strong>The</strong> first incident came on March 3,in Takengon in Central <strong>Aceh</strong>, where a mob protesting the alleged kidnappingand ransoming of a coffee trader by GAM attacked three JSC mon<strong>it</strong>ors(one of whom, a GAM representative, was beaten unconscious),burned three JSC vehicles, and set fire to the JSC office. <strong>The</strong> protesterscalled for the ending of GAM “extortion,” <strong>it</strong>s disarmament, a declarationthat <strong>it</strong> was the enemy of the people of Central <strong>Aceh</strong>, and the removal ofthe JSC from Central <strong>Aceh</strong>. 135 As this incident took place in an area wherethe local mil<strong>it</strong>ary had previously encouraged the formation of a mil<strong>it</strong>iaamong Javanese transmigrants, <strong>it</strong> was widely believed that members of
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong> 41this mil<strong>it</strong>ia were involved in the attack (which was not obstructed by thelocal mil<strong>it</strong>ary or police). 136 One Banda <strong>Aceh</strong>–based NGO, Kontras,released a report in which <strong>it</strong> claimed w<strong>it</strong>nesses had seen Kostrad personnelhanding out banners and placards to participants.137 A week later, on March 10, severalhundred demonstrators gathered at the JSCoffice in Langsa, <strong>East</strong> <strong>Aceh</strong>, again protestinga GAM kidnapping and calling for the dissolutionof the JSC if <strong>it</strong> could not secure therelease of the kidnapped man. 138 <strong>The</strong>n on March 17 about 100 demonstratorsprotested at the JSC office in Sigli in Pidie district where theydemanded that the JSC take action against “extortion” by GAM andcalled for more TNI posts in the district. 139 Similar demonstrations followedin Meulaboh in <strong>West</strong> <strong>Aceh</strong> and Tapaktuan, South <strong>Aceh</strong>. On April6, thirty trucks brought demonstrators back to the JSC headquarters inLangsa where they burned the office down. Faced w<strong>it</strong>h these threats to <strong>it</strong>spersonnel in the field, the JSC decided on April 8 to w<strong>it</strong>hdraw all <strong>it</strong>s 144observers to Banda <strong>Aceh</strong>.<strong>The</strong>se demonstrations were seen by virtually all observers as engineeredby the secur<strong>it</strong>y forces in an effort to show that in fact the people of<strong>Aceh</strong> opposed the peace process. Senior officers certainly took l<strong>it</strong>tle troubleto hide their sympathy for the actions. <strong>The</strong> day after the attack on theJSC in Takengon, the provincial police chief, Bahrumsyah, said that theaction represented an “uprising” of the Central <strong>Aceh</strong>nese people: “I amproud of the people of Central <strong>Aceh</strong> who have adopted a stance of wagingwar against oppression. Although the incident yesterday, where theJSC was broken up and three cars were burned, was not an effort toresolve the problem, nevertheless I am proud of that stance.” He called onother regions to follow su<strong>it</strong>. “We are tired of living in a conflict area,” hesaid, adding that if the people did not have “bravery in defending truth”they would continue to be “victims.” 140At the end of March, the army held <strong>it</strong>s annual command meetingattended by about 100 senior officers at facil<strong>it</strong>ies provided byExxonMobil in Lhokseumawe—the first time such a meeting had beenheld outside Java. 141 Although General Ryamizard said that the s<strong>it</strong>uationin <strong>Aceh</strong> was not discussed at the meeting, army officers toured Central<strong>Aceh</strong> and Pidie where they were greeted by demonstrators calling for thedissolution of the JSC and more secur<strong>it</strong>y posts to protect the people<strong>The</strong> mil<strong>it</strong>ary’s desire to terminatethe peace processbecame more apparent
42 Edward Aspinall & Harold Crouchfrom “extortion” by GAM. 142 <strong>The</strong> mil<strong>it</strong>ary appeared to be preparing publicopinion for a renewed mil<strong>it</strong>ary offensive.<strong>The</strong> army-backed demonstrations reflected a widespread hostil<strong>it</strong>ytoward the HDC-sponsored peace process among mil<strong>it</strong>ary personnel in<strong>Aceh</strong>. According to one senior mil<strong>it</strong>ary officer in <strong>Aceh</strong>, the HDC triedto appear neutral but in fact sided w<strong>it</strong>h GAM. 143 A middle-ranking officerasked why the international commun<strong>it</strong>y was forcing Indonesia totreat rebels as if they had the same status (sejajar) as the government ofIndonesia. He also claimed that <strong>West</strong>ern pressure to observe humanrights had prevented the mil<strong>it</strong>ary from “finishing off” GAM in thepast. 144 One senior officer expressed his amazement: “Just imagine, soldierswho have from birth held rifles, rifles which they consider to belike their first wives, are now told to leave their bases w<strong>it</strong>hout theirweapons. In a conflict area, what’s more. Isn’t <strong>it</strong> great, that agreement?” 145Meanwhile during March and April there was an upsurge in clashesbetween the secur<strong>it</strong>y forces and GAM. Data collected by the TNI inmid-April showed that during the four months since the agreement wassigned on December 9, some fifty-eight people had been killed: fiftycivilians (including members of GAM), three from the police, and fivefrom the mil<strong>it</strong>ary. 146 Now fifty people were reportedly killed in the firstthree weeks of April. 147 General Ryamizard claimed that GAM hadmade use of the cease-fire to increase <strong>it</strong>s manpower from 3,000 to 5,000and had acquired new arms, bringing the number of weapons up from1,800 to 2,100. In response the TNI planned to increase the strength ofthe three organic infantry battalions in <strong>Aceh</strong> from the present 600–650personnel to the standard size of 746 and eventually to 1,000. 148 In mid-April, Major General Djali revealed that the number of TNI troops in<strong>Aceh</strong> had been increased to 26,000. When the HDC pointed out thatan increase in personnel would conflict w<strong>it</strong>h the COHA agreement, adefiant Ryamizard replied: “If I am asked whether I want to increase thetroops in <strong>Aceh</strong>, that is my business. Because I understand the mil<strong>it</strong>ary.”149 Meanwhile the launching of the American attack on Iraq onMarch 19 was seen by many mil<strong>it</strong>ary officers as providing an opportun<strong>it</strong>yto renew the offensive against GAM in circumstances where theUn<strong>it</strong>ed States was hardly in a pos<strong>it</strong>ion to object. <strong>The</strong> Kostrad commander,Lieutenant General Bib<strong>it</strong> Waluyo, questioned why the mil<strong>it</strong>aryoffensive was always being postponed. 150
Collapse of the Talks<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong> 43In response to these developments, President Megawati instructed theTNI and the police to prepare for “secur<strong>it</strong>y operations” in <strong>Aceh</strong>. At thesame time, the government called—as a last resort—for a meeting of theJoint Council established under the COHA agreement. <strong>The</strong> Indonesianmember of the Joint Council, Bambang Yudhoyono, put forward twononnegotiable demands: that GAM accept autonomy as the final goal ofthe peace process and that <strong>it</strong> warehouse (menggudangkan) <strong>it</strong>s weapons. 151<strong>The</strong> first of these was a significant hardening of pos<strong>it</strong>ion—previously theIndonesian government had not insisted that GAM explic<strong>it</strong>ly give up <strong>it</strong>sgoal of independence before participating in talks. Jakarta in<strong>it</strong>ially proposedthat the meeting be held in Indonesia, but GAM insisted onGeneva as a neutral venue. 152 Although the date was set for April 25, atthe last moment GAM requested a delay until April 27. Feeling that <strong>it</strong>was being manipulated by GAM, the Indonesian government angrilyannounced that <strong>it</strong> would not attend the meeting. 153 On April 28,Bambang Yudhoyono emerged from a cabinet meeting to say that thegovernment was giving GAM yet another “final chance.” GAM had twoweeks to fulfill the two cond<strong>it</strong>ions for talks to resume. In the meantime,he added, although mil<strong>it</strong>ary operations would commence only if cond<strong>it</strong>ionsdeteriorated, “a law enforcement operation has to be immediatelyconducted w<strong>it</strong>h intens<strong>it</strong>y including responding to the armed separatistmovement as a threat to the secur<strong>it</strong>y of the nation which needs to beseverely punished.” 154 Responding that <strong>it</strong> could not accept an ultimatum,GAM proposed that the Joint Council meeting be held after May 12 inGeneva—after the expiry of the deadline set by Indonesia. 155In a desperate attempt to save the talks, the HDC—strongly backedby the Un<strong>it</strong>ed States, Japan, the European Union, and the WorldBank—finally persuaded the two sides to meet in Tokyo on May 17. Atthe last moment, w<strong>it</strong>h both delegations already in Tokyo, the talksalmost foundered when police in <strong>Aceh</strong> arrested five local GAM negotiatorswho were to advise the GAM delegation at the talks. <strong>The</strong> GAMteam in Tokyo refused to participate unless the arrested GAM negotiatorswere released. <strong>The</strong> talks were then delayed for several hours as theIndonesian government arranged the release of the men from police custody—buttoo late for them to fly to Tokyo.As had always been the practice in these negotiations, the two sides
44 Edward Aspinall & Harold Crouchdid not talk directly w<strong>it</strong>h each other around the same table but communicatedthrough the HDC. GAM, in <strong>it</strong>s draft prepared in consultationw<strong>it</strong>h the HDC, proposed strengthening the COHA agreement. In a keyclause <strong>it</strong>s draft said: “GAM is comm<strong>it</strong>ted to dropping the armed struggleas stipulated in the relevant clauses of the COHA w<strong>it</strong>h all reciprocalmeasures from the government of the Republic of Indonesia and to participatein the pol<strong>it</strong>ical process as stipulated in the COHA, and in thecontext of the COHA will refrain from advocating independence.” Thiswas a significant concession by the movement—and one that reportedlytroubled several younger <strong>Aceh</strong>nese “civil society” representatives who werepresent. GAM also comm<strong>it</strong>ted <strong>it</strong>self to complete the “placement” of <strong>it</strong>sweapons in accord w<strong>it</strong>h the COHA timetable and to cease immediatelyany efforts to bring in add<strong>it</strong>ional weapons, ammun<strong>it</strong>ion, and ordnance in<strong>Aceh</strong>. Its draft also required the Indonesian government “to return immediately<strong>it</strong>s forces in <strong>Aceh</strong> to pre-December 9, 2002, levels.” 156GAM’s promise to abandon armed struggle and refrain from advocatingindependence, however, did not go far enough for the Indonesiangovernment. <strong>The</strong> government’s final draft proposed: “(a) GAM fullyaccepts the special autonomy status provided by the Nanggroe <strong>Aceh</strong>Darussalam Law w<strong>it</strong>hin the framework of the un<strong>it</strong>ary state of theRepublic of Indonesia and consequently agrees not to seek the independenceof <strong>Aceh</strong>; (b) in this regard, GAM is comm<strong>it</strong>ted to dropping thearmed struggle, to disbanding the <strong>Aceh</strong>nese State Army, and to participatingin the pol<strong>it</strong>ical process as stipulated in the COHA.” <strong>The</strong> governmentdraft repeated the GAM draft’s comm<strong>it</strong>ment to placement of GAMweapons in accordance w<strong>it</strong>h the COHA timetable but rejected <strong>it</strong>s proposalthat government forces in <strong>Aceh</strong> be reduced to their pre-COHA level.Instead <strong>it</strong> only offered “to repos<strong>it</strong>ion <strong>it</strong>self to defensive pos<strong>it</strong>ions as providedby COHA.” 157<strong>The</strong> government’s insistence that GAM fully accept special autonomyand explic<strong>it</strong>ly abandon <strong>it</strong>s struggle for independence, together w<strong>it</strong>hthe disbandment of <strong>it</strong>s mil<strong>it</strong>ary force, was in effect a demand that GAMsurrender and dissolve <strong>it</strong>self. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that theGAM delegation would not sign the statement and the talks collapsed.Government leaders—including the doves—were apparently convincedthat GAM could not be trusted and their promises would not be kept.Equally important, preparations for mil<strong>it</strong>ary operations were by now sowell advanced that <strong>it</strong> was very unlikely they could have been halted.
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong> 45Apparently Yudhoyono and other senior policymakers now viewed theTokyo talks primarily as a means to demonstrate to domestic and internationalaudiences that they had exhausted all attempts at negotiation.This explains why the government’s ultimatum to GAM was muchtougher than any previously presented. Yudhoyono was also under greatpressure from his mil<strong>it</strong>ary colleagues impatient to go into action.On the following day, President Megawati signed the mil<strong>it</strong>ary emergencydeclaration that commenced at midnight on May 18. During previousweeks the TNI’s strength in <strong>Aceh</strong> had been increased to about 30,000together w<strong>it</strong>h about 12,000 police. 158 Under the mil<strong>it</strong>ary emergency, some ofthe powers of the civilian governor were transferred to the new <strong>Aceh</strong> armycommander, Major General Endang Suwarya, who replaced his <strong>Aceh</strong>nesepredecessor, Major General Djali Jusuf. Mil<strong>it</strong>ary operations began almostimmediately. <strong>The</strong> declaration of a mil<strong>it</strong>ary emergency and launching of mil<strong>it</strong>aryoperations received the endorsement of DPR leaders in Jakarta andwere generally supported by the mass media and public opinion.Lessons<strong>The</strong> Indonesian government has now ruled out further negotiations w<strong>it</strong>hthe old GAM leadership in Stockholm who have been unwilling to abandontheir struggle for independence. Any future negotiations, accordingto Bambang Yudhoyono, must be on the basis of acceptance of the “endstate” of special autonomy w<strong>it</strong>hin the Republic of Indonesia. It thusseems that no step by GAM short of cap<strong>it</strong>ulation would induceIndonesia to return to negotiations. Nevertheless, Yudhoyono did notexclude the possibil<strong>it</strong>y of including <strong>Aceh</strong>-based GAM leaders in futurenegotiations—provided they are able to accept the government’s cond<strong>it</strong>ions.Future talks, however, would not be w<strong>it</strong>h GAM alone but wouldinclude other <strong>Aceh</strong>nese sectors. In contrast to some of his mil<strong>it</strong>ary colleagues,Yudhoyono said that the goal of mil<strong>it</strong>ary operations is not towipe out GAM but to create cond<strong>it</strong>ions that are conducive for nonsecur<strong>it</strong>ymeasures to win the “hearts and minds” of the people of <strong>Aceh</strong>. 159Our study concludes that the fundamental reason for the breakdownof negotiations between the government and GAM was the huge gapbetween their goals. In retrospect <strong>it</strong> was inev<strong>it</strong>able that a final resolutioncould not be reached so long as ne<strong>it</strong>her side was willing to abandon <strong>it</strong>spos<strong>it</strong>ion. In other words: our analysis stresses that underlying factors wereprimarily responsible for the failure of the process. <strong>The</strong>se factors included
46 Edward Aspinall & Harold Crouchnot only the tactical (rather than principled) pos<strong>it</strong>ion that both sidesadopted toward the peace process but also aspects of the broad pol<strong>it</strong>icalcontext such as the gradual recovery of the Indonesian mil<strong>it</strong>ary’s pol<strong>it</strong>icalconfidence and influence from the low point when the peace processbegan. But were there also problemsin the design and implementationof the process <strong>it</strong>selfbreakdown was the huge gapthat contributed to <strong>it</strong>s collapse?between their goals Could these problems have beenaddressed? Could other measureshave been taken, at least to preserve the peace, even if they could notbring about a complete resolution of the conflict?One impediment was the government’s impos<strong>it</strong>ion of a stricttimetable on the negotiations that followed COHA in December 2002.An important lesson is that the final resolution of zero-sum disputes cannotbe achieved quickly. In the absence of mutual confidence, <strong>it</strong> wasunrealistic for the government to hope that the signing of the COHAagreement would lead to a full settlement seven months later. GAM couldnot be expected to suddenly discard the goal for which <strong>it</strong> had been fightingfor a quarter of a century. <strong>The</strong> time frame was also too short for thegovernment to demonstrate <strong>it</strong> had the will to implement the reforms thatwere needed to win <strong>Aceh</strong>nese “hearts and minds.” On the other side,GAM’s use of the cease-fire to mobilize support and consolidate <strong>it</strong>s forcesmade <strong>it</strong> almost inev<strong>it</strong>able that the mil<strong>it</strong>ary hard-liners would reject adrawn-out process.Some cr<strong>it</strong>ics have argued that negotiations over the cease-fire shouldhave been conducted in parallel w<strong>it</strong>h talks over the substance of the settlement.This indeed was the view of the HDC but <strong>it</strong> was not able to persuadethe two parties which were inclined to focus first on the immediateissues of demil<strong>it</strong>arization and to leave the All-Inclusive Dialogue untillater. 160 <strong>The</strong> failure to commence substantive talks placed particular pressureon GAM, by effectively requiring that <strong>it</strong> disarm w<strong>it</strong>hout any guaranteethat <strong>it</strong>s pol<strong>it</strong>ical aspirations would eventually be addressed. GAM’sreluctance to disarm in turn stoked government suspicion that the movementwas not serious about the peace process. By entering discussions onsubstance while at the same time negotiating details of the demil<strong>it</strong>arizationprocess, each side might have been able to offer the other sidestronger incentives to adhere to the cease-fire. Incentives to GAM<strong>The</strong> fundamental reason for the
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong> 47(perhaps in the form of recogn<strong>it</strong>ion for some kind of local pol<strong>it</strong>ical partyor electoral process) might have convinced the organization to act moredecisively on the demil<strong>it</strong>arization issue. <strong>The</strong> counterargument, of course,is that <strong>it</strong> was difficult enough to reach agreement on demil<strong>it</strong>arizationw<strong>it</strong>hout complicating <strong>it</strong> further by bringing in the seemingly intractablequestions that would be tackled later by the all-inclusive dialogue.Disagreement over a final settlement might have sabotaged the cease-firenegotiations—as such disagreement did in fact eventually sabotage <strong>it</strong>simplementation. Following the failure of the peace process, even thedoves in the government now insist that agreement on the final goal—special autonomy—must be a precond<strong>it</strong>ion for renewed negotiations.In retrospect, <strong>it</strong> appears that a successful formula would have neededto broach the substantive pol<strong>it</strong>ical issues, but in a way that aimed tocome up w<strong>it</strong>h interim rather than final solutions. Such a “delayed settlement”approach (more or less what HDC was aiming at) would haverequired both sides to refrain from mil<strong>it</strong>ary actions while the governmentsought ways of drawing GAM into local pol<strong>it</strong>ical processes andstructures w<strong>it</strong>hout first requiring GAM to give up <strong>it</strong>s ultimate pol<strong>it</strong>icalgoals. <strong>The</strong> key ingredient would be for the government to provideGAM w<strong>it</strong>h greater incentives to participate in conventional pol<strong>it</strong>ics asan alternative to armed struggle. In the Southern Philippines, one crucialelement that assisted the (adm<strong>it</strong>tedly painfully slow) progress in thepeace process was the Philippine government’s willingness to tolerate“const<strong>it</strong>utional” pol<strong>it</strong>ical activ<strong>it</strong>ies by former rebels—even allowing theleader of the Moro National Liberation Front, Nur Misuari, to becomehead of an autonomous Moro homeland. Participation in the peaceprocess in <strong>Aceh</strong>, by contrast, seemed to be leading GAM toward a pol<strong>it</strong>icaldead-end. Current laws made <strong>it</strong> impossible for GAM to participatein the electoral process and maintain <strong>it</strong>s ident<strong>it</strong>y. Indonesian officialsruled out the possibil<strong>it</strong>y of separate local elections in <strong>Aceh</strong>, let aloneGAM participation in them, regardless of whether the movement aimedat achieving independence or not. Eventually GAM was offered a choicebetween complete cap<strong>it</strong>ulation or a mil<strong>it</strong>ary offensive. Even so, GAM’sfinal draft statement at the Joint Council meeting in Tokyo in May2003, in which <strong>it</strong> offered to give up <strong>it</strong>s armed struggle and refrain fromadvocating independence, may have contained a basis for a “delayed settlement”and later negotiations and perhaps should not have beenrejected so abruptly by the Indonesian side.
48 Edward Aspinall & Harold CrouchAnother common cr<strong>it</strong>icism of the peace process is that participationin the main negotiations on the <strong>Aceh</strong>nese side should not have been lim<strong>it</strong>edto GAM: a wider spectrum of <strong>Aceh</strong>nese society should have beeninvolved. In this perspective, lim<strong>it</strong>ing participation to the Indonesiangovernment and representatives of GAM doomed the negotiations tofailure by establishing an adversarial framework in which the two sideshad fundamentally incompatible pos<strong>it</strong>ions regarding the end result.Involving a broader range of representatives of <strong>Aceh</strong>nese society mighthave widened the scope of discussion and shifted the focus away fromthe ultimate question of sovereignty toward more practical steps thatcould be taken to lessen the suffering of the civilian population. Tworesponses can be made to this proposal. First, the goal of the originalnegotiations was to achieve a cease-fire as a precond<strong>it</strong>ion for discussionsabout a long-term resolution. It could hardly be expected that such discussionswould be fru<strong>it</strong>ful while fighting continued on the ground. <strong>The</strong>cease-fire, therefore, had to be negotiated by the parties engaged in thefighting, not by all sections of society. Only then could broader discussionstake place w<strong>it</strong>hin the framework of the all-inclusive dialogue asenvisaged in the COHA agreement. Ensuring that civil society participantswould be selected by an open and transparent mechanism toensure they were truly representative of the <strong>Aceh</strong>nese commun<strong>it</strong>y wasanother challenge that would have been difficult enough to achieve if thecease-fire had held—let alone under cond<strong>it</strong>ions of violent conflict. <strong>The</strong>second reason for negotiating w<strong>it</strong>h GAM alone was that GAM was notwilling to participate as just one among many <strong>Aceh</strong>nese groups. If thegovernment had insisted on including other groups, most likely thenegotiations would not have begun at all.An alternative approach for the government might have been to concentrateon talking w<strong>it</strong>h GAM’s <strong>Aceh</strong>-based leaders rather than w<strong>it</strong>h theold-guard in Stockholm. Indeed, by agreeing to negotiate w<strong>it</strong>h Hasan diTiro and his “government,” Jakarta may have inadvertently reinforcedtheir author<strong>it</strong>y over the movement in <strong>Aceh</strong>. Offering concessions to localGAM leaders might have encouraged them to seek their own separatedeal w<strong>it</strong>h Jakarta. This too, however, was a doubtful propos<strong>it</strong>ion.Although the s<strong>it</strong>uation on the ground in 1999 was confused, <strong>it</strong> appears inretrospect that the key GAM field commanders were loyal to their leadersin Stockholm. <strong>The</strong> fact that many of them had trained together in Libyain the late 1980s gave them considerable ideological and group cohesion.
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong> 49Certainly by the time Abdurrahman Wahid sent his aide BondanGunawan to meet GAM commander Abdullah Syafi’ie in March 2000,the HDC-sponsored talks were already under way in Geneva and theopportun<strong>it</strong>y to separate the <strong>Aceh</strong>-based GAM from the Stockholm groupmay have been missed. Much later, in 2002, some officials claim theydetected indications that certain local leaders were adopting a more flexibleapproach which was then vetoed by Stockholm. 161 But there may havebeen an element of wishful thinking here too: Indonesian leaders periodicallyasserted that GAM was rent by internal divisions as part of theirattempt to discred<strong>it</strong> the movement. Overall <strong>it</strong> seems likely that mostGAM field commanders were loyal to Stockholm and equally uncompromisingon the question of independence. Although the government nevertested their loyalty by seriously attempting to induce them to break w<strong>it</strong>hStockholm, such an attempt would have necess<strong>it</strong>ated pol<strong>it</strong>ical concessionsthat the government was unwilling to make.Finally, we must consider the role of the HDC and the internationalcommun<strong>it</strong>y in seeking a resolution to the <strong>Aceh</strong> conflict. (see Huberforthcoming) Some cr<strong>it</strong>ics have suggested that the HDC <strong>it</strong>self may havepartly contributed to the failings of the peace process due to such factorsas <strong>it</strong>s relative inexperience and the lim<strong>it</strong>ed local knowledge of <strong>it</strong>s personnel—althoughthese in<strong>it</strong>ial drawbacks were gradually overcome duringthe more-than three years of the peace process. Others have suggestedthat because the <strong>Aceh</strong> peace process was the HDC’s first major internationalmediation effort, the organization had an inst<strong>it</strong>utional interest in“talking up” the process—at times encouraging a false sense of optimismw<strong>it</strong>h the result that fundamental stumbling blocks were not properlyaddressed. But, as HDC members point out, they only dropped their“low-profile” approach when they felt that misleading press reports neededto be countered in the period after the COHA was signed. Yet anothercr<strong>it</strong>icism was that the HDC, as a relatively new and low-profile NGO,lacked sufficient leverage over the two parties; people in the organizationrespond that they did have the capac<strong>it</strong>y to exert pressure on the partiesby mobilizing the international commun<strong>it</strong>y, notably via the “wise men.”Although we have not been sufficiently closely involved in the process topronounce judgment on these questions, the overall thrust of our analysissuggests that such failings, even if proved, would have been at most ofsecondary importance. Moreover, the HDC was acting under great constraints.Key elements in the Indonesian mil<strong>it</strong>ary and pol<strong>it</strong>ical el<strong>it</strong>e were
50 Edward Aspinall & Harold Crouchaware that GAM and other pro-independence groups aimed to internationalizethe <strong>Aceh</strong> conflict and were strongly concerned to lim<strong>it</strong> (or preventaltogether) international involvement in the peace process. Directinvolvement in mediation attempts by a more powerful internationalbody, such as the UN, was ruled out from the start. In these circumstances,<strong>it</strong> is not surprising that HDC’s leverage was constrained. Indeedthe organization deserves cred<strong>it</strong> for keeping the process going as long as<strong>it</strong> did and for exploring innovative methods (such as involvement of the“wise men”) for extending international participation. Moreover, majorcountries, including the Un<strong>it</strong>ed States, Japan, and the European Union,together w<strong>it</strong>h the World Bank, supported peace negotiations andopposed a mil<strong>it</strong>ary solution. <strong>The</strong> mediation efforts of the HDC weresupported and partly financed by these countries. Through the “wisemen,” the Un<strong>it</strong>ed States and other countries added weight to the role ofthe HDC and helped formulate the COHA agreement. But as eventsshowed, the influence of the international commun<strong>it</strong>y was not decisive.ProspectsAt present the ball is in the Indonesian government’s court. By abandoningthe peace process and launching a mil<strong>it</strong>ary offensive, <strong>it</strong> has greatlyreduced the capac<strong>it</strong>y of other actors to bring about a peaceful resolutionof the <strong>Aceh</strong> conflict. Not only have government officials made <strong>it</strong> clearthat they believe HDC’s role in the conflict is ended, but the capac<strong>it</strong>y offoreign governments to influence the course of events is now lim<strong>it</strong>ed.While the governments of Japan, various EU countries, the Un<strong>it</strong>edStates, and others expressed their disappointment when the May 2003Tokyo talks failed, these governments were also distressed by the pos<strong>it</strong>iontaken by GAM during the talks. Today <strong>it</strong> would take considerable publicpressure on the part of foreign governments to persuade Jakarta to returnto the negotiating table. <strong>The</strong>re have been few signs that these governmentsare willing to risk their good standing w<strong>it</strong>h Jakarta by openlyexerting pressure on the <strong>Aceh</strong> issue at a time when other issues (notablythe “War on Terror”) are greater foreign policy prior<strong>it</strong>ies. 162GAM has l<strong>it</strong>tle capac<strong>it</strong>y to bring about a return to the negotiatingtable, although <strong>it</strong>s leaders have called for a resumption of talks. 163 Havingrefused to accede to the final Indonesian ultimatum, however, the movementis now defending <strong>it</strong>s very existence. GAM forces on the ground areunder sustained mil<strong>it</strong>ary assault, and the Indonesian government is
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong> 51attempting to persuade Sweden to take legal action against theStockholm-based leadership. At present any step short of GAM’s cap<strong>it</strong>ulationon the core issues of independence and armed struggle would notinduce Indonesia to return to negotiations. Having resisted this outcomein Tokyo and survived previous mil<strong>it</strong>ary offensives, GAM’s cap<strong>it</strong>ulationcan hardly be expected.<strong>The</strong> Indonesian government’s recourse to mil<strong>it</strong>ary action and the“secur<strong>it</strong>y approach,” however, carries significant risks. <strong>The</strong> governmentcannot guarantee that the methods of <strong>it</strong>smil<strong>it</strong>ary forces will not simply lay the foundationfor new separatist challenges in thefuture. In his very frank book, the formerKorem commander and later chief of staffof the <strong>Aceh</strong> Kodam, Brigadier GeneralSyarifudin Tippe, points to the lack of professionalism of army troops in<strong>Aceh</strong>: “During the DOM period [1990–98] el<strong>it</strong>e soldiers w<strong>it</strong>h professionalcapac<strong>it</strong>y in fact besmirched the good name of the TNI throughtheir behavior that violated human rights and contradicted the ethic andident<strong>it</strong>y of soldiers of the TNI. And then in the post-DOM period, theprofessional capac<strong>it</strong>y of soldiers sent to the region was extremely doubtful.. . . Even worse, they were caught up in and unable to free themselvesfrom undisciplined behavior, arrogance, illegal extractions, andeven extortion.” He concludes that the secur<strong>it</strong>y forces have “weak capac<strong>it</strong>y. . . to carry out secur<strong>it</strong>y operations to resolve the <strong>Aceh</strong> conflict”(Tippe 2000: 94–95).At the core of <strong>Aceh</strong>nese resistance to—and indeed hatred of—Jakartarule has been the repressive role of the mil<strong>it</strong>ary and police. In add<strong>it</strong>ion tothe 1,000–3,000 killed and 900–1,400 missing in mil<strong>it</strong>ary operationsduring the early 1990s, an estimated 450 civilians were killed betweenmid-1998 and the end of 1999. In 2000 the estimate was 700 civilians;in 2001 <strong>it</strong> was over 1,000 and perhaps many more. <strong>The</strong> Legal AidInst<strong>it</strong>ute in <strong>Aceh</strong> estimates that the 2002 figure had reached 1,228 by theend of November. 164 Many thousands more became refugees as a result ofthe fighting. In early September 2003, secur<strong>it</strong>y forces said that 319 civilianshad been killed since the start of the mil<strong>it</strong>ary emergency in mid-May;human rights groups said many of the 809 claimed GAM fatal<strong>it</strong>ies duringthe same period were also civilians. 165 Although GAM was responsible forsome of the killing, much was perpetrated by soldiers and Brimob.Jakarta’s recourse tomil<strong>it</strong>ary action carriessignificant risks
52 Edward Aspinall & Harold CrouchMoreover, many victims and w<strong>it</strong>nesses attested to torture, rape, looting,arson, and other acts of violence comm<strong>it</strong>ted by secur<strong>it</strong>y forces.By using the mil<strong>it</strong>ary option to create a breathing space in which theNAD law and other concessions may take effect, the government mayfurther undermine <strong>it</strong>s long-term credibil<strong>it</strong>y in the eyes of the <strong>Aceh</strong>nesepopulation and hence render those concessions ineffective. Whenever themil<strong>it</strong>ary embarked on an offensive in the past, GAM would suffer lossesalthough, inev<strong>it</strong>ably, <strong>it</strong> was noncombatants who suffered most. <strong>The</strong>problem for the government is that <strong>Aceh</strong>—as the government <strong>it</strong>self hasalways proclaimed—is not a foreign terr<strong>it</strong>ory under Indonesian occupationbut is inhab<strong>it</strong>ed by people that Jakarta claims as <strong>it</strong>s own. 166 <strong>The</strong>more casualties inflicted by the secur<strong>it</strong>y forces, the stronger the resentmentengendered among the <strong>Aceh</strong>nese population and the more supportgiven to separatism. GAM had already been crushed mil<strong>it</strong>arily in 1977and again in the early 1990s, but mil<strong>it</strong>ary brutal<strong>it</strong>y inflicted on one generationhad sown the seeds of rebellion in the next. As Syaiful Achmad,an <strong>Aceh</strong>nese member of the DPR, explained: “Those who have joinedGAM are the sons of fathers who were killed by the mil<strong>it</strong>ary, and youngpeople who have lost hope because the forests and fish of our regionhave been plundered.” 167 GAM’s leaders believe deeply in an ethos ofblood sacrifice. <strong>The</strong>y are confident that the suffering vis<strong>it</strong>ed upon the<strong>Aceh</strong>nese population as a result of mil<strong>it</strong>ary operations will be so heavythat <strong>it</strong> will swell future popular support for independence.Part of the Indonesian government’s strategy has been to sidestepGAM altogether and address unilaterally some of the underlying issuesthat have generated support for the insurgency. <strong>The</strong> NAD law has thepotential to go some distance toward meeting the economic grievances ofthe <strong>Aceh</strong>nese people. But much will depend on how the new revenuesare spent. Corruption and misuse of funds are common among regionalgovernments throughout Indonesia, and the same pressures felt elsewhereare also felt in <strong>Aceh</strong>—the main difference being that in <strong>Aceh</strong> the amountof funds available is much higher than in the less well endowedprovinces. <strong>The</strong> International Crisis Group (ICG 2003: i) has describedthe provincial government <strong>it</strong>self as “an obstacle to lasting peace because <strong>it</strong>has such low credibil<strong>it</strong>y and is so widely seen as corrupt. As long as <strong>it</strong> isseen to embody ‘autonomy’ . . . many <strong>Aceh</strong>nese will continue to seeindependence as a desirable alternative.” Moreover, to the extent that theregional government in <strong>Aceh</strong> is forced to bear some of the cost of main-
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong> 53taining a huge mil<strong>it</strong>ary and police presence, less will be available toimprove living standards of the people of <strong>Aceh</strong>. <strong>The</strong> current mil<strong>it</strong>aryemergency—under which the regional commander, Major GeneralEndang Suwarya, has been made “Regional Mil<strong>it</strong>ary EmergencyAuthor<strong>it</strong>y” for the province and numerous junior officers are taking uppos<strong>it</strong>ions in the civilian administration—is likely to prevent the NADlaw from delivering a sense of genuine self-government.Another grievance that could be addressed unilaterally by the governmentis the ubiqu<strong>it</strong>ous perception that mil<strong>it</strong>ary and police personnelenjoy impun<strong>it</strong>y for human-rights crimes. Of all the possible measuresthat might restore <strong>Aceh</strong>nese confidence in the central government, themost immediately effective would be the prosecution of senior mil<strong>it</strong>aryand police personnel responsible for human rights violations. Even thegovernor of <strong>Aceh</strong>, Abdullah Puteh, has called for the establishment of ahuman rights court in <strong>Aceh</strong>. 168 Such a measure, however, would meetalmost total resistance w<strong>it</strong>hin the secur<strong>it</strong>y forces. During the current mil<strong>it</strong>aryemergency, courts martial have indeed punished some ordinary soldierswho comm<strong>it</strong>ted abuses but senior officers remain immune. GeneralEndriartono claims that he is not opposed to the establishment of ahuman rights court in <strong>Aceh</strong> but adds that for the next two years prior<strong>it</strong>yshould be given to pol<strong>it</strong>ical and economic stabil<strong>it</strong>y, not upholding thelaw. 169 Even in the unlikely case that a human rights court is establishedsome time in the future, the experience of trials of senior mil<strong>it</strong>ary personnelaccused of offences in <strong>East</strong> Timor does not provide much assurancefor the <strong>Aceh</strong>nese.In conclusion, therefore, we are skeptical that the Indonesian sidewill be able to achieve what <strong>it</strong> could not in the past. Previous mil<strong>it</strong>aryoperations have succeeded in reducing GAM’s armed presence, but thegovernment’s methods have alienated the population and made many ofthem more sympathetic to the rebels. <strong>The</strong>re does appear to be someawareness on the part of the senior officers that victimization of civiliansshould be reduced and efforts have been made by the mil<strong>it</strong>ary leadershipto impose stronger discipline. However, there are also indications thatmany of the methods used in the current secur<strong>it</strong>y operations are similarto those of past (see Sukma forthcoming). Moreover, restrictions onaccess by international agencies and the press make <strong>it</strong> difficult to verifythe mil<strong>it</strong>ary’s claims of better performance. At the same time, corruptionin local government and resistance to punishing perpetrators of human
54 Edward Aspinall & Harold CrouchA final resolution isunlikely to be attainedw<strong>it</strong>hout fundamentalchanges in pos<strong>it</strong>ionrights abuses undermine the government’s capac<strong>it</strong>y to take unilateralaction to reduce the popular base of the insurgency. As a result, <strong>it</strong> seemslikely that GAM will not be eliminated as a mil<strong>it</strong>ary force and may eventuallyexperience another resurgence once the current mil<strong>it</strong>ary operationsend or at some later moment of crisis in Jakarta/<strong>Aceh</strong> relations. It is ourview, therefore, that a final resolution of the <strong>Aceh</strong> conflict is unlikely tobe achieved soon and will ultimately require a new round of talks.In reviewing the lessons of the failed process, we have stressed theconstraints faced by negotiators on both sides—constraints caused by theunderlying gulf that separated them on the eventual pol<strong>it</strong>ical status of<strong>Aceh</strong>, as well as internal divisions and ambivalence concerning the peaceprocess <strong>it</strong>self. On the Indonesian side, those who supported negotiationswere always in a minor<strong>it</strong>y in the government and faced constant cr<strong>it</strong>icismfrom those who favored mil<strong>it</strong>ary action. Indeed at times the mil<strong>it</strong>ary—orat least some elements w<strong>it</strong>hin <strong>it</strong>—was taking active steps to underminethe process. On the GAM side, <strong>it</strong> was the negotiators themselves whowere the hard-liners. <strong>The</strong> Stockholm-based leaders had already mademany sacrifices for the independence cause and were constrained by theirawareness that their credibil<strong>it</strong>y among their followers would have been atstake if they had given up their fundamental goal of independence.A final resolution is unlikely to be attained w<strong>it</strong>hout fundamentalchanges in the pos<strong>it</strong>ion of one or both sides. <strong>The</strong> Indonesian governmentwould have to carry out a thorough reform of <strong>it</strong>s secur<strong>it</strong>y sectorwhile reducing the influence and autonomy of hard-line officers oversecur<strong>it</strong>y policy. <strong>The</strong> GAM leadership, for <strong>it</strong>s part, would need to developa greater recogn<strong>it</strong>ion of <strong>it</strong>s own lim<strong>it</strong>ed mil<strong>it</strong>aryoptions and the inadvisabil<strong>it</strong>y of simplyawa<strong>it</strong>ing the collapse of the Indonesianstate. It takes a good deal of optimism tobelieve that these cond<strong>it</strong>ions are likely tomaterialize soon. Although our analysisdraws attention to steps that may be takento improve the course of future negotiations, we stress that the greatestobstacle to a settlement was that key groups on both sides were simplyunwilling to believe their mil<strong>it</strong>ary options were exhausted. It is for thesereasons that we think the quest for a final resolution should not beallowed to prejudice efforts to achieve a reduction in violence—and hopefullya sustainable peace—long before a final settlement can be reached.
Endnotes1. <strong>The</strong> official name of the movement is the Acheh-Sumatra National LiberationFront (ASNLF). Most Indonesians and <strong>Aceh</strong>nese, however, use the Indonesianlanguageacronym GAM, a practice followed in this paper.2. Jakarta Post, May 19, 2003.3. Kompas, May 20, 2003.4. One of the authors was surprised by the calm—almost casual—demeanor ofGAM negotiators in <strong>Aceh</strong> in March 2003 in contemplating what seemed at thattime to be the inev<strong>it</strong>able renewal of mil<strong>it</strong>ary operations.5. Interviews w<strong>it</strong>h Malik Mahmud and Zaini Abdullah, Stockholm, July 2002.6. Interview w<strong>it</strong>h Teuku Kamaruzzaman, Banda <strong>Aceh</strong>, March 2003.7. Interview w<strong>it</strong>h Sofyan Ibrahim Tiba, Banda <strong>Aceh</strong>, March 2003.8. Kompas, August 8, 1998.9. Kompas, March 27, 1999.10. Kompas, December 24, 1999.11. Kompas, July 14, 1999.12. Colonel Syarifudin Tippe, commander of the Mil<strong>it</strong>ary Resort Command based inBanda <strong>Aceh</strong> at that time, said he did not have sufficient troops to deal w<strong>it</strong>h thes<strong>it</strong>uation in any other way. Interview w<strong>it</strong>h Brigadier General Syarifudin Tippe,Banda <strong>Aceh</strong>, March 2003.13. Serambi, September 16, 1999.14. Serambi, November 11, 1999.15. Jakarta Post, November 23, 1999.16. Kompas, December 9, 1999.
56 Edward Aspinall & Harold Crouch17. Kompas, November 12, 1999.18. Republika, November 17, 1999.19. Hasan di Tiro is reported to have said that “talk of dialogue is stupid.” See AFP,November 10, 1999.20. It was claimed that Gus Dur spoke to the GAM leader in Sweden, Hasan di Tiro,by telephone but Hasan denied this: “I have nothing to do w<strong>it</strong>h Wahid, who hasno power there, or w<strong>it</strong>h the Indonesian mil<strong>it</strong>ary. We demand unilateral independencefor <strong>Aceh</strong>, w<strong>it</strong>hout a referendum.” See AFP, November 6, 1999.21. <strong>The</strong> Henry Dunant <strong>Center</strong> later renamed <strong>it</strong>self the Centre for Human<strong>it</strong>arianDialogue but continued to use the HDC acronym and remained known by <strong>it</strong>sformer name in Indonesia.22. Jakarta Post, May 5, 2000.23. HDC “Mission Statement” (http://www.hdcentre.org).24. <strong>The</strong> main exception was Malik Mahmud, the “prime minister” of the government-in-exile,who had recently moved to Stockholm from Singapore.25. Conversation w<strong>it</strong>h Hassan Wirajuda in Jakarta, May 21, 2000. For a discussion ofthe negotiation process by Hassan Wirajuda see Kontras, May 31–June 6, 2000.26. Kompas, March 18, 2000.27. Republika, March 20, 2000.28. Suara Pembaruan, January 9, 2000.29. Jakarta Post, January 18, 2000.30. Bondan said that several hours before he met Abdullah Syafi’ie he had obtained aguarantee from the chief of staff of the North Sumatra army command that troopswould not carry out operations in the area where the meeting was to be held; seeKompas, March 18, 2000. It seems that the troops involved in the raid were notfrom the army but from Brimob (Brigade Mobil), the police paramil<strong>it</strong>ary force.Whether they were acting on their own in<strong>it</strong>iative or carrying out higher orderswas not clear. In an interview Bondan suggested that the troops may have beencarrying out a routine operation and did not know about the meeting. Intervieww<strong>it</strong>h Bondan Gunawan, Jakarta, August 2000.31. Kontras, October 4–10, 2000.32. Thus various attempts by local and Jakarta-based <strong>Aceh</strong>nese to in<strong>it</strong>iate an <strong>Aceh</strong>nese“people’s congress” in the first part of 2000 were aborted, due largely to GAM’srefusal to cooperate.33. Media Indonesia, November 18, 1999; Kompas, November 19, 1999. Not all officers,however, were opposed to dialogue. One officer who showed interest in promotingtalks w<strong>it</strong>h GAM even during the Habibie era was the commander of theTeuku Umar Korem (subprovincial mil<strong>it</strong>ary command) based in Banda <strong>Aceh</strong>,Colonel Syarifudin Tippe. See Waspada, September 1, 1999.34. Kompas, March 2000.35. Jakarta Post, May 6, 2000. For similar comments by Defense Minister JuwonoSudarsono see Kompas, May 10, 2000.36. Republika, March 19, 2000.
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong> 5737. “Joint Understanding on Human<strong>it</strong>arian Pause for <strong>Aceh</strong>,” May 12, Geneva.38. <strong>The</strong> International Crisis Group, however, reported that “even w<strong>it</strong>h training, <strong>it</strong>sskills were low and the fear of reporting the truth high” (ICG 2003: 3). <strong>The</strong>sebodies were later established in the districts most affected by the conflict. Oneunanticipated consequence of the way in which members were selected was thatrelatively neutral NGO representatives were quickly identified w<strong>it</strong>h the side thathad selected them.39. Jakarta Post, May 16, 2000.40. Kompas, May 16, 2000.41. Kompas, May 12, 2000.42. Pokok-Pokok Pikiran Diskusi Pemecahan Masalah <strong>Aceh</strong> Pasca PenandatangananKesepahaman Bersama (unsigned five-page document dated May 2000).43. Jakarta Post, May 12, 2000. Surjadi had replaced General Wiranto followingWiranto’s dismissal from the cabinet.44. “Joint Understanding on Human<strong>it</strong>arian Pause for <strong>Aceh</strong>,” May 12, Geneva, p. 3.On the subsequent debates w<strong>it</strong>hin the KBMK see Kontras, June 28–July 4, 2000.45. In the view of one informant from an international agency active in <strong>Aceh</strong>, at thispoint Indonesian secur<strong>it</strong>y forces on the ground, confident they could win an openmil<strong>it</strong>ary conflict, began to suspect they had poor prospects of competing w<strong>it</strong>hGAM in winning the hearts and minds of the population under cease-fire cond<strong>it</strong>ions(confidential communication, June 27, 2001).46. See the comments by the SIRA coordinator, Muhammad Nazar, in Jakarta Post,August 2, 2000, and Kompas, August 7, 2000.47. Confidential communication, August 14, 2000.48. Kompas, September 5, 2000. <strong>The</strong>se figures come from the NGO Forum PeduliHAM <strong>Aceh</strong>.49. Jakarta Post, May 12, 2000.50. Kontras, September 6–13, 2000.51. Kompas, November 17, 2000.52. Kompas, March 31, 2001. Teungku Kamal had supported women who claimed tohave been raped by Brimob personnel.53. As early as October Mahfud announced that Indonesia was considering unilaterallycanceling the agreement because <strong>it</strong> benef<strong>it</strong>ed only GAM and harmed Indonesia.See Media Indonesia, October 19, 2000.54. “Testimony of Nazaruddin, aged 22,” Human Rights Watch, December 12, 2000.55. Kontras, May 30–June 5, 2001. Funds totaling $600,000 had been received fromthe Norwegian, Br<strong>it</strong>ish, and New Zealand governments.56. “Provisional Understanding Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesiaand the Leadership of the Free <strong>Aceh</strong> Movement,” Geneva, January 9, 2001.57. See, for example, comments by the <strong>Aceh</strong> governor, Abdullah Puteh, in SerambiIndonesia, June 29, 2001.58. Serambi Indonesia, January 10, 2001.59. Jakarta Post, February 20, 2001.
58 Edward Aspinall & Harold Crouch60. Kompas, April 10, 2001.61. Kostrad, the Army Strategic Reserve Command, consists of more than 30,000troops available to be sent to “trouble spots.”62. Of the Rp 6.9 trillion allocated to regional government in <strong>Aceh</strong>, only Rp 1.1 trillionhad been disbursed by June. <strong>The</strong> governor, Abdullah Puteh, complained thatthe only project that had been carried out was “a massive law enforcement whichmany viewed as being excessive,” not economic development projects. See JakartaPost, June 26, 2001.63. Kompas, August 23, 2001.64. In one account in Serambi Indonesia, June 25, 2001, <strong>it</strong> was reported that residentsof Drien Mangko in Wolya had discovered the bodies of three members of a familyin a hut in the middle of a rice field. All had bullet wounds and the hut hadbeen burned. <strong>The</strong> three were identified as Muhammad Dasyah (age 55), his wifeUmi Kalsum (age 45), and their 5-year-old child Heri Safwan. <strong>The</strong> newspaperadded that prior to this report Major C.A.J. Sulistiadi had issued a press releasesaying that twenty soldiers from Infantry Battalion 320/BP had raided a hut bythe side of the Drien Mangko River, seized some equipment, and killed a GAMmember called “M Dasah.” Four other GAM members escaped. No mention wasmade of the other two victims.65. Serambi Indonesia, July 21, 2001. As an indication of the impotence of the sponsorsof the peace process, this report describes two local HDC representatives desperatelyattempting to prevent the arrests. When one tried to hand an arrestingofficer a mobile telephone, the officer replied: “That’s none of your business.”66. Jakarta Post, August 30, 2001. Although they were released, the charges were notw<strong>it</strong>hdrawn. Interview w<strong>it</strong>h one of the men, Teuku Kamaruzzaman, Banda <strong>Aceh</strong>,March 2003.67. Kompas, July 30, 1999.68. See her first independence day speech as president; Kompas, August 18, 2001.69. Media Indonesia, November 30, 2001.70. Kompas, August 25, 2001.71. Jakarta Post, July 26, 2002.72. Koran Tempo, May 2, 2002.73. Jakarta Post, January 17, 2001.74. A GAM official told the International Crisis Group (ICG 2002: 2) that the areaunder <strong>it</strong>s effective control had shrunk from 60–70 percent to around 30–40 percent.ICG noted that although these figures were not necessarily “geographicallyaccurate,” they suggested the extent of GAM’s losses.75. Kompas, April 6, 2001.76. Malaysia’s former deputy prime minister, Musa H<strong>it</strong>am, was in<strong>it</strong>ially involved butsoon w<strong>it</strong>hdrew, possibly because of GAM’s suspicions about Malaysia’s role.77. In an interview one of the GAM negotiators said that although <strong>it</strong> was difficult forGAM to return to negotiations immediately after the murder of Abdullah Syafi’ie,GAM was “rational, not emotional.” He believed that the TNI wanted to sabotagethe forthcoming talks but GAM would not allow <strong>it</strong>self to be intimidated.Interview w<strong>it</strong>h Teuku Kamaruzzaman, Banda <strong>Aceh</strong>, March 2003.
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong> 5978. <strong>The</strong> joint statement is included in the Cessation of Hostil<strong>it</strong>ies agreement adoptedon December 9, 2002.79. Acheh-Sumatra National Liberation Front, press release, Geneva, May 10, 2002.80. Kompas, May 14, 2002.81. Kompas, May 12, 2002.82. Koran Tempo, May 13, 2002.83. Jakarta Post, May 31, 2002.84. Koran Tempo, July 12, 2002.85. Koran Tempo, August 10, 2002.86. Koran Tempo, August 13, 2002.87. Koran Tempo, July 12, 2002.88. Koran Tempo, August 28, 2002.89. Jakarta Post, July 19, 2002.90. Kompas, August 20, 2002.91. In<strong>it</strong>ially HDC had proposed a “three-key system” under which the third keywould be held by TNI; GAM objected, however, and the TNI agreed to relinquish<strong>it</strong>s key (ICG 2003: 10).92. Tempo, November 25, 2002.93. Kopassus (Komando Pasukan Khusus) is the army’s el<strong>it</strong>e special force.94. Koran Tempo, November 9, 2002.95. Koran Tempo, November 11, 2002.96. Koran Tempo, November 8, 2002.97. Koran Tempo, November 21–22, 2002.98. In the end the foreign mon<strong>it</strong>ors were mainly from Thailand. GAM vetoed participationof mon<strong>it</strong>ors from Malaysia and Singapore (because these countries were“too close to Jakarta”) but accepted Thailand and the Philippines. When PresidentArroyo casually remarked that the participation of the Filipino mon<strong>it</strong>ors was away of repaying Indonesia for <strong>it</strong>s earlier assistance in Mindanao, however, GAMprotested their presence. Eventually, only eight Filipinos joined the mon<strong>it</strong>oringteam.99. <strong>The</strong> term all-inclusive dialogue echoed the all-inclusive dialogue held between proindependenceand pro-Jakarta groups in <strong>East</strong> Timor. A key government cond<strong>it</strong>ionfor the <strong>East</strong> Timor dialogue was that <strong>it</strong> would not discuss <strong>East</strong> Timor’s futurepol<strong>it</strong>ical status.100. See, for example, comments by Governor Abdullah Puteh in Analisa, December17, 2002.101. HDC news release, February 9, 2003.102. Kompas, January 28, 2003.103. Kompas, December 16, 2002.104. Analisa, December 17, 2002.105. Kompas, December 13, 2002.
60 Edward Aspinall & Harold Crouch106. Kompas, January 16, 2003, February 6, 2003, February 14, 2003; Jakarta Post,February 14, 2003.107. COHA, Article 5(b).108. Koran Tempo, January 28, 2003.109. Koran Tempo, February 11, 2003.110. Kompas, February 16, 2003. This revealing report mentions a police officer whoadm<strong>it</strong>ted that his men could only work w<strong>it</strong>hin a radius of 300 meters from thepolice station. Villagers were reluctant to report even criminal matters to thepolice.111. Kompas, April 16, 2003.112. Kompas, April 28, 2003.113. Serambi Indonesia, February 11, 2003.114. Serambi Indonesia, April 11, 2003.115. Analisa, February 13, 2003.116. Koran Tempo, February 15, 2003. Nazar had been jailed for nine months in 2001for advocating the holding of a referendum. A warrant was also issued for thearrest of another speaker, Muhammad Kautsar.117. Stra<strong>it</strong>s Times, April 10, 2003.118. Serambi Indonesia, January 17, 2003.119. Kontras, February 19–25, 2003. <strong>The</strong> pre-COHA debate about whether thereshould be two or three “keys” seems rather bizarre in this context.120. Koran Tempo, February 24, 2003.121. Koran Tempo, February 22, 2003.122. Koran Tempo, March 14, 2003.123. Kompas, February 8, 2003. <strong>The</strong> Indonesian army has a “terr<strong>it</strong>orial” structure inwhich troops are spread throughout the country in a hierarchy of commandsstretching from Jakarta to small townships. This system operates throughout thecountry, not just in <strong>Aceh</strong>.124. Tempo, February 10, 2003.125. Kompas, April 15, 2003.126. Kompas, December 10, 2002.127. Tempo, December 8, 2002.128. Jakarta Post, February 18, 2003.129. Koran Tempo, January 27, 2003.130. JSC News Release, February 15, 2003.131. Jakarta Post, January 21, 2003; Serambi Indonesia, January 21, 2003.132. Kompas, February 5, 2003.133. Koran Tempo, March 7, 2003.134. Kiki Syahnakri, “<strong>Aceh</strong> Pascaperjanjian Damai,” Kompas, February 25, 2003.135. Kompas, March 5, 2003; JSC News Release, March 20, 2003.136. For background on this mil<strong>it</strong>ia see ICG (2002: 6–8).
<strong>The</strong> Failure of the <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>Process</strong> in <strong>Aceh</strong> 61137. “Kronologis pengrusakan dan pembakaran kantor dan mobil JSC di BuntulKubu, Takengon, <strong>Aceh</strong> Tengah,” distributed by e-mail by the U.S.-based Acheh<strong>Center</strong>, March 6, 2003.138. Kompas, March 13, 2003.139. Serambi Indonesia, March 18, 2003. Pidie is one of GAM’s stronghold districts.140. Waspada, March 5, 2003.141. Tempo, March 31, 2003.142. Tempo, March 31, 2003. <strong>The</strong> demonstrators in Pidie, one of GAM’s main bases ofsupport, wore masks—presumably so they could not be identified as people fromoutside Pidie or, as some claimed, soldiers or police.143. Interview, Banda <strong>Aceh</strong>, March 2003.144. Interview, March 2003.145. Kompas, April 24, 2003.146. Kompas, April 16, 2003.147. Jakarta Post, April 25, 2003.148. Kompas, March 29, 2003.159. Kompas, April 5, 2003.150. Koran Tempo, April 22, 2003.151. Jakarta Post, April 24, 2003; Koran Tempo, April 25, 2003.152. Koran Tempo, April 15, 2003.153. Kompas, April 25, 2003. Yudhoyono had been informed of the postponementonly one hour before he was due to depart from Jakarta. Several other members ofthe Indonesian delegation had already left for Geneva.154. Jakarta Post, April 29, 2003.155. Kompas, May 6, 2003.156. Draft Statement of the Joint Council (GAM).157. Draft Statement of the Joint Council (the version containing the government’sfinal offer).158. Kompas, May 10, 2003; May 8, 2003.159. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in a meeting w<strong>it</strong>h members of the <strong>East</strong>-<strong>West</strong> <strong>Center</strong>Washington <strong>Aceh</strong> Study Group, Jakarta, June 18, 2003.160. Communication from David Gorman, former head of HDC team in <strong>Aceh</strong>,September 2003.161. Meeting w<strong>it</strong>h Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Jakarta, June 18, 2003.162. However, in responding to a question at a press conference following the ASEANSumm<strong>it</strong> in Bali in October, the Japanese prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi, said“W<strong>it</strong>h respect to <strong>Aceh</strong>, we certainly hope in the first place for a peaceful resolution”and expressed Japan’s readiness to assist the process. Jakarta Post, October 9, 2003.163. See for example Acheh-Sumatra National Liberation Front, “Speech of Mr. MalikMahmud, Prime Minister of the State of Acheh, at the Exchange of Views onHuman Rights in Indonesia, Human Rights Working Group, EuropeanParliament,” October 1, 2003.
62 Edward Aspinall & Harold Crouch164. Media Indonesia Online, November 30, 2002.165. Media Indonesia, September 7, 2003; Serambi Indonesia, September 3, 2003.166. Army forces in <strong>Aceh</strong>, as in other provinces, consist of “organic” and “nonorganic”troops. Organic troops are those attached to the <strong>Aceh</strong> regional army command(Kodam); “nonorganic” troops are brought in temporarily from other parts ofIndonesia. <strong>The</strong> nonorganic troops can easily be seen by <strong>Aceh</strong>nese as an army of occupation.Even among the organic un<strong>it</strong>s based in <strong>Aceh</strong>, a former <strong>Aceh</strong> Kodam commanderestimated there were only about 100 <strong>Aceh</strong>nese soldiers among the 600 or700 in each battalion. Interview w<strong>it</strong>h Major General. Djali Jusuf, Jakarta, June 2003.167. Kompas, September 20, 2002.168. Jakarta Post, January 13, 2003.169. Koran Tempo, December 20, 2002.
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64 Edward Aspinall & Harold CrouchSchulze, Kirsten. Forthcoming. <strong>The</strong> Anatomy of the Free <strong>Aceh</strong> Movement. Policy Studiesseries. Washington, D.C.: <strong>East</strong>-<strong>West</strong> <strong>Center</strong>.Sukma, Rizal. Forthcoming. Secur<strong>it</strong>y Operations in <strong>Aceh</strong>: Patterns and Dynamics. PolicyStudies series. Washington, D.C.: <strong>East</strong>-<strong>West</strong> <strong>Center</strong>.Tippe, Syarifudin. 2000. <strong>Aceh</strong> di Persimpangan Jalan. Jakarta: Pustaka Cidesindo.Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang. 2001. <strong>Aceh</strong> Perlu Keadilan Kesejahteraan dan Keamanan.Jakarta: Kantor Menko Polsoskam.
65<strong>The</strong> Dynamics and Management of Internal Conflicts in Asia:Project Rationale, Purpose and OutlineProject Director: Muthiah AlagappaPrincipal Researchers: Edward Aspinall (<strong>Aceh</strong>)Danilyn Rutherford (Papua)Christopher Collier (Southern Philippines)Gardner Bovingdon (Xinjiang)Elliot Sperling (Tibet)RationaleInternal conflicts have been a prominent feature of the Asian pol<strong>it</strong>icallandscape since 1945. Asia has w<strong>it</strong>nessed numerous civil wars, armedinsurgencies, coups d’etat, regional rebellions, and revolutions. Manyhave been protracted; several have far reaching domestic and internationalconsequences. <strong>The</strong> civil war in Pakistan led to the break up of thatcountry in 1971; separatist struggles challenge the pol<strong>it</strong>ical and terr<strong>it</strong>orialintegr<strong>it</strong>y of China, India, Indonesia, Burma, the Philippines, Thailand,and Sri Lanka; pol<strong>it</strong>ical uprisings in Thailand (1973 and 1991), thePhilippines (1986), South Korea (1986), Taiwan, Bangladesh (1991),and Indonesia (1998) resulted in dramatic pol<strong>it</strong>ical change in thosecountries; although the pol<strong>it</strong>ical uprisings in Burma (1988) and China(1989) were suppressed, the pol<strong>it</strong>ical systems in these countries as well asin Vietnam continue to confront problems of pol<strong>it</strong>ical leg<strong>it</strong>imacy thatcould become acute; and radical Islam poses serious challenges to stabil<strong>it</strong>yin Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and India. In all, millions of peoplehave been killed in the internal conflicts, and tens of millions have beendisplaced. And the involvement of external powers in a compet<strong>it</strong>ive manner(especially during the Cold War) in several of these conflicts hadnegative consequences for domestic and regional secur<strong>it</strong>y.Internal conflicts in Asia (as elsewhere) can be traced to three issues—national ident<strong>it</strong>y, pol<strong>it</strong>ical leg<strong>it</strong>imacy (the t<strong>it</strong>le to rule), and distributivejustice—that are often interconnected. W<strong>it</strong>h the bankruptcy of thesocialist model and the trans<strong>it</strong>ions to democracy in several countries, thenumber of internal conflicts over the leg<strong>it</strong>imacy of pol<strong>it</strong>ical system hasdeclined in Asia. However, pol<strong>it</strong>ical leg<strong>it</strong>imacy of certain governmentscontinues to be contested from time to time and the leg<strong>it</strong>imacy of theremaining communist and author<strong>it</strong>arian systems are likely to confrontchallenges in due course. <strong>The</strong> project deals w<strong>it</strong>h internal conflicts arising
66from the process of constructing national ident<strong>it</strong>y w<strong>it</strong>h specific focus onconflicts rooted in the relationship of minor<strong>it</strong>y commun<strong>it</strong>ies to thenation-state. Here too many Asian states have made considerableprogress in constructing national commun<strong>it</strong>ies but several states includingsome major ones still confront serious problems that have degeneratedinto violent conflict. By affecting the pol<strong>it</strong>ical and terr<strong>it</strong>orial integr<strong>it</strong>yof the state as well as the physical, cultural, economic, and pol<strong>it</strong>ical secur<strong>it</strong>yof individuals and groups, these conflicts have great potential toaffect domestic and international stabil<strong>it</strong>y.Purpose<strong>The</strong> project investigates the dynamics and management of five key internalconflicts in Asia—<strong>Aceh</strong> and Papua in Indonesia, the Moro conflict insouthern Philippines, and the conflicts pertaining to Tibet and Xinjiangin China. Specifically <strong>it</strong> investigates the following:1. <strong>Why</strong> (on what basis), how (in what form), and when does group differentiationand pol<strong>it</strong>ical consciousness emerge?2. What are the specific issues of contention in such conflicts? Arethese of the instrumental or cogn<strong>it</strong>ive type? If both, what is the relationshipbetween them? Have the issues of contention altered overtime? Are the conflicts likely to undergo further redefin<strong>it</strong>ion?3. When, why, and under what circumstances can such contentionslead to violent conflict? Under what circumstances have they not ledto violent conflict?4. How can the conflicts be managed, settled, and eventually resolved?What are policy choices? Do options such as national self-determination,autonomy, federalism, electoral design, and consociationalismexhaust the list of choices available to meet the aspirations of minor<strong>it</strong>ycommun<strong>it</strong>ies? Are there innovative ways of thinking about ident<strong>it</strong>yand sovereignty that can meet the aspirations of the minor<strong>it</strong>ycommun<strong>it</strong>ies w<strong>it</strong>hout creating new sovereign nation-states?5. What is the role of the regional and international commun<strong>it</strong>ies inthe protection of minor<strong>it</strong>y commun<strong>it</strong>ies?6. How and when does a policy choice become relevant?DesignA study group has been organized for each of the five conflicts investigatedin the study. W<strong>it</strong>h a principal researcher each, the study groupscomprise pract<strong>it</strong>ioners and scholars from the respective Asian countries
67including the region or province that is the focus of the conflict, theUn<strong>it</strong>ed States, and Australia. For compos<strong>it</strong>ion of study groups please seethe participants list.All five study groups met jointly for the first time in Washington, D.C.from September 29 through October 3, 2002. Over a period of four days,participants engaged in intensive discussion of a wide range of issues pertainingto the five conflicts investigated in the project. In add<strong>it</strong>ion toidentifying key issues for research and publication, the meeting facil<strong>it</strong>atedthe development of cross country perspectives and interaction amongscholars who had not previously worked together. Based on discussion atthe meeting five research monograph length studies (one per conflict) andtwenty policy papers (four per conflict) were commissioned.Study groups met separately for the second meeting. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Aceh</strong> andPapua study group meetings were held in Bali on June 16-17, theSouthern Philippines study group met in Manila on June 23, and theTibet and Xinjiang study groups were held in Honolulu from August 20through 22, 2003. <strong>The</strong>se meetings reviewed recent developments relatingto the conflicts, cr<strong>it</strong>ically reviewed the first drafts of the policy papersprepared for the project, reviewed the book proposals by the principalresearchers, and identified new topics for research.<strong>The</strong> third meeting of all study groups has been scheduled from February28 through March 2, 2004 in Washington, D.C.Publications<strong>The</strong> project will result in five research monographs (book length studies)and about twenty policy papers.Research Monographs. To be authored by the principal researchers, thesemonographs present a book-length study of the key issues pertaining toeach of the five conflicts. Subject to satisfactory peer review, the monographswill appear in the <strong>East</strong>-<strong>West</strong> <strong>Center</strong> Washington series AsianSecur<strong>it</strong>y, and the <strong>East</strong>-<strong>West</strong> <strong>Center</strong> series Contemporary Issues in the AsiaPacific, both published by the Stanford Univers<strong>it</strong>y Press.Policy Papers. <strong>The</strong> policy papers provide a detailed study of particularaspects of each conflict. Subject to satisfactory peer review, these 10,000to 25,000-word essays will be published in the <strong>East</strong>-<strong>West</strong> <strong>Center</strong>Washington Policy Studies series, and be circulated widely to key personneland inst<strong>it</strong>utions in the policy and intellectual commun<strong>it</strong>ies and the mediain the respective Asian countries, Un<strong>it</strong>ed States, and other relevant countries.
68Public ForumsTo engage the informed public and to disseminate the findings of theproject to a wide audience, public forums have been organized in conjunctionw<strong>it</strong>h study group meetings.Two public forums were organized in Washington, D.C. in conjunctionw<strong>it</strong>h the first study group meeting. <strong>The</strong> first forum, cosponsored by the<strong>East</strong>-<strong>West</strong> <strong>Center</strong> Washington and Un<strong>it</strong>ed States-Indonesia Society, discussedthe <strong>Aceh</strong> and Papua conflicts. <strong>The</strong> second forum, cosponsored bythe <strong>East</strong>-<strong>West</strong> <strong>Center</strong> Washington, Un<strong>it</strong>ed States Inst<strong>it</strong>ute of <strong>Peace</strong>, theAsia Program of the Woodrow Wilson International <strong>Center</strong>, and theSigur <strong>Center</strong> of the George Washington Univers<strong>it</strong>y, discussed the Tibetand Xinjiang conflicts.Public forums were also organized in Jakarta and Manila in conjunctionw<strong>it</strong>h the second study group meetings. <strong>The</strong> Jakarta public forum on<strong>Aceh</strong> and Papua, cosponsored by the <strong>Center</strong> for Strategic andInternational Studies in Jakarta, and the Southern Philippines publicforum cosponsored by the Policy <strong>Center</strong> of the Asian Inst<strong>it</strong>ute ofManagement, attracted persons from government, media, think tanks,activist groups, diplomatic commun<strong>it</strong>y and the public.Funding SupportThis project is supported w<strong>it</strong>h a generous grant from the CarnegieCorporation of New York.
69Project DirectorMuthiah Alagappa<strong>East</strong>-<strong>West</strong> <strong>Center</strong> Washington<strong>Aceh</strong> Study GroupEdward AspinallUnivers<strong>it</strong>y of SydneyPrincipal ResearcherHarold CrouchAustralian National Univers<strong>it</strong>yAhmad Humam HamidCare Human Rights, <strong>Aceh</strong>Sidney JonesInternational Crisis Group, JakartaT. Mulya LubisLubis, Santosa and Maulana,JakartaMarcus Me<strong>it</strong>znerUSAID, JakartaMichael RossUnivers<strong>it</strong>y of California, Los AngelesPapua Study GroupDanilyn RutherfordUnivers<strong>it</strong>y of ChicagoPrincipal ResearcherIkrar Nusa BhaktiIndonesian Inst<strong>it</strong>ute of Sciences(LIPI), JakartaRichard ChauvelVictoria Univers<strong>it</strong>y, MelbourneBenny Giay<strong>The</strong> Inst<strong>it</strong>ute for Human RightsStudy and Advocacy, JayapuraBarbara HarveyFormer Deputy Chief of Mission forthe U.S. Embassy in IndonesiaKirsten ShulzeLondon School of EconomicsRizal SukmaCSIS JakartaAgus WidjojoFormer Chief of Staff forTerr<strong>it</strong>orial AffairsGovernment of IndonesiaSastrohandoyo WiryonoChief Negotiator for theGovernment of Indonesia inthe peace talks w<strong>it</strong>h the Free<strong>Aceh</strong> MovementDaniel ZivUSAID, JakartaRodd McGibbonUSAID, JakartaOctavianus MoteYale Univers<strong>it</strong>ySamsu Rizal PanggabeanGadjah Mada Univers<strong>it</strong>y,YogyakartaJohn RumbiakELS-HAM, JayapuraBarnabas SuebuFormer Governor of Irian JayaAgus SumuleUnivers<strong>it</strong>as Negeri Papua, Amban
70Southern Philippines Study GroupChristopher CollierAustralian National Univers<strong>it</strong>yPrincipal ResearcherRobert F. BarnesUSAID, PhilippinesNoemi BautistaUSAID, PhilippinesSaturnino M. BorrasInst<strong>it</strong>ute of Social Studies,<strong>The</strong> HagueJesus DurezaPresidential Assistant forMindanao, Davao C<strong>it</strong>yAlma EvangelistaUn<strong>it</strong>ed Nations DevelopmentProgramme, ManilaEric GutierrezInst<strong>it</strong>ute for Popular DemocracyCarolina HernandezInst<strong>it</strong>ute for Strategic andDevelopment Studies, ManilaTibet Study GroupElliot SperlingIndiana Univers<strong>it</strong>yPrincipal ResearcherAllen CarlsonCornell Univers<strong>it</strong>yShulong ChuTsinghua Univers<strong>it</strong>y, BeijingYongbin DuChinese <strong>Center</strong> for Tibet Studies,BeijingAbraham S. IribaniAssistant Secretary, Department ofthe Interior and LocalGovernmentGovernment of the Philippines,ManilaMary Judd<strong>The</strong> World Bank - PhilippinesMacapado MuslimMindanao State Univers<strong>it</strong>y,General Santos C<strong>it</strong>yAmina Rasul-BernardoAsian Inst<strong>it</strong>ute of Management,ManilaSteven Rood<strong>The</strong> Asia Foundation, PhilippinesDavid TimbermanUSAID, Washington, D.C.Michael YatesUSAID, PhilippinesMark D. KoehlerU.S. Department of StateCarole McGranahanUnivers<strong>it</strong>y of Colorado at BoulderTashi RabgeyHarvard Univers<strong>it</strong>yTseten WangchukVoice of America
71Xinjiang Study GroupGardner BovingdonIndiana Univers<strong>it</strong>yPrincipal ResearcherJay DautcherUnivers<strong>it</strong>y of PennsylvaniaTalant MawkanuliIndiana Univers<strong>it</strong>yJames MillwardGeorgetown Univers<strong>it</strong>yOther ParticipantsAllen ChoatAsia Foundation, Hong KongChester CrockerGeorgetown Univers<strong>it</strong>yStephen Del RossoCarnegie Corporation of New YorkPauline KerrAustralian National Univers<strong>it</strong>yFederico M. MacaranasAsian Inst<strong>it</strong>ute of Management,ManilaSusan ShirkUnivers<strong>it</strong>y of California, San DiegoStan ToopsMiami Univers<strong>it</strong>yShengmin YangCentral Univers<strong>it</strong>y forNational<strong>it</strong>ies, BeijingChristopher McNally<strong>East</strong>-<strong>West</strong> <strong>Center</strong>Charles Morrison<strong>East</strong>-<strong>West</strong> <strong>Center</strong>Dr. Hadi SoesastroCSIS JakartaSheila Sm<strong>it</strong>h<strong>East</strong>-<strong>West</strong> <strong>Center</strong>Arun Swamy<strong>East</strong>-<strong>West</strong> <strong>Center</strong>Barbara WalterUnivers<strong>it</strong>y of California, San Diego
72Background of the <strong>Aceh</strong> Conflict<strong>Aceh</strong> is the s<strong>it</strong>e of one of Asia’s longest-running internal conflicts. Since1976, Indonesian sovereignty over the terr<strong>it</strong>ory has been contested by anarmed insurgency led by the separatist Free <strong>Aceh</strong> Movement (GAM). Arange of local grievances—especially those concerning allocation of naturalresource revenues and human rights abuses—have contributed to theconflict.<strong>Aceh</strong>, w<strong>it</strong>h an estimated population of about 4.2 million, isIndonesia’s westernmost province. Almost all <strong>Aceh</strong>nese are Muslims, andthey have a reputation for Islamic piety. Most of the population isemployed in agriculture, though <strong>Aceh</strong> is also rich in natural resources,especially natural gas and oil. ExxonMobil Indonesia, which operates inthe Arun gasfields, is a major contributor to national revenues.Unlike <strong>East</strong> Timor, which had been a Portuguese colony, but likeother parts of Indonesia, <strong>Aceh</strong> was part of the Dutch <strong>East</strong> Indies prior toWorld War II. It came into the Dutch colonial empire relatively late,however. For centuries the <strong>Aceh</strong>nese sultanate had been a powerfulIslamic state, reaching <strong>it</strong>s apogee during the seventeenth century. <strong>The</strong>Dutch launched an assault in 1873, but only managed to subdue the terr<strong>it</strong>ory(arguably never completely) after three decades of b<strong>it</strong>ter warfare.<strong>Aceh</strong>’s leaders, many of whom were ulama (religious scholars), mostlysupported the struggle for Indonesian independence in 1945–49.Many, however, soon became disillusioned w<strong>it</strong>h the central government.In 1953 they launched a revolt as part of the Darul Islam (Abode ofIslam) movement which joined several regional Islamic rebellions in astruggle to form an Indonesian Islamic state. <strong>The</strong> rebellion in <strong>Aceh</strong> waseventually resolved by negotiations leading to the province’s nominalrecogn<strong>it</strong>ion as a “special terr<strong>it</strong>ory.”<strong>The</strong> current separatist conflict began in 1976 when Hasan di Tiro, asupporter of Darul Islam living in the Un<strong>it</strong>ed States, returned to <strong>Aceh</strong> toform GAM and make a “redeclaration” of <strong>Aceh</strong>nese independence.In<strong>it</strong>ially the movement was small and Indonesian secur<strong>it</strong>y forces soondefeated <strong>it</strong>. In 1989, a more serious outbreak of rebellion by GAMresulted in a brutal counterinsurgency operation claiming several thousandcivilian lives.
In late 1998, following the resignation of President Suharto and thecollapse of his author<strong>it</strong>arian regime, conflict erupted on an even greaterscale. A large student-led protest movement called for a referendum onindependence similar to that granted in 1999 for <strong>East</strong> Timor. <strong>The</strong> GAMinsurgency reemerged—greatly expanding the range of <strong>it</strong>s operations andattacking secur<strong>it</strong>y forces and other targets. By mid-1999, large parts ofthe terr<strong>it</strong>ory were under the movement’s control.<strong>The</strong> Indonesian government responded w<strong>it</strong>h a mix of concessionsand mil<strong>it</strong>ary action. Negotiations between the government and GAMproduced two cease-fires, in June 2000 and December 2002, althoughne<strong>it</strong>her held. In 2001, the national parliament passed a SpecialAutonomy Law giving <strong>Aceh</strong> considerable author<strong>it</strong>y to manage <strong>it</strong>s ownaffairs and a greater share of <strong>it</strong>s natural resource revenues. Secur<strong>it</strong>y operationscontinued, however, and the death toll in fighting and among civilianswas considerable. Eventually, in May 2003, the peace process brokedown, a “mil<strong>it</strong>ary emergency” was declared, and secur<strong>it</strong>y forces launcheda large-scale offensive.73
Policy StudiesA Publication of the <strong>East</strong>-<strong>West</strong> <strong>Center</strong> WashingtonEd<strong>it</strong>or: Dr. Muthiah Alagappa<strong>The</strong> aim of Policy Studies is to present scholarly analysis of key contemporary domesticand international pol<strong>it</strong>ical, economic, and strategic issues affecting Asia in a policy relevantmanner. Wr<strong>it</strong>ten for the policy commun<strong>it</strong>y, academics, journalists, and theinformed public, the peer-reviewed publications in this series will provide new policyinsights and perspectives based on extensive fieldwork and rigorous scholarship.Each publication in the series presents a 10,000 to 25,000 investigation of a singletopic. Often publications in this series will appear in conjunction w<strong>it</strong>h <strong>East</strong>-<strong>West</strong><strong>Center</strong> research projects; stand-alone investigations of pertinent issues will also appearin the series.SubmissionsSubmissions may take the form of a proposal or completed manuscript.Proposal. A three to five page proposal should indicate the issue, problem, or puzzle tobe analyzed, <strong>it</strong>s policy significance, the novel perspective to be provided, and date bywhich the manuscript will be ready. <strong>The</strong> ed<strong>it</strong>or and two relevant experts will reviewproposals to determine their su<strong>it</strong>abil<strong>it</strong>y for the series. <strong>The</strong> manuscript when completedwill be peer-reviewed in line w<strong>it</strong>h the double blind process.Complete Manuscript. Submission of complete manuscript should be accompanied by atwo page abstract that sets out the issue, problem, or puzzle analyzed, <strong>it</strong>s policy significance,and the novel perspective provided by the paper. <strong>The</strong> ed<strong>it</strong>or and two relevantexperts will review the abstract. If considered su<strong>it</strong>able for the series, the manuscript willbe peer reviewed in line w<strong>it</strong>h the double blind process.Submissions must be original and not published elsewhere. <strong>The</strong> <strong>East</strong>-<strong>West</strong> <strong>Center</strong>Washington will have copyright over material published in the series.A CV indicating relevant qualifications and publications should accompany submissions.Notes to ContributorsManuscripts should be typed and double-spaced. C<strong>it</strong>ations should be inserted in thetext w<strong>it</strong>h notes double-spaced at the end. <strong>The</strong> manuscript should be accompanied by acompleted bibliography. All artwork should be camera ready. Authors should refrainfrom identifying themselves in their proposals and manuscripts and should follow thePolicy Studies stylesheet, available from the series’ ed<strong>it</strong>orial office. Submissions shouldbe sent to:Ed<strong>it</strong>or, Policy Studies<strong>East</strong>-<strong>West</strong> <strong>Center</strong> Washington1819 L Street NW, Su<strong>it</strong>e 200Washington, D.C. 20036Submissions can also be forwarded by Email toAsianSecur<strong>it</strong>y@<strong>East</strong><strong>West</strong><strong>Center</strong>Washington.org
About this IssueThis paper presents a preliminaryanalysis of the history and dynamicsof <strong>Aceh</strong>’s abortive peace processconducted between the Free <strong>Aceh</strong>Movement (GAM) and theIndonesian government. After surveyingthe origins and progress ofthe negotiations, the paper examinesthe roles played by the main players,the problems encountered along theway, and the achievements that wereregistered. Currently the peaceprocess has broken down becausethe two parties have been unable toagree on the fundamental issuedividing them: whether <strong>Aceh</strong> wouldbecome an independent nation orremain an integral part of theIndonesian state. This essay explainsthe reasons for the failure of theprocess w<strong>it</strong>h the hope that the lessonslearned may be of relevance topolicymakers, analysts, and othersw<strong>it</strong>h an interest in the long-termresolution of the <strong>Aceh</strong> conflict aswell as other internal disputes in theregion and beyond. It also suggeststhat the Indonesian government’scurrent resort to a mil<strong>it</strong>ary solutionis not only unlikely to resolve theconflict but may ultimately be counterproductive.Eventually a return tonegotiations - not necessarily w<strong>it</strong>hGAM alone - will be necessary.Forthcoming Issues:“Secur<strong>it</strong>y Operations in <strong>Aceh</strong>:Patterns and Dynamics”Dr. Rizal SukmaCentre for Strategic and InternationalStudies-Jakarta“<strong>The</strong> Anatomy of the Free <strong>Aceh</strong>Movement (GAM)”Dr. Kirsten SchulzeLondon School of Economics“Southern Philippines and theInternational War Against Terror”Dr. Christopher CollierAustralian National Univers<strong>it</strong>yAbout the AuthorsDr. Edward Aspinall is a lecturer in the Department of History and the Department ofChinese and Southeast Asian Studies at the Univers<strong>it</strong>y of Sydney. Dr. Harold Crouch is aprofessor in the Department of Pol<strong>it</strong>ical and Social Change, the Research School ofPacific and Asian Studies at the Australian National Univers<strong>it</strong>y.ISBN 1-932728-01-5