civil servants' attitudes to good governance and corruption

CIVIL SERVANTS’ ATTITUDES TO GOODGOVERNANCE AND CORRUPTIONResults from 2011 Survey with Civil Servants inZanzibarZANZIBAR REPORTSSeries editor:Kjetil Tronvoll

Table of contents1! Introduction _____________________________________________________________ 5!2! Aims and Justification ____________________________________________________ 8!3! Context of the Current Public Service ________________________________________ 9!3.1! Lessons from Previous Reforms __________________________________________ 9!3.2! Public Servants: Why Should We Care? ___________________________________ 10!4! The Socio-Economic Situation of Officers ___________________________________ 12!4.1! Public Servants – Who Are They _________________________________________ 12!4.2! Socio-Economic Pressures _____________________________________________ 15!5! Degree of Bureaucraticness _______________________________________________ 19!5.1! Recruitment _________________________________________________________ 19!5.2! Tenure and Promotion _________________________________________________ 20!5.3! Other Bureaucratic Qualities ____________________________________________ 22!6! Attitudes Towards Good Governance _______________________________________ 25!6.1! What Does “Good Governance” Mean? ____________________________________ 25!6.2! The Good Governance Agenda __________________________________________ 26!6.3! Autonomy of the Public Service __________________________________________ 27!6.4! Best and Worst Performing Parts of Government According to Civil Servants ______ 28!7! Corruption _____________________________________________________________ 31!7.1! The Meaning of “Corruption” ____________________________________________ 31!7.2! Attitudes Towards Corruption ____________________________________________ 32!7.3! Corruption at Different Levels____________________________________________ 35!8! Conclusions ____________________________________________________________ 38!8.1! Main Findings ________________________________________________________ 38!8.1.1! Socio-Economic Context ____________________________________________ 38!8.1.2! Degree of Bureaucraticness _________________________________________ 39!8.1.3! Good Governance _________________________________________________ 39!8.1.4! Corruption _______________________________________________________ 40!8.1.5! Some Final Reflections _____________________________________________ 41!9! References _____________________________________________________________ 42!10! Appendix 1: Methodology_________________________________________________ 43!10.1!Research Design _____________________________________________________ 43!10.2!Response Rates______________________________________________________ 44!10.3!Qualitative Data ______________________________________________________ 45!11! Appendix 2: The Structure of Government ___________________________________ 47!11.1!The Executive________________________________________________________ 47!11.2!The Public Service ____________________________________________________ 49!12! Appendix 3: Evaluation Team______________________________________________ 51!

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and CorruptionPREFACEThis report is based primarily on survey-, interview-, and focusgroup data generated as part of the ILPI project providingtechnical assistance to the Government of Zanzibar on goodgovernance and corruption in Zanzibar.The analysis is also informed by our prior knowledge andexperiences of African politics and society in general and ofZanzibar in particular, but also draws on our academicbackground and relevant academic literature. Concerning thelatter, we have chosen to minimize the use of jargon andreferences due to the largely non-academic nature of this projectin order to enhance readability.Finally, the contents and conclusions contained here have beenreached independently and without influences from the Zanzibarauthorities, development actors, or other political concerns.While not an academic product per see, we nevertheless regard itas non-political, analytical product with analysis and conclusionsbased on available, high-quality data.Winifred V. Pankani and Staffan I. Lindberg.4

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and CorruptionA summary of the qualifications of the project-team is found in Box 1. The projectteam consists of in total of six members who have the necessary analytical skills;prior extensive experience with good governance, anti-corruption, legislation, andpolicy formulation; intimate knowledge of Africa and Zanzibar; and the required skillsfor quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis. The ILPI Team Leader forthe project holds a PhD in Political Science, has experience as Research Director,Principal Investigator, and Project Leader for several multi-country researchcollaborations as well as Team Leader for consultancies on Democracy and GoodGovernance in several African countries and cross-regional projects. For details onthe team, see Appendix 3.7

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and Corruption2 AIMS AND JUSTIFICATIONThe Civil Service survey was designed and carried out by ILPI on behalf of theMPSGG as part of the technical assistance under the agreement with the NorwegianEmbassy in Dar es Salaam who provided funding for the survey. The surveys wereconducted from the 11 th of July through the 24 th of July 2011. It was designed tocollect country specific as well as general information regarding the perceptions ofofficers about the objectives, principles, training methods, and personalcharacteristics of officers, as well as their attitudes towards good governance andcorruption.The first aim was, hence, to provide a baseline assessment of the quality ofgovernment and the level of corruption throughout Zanzibar. By conducting this civilservants survey, ILPI is enabling the MPSGG and development partners to acquire amore accurate understanding of how civil servants of Zanzibar view the overall qualityof their government, as well as provide information of civil servants’ actualunderstanding of phenomena like corruption and good governance.The second goal was to assess different sections of the government on severalperformance standards including civil servants’ perceptions of the bureaucracy’squality and service delivery. By conducting a base-line assessment prior to thecompletion and implementation of good governance and anti-corruption legislation,training, and sensitization, annual assessments can then be compared to the baselineto indicate the effectiveness of policy implementation. Only by conducting such astudy before and after the governance and anti-corruption legal reforms andimplementation of activities in the respective strategic plans is it possible (1) toassess absolute change in the quality of government and (2) to attribute the changeto the reforms and related activities such as training and sensitization programs withthe civil service.The project finally provides a unique opportunity to inform the MPSGG’s work on theStrategic Plan for implementation of the new Good Governance Policy and supportthe Anti-Corruption Act. The survey was thus designed to collect baseline data onperceptions about accountability, corruption, and good governance within the publicservice. Since this is the first in what would be, hopefully, an annual survey, thequestionnaire was rather detailed and long. Many of the questions were drawn froman earlier survey conducted by FACTIT in association with Dar Management andComputing Center (DAR/MCC) and UNIQUE Financial Service on perceptions aboutcorruption and good governance.Our main reason for including these questions was to produce the beginnings of atime series data set by building on an already existing base. This, we believe is aneffective use of already spent resources. The aim is to produce complimentarycurrent and reliable data for the public service to help in the enhancement ofbureaucratic capacity and the institutionalization of good governance in Zanzibar, andover time a valuable database that will strengthen the technical capacity ofgovernment institutions.Details on survey methodology, sampling, are found in Appendix 1.A brief description and analysis of the structure of the government in Zanzibar, isfound in Appendix 2.8

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and Corruption3 CONTEXT OF THE CURRENT PUBLIC SERVICEThe Zanzibari public service is conditioned on its Arab Sultanate and colonial Britishpast. The revolution of 1964 sought to, among other things, end Arab domination ofthe police, public service, and other state institutions 9 . It led to the mass exodus ofqualified Arab and Asian personnel, which contributed to an inadequatelyinstitutionalized bureaucracy with low capacity. The state – the executive, judiciaryand legislature – became fused under the executive, which prevented “Weberian”principles to be guiding the civil service. The combined dynamics of politicalmaneuverings and low bureaucratic capacity created a self-reinforcing dynamic thatmakes the public service difficult to transform 10 . Much of this dynamic seems to havepersisted to the present day and present a formidable challenge to the current,reform-minded Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar (RGZ).Institutions matter (e.g. North 1990) because they provide the rules of the game,constraining some behaviors while providing incentives for others. Hence, theimportance of effectively implementation of the new Good Governance policy cannotbe over emphasized. Care must be taken so that the implementation of this particularpolicy does not suffer the fate of many well-researched and thoughtfully proposedpolicies that never got thoroughly implemented.3.1 LESSONS FROM PREVIOUS REFORMSStarting from the 1970s, Zanzibar engaged in a series of reforms aimed at enhancingstate capacity and improving the delivery of government services. In 1977 the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) of Zanzibar and Tanganyika African National Union (TANU)joined forces to form Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and island of origin and partyaffiliation became important criteria for entry into the public service. 11The political tumult of the 1970s coupled with the debit crisis of the 1980sundermined Zanzibar’s already underdeveloped economy as commodity prices fell tonew lows. Corruption became a major problem in the civil service during this periodaccording to interviews with key civil servants, marking the “rotting of the publicservice … a process that started with the rapid Africanization and purges of the1960s” 12 .By mid 1990s the combined pressure from the World Bank to reform along structuraladjustment and an increasingly unsustainable public service wage bill gave theimpetus to the Public Service Reform Program (CSRP) “aimed at achieving a smaller,9 The previous administrative structure and policies as well as the very functions and purpose of the civilservice, as in many African countries were distorted in favor of the British, and in Zanzibar Arabs andAsians. The overriding concern, typical of the radical change of this period, was reordering theopportunities field, thus justice and equity for the many became the fundamental policy of thegovernment and its bureaucrats.10 In this Zanzibar is not alone, most of Sub-Sahara Africa is still dealing with their colonial legacies11 Personal interview, July 25, 201112 Personal interviews, 19th and 25th July 2011. Although the Civil Service Act of 1986 was passed itwas never implemented, a fated suffered by many of the country’s reforms.9

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and Corruptionaffordable, well-compensated, efficient and effective public service” (World Bank2002:2). The subsequent structural adjustment policy of shrinking the public serviceby reducing its bloated wage bill probably increased the importance of political andparochial identities in securing jobs, contracts and a host of other services.The 2002 Public Service Reform Program (PSRP) intended at enhancing Zanzibar’sinformation system to enable the country’s payroll structure to function moreeffectively, as well as provide “relevant, complete, accurate and timely information tomanagers and administrators” (ibid: 2-3). In 2003, the Government formulated theZanzibar Good Governance Strategic Plan 2007-2012. In 2002 a new Public ServiceAct was also passed establishing the component agencies of the Public Service, yetZanzibar is still working on bringing together all the disparate documents regulatingthe public service 13 .Along with the above, the RGZ’s “Vision 2020” is a long-term strategy to eradicatepoverty and attain sustainable development by 2020. To this end, the RGZ dividedVision 2020 into two sequential phases (ZPRP and MKUZA) 14 for implementation ofVision 2020 in the medium term.Given the limited impact of previous reform efforts, the implementation of the newGood Governance Policy will require a nuanced approach to both training andsensitization of the civil service, and publicizing the salience and imperative of goodgovernance and systematic education of society. Any implementation strategy musttake into account the cultural, social and political realities of everyday forms ofworking within the public service. Not only will the implementation of the GoodGovernance Policy require bold initiatives, well-articulated strategies, but also mostimportantly, it will require the honesty, bravery, and innovation of every single publicservant. Achieving good governance is an internal effort Zanzibaris alone canundertake.3.2 PUBLIC SERVANTS: WHY SHOULD WE CARE?The public service provides and guarantees some of the most fundamentalorganizations that enable a country to function properly, for the development of acountry’s economy, and the advancement of its citizens. Public institutions regulateand ease some of the more undesirable effects of, for example, the influence ofpowerful or privileged groups over the less powerful. It cushions some of the effectsof the markets on the lives of ordinary citizens by regulating the private sector and bycreating specific social policies that provide protection for the poor and vulnerable.Public institutions have the added responsibility of formulating, implementing,enforcing, and monitoring how the business sector operates. Hence the degree towhich the institutions of government operate within the accepted standards of goodgovernance is of critical importance.13 During our stay in Zanzibar we were given a draft of the Public Service Regulation Policy, which iscurrently going through multiple drafts as comments and insights from the stakeholders, are beingincorporate into the main document.14 The Zanzibar Poverty Reduction Plan (ZPRP) is a three- year medium term program mainlyconcentrates on poverty reduction by selecting, focusing on and allocating more resources to selectpriority sectors considered to have direct, immediate impact on poverty reduction. In 2005 the RGZtransitioned from ZPRP to MKUZA.10

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and CorruptionCivil servants are also the face of any government. How they respond to and treat thecitizenry becomes a reflection of the state and its political leadership. Civil servantsare supposed to be neutral partners who work to carry out the policies of theexecutive, legislature, and the judiciary regardless of whether they support thegovernment in power or not.It is therefore important what public servants think about their own institutions, theirjobs and roles. Hence, the data from this first ever civil servants survey providescrucial baseline data for understanding Zanzibari civil servants attitudes towards theirroles and governance that will facilitate improvements as we gain more systematicinsights into the public service as a whole.The views of civil servants are particularly important since any attempt to develop ortransform, the political system is contingent on capacity of the national bureaucracy.However, the ability to carry any of these functions out effectively is intricately tied tothe degree and quality of government, that is, the degree to which public officials usetheir power in a way that is accountable and transparent, respects the rule of law andpeople’s basic human rights, and also prevents and combats corruption.11

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and Corruption4 THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION OF OFFICERS4.1 PUBLIC SERVANTS – WHO ARE THEYAge and sex are important variables and Table 3 presents the distribution of thepublic servants surveyed in the seven ministries and three autonomous institutions.We could not get complete roaster of staff in the public service, much less one thatincluded the age data needed to check if the sample is representative, but the ageseem slightly higher than expected with 614 officials (55 percent of valid responses)are over the age of 41. It could just be that this is the situation in Zanzibar. The issueof an aging workforce was repeated several times during both focus group and oneon-oneinterviews with officials. Officials at the district level were particularlyconcerned with the issue of an aging workforce.Table 3.Age Distribution.N %18 – 25 32 226 – 40 475 3741 – 50 380 2951 – 60 221 1761 + 13 1No response 174 14Total 1295 100Asked what officials saw as some of the main challenges facing the public service, anaging work force was one of the top three concerns. Officials were particularlyconcerned about the loss of knowledge accumulated over decades of working theirway up the ranks of the public service. This loss of institutional memory according toofficials will not only be lost for ever, due to Zanzibar’s notoriously bad system ofrecord keeping 15 , but would over time undermine the already weak capacity of theservice.But a close reading of the figures suggests the issue might not be as bad as manyaging officials suggest. The fact that 45 percent of those surveyed are between theages of 18-40 suggests there is already a young cohort currently learning from oldercolleagues. While this does not invalidate the arguments advanced by the officials, ordiminishes the effects of the loss of institutional memory, the fact that Zanzibar has ayounger cohort in the workforce is good for the kind of changes needed toinstitutionalize the principles of good governance. It bodes well for innovation andopenness to new ideas, and many of the skills needed in modern economies areincreasingly found among the young. Additionally, in the implementation of the newGood Governance Policy it is up to the younger generation to do the heavy lifting thatcomes with changing the business-as-usual manner in which bureaucracies tend towork.Of the 1,295 respondents, 1133 filled out their gender and of these 62 per cent (697)of the sample were men while 38 percent (436) of the respondents were women (see15 Personal interview, 15 th July12

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and CorruptionTable 4). Again, the inadequate sampling frame prevents us from judging the extentto which this is representative of the civil service as a whole.Table 4.Gender Distribution of SampleN %Male 697 62Female 436 38Total 1133 100Table 5 shows that 305 (25 percent) of respondents have worked in their currentposition for more than 16 years, while 147 (12 percent) have been at their current jobposition between 11 to 15 years. Another 221 (18 percent) have spent 6-10 years, 27percent have been working at their current position for up to five years while only 19percent had been at their current position for less than a year.That 37 percent has been not only in the civil service but also in their current positionfor 11 or more years, and 55 percent has been at least six years in their currentposition is perhaps a positive aspect when it comes to institutional memory andbuilding capacity. But this situation also presents a possible problem when it comesto institutional reform and to changing ingrained patterns of behavior based on workandsocial norms affecting work ethics and standards of performance.The acquired wisdom in the field of bureaucratic organization tells us that individualstend to be socialized to benefit from the system the way it is when entering theservice, which produces a natural tendency to resist reform. A possible challenge forthe current RGZ and for the MPSGG when implementing the Good GovernanceStrategic Plan will thus be identifying incentives for these individuals to accept andsupport reform efforts. The RGZ and MPSGG must be able to demonstrate that thereis a valid answer to civil servants when facing the question “What is in it for me?”Table 5.How long have you worked in your current position?N %Less than 1 year 235 191 - 5yrs 335 276 - 10yrs 221 1811 - 15yrs 147 1216 or more 305 25Total 1243 100Education is also important because it helps individuals make informed decisionsabout their own personal lives and it is necessary in the daily charge of governmentbusiness. The better educated a workforce, the better its ability to analyze, articulateand critically review policy and its implementation. Thus, educational level is ameasure of formal bureaucratic capacity.Table 6 offers a summary of the educational qualifications. Less than 2 percent havenever been to school, six per cent have completed primary school, while 24 percenthave a secondary education. Only 17 percent of officials have an undergraduatedegree and 10 percent a master’s degree. Less than one percent have PhD degrees.The educational profile has particular implications for policy formulation, analysis andimplementation, the core business of every government. On one hand we purposivelyoversampled from the ranks of frontline officers since they are the foot soldiers ofgovernment policy.13

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and CorruptionTable 6.Level of Education.N %None 20 1.6Completed primary 80 6.4Completed secondary 296 23.7Vocational 21 1.7Certificate/Dip 485 38.8BA/BS degree 217 17.4MA degree 124 9.9PhD degree 6 0.5Total 1249 100.0On the other hand, that less than 30 percent of the most important public serviceofficers have some kind of university degree portrays a picture of a civil service that isa lot less educated than the tasks before them would dictate.In interviews many of the top-level officials claim that the less than desired level ofbureaucratic capacity within the public service is directly attributable to the loweducational levels of their officers. The charge that officers could not write well, letalone engage in thoughtful analysis was often repeated among top-level officials.This is what one top-level official had to say about his unit:“only my personal [sic], and principal secretary and director of planning speak thesame language most of the time ... this is very important. I am lucky.” 16He considers himself lucky that he at least have three other people who are at theanalytical level where a meaningful dialogue about policy implementation is possible.A related problem is the emerging trend of subordinates being better qualified thantheir bosses. According to interviewees, this often results in one of two dynamics; thefirst are situations in which the boss delegates broad swaths of issue areas to aparticular subordinate. This favored official becomes increasingly indispensable to theboss and the relationship between the boss and this favored staff becomespersonalized. What is important, according to discussions with interviewees, is theblurring of official boundaries and rules as fellow officials sometimes choose to godirectly to one or the other instead of following the accepted and received officialprocedures of getting something done. The personalized relationships invariablyresult in factions when legitimate deputies who are passed by also end up withsympathizers loyal to him or her. Thus, in trying to leverage the skills of a moreeducated junior colleague some bosses end up creating an atmosphere whereinstrumental disorder reigns, undermining the ability of officials to effectively carry outthe business of the government in an organized and predictable manner. Thisinterviewee captures much of the above sentiment:“When the boss doesn’t know and he trusts one who is a junior but moreeducated you now have two interests, instead of one. They become good friendsand the boss does a lot for this person because this person is doing the work ofthe boss and makes the boss look good. Accordingly, this better educated personmeanwhile becomes ‘too big for his shoes’ … this creates a bad feeling in theoffice. The two of them also share all the money. This is very common in this16 Personal interview 20 th July, 2011 Unguja14

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and Corruptioncountry. Promotion is not based on qualification so people do not know the job,much more how to evaluate or monitor the work” 17Alternatively, some better-educated subordinate officers end up feeling alienatedbecause their superiors are unwilling to listen or entertain their opinions. One youngofficer we interviewed had just returned from studying abroad and felt he was unableto practice what he had spent his own resources (he had to take out a personal loanto fund his education) because his superiors showed no interest or felt threatened byhis new capabilities. At the time of the interview, the officer was so unhappy that hehad just petitioned to be returned to his old unit from which he had been promoted tohis current station.Finally, public service positions can serve as a source of political patronage andpolitical affiliation, rather than qualification, may become the more decisive factor inrecruitment of political heads as well as civil servants. It is an open secret that someministers maybe ill suited for their particular Ministry, and yet head importantministries simply because they are loyal party supporters. These ministers are said todepend heavily on their principal secretaries, or deputy ministers, who in all fairnessare career civil servants and should be experts to support the Ministers, who arepoliticians not necessarily experts on the specific portfolio of the Ministry.4.2 SOCIO-ECONOMIC PRESSURESOf the 1,251 people who responded to the question “Please state the range of yourcurrent (2011) gross monthly salary” 65 percent made between Tsh100,000 andTsh299,999. Even keeping in mind that we intentionally oversampled from the ranksof the street level bureaucrats who is the key link between citizens and the state, thedata reflects the fact that most civil servants make relatively little. One can suspectthat this plays an important role in that they passively accept a somewhat arbitrarytenure and promotion track. In this environment one does not depend on the wagesto survive. It is also telling that only three people made more than Tsh2,500,000.Table 7.Current (2011) gross monthly salaryN %Up to 99,999 274 22100,000 - 299,999 815 65300,000 - 499,999 58 5500,000 - 749,999 22 2750,000 - 999,999 17 21,000,000 - 1,499,999 45 31,500,000 - 2,499,999 17 12,500,000 - above 3 0Total 1251 100The officials in our sample on average support 8-9 people on their salaries (standarddeviation 6.2). This figure was arrived at after dropping the nine more extreme figuresabove 100. Regardless of the actual number used, it is clear that Zanzibar civil17 Personal interview July 25 th , 2011.15

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and Corruptionservants are under a lot of financial pressure. Again our survey data is borne out bythe qualitative data. Interviewees mentioned feeling pressured to help extendedfamily members and friends.In a small society like Zanzibar, what people think of a person is very important. Likemost Africans, the pressure to be perceived as a good person and successful persontakes on an added dimension. The combined pressure to appear successful – bothas a bread winner and as a family member has resulted in public officials having tolook elsewhere for extra money since 98 percent of respondents answer that theirpay is not enough for they and their dependents to subsist on. See Table 8 below.Table 8.Is your monthly pay enough for you, your family, and otherdependents?N %Yes 24 2No 1228 98Total 1252 100To supplement what is widely acknowledged as low salaries within the public service,some employees have various other income-generating activities. Table 9 shows thatabout 30 percent say yes to the questions “Do you have another means of generatingincome besides your government job?”. The lists of activities they engage is tellingand is summed up into three categories.Table 9.Do you have another means of generating income besides your government job?N %Yes 364 29No 878 71Total 1242 100Respondents who admit having to find extra means of making money engages inactivities summarized in Table 10 below.Table 10.Other income-generating activities.ActivityRankFarming 1Business 2Real Estate Rental 3The number one money generating activity most public servants engage in isfarming. This is also borne out by qualitative interviews. Many officers interviewedhave shambas. Farming as a way of supplementing one’s wages seems to beinfluenced by a number of factors. Officials stationed at the district level are morelikely to engage in small-scale farming compared to their colleagues at the variousheadquarters who are more likely to engage in what they term “serious farming”.During the ILPI data collection period, many of the officials interviewed were forexample busy with preparations to grow rice or with reviving neglected plantationsdue to the current increase in the price of cloves, Officials who listed farming as theirmajor alternative income-generating activity were slightly less likely to use officialtime to run farm-related errands during official business hours compared to officialswho owned businesses.The category labeled business is a catch-all grouping for a wide range of for profitactivities ranging from pretty trading to survey consulting, map planning and drawing,16

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and Corruptionoperating or running a shop, to tailoring. Construction and contracting is anotherfavorite, as is micro-credit and the sale of wood charcoal.Public servants in Zanzibar like many of their African counterparts moonlight due firstand foremost to low salaries and much of financial pressure come from family andfriends.Table 11.How often are you been asked to contribute financially to, or to assist with any of the following?Weekly Monthly A few a year Never TotalN % N % N % N % N %Pay hospital bills, school fees or give moneyto a relative/ friend 217 18 608 51 263 21 112 9 1200 100Contribute to a wedding or funeral forfriend/relative/co-worker 81 7 393 34 635 54 60 5 1169 100Help someone find a job 38 3 92 8 385 34 616 54 1131 100Help a relative or friend navigate governmentbureaucracy 16 1 25 2 129 12 941 85 1111 100Table 11 gives some evidence on the social obligations and pressures of civilservants in Zanzibar. Asked how often they are requested to contribute financially tofamily and friends during the past 3 months, 69 percent respondents state at leastmonthly while only 9 percent are never asked.Similarly, 41 percent report that they are asked on a weekly or monthly basis tocontribute towards a wedding or funeral for friend/relative/co-worker, while another 54percent are asked a few times a year. Only 5 percent are never asked.Again the survey data is corroborated by the qualitative interviews, a quote from oneofficial sums up the findings in Table 11.… we donate to family, they [extended family members] refuse to invest inimportant things like education, rather they will contribute to things like weddings,funerals, only a few know the importance of education and might help poorrelatives in this regard, but the help is very small because it is not a one timepayment and you are done. With weddings and funerals it is a one timeexpenditure and you are done” 18 .These immediate sources of financial strain probably have a significant impact onbureaucratic capacity since staff is so frequently under pressure to contribute to themore everyday forms of reciprocity. It is the business of the state that suffers whenpublic duties have to compete with social obligations.Social pressures are mostly financial. The responses for helping family and friendsnavigate government bureaucracy, or find a job were much lower. This suggests thatcivil service officials are rarely involved in undermining the functioning of the publicservice by interfering with application of rules or undue influences getting someone ajob. This is good news and informative for the reform agenda. To the extent that thereare problems with recruitment and/or due processes, it is not primarily caused bysocial obligations.18 Personal interview 15 th July, 2011 Pemba17

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and CorruptionAnother clue to the perceived situation of Zanzibari public service officers is how theyrate their economic situation compared to other Zanzibaris and compared to howtheir situation was 12 months ago. Table 12 presents the results from the survey.Table 12.Economic Assessment of Public Service Staff.How would you rate your own living condition compared to that of most Zanzibaris? N %Much worse 161 13Worse 617 48Same 378 30Better 108 8Much Better 10 1Total 1274 100Your own living condition compared to 12 months ago?Much worse 240 20Worse 459 38Same 403 33Better 83 7Much Better 22 2Total 1207 100It is somewhat surprising and indeed worrying that 61 percent of the civil serviceofficers perceive their own living conditions to be worse, or much worse, than theaverage Zanzibari. One should perhaps not be surprised if the willingness to providepunctual, high-quality service for the general public is lower than one would like,when public servants perceive that they themselves are in more need than theaverage person they are supposed to serve. Only about 10 percent of officers thinkthat they are better off than average.This picture is even more worrying when we look at how things have developed overthe past year. Not only are the public servants to their own estimation worse off thanmost other Zanzibaris, 58 percent of the staff also perceive their economic situationto have worsened while less than 9 percent feel that they are better off todaycompared to one year ago.The combined situation of officers with frequent and demanding social obligationsand a worse than average economic situation, that has deteriorated over the past 12months, constitute a serious threat to the good governance and anti-corruptionagenda.18

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and Corruption5 DEGREE OF BUREAUCRATICNESSTo the extent that the national bureaucracy is characterized by 1) meritocraticrecruitment and professional advancement processes, 2) insulation from politicalpressure, and 3) clarity and predictability of rules (Evans 1999) we can plausibly inferthat the bureaucracy is or should be effective. This is what is meant with “Weberian”bureaucracy, or degree of bureaucraticness.5.1 RECRUITMENTSo are civil servants in Zanzibar appointed into the public service according the civilservants themselves? Table 13 presents the results.Table 13.In general how are people appointed into the public service?N % RankThrough a formal interview chaired by Public Service Commission. 516 42 1Through an formal interview by senior management/official(s) 177 14 2Through influence by friend/relative 170 14 3Through a formal interview by outsourced firm or committee or agency 155 13 4Through political appointment 77 6 5Through the usual tenure and promotion track 71 6 6Through executive appointment 70 6 7Through of Island of origin 3 0 8Total 1239 101According to the experience of the civil servants themselves, entry into the civilservice through a formal interview process with the Public Service Commission is themain mode (42 percent of respondents say this is the most common way) of gaininga government job, followed by going through a formal interview by seniormanagement /official(s) or an interview process outsourced to a firm, a committee, oran agency. Together, 69 percent of respondents claim that these formal interviewprocesses are the ways in which people generally get public sector jobs. This mustbe considered an encouraging sign.Another 13 percent of respondents get a tenured job in the civil service through theusual tenure and promotion track. However, 14 percent of the civil servants say thatgetting a job through influence by a friend or a relative is the most common waypeople get jobs in the public service. Another 32 percent claim that even if it is not themost common way people get jobs, it is still one of the main means. So all in all, 46percent of the individuals who answered this question, acknowledges that one of theways people get jobs in the public sector is through influence by friends or familymembers. This must be seen as a disturbing figure and one that the goodgovernance and anti-corruption agenda should seek to address.During a focus group discussion with a group of officers, issues of inadequatemanpower were raised by several of the participants. After rattling off what theirmanpower needs are, they were asked how they would like those needs met. Theirfirst preference was to train already existing officers. Pushed to be more concrete,they explained that, politics aside, there are many qualified deserving individuals ineach of their units who would be much better fits [than new recruits] due to theexperience they had already amassed. Their second preference was to recruitgraduates, since this particular ministry had according to the interviewees’ unusuallylow number of university graduates. They wanted potential graduates to be recruited19

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and Corruptionand bonded to the ministry before they graduated. Their third preference was torecruit from within the public service at large, since public servants share basicallythe same culture. The least preferred option was to recruit other outsiders.5.2 TENURE AND PROMOTIONTable 14 presents the results from the survey regarding some of the more importantquestions on promotion and tenure posed in the survey. Given the fact that theimplementation of Zanzibar’s Good Governance policy is to a large extent dependenton the buy-in of public officials, it is important that they perceive the system to be fairand that good work will be rewarded. Additionally, promotion from within the ranks notonly creates and sustains a spirit de corps among officers, it also assumes thattenure is not the overriding factor, promotes meritocracy and creates loyalty to thecivil service.Looking across all MDAs, 36 percent (409) of respondents think skills and merithardly ever mattered for promotion, while only 11 percent (126) think it almost alwaysdoes. This is a very worrying pattern that deserves serious attention and suitableaction. When 90 percent of the work force thinks advancement in the service might ormight not be determined by the value of their work, then the incentives for showing upfor work, and working hard and diligently, hardly becomes the norm. Generally publicservice staff does not identify one or the other factor as always, or almost always themost important factor for promotion and it seems respondents believe there is littlethey can do to influence the promotion process.Table 14.Please indicate how frequently these statements capture the promotion process in your ministry.Hardly Ever Half the time Always TotalN % N % N % N %Skills and merit are most important forpromotion409 36 614 53 126 11 1149 100Seniority counts most for promotion 555 50 512 45 56 5 1083 100Connections with the right people countsmost for promotion574 54 424 38 91 9 1049 100Political party affiliation counts most forpromotion636 62 338 31 74 7 1008 100Civil servants who bribe get faster promotion 724 74 245 22 35 4 964 100Civil servants who follow rules and workhard get promoted faster521 48 511 46 65 6 1057 100Where you come from counts most forpromotion639 64 333 30 60 6 1002 100Political affiliation is much less important for tenure and promotion than one mighthave believed, according to the respondents. Only 74 people (7 percent) out of the1008 who answered the question if political party affiliation counts most for promotionbelieve it is the most important factor for promotion in their ministry. Similarly, only 9percent (91 respondents) think connections with ‘the right people’ is the mostimportant for promotion in their ministry. These low figures are in direct contradictionto widely spread claims that political affiliation, and who you know are importantfactors in getting the limited jobs available within the public service. At the other endof the scale, 62 percent and 54 percent respectively says that one of these factors“hardly ever” is the most important factor for promotion.Another observation we make is that the percentage who say that any of the itemsmatter “almost always” for promotion, is very low. While it is a good sign that thehighest percentage (11 percent) is found for skills and hard work, the figures areoverall worryingly low. One can thus read Table 13 as a statement by officials that thetenure and promotion process in the pubic service is mostly by fiat, then one begins20

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and Corruptionto view the data as not boding well for the institutionalization of good governance. Ifnothing matters for promotion, how do you motivate a workforce to reach for higherheights in the daily discharge of their duties for which they badly enumerated andunappreciated?AwlaysFigure: Mean Level of Frequency of Factors Important for PromotionRated on a Scale from 0 to 109876Half of the Time5.34324 43.32.34.131Hardly EverSkills&MeritSeniorityConnectionsPolitical PartyBribesRules&WorkFactors Important for Promotion in Your Ministry?OriginCircles mark mean value; Band shows 1 standard deviation from meanAnother way of looking at the data, is to look at the means and standard deviations ofthe ratings provided by all respondents. The figure above displays the results of suchan analysis. The good news is that skills and merits count the most for promotion andthat bribes counts the least. The bad news is that having the right connections withthe right people, belonging to the “right” political party, and the island of origin, arestill relatively important factors.Do the MDAs surveyed differ with regards to how clear and predictable the process oftenure and promotion is? We asked respondents to evaluate the MDA they worked inand Table 15 presents the results.A couple of MDAs stand out for higher levels of bureaucraticness in this comparison.The ministry of Finance and the Zanzibar Revenue Board have significantly lowershares of their staff who think the rules are not clear and not predictable than otherministries. It is a positive sign that the authorities in charge of the economy andrevenue collection are the most professional. The Ministry of Health and the Ministryof Education score low of this measure of bureaucraticness. One interpretation is thatthe two ministries that Zanzibaris perhaps have the most contact with, are performingparticularly bad in this respect.21

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and CorruptionTable 15.For someone who enters as a junior officer in your MDA, the process of tenure and promotion is clearand predictable for all and is based on length of service?MDAMin. ofAgric.Min. ofEducationMin. ofFinanceZRBMPS&GGMin. ofHealthMin. of Lands(incl.ZWA&ZECO) PO TotalDisagree N 132 64 24 13 8 52 82 30 408% 36.7 41.6 24.2 30.2 28.6 57.1 34.2 26.3 35.8Neither N 75 27 20 8 9 18 50 28 235% 20.5 17.5 20.2 0.8 31.1 0.8 20.8 24.6 20.6Agree N 159 63 55 22 11 21 108 56 495% 43.4 40.9 55.6 51.2 39.3 23.1 45.0 49.1 43.5Total N 366 154 99 43 28 91 240 114 1,138% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Another possibility is that civil servants in these ministries think that education shouldcount more for them in terms of promotion and tenure, rather than ‘length of service’that the question specified. We do not have the means to adjudicate between the twopossibilities at this point, but hope that future surveys and interviews will address thisissue.5.3 OTHER BUREAUCRATIC QUALITIESWe also asked respondents to rank their own ministry in terms of a number of otherbureaucratic qualities. Table 16 displays the means and standard errors for how theministries’ own staff rated their own ministry. Without going into all details here, a fewthings can be said about these results.First, civil servants are quite positive in their overall assessment of the qualities oftheir own ministries. It is possible that the respondents (un-)consciously want to affecthow their own ministry comes out in the assessment and therefore give higher ratingsthan the actual situation merits, but we think that is only one part of the story andprobably not affecting the means more than on the margin. It is quite possiblehowever, that many have rather low expectations. They may simply not be aware ofhow a well-functioning bureaucracy that for example respects the rules andprocedures looks like. The bar they have for what counts as ‘excellent performance’is simply too low. This is not an unreasonable interpretation. Socialization andcognitive adaptation to one’s surroundings is a well-known mechanism. Beingfrustrated by underperformance and unfairness on a daily basis – a consequence ofhigh expectations in a low performance environment – is exhausting.Second, it is clear that a couple of MDAs are rated significantly lower than mostothers on all or most of the indicators. This pertains in particular to the Ministry ofHealth, and the Ministry of Lands, Settlement, Water, and Energy.Third, we note that among the indicators that directly measure the core dimensions ofgood governance as detailed in the new Good Governance Policy, officers think thattheir MDA is doing relatively well on being accountable to the public but generallymuch worse on being transparent.This is an important clue for the implementation of the policy and the formulation of astrategic plan. Transparency is a great problem even in the eyes of the civil servantsthemselves. This is both pointing to an area where improvements are needed and atthe same time, indicate that there will be a great deal of support among civil servants22

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and Corruption6 ATTITUDES TOWARDS GOOD GOVERNANCE6.1 WHAT DOES “GOOD GOVERNANCE” MEAN?During a stakeholders’ meeting in May 2011 the ILPI team noticed that participantseach had their particular take on what good governance is or should be. Mostparticipants defined good governance either explicitly or implicitly as the rule of lawand respect of human rights, but good governance according to various speakersalso included higher salaries, respect of Zanzibari culture, and things like coastalpatrol boats.Good governance has become more of a catchall phrase, thus necessitating thecollection of systematic data on perceptions of public officials about what goodgovernance was.Several participants at the workshop also disagreed with the MPSGG’s assertion thatthere was an absence of a good governance policy in Zanzibar. 22 They felt there issomething and that everyone knows what good governance is.Table 18 offers a summary of the answers to the question in the survey with civilservants. The answers provided in the table below are listed from most popularunderstanding to least common.Table 18.Good governance encompasses a number of important aspects of how a government works and who works in it.Which of the following would you say is the most essential for reaching the goal of good?N %Accountability to citizens 297 26Commitment to Policy Goals 244 21Getting Citizens involved 200 18Effective Leadership 192 17Fighting Corruption 138 12Other 37 3Reducing Costs 23 2Public Transparency 9 0Total 1140 100Asked what good governance is thus phrased, a plurality of the officials (26 percent)identifies the concept with accountability, which is one of the core dimensions of theconcept. This is, however, closely followed by good governance as commitment topolicy goals (21 percent), which is something that is only weakly related to what goodgovernance is. The third most frequently mentioned answer is citizen involvement (18percent), which is one core part of good governance but perhaps not the most centralone. Even more distantly related to good governance is the next category of effectiveleadership (17 percent) and fighting corruption comes in only at fifth place with 12percent of respondents indicating it as the most central component of goodgovernance.Surprisingly, only 9 respondents, or 0.01 percent identify transparency as the core22 Personal interview 27 th May, 2011.25

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and Corruptionmeaning of good governance despite that it is one of the most central dimensions ofgood governance.The data from Table 18 reveals that even public officials mean different things, orhave different understandings, or priorities when they use the concept. There isclearly no unified, coherent understanding among civil servants with regards to thisissue – much in contrast to the issue of corruption. Overall, the survey data dovetailswell with the interview data with key officials, who, on average commented on theneed for government to show commitment to policy goals by providing realisticbudgets and credible sanctions. 23It is clear that there is a lot of education to be done in order for the civil servants tohave a clear understanding of what good governance entails. And in this sense, thisissue is very different from corruption, which the bureaucrats generally know what it isright away.6.2 THE GOOD GOVERNANCE AGENDAIn essentially all qualitative interviews the team conducted, we brought up issues ofgood governance along similar lines that were asked in the survey to gain a deeperunderstanding of responses. Reactions to questions on good governance during theinterviews can be broadly categorized into two classes, (i) those who were uncriticallysupportive of ILPI’s project to provide technical assistance and conduct the surveysand (ii) those who, though supportive, were much more forward in their critiques andmisgivings. Much of the interview material incorporated into the following is from thequalitative interview data with the group of skeptics since the implementation of thegood governance policy stands to benefit the most from their critiques and flagsraised.Respondents in this category tended to be well-educated, upper (some of them veryhigh up) and middle level bureaucrats and were quiet blunt about what they thoughtof the sequence of the project. Many officials were very positive and receptive of thegood governance policy process and openly stated it was long over due. But theofficials who tended to be critical of the project objected to the issue of sequencing,rather than the substantive issues. The general sentiment of this group is bestcaptured in the quote below.“Your mission on Good governance seems to me to be putting the horse beforethe cart. Yes it is one of the many issues we face, but is it the most important?No. The whole system needs to be restructured. The civil service needs to berestructured; we cannot do anything here without a separation of powers.” 24This feeling had been expressed at an earlier meeting at a stakeholders’ workshopduring the team’s initial assessment visit in May 2011. Participants at the workshopexpressed their dissatisfaction with the concentration of powers within the executivein general and the president’s office in particular. However, the House ofRepresentatives also got its fair share of criticism in that “too many things go through23 Personal interview 25 th July, 2011, Unguja.24 Focus group 26 th July, 2011, Unguja.26

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and Corruptionthe House” 25 and that law making was still basically a one-person driven process,even during the era of Unity Government. Like the public officials in the skepticscategory, participants at the stakeholder workshop in May also felt the real test was inthe implementation of the policy, not having a good governance policy in and of itself.Given Zanzibar’s history of not, or only half implementing policies, this seemed a faircritique and a challenge the government would do well to take on.Skeptical officials argued that the“…whole country is a one-man show [run by] a very closed group of a selectfew … [which according to these officials was] the fundamental problem [ofZanzibar, whether one was] CUF or CCM… Good governance is not ourmain problem here.” 26According to these officials, the Ministry of Good Governance and ILPI should rathersimultaneously pursue a good governance agenda that is linked with a clearseparation and delimitation of the powers of the executive, legislature, and thejudiciary. The sense that the president controls too much was communicated invarious ways ranging from the subtle to the very blatant comments like:“The president then appointment all the top people, many of the ministersare not well educated, but were faithful political supporters.” 276.3 AUTONOMY OF THE PUBLIC SERVICETable 19 below gives credence to these critiques. The results underscore theargument for the separation of powers. Asked if the public service had the autonomyto formulate policy without political interference of the 1,092 respondents whoanswered that question, 53 percent think that the public service always or sometimeslacks autonomy when it comes to policy, while the remaining 47 percent consider theservice fully autonomous.Table 19.Has autonomy to formulate policy without political interference?N %Never 223 20Some times 359 33Always 521 47Total 1103 100Another recurring theme in the interviews and focus groups was the issue of how thegood governance policy is going to ensure old and new rules are obeyed ”we wantmore than just a report, we want the fruits of the report, we want implementation”. 28One aspect of this aspect of good governance and following rules, is the right of thecivil service to hire, discipline, fire, and demote staff without political interference.Table 20 shows the responses to a question the survey posed on this issue.25 Personal communication 27 th May, 2011, Unguja.26 Personal interview 19th July, 2011, Unguja.27 Personal interview 15th July, 2011, Pemba.28 Personal interview 17th July, 2011, Unguja.27

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and CorruptionTable 20.Has the power to hire, discipline, fire and/or demote staff without political interference?N %Never 261 23Some times 483 43Always 367 44Total 1111 100Also on this issue, which is even more clear-cut and concrete than the question ofpolicy autonomy, a definitive majority (66 percent) considers bureaucratic autonomyto be compromised always or sometimes. On this issue good governance wouldimply that the public service is autonomous in these decisions almost all the time,whereas the figures above indicate that this is not the case.The inescapable conclusion is that the civil service’s autonomy from politicalinterference and de facto mandate to carry out the translation of policy into actionabledirectives, design implementation, and pursue its mandate of reform, is restricted at alevel that can threaten to undermine the good governance and anti-corruptionagenda. It seems advisable that preparations for reform include strategies and effortsaiming to increase the autonomy of the civil service in ways that can change theperceptions indicated by the figures and qualitative evidence discussed above.6.4 BEST AND WORST PERFORMING PARTS OF GOVERNMENTACCORDING TO CIVIL SERVANTSFinally, the pubic service officers were asked to consider a set of ten differentdescriptions associated with positive and negative governance attributes, and toidentify which of the ministries that best fit the description.Table 21 shows the results for the first five qualities. With so many ministries that the“votes” are spread out on, there is naturally no consensus emerging among amajority of respondents but there are nonetheless some clear patterns. We havemarked in bold the figures that stick out at the top in each category.Table 21.For each of the following please indicate which ministry best fits the category.Fastest inProvidingServicesMostImportant tocitizensMost Important forZNZ BusinessesMost Usedby citizensMostTransparentPresident’s Office 13.8% 6.4% 0.5% 3.7% 12.3%Finance 12.8% 7.7% 8.7% 7.6% 5.5%Good Governance 2.0% 6.6% 2.6% 1.8% 10.4%Constitution/Law 0.7% 1.9% 1.0% 2.8% 12.4%Infrastructure /Communication 2.6% 0.7% 7.1% 5.8% 1.9%Education 24.9% 30.1% 4.4% 14.2% 17.0%Trade/Industry/Markets 0.2% 2.0% 67.0% 1.9% 1.2%Social Development /Women/Chil. 2.4% 2.1% 0.8% 3.2% 4.6%Information/Culture/etc. 6.9% 1.7% 1.3% 4.7% 13.0%Land/Settlement/Water /Energy 4.9% 10.4% 1.5% 12.3% 3.0%Health 17.2% 21.5% 1.7% 36.2% 6.1%Agriculture/Resources 7.8% 7.2% 0.9% 3.9% 8.5%Livestock/Fisheries 2.8% 0.6% 0.1% 0.6% 2.1%Labor/Nat. Econ.Emp./etc. 1.1% 1.0% 2.2% 1.44% 2.2%Total N 1,058 1,009 984 971 918Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education are both ranked at the top on severalqualities. Providing services fast, being most important to citizens, most used by28

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and Corruptioncitizens, and in the case of the Ministry of Education being most transparent. Thelatter however indicates a different understanding of transparency given that this isalso one of the ministries pointed out for being corrupt, and these two qualities do notgo well together. 29Unsurprisingly, the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Markets is considered mostimportant for business by a large majority, but we also note that in terms oftransparency, the President’s Office, the Ministry of Constitution and Law, and theMinistry of Information, Culture, Tourism, and Sports rank high.Table 22 shows the results on the remaining five qualities. Again we find the Ministryof Education and the Ministry of Health ranking high on several: not only bestperforming and where staff work hard, but also in most need of reform measures, andas being the most overburdened ones.Table 22.Ranking of ministries on various qualities.Most NeedsReformsMostOver-BurdenedBestPerforming OfficeHas the MostEffectiveMinisterWhere StaffWorkHardest/MostPresident’s Office 3.3% 9.4% 20.1% 13.7% 6.7%Finance 7.1% 5.9% 11.0% 15.2% 6.7%Good Governance 9.5% 3.9% 5.8% 4.0% 3.2%Constitution/Law 5.7% 3.7% 5.3% 7.9% 1.6%Infrastructure /Communication 3.5% 9.1% 4.2% 6.2% 4.6%Education 18.3% 17.1% 15.5% 6.6% 22.4%Trade/Industry/Markets 2.7% 1.6% 1.9% 3.2% 1.5%Social Development /Women/Chil. 1.8% 3.8% 5.2% 2.0% 2.9%Information/Culture/etc. 2.9% 1.8% 4.1% 1.7% 2.3%Land/Settlement/Water /Energy 8.7% 16.1% 5.3% 6.4% 10.1%Health 18.6% 17.1% 4.7% 6.0% 12.1%Agriculture/Resources 13.9% 6.5% 11.0% 14.5% 18.8%Livestock/Fisheries 0.7% 1.2% 3.3% 3.5% 3.8%Labor/Nat. Econ.Emp./etc. 3.5% 3.0% 2.8% 9.0% 3.3%Total N 980 955 910 919 964Together, it paints a picture where civil servants in Zanzibar consider these twoministries to work hard and do much good in areas where citizens need the state themost, but that they also are insufficient to the task as it is and need reforms, possiblyalso more resources.None of these two critical ministries have been blessed with the most effectiveministers at the present, however, according to civil servants. These politicians areranked rather low. The most effective ministers come instead from the President’sOffice, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Agriculture.Unfortunately, Ministry of Health is not in the group where staff works the hardest andare most dedicated, according to this survey. Ministry of Education is, however, eventhe one ranked the highest followed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Resources.29 To clarify this perception of transparency and the apparent contradiction, one needs further qualitativeresearch.29

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and CorruptionUnfortunately, in terms of implementing the Good Governance Policy, the MPSGGdoes not rank very high in any of these qualities, and the lower scores on the lastthree items (best performing, most effective minister, and staff work hardest) presentsome possible concerns for the implementation phase. Whether the rankings reflectthe true situation or not, the perception among other ministries poses a seriouschallenge that needs to be addressed.30

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and Corruption7 CORRUPTION7.1 THE MEANING OF “CORRUPTION”Before we go into the attitudes to corruption and the level of corruption in variousministries, it is important that we know what civil servants think corruption means. Weposed this question and gave the respondents various options to indicate what thecore meaning of corruption is to them. The figure below presents the results of thisanalysis.It is clear that an overwhelming majority of civil servants associate the core meaningof corruption with demands for unofficial payments. Takrima, and Bakshish on theother hand are rarely associated with corruption in the first place. Similarly, demandfor favors and sex, embezzling of public funds, fraud and abuse of power are notconsidered to be the main thing civil servants associate with corruption.While it is comforting that many respondents think that unofficial payments arecorruption, and perhaps because this is a common form of corruption that many haveexperienced from either side, it is also troubling that so few think that the core ofcorruption cannot be said to be captured by the other attributes.Corruption does not have to be exchange of money per se in return for a particularfavor. Other kinds of favors or sex are possible substitutes. Corruption is perdefinition always fraudulent and a form of abuse of power, and it is not clear why civilservants do not associate abuse of power and fraud with corruption.Figure: What does ''Corruption'' most mean to you?Percentage of Respondents0 20 40 60 80Unofficial Payments74.35Takrima4.101 3.9275.3236.373.839.8726.6108.6108BakshishDemands for FavorsDemand for SexEmbezzlementMeaning of CorruptionFraudAbuse of PowerOtherN=30; Values in figure correspond with raw percentagesThe results also stand in sharp contrast to what ordinary Zanzibaris think corruptionis. Citizens as frequently indicate abuse of power as coterminous with corruption asthey indicate unofficial payments, and they think fraud and embezzlement are formsof corruption as well.31

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and CorruptionA positive interpretation of this situation is that civil servants actually know very wellwhat corruption is. If we go back to the Good Governance Policy’s definition ofcorruption, which is reflective of the general scholarly consensus, civil servantsseems to know what they are doing. Corruption is the misuse of office for private gainin an exchange with a third party. In other words, there are many forms of abuse ofpower that are not corruption such as when a politician of official make a decision oncontravention of rues and regulations without making a private gain.Similarly, there are many forms of fraud and embezzlement that are examples of pureand simple theft, which again is not corruption as such. One can also demand favors,and get them, from civil servants without necessarily engage in corruption even ifdemand for favors can stimulate corrupt behavior among officials as indicatedelsewhere in this report.But the bottom-line is that a vast majority of civil servants (74 percent) veryadequately identify unofficial payments as the thing they associate with corruptionfirst and foremost among the various options. Identifying and knowing what corruptionis, is not the primary issue in the civil service at Zanzibar. Virtually everyone in thecivil service knows what corruption is when they see it, and resources shouldprobably not be spent of any major sensitization and training programs in thisrespect.7.2 ATTITUDES TOWARDS CORRUPTIONThe survey also asked respondents to rate their own ministry in terms of how muchcorruption there is. Table 23 reports on the findings.Table 23.Would you describe your ministry as corrupt?Min. ofAgric.Min. ofEducationMin. ofFinanceZRBMDAMPS&GGMin. ofHealthMin. of Lands(incl.ZWA&ZECO)Pres.OfficeTotalAgree N 32 12 7 2 0 16 32 4 105% 9.3 8.1 6.9 4.7 0.0 17.4 13.3 3.5 9.4Neither N 109 45 36 20 8 34 96 30 378% 31.7 30.2 35.3 46.5 32.0 38.0 39.8 26.1 34.0Disagree N 203 92 59 21 17 42 113 81 628% 59.0 61.8 57.8 48.8 68.0 45.7 46.9 70.4 56.6Total N 344 149 102 43 25 92 241 115 1,112% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0We find that the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Lands, Settlements, Water, andEnergy, are the two ministries identified by their own civil servants as the mostcorrupt. Over 17 percent of respondents in the Ministry of Health agree, or evenstrongly agree, that it is corrupt and the corresponding figure for the Ministry of Landsis over 13 percent. Another 38 percent and 40 percent respectively fail to say thattheir ministry is not corrupt by disagreeing with the statement.Looking at the results from the other angle – the share of respondents that disagreewith the statement and thus indicate that their ministry is not corrupt – we can seethat we also have to add Zanzibar Revenue Board to the more corrupt institutionsalongside the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Lands, Settlements, Water, and32

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and CorruptionEnergy. These three MDAs have fewer than 50 percent of respondents who disagreewith the statement about corruption.The least corrupt MDAs in this survey according to the estimation by civil servantsare the President’s Office and the Ministry of Education.But since the self-evaluation estimates can be open to critiques in the sense that civilservants would not want to acknowledge corruption in their own ministry, we alsodecided to include a general question where all civil servants in the survey wereasked to evaluated not only their own ministry but all ministries as well as membersof the HoR, and the Parliamentary Service. Table 24 presents the results of theanalysis when we categorize the 0-10 scaled answers into three categories.Table 24.In terms of corruption, how would you rate this ministry on a scale of 0 (Not Corrupt) to 10 (Very Corrupt)?Not at all Somewhat Very corruptTotalcorrupt corrupt% % % % NPresident’s office 50 33 17 100 901Min. of Finance 27 32 41 100 895Min. of Good Governance 41 38 21 100 860Min. of Constitution and Law 32 34 34 100 869Min. of Infrastructure and Communication 29 48 24 100 858Min. of Education 39 42 19 100 894Min. of Trade, Industry, and Markets 28 39 32 100 863Min. of Social Dev., Women and Children 41 43 16 100 864Min. of Info., Culture, Tourism, and Sports 38 43 19 100 858Min. of Land, Water, and Energy 24 34 42 100 911Min. of Agriculture and Natural Resources 46 41 13 100 914Min. of Livestock and Fisheries 43 42 15 100 889Min. of Labor, Employment, and Cooperatives 41 39 20 100 860Members of the House of Representatives 46 27 27 100 864The Parliamentary Service 45 26 29 100 862It is first worth noting that none of the MDAs are rated as essentially uncorrupt. AllMDAs included in the study have significant problems with corruption even accordingto civil servants themselves. While a survey with citizens for example, can becritiqued for building on perceptions and rumors shared by citizens that may notnecessarily have all that much to do with reality, this is different. Civil servants workinside these MDAs and see with their own eyes what is going on every day. Manyhave frequent professional interactions across ministries and many share friends andcolleagues across several MDAs. The information gleaned from data provided by civilservants should therefore be more reliable than a general perceptions survey. Thefinding that corruption is found across MDAs therefore presents valuable andinstructive information ahead of implementation of the Good Governance StrategicPlan. Civil servants and politicians know exactly which actions are corrupt, but thepractice is still prevalent and require significant action in the near future.While all MDAs have issues with corruption, some seem to be more affected thanothers. One way approaching this is to look at the MDAs with a smaller share ofrespondents agreeing that this particular MDA is ‘Not corrupt at all’. If few civilservants agree with this judgment, it is indicative of a higher prevalence of corruption(shaded in light grey). Setting an admittedly somewhat arbitrary bar at one-third (1/3)of respondents, we note that five – Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Constitutionand Law, the Ministry of Infrastructure and Communication, the Ministry of Trade,Industry, and Markets, and the Ministry of Land, Settlement, Water, and Energy –come out as particularly affected by corruption. Any anti-corruption activities and33

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and Corruptiongood governance programs should include and focus in particular on these fiveministries.If we look at Table 24 but focus on the other end of the scale, those MDAs thatparticularly many civil servants judge to be ‘Very corrupt’ we get much the samepicture although only three of the five ministries identified above reach above thelevel of one-third of respondents: Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Constitution andLaw, and the most corrupt MDA seems to be the Ministry of Land, Settlement, Water,and Energy.If one looks for positive signs, one can on the one hand note that a larger share ofrespondents indicate that the President’s Office in particular, but also the Ministry ofAgriculture and Natural Resources, the Members of the HoR and the ParliamentaryService are not corrupt at all (50, 46, 46, and 45 percent respectively).On the other hand, among these bodies only the President’s Office and the Ministryof Agriculture and Natural Resources are also scoring low in terms of the share ofrespondents saying they are “Very Corrupt” (17 and 13 percent, respectively). TheMinistry of Agriculture and Natural Resources thus seems to be the cleanest andmost honest MDA.Yet, for the agenda of good governance and anti-corruption it is indeed welcomenews that the President’s Office, which must lead reforms, is also among the leastaffected by corruption.There are a two other ministries besides the Ministry of Agriculture and NaturalResources that score better than the President’s Office on this indicator (but worseon the other end), and these are the Ministry of Social Development, Women andChildren, and the Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries.Another way of analyzing and presenting the same basic data, is to look at the meanratings per ministry as presented in the figure below.Completely Corrupt987Figure: Mean Level of Corruption of Various Government OfficesRated on a Scale from 0 to 106Somewhat Corrupt433.415.564.065.074.734.145.23.794.095.833.423.733.934.15 4.2621Not at all CorruptPresident's OfficeFinanceGood GovernanceConstitution/LawInfrastructure/CommunicationEducationTrade/Industry/MarketsSocial Developlment/Women/ChildrenInfo/Tourism/etcLevel of CorruptionLand//Water/EnergyAgric/ResourcesLivestock/FisheriesLabor/Employ./etcMembers of HoRParliamentary ServiceCircles mark mean value; Band shows 1 standard deviation from mean34

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and CorruptionThis way of analyzing the data does not change the picture much except that thePresident’s Office now beats the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources to itwhen it comes to being the champion of cleanest MDA.7.3 CORRUPTION AT DIFFERENT LEVELSTable 25 shows the results of a series of questions were respondents were asked torate different levels in the bureaucratic hierarchy in terms of how much corruptionthere is across levels in the bureaucracies in the MDAs. Given that frontline officerswere over-sampled, it is perhaps not surprising that upper level bureaucrats are seenas most corrupt. Almost half of the civil servants (46 percent) identified the upperlevel officials as “Very corrupt”. Even if there is some effect of the sampling on thisissue, it does not seem plausible that it can explain the differences in Table 25.These differences are substantive and highly significant so it is clear that corruption isa much more significant problem at higher levels in the bureaucracy, than at lowerlevels.Table 25.In terms of corruption, how would you rate the following?Very corruptSomewhatcorruptNot at allcorruptN % N % N % N %Upper level officials above directors 518 46 247 22 369 32 1134 100Directors 357 32 364 33 371 34 1092 100Officers 287 26 463 41 355 33 1087 100Support and technical staff 183 16 418 38 504 46 1099 100Your colleagues 77 6 177 16 859 78 1107 100Yourself 42 4 60 5 1035 91 1137 100At the same time, only four and five percent of respondents identified themselves as“Very corrupt” and “Somewhat corrupt” respectively, and the figures for “Yourcolleagues” also appear lower than expected given the findings above. But it is notuncommon in surveys that you get a response effect of direct questions regardingsocially less desirable behavior such as corruption.The upper level officials in particular are not only perceived as on average, to bemore corrupt, but are also more likely to spend up to four hours a day of official timein pursuit of their private business.The survey included a special question on this issue. Table 26 presents the results.Out of a total of 1091 officials who answered the question “How many hours of officialtime per day, do you think the following spend on personal business or doing thingsfor other people (social obligations) that have nothing to do with their official duties?”66 percent report that upper level officials above the level of directors spent from twohours up to half of the workday pursuing their own private interests. An oft-repeatedchallenge of the public service in Africa in general, and of Zanzibar in particular, is theissue of “putting individual interests first” 30 .Total30 Personal interview 22 nd July, 2011, same message repeated in interview 25 th July, 201135

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and CorruptionTable 26.How many hours of official time per day do you think the following spend on personal business or on doing things forother people (social obligations)?Up to 1hr 2- 4 hrs 4+ hrs Total. N % N % N % N %Upper level officials above director 343 31 446 41 302 28 1091 100Directors 368 34 408 38 301 28 1077 100Officers 365 34 380 35 326 30 1071 100Support and technical staff 363 34 379 35 329 31 1071 100Your colleagues 430 40 305 28 340 32 1075 100You 550 48 253 22 338 30 1141 100What is believed to be true is often true in its consequences. When subordinatesbelieve that the big men and women who “get all the benefits and allowances like fuel[subsidies], accommodation allowance, opportunities to travel and attend choiceworkshops and conferences”, 31 also use official time in pursuit of increasing theiralready higher salaries, then it is perceived as “only fair” and “some justice” when thelower paid, lower ranked officers takes a hour to “rush” off to stock a shop or buyseedlings for their farm. It is also easy to see that even corrupt deals can be seen byofficers in the same light at lower levels in the bureaucracy.One of the challenges facing the implementation and institutionalization of the policywill be the extent to which both civil servants and the general public perceive thegovernment as acting fair. The survey included a few questions on what the civilservants believe are the most important causes of corruption in the civil service.1,011 civil servants answered the question of what causes corruption and povertyand low salaries were the clearly dominant answer categories in all respects.If the head of the civil service clamps down on the mismanagement of official timeand the corruption by senior management and top-level officials, the civil servants atlower levels may start to believe in, and be willing to support, the change thegovernment desires. Only then will good governance reforms and anti-corruptionactivities stand a chance to make a difference. As long as there is the perceptionamong a vast majority of staff in the public service that upper-levels are corrupt andthat they are allowed to spend a lot of their official working time on private business,how can anyone expect them to believe in any talk of “reform” and “real change”?This is of course especially true if one also fears to be punished in some sense forreporting corrupt behavior. The survey asked the question if respondents thought youwould make “unnecessary enemies” in such a situation. Table 27 show that 68percent of the civil servants believe that you make “unnecessary enemies” byreporting or trying to fight corruption.Table 27.You will make unnecessary enemies if you report or try to fight corruptionN %Disagree / Disagree Strongly 172 15Neither 200 17Agree / Agree Strongly 671 68Total 1152 10031 Personal interview 25 th Jully, 201136

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and CorruptionThis gives an indication of how risky civil servants find it to report corruption and animportant task for the reform efforts must be to change this culture of fear and makehesitant civil servants comfortable with reporting abuses of power and position. It iseven worse of course if you do not only risk getting enemies, but if one perceives thatno matter what, nothing gets done anyway. Table 28 demonstrates that this is awidespread perception among staff in the civil service in Zanzibar.Table 28.There is no point of reporting corruption because nothing gets doneN %Disagree / Disagree Strongly 318 28Neither 216 18Agree / Agree Strongly 624 54Total 1158 100The survey shows that a majority, more almost 54 percent, of civil servants thinksthere is no point in reporting corruption because nothing gets done about it anyway.This is damaging for any reform-minded politician and bureaucrat and is an issue thatprobably must be addressed before anything else. It points to a dire need to bringtraining and sensitization programs to bear on this issue. These results alsodemonstrate another very important need, which is the need for impartial, powerful,and autonomous institutions that can receive and deal with complaints aboutcorruption. Such institutions (e.g. a powerful ombudsman along the lines of the newanti-corruption authority) must be credible and provide assurance against perceptionslike the ones reported above.An important step would be if a few high-level positioned individuals who areengaging in corruption were charged and convicted demonstrating the effects ofreform efforts and a new climate for coming forward with reports.37

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and Corruption8 CONCLUSIONSThis report provides an assessment of data collected in the survey carried with asample of public officials in seven ministries and three autonomous institutions out onUnguja and on Pemba. The data from the public service survey provides informationabout the attitudes of public officials towards formal and informal rules, theirperceptions of good governance, accountability, and corruption.The surveys were conducted from the 11 th of July through the 24 th of July 2011. Thefirst aim was to provide a baseline assessment of the quality of government and thelevel of corruption throughout Zanzibar. The second goal was to assess differentsections of the government on several performance standards including civilservants’ perceptions of the bureaucracy’s quality. The project finally provides aunique opportunity to inform the MPSGG’s work on the Strategic Plan forimplementation of the new Good Governance Policy and support the forthcomingAnti-Corruption Act. The survey was thus designed to collect baseline data onperceptions about accountability, corruption, and good governance within the publicservice.Since budgetary and time allocations prevented inclusion of all Ministries, Agencies,and Departments (MDAs), seven ministries and three autonomous bodies werepurposively selected to meet one basic criterion, direct interaction with the public. Thefinal sample was selected in consultation with officials from the Ministry of StatePresident’s Office for Public Service and Good Governance.The random selection of respondents was conducted by combining a systematicsampling approach with probability proportional selection. A total of 1,892questionnaires were distributed in approximate proportion to the number of staff inthe targeted groups adjusting sample selection to compensate for small MDAs inorder to collect samples we could work with statistically. The overall response ratewas close to 70% according to these figures, even though it varies from a low of lessthan 30 percent in the case of the MPSGG, to a high of over 90 percent in the case ofthe Ministry Agriculture.Data collection also involved 12 qualitative, semi structured in-depth and three focusgroup interviews to supplement the survey data.8.1 MAIN FINDINGS8.1.1 Socio-Economic Context37 percent of civil servants have been not only in the civil service but also in theircurrent position for 11 or more years, and 55 percent has been at least six years intheir current position. This is a positive aspect when it comes to institutional memoryand building capacity. But it also presents a possible problem when it comes toreform and to changing ingrained patterns of behavior.The level of education is rather low in the Zanzibari civil service. Only 17 percent ofofficials have an undergraduate degree and 10 percent has a master’s degree. Lessthan one percent have PhD degrees. Young, well-educated junior officers coming intothe service also present challenges, however, of alienation and favoritism.38

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and CorruptionThe civil service staff is poorly paid in Zanzibar. 65 percent made betweenTsh100,000 and Tsh299,999, while they on average support 8-9 people on thissalary, and 98 percent claim not to be able to care for their family on their salaryalone, hence, 71 percent engage in other income-generating activities, primarilyfarming.Beyond the immediate family, civil service officials are also facing strong socialpressures. Almost 70 percent face demands to pay for hospital bills, school fees andthe like at least monthly. 45 percent must help a relative find a job a few times a yearat least.It may thus not be surprising that 61 percent of the civil service officials perceive theirfinancial situation to be worse, or much worse, than the average Zanzibari. 58percent of the staff also perceive their economic situation to have worsened whileless than 9 percent feel that they are better off today compared to one year ago. Thissituation is worrying.The combined situation of officers with frequent and demanding social obligationsand a worse than average economic situation, that has deteriorated over the past 12months, constitute a serious threat to the good governance and anti-corruptionagenda.8.1.2 Degree of Bureaucraticness69 percent of respondents claim that formal interview processes are the ways inwhich people generally get public sector jobs. This must be considered anencouraging sign.Only 7 percent indicate that political party affiliation counts most for promotion and 9percent think connections with ‘the right people’ is the most important factor. On theother hand, 90 percent of the work force thinks advancement in the service might ormight not be determined by skills and merit of which 36 percent judge that skills andmerit hardly ever matter. This is a very worrying pattern that deserves seriousattention.On a series of general indicators of bureaucratic quality such as ethical values,disciplining staff who break rules, transparency, and respect for rules, a couple ofMDAs are rated significantly lower than most others. This pertains in particular to theMinistry of Health, and the Ministry of Lands, Settlement, Water, and Energy.We also find that the pattern of self-evaluations of ministries indicate that civilservants have too low expectations, and set the bar too low for what counts asacceptable and even excellent bureaucratic performance.8.1.3 Good GovernanceThe survey results show that public officials mean different things, or have differentunderstandings, or priorities when they use the concept of Good Governance. Thereis clearly no unified, coherent understanding among civil servants with regards to thisissue – much in contrast to the issue of corruption. It is clear that there is a lot ofeducation to be done in order for the civil servants to have a clear understanding ofwhat good governance entails.In terms of bureaucratic autonomy, 53 percent think that the public service always orsometimes lack autonomy when it comes to policy. A definitive majority (66 percent)39

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and Corruptionconsiders bureaucratic autonomy to be compromised always or sometimes when itcomes to hire, disciplining, fire, and demote civil servants. It seems advisable thatpreparations for reform include strategies and efforts aiming to increase theautonomy of the civil service.Asking the civil servants to evaluate all ministries on a range of good governanceissues, the results show that the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education areranked most favorably across many of these indicators. It paints a picture where civilservants in Zanzibar consider these two ministries to work hard and do much good inareas where citizens need the state the most, but that they also are insufficient to thetask as it is and need reforms, possibly also more resources.None of these two critical ministries have been blessed with the most effectiveministers at the present, however, according to civil servants. The politicians areranked rather low. The most effective ministers come instead from the President’sOffice, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Agriculture.8.1.4 CorruptionA vast majority of civil servants (74 percent) adequately identify unofficial paymentsas the thing they associate with corruption first and foremost among the variousoptions.All MDAs included in the study have significant problems with corruption evenaccording to civil servants themselves.The Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Lands, Settlements, Water, and Energy,are the two ministries identified by their own employees as the most corrupt. Theleast corrupt MDAs in this survey according to the self-estimation by are thePresident’s Office and the Ministry of Education.Allowing all civil servants to evaluate all ministries, those MDAs that particularly manycivil servants judge to be ‘Very corrupt’ are: the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry ofConstitution and Law, and the most corrupt MDA seems to be the Ministry of Land,Settlement, Water, and Energy.The collective evaluation of civil servants indicate that the President’s Office inparticular, but also the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the Members ofthe HoR and the Parliamentary Service are the least corrupt among the institutionsincluded in the study. Among these bodies only the President’s Office and theMinistry of Agriculture and Natural Resources are also scoring low in terms of theshare of respondents saying they are “Very Corrupt” (17 and 13 percent,respectively). The Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources thus seems to be thecleanest and most honest MDA. For the agenda of good governance and anticorruptionit is indeed welcome news that the President’s Office, which must leadreforms, is also among the least affected by corruption.One should be clear, however, that we did not separate out all different parts of thePresident’s Office, such as the local governments and we do not believe that e.g.Stone Town Municipal Authority were on the minds of respondents.The results also show that corruption is much more a problem at higher levels in thebureaucracy, than at mid- and lower levels. Almost half of the civil servants (46percent) identified the upper level officials as “Very corrupt” but only 16 percent saythe same thing about lower levels. This is further aggravated by figures like that 66percent report that upper level officials above the level of directors spent from two40

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and Corruptionhours up to half of the workday pursuing their own private interests. This is a seriousproblem. When subordinates believe that the superiors use official time in pursuit ofincreasing their already higher salaries, then it is perceived as “only fair” and “somejustice” when the lower paid, lower ranked officers take a hour off or even engage incorrupt exchanges. As long as there is the perception among a vast majority of staffin the public service that upper-levels are corrupt and that they are allowed to spenda lot of their official working time on private business, how can anyone expect them tobelieve in any talk of “reform” and “real change”?Reporting corruption is also perceived to be risky and meaningless. 68 percent of thecivil servants believe that you make “unnecessary enemies” by reporting or trying tofight corruption. 54 percent of civil servants are of the opinion there is no point inreporting corruption because nothing gets done about it anyway. These results alsodemonstrate another very important need, which is the need for impartial, powerful,and autonomous institutions that can receive and deal with complaints aboutcorruption.8.1.5 Some Final ReflectionsA recurring theme in the interviews was the issue of how the good governance policywas going to ensure existing rules are obeyed, that real reform is actuallyimplemented. Given Zanzibar’s history of policy implementation we should treat thisskepticism with the due seriousness coming from the very agents of change whosehelp the good governance policy cannot do without.The response rate of the Ministry for Public Service and Good Governance to thesurvey is a concern. While we have been very impressed by the core team workingon the policy, the MPSGG had the lowest response rate of all, which does not bodewell for the implementation of the policy.Bureaucratic inertia in Zanzibar has historical as well as structural roots. Yet one canidentify competent individual officers, and this has been our experience with theMPSGG. But the impact of these agents of change can be undermined when theircolleagues may possibly be apathetic or even resistant to change.Our experience working with the Ministry of Lands, Settlement, Water, and Energyprovided a good lesson in creating the kind of teamwork needed to implementpolicies. Within the public service it is often middle and junior level officers whoundertake the actual business of carrying out mandates.41

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and Corruption9 REFERENCESILPI. 2010. THE FRAMEWORK FOR UNITY: A Profile of the New Government of NationalUnity in Zanzibar. Report Series: ZANZIBAR SPECIAL REPORTS. Series editor:Kjetil Tronvoll.Lipton, M. 1991. "Market Relaxation and Agricultural Development." In States or Markets?Neo-liberalism and the Development Policy Debate, ed. i. C. a. Manor. Oxford:Clarendon Press.Mahoney, J. and Goertz. 2006. "A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitaive andQualitative Research." Political Analysis 14 (3):227-49.North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,Revolutionary Government Of Zanzibar. 2010. Public Service Management Policy Draft.Office of the PresidentWorld Bank. 2002 “Evidence-Based Governance in the Electronic Age: Case Study Personneland Payroll Records and Information Systems in Tanzania. A WorldBank/International Records Management Trust Partnership Project42

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and Corruption10 APPENDIX 1: METHODOLOGY10.1 RESEARCH DESIGNSince budgetary and time allocations prevented inclusion of all Ministries, Agencies,and Departments (MDAs), seven ministries and three autonomous bodies werepurposively selected to meet one basic criterion, direct interaction with the public. Thefinal sample was selected in consultation with officials from the Ministry of StatePresident’s Office for Public Service and Good Governance.The random selection of respondents was conducted by combining a systematicsampling approach with probability proportional selection. This combined techniquewas imperative given the different sizes of MDAs concerned. Yet, given that the exactsizes of the MDAs were not known beforehand, and the approximate numbers wehad been given in advance varied substantially with the figures acquired during theprocess of sampling, and that staff rolls were often incomplete, both aspects of therandom sampling were to some extent undermined.Respondents for the survey were selected using staff rolls as sampling frames. Giventhe fact that we could not find a unified staff roll for the public service, we had tonegotiate sampling with each MDA individually. In some cases this meant that theMDA could provide us with a complete listing of staff with full names, position, andunit. In other cases the MDA could only provide incomplete lists, and yet other casesonly aggregates of the number of staff per unit. Further given that staff rolls weretypically not up to date, we met with the administrative or planning directors of eachministry to work together on the sampling frames.At the district level, the issue of staff rolls was even more problematic as there weresignificant differences between the numbers given to us at the national, regional, anddistrict levels. Hence, at the regional and district levels the choice was made tosimply go through the rolls with the officers-in-charge at the various departments orunits, after which respondents were randomly selected and stratified.Second, within each MDA three levels of personnel were systematically selected 32 toensure a fair coverage of upper, middle and junior officers. 33 The main advantageaccruing from employing this second-stage purposive probability sampling approachwas the ability to explore some of the different dynamics hypothesized as importantfor bureaucratic effectiveness and efficient service delivery.32 Even though we value the work of drivers, cleaners, security guards, messengers, trainees, typist,carpenters, and mechanics, they were systematically excluded from the sample. Depending on the sizeof the institution, only 19 to 36 per cent of the total staff was therefore considered eligible as potentialrespondents.33 Even though we included public servants working for the Ministry of Local Government, employeesworking directly for local governments were excluded. In Zanzibar there are two types of localgovernment staff, those who are employed directly by the government and are considered part of thepublic service, and those who are employed directly by local governments; these employees often tendto be employed on short-term basis and overall tend to be low skilled, as local government in Zanzibar isstill in its developmental phase. This group of officials was excluded from the sample.43

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and Corruption10.2 RESPONSE RATESRespondents thus selected came from the national, regional and not the least thedistrict levels. Table 1 displays the total number of sampled per MDA and responserates for each institution.Table 1.Civil Service Survey Distribution.Sampling RecordsCoded SampleDistributed Collected ResponseMDA Unguja Pemba Total Unguja Pemba Total RateMin. of State (PO) 227 15 242 129 6 135 55,8%Min. of Agriculture 373 97 470 354 74 428 91,1%Min. of Education 200 35 235 128 33 161 68,5%Min. of Finance 189 12 201 110 9 119 59,2%MPSGG 93 10 103 19 10 29 28,2%Min. of Health 144 43 187 73 27 100 53,5%Min. of Lands, Housing, Water, &Energy (incl. ZWA & ZECO) 340 45 385 224 56 280 72,7%Zanzibar Revenue Board 54 15 69 37 9 46 66,7%Unknown 0 0 2Total 1620 272 1892 1074 224 1300 68,7%Table 1 gives the figures of the sampling record, and the figures from the coded data.The sampling process as described above was a little unorthodox and the partlyimprovised sampling at the ministry and oftentimes department level led to numerouschanges in the sampling frame and accompanying samples drawn. We wish toacknowledge that under the extremely challenging time constraints, some informationmay have gone missing in this complex process. Another source of possible error isthe data entry process. After realizing that it was not possible to train the selectedZanzibari research assistants up to the level we would be comfortable with,questionnaires were transported with a team member going to Ghana and enteredthere by a professional company. Due to miscommunication with regards to codinginstructions, however, some questionnaires may have been attributed to the wronglocation even after a process of recoding was conducted. 34 The discrepancies areprobably not very large however.34 Even though each survey questionnaire was assigned a discrete number, the questionnaire itself didnot include a category or item for the location, the latter referring to whether the respondent filling out thequestionnaire was doing so from Unguja or Pemba. The decision to leave out that question was toensure respondents felt comfortable with the our statement that no identifying information was going tobe collected from them and that their anonymity was guaranteed, thus making it more likely thatrespondents would give truthful answers. To track the location of completed questionnaires, eachministry’s returns were collected and stored in separate folders. Folders were then labeled by ministry,department or unit from which the surveys were picked up, if the location was not at headquarters. Thenumber to questionnaires given out and the number collected back was also due noted. The foldersystem was discarded by the data entry firm for the unique number system on each questionnaire oncethey arrived in Ghana since the quality control aspect of the folder system was not explained to them.44

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and CorruptionAcross all the MDAs selected for sampling, a total of 1,892 questionnaires weredistributed in approximate proportion to the number of staff in the targeted groupsadjusting sample selection to compensate for small MDAs in order to collect sampleswe could work with statistically. The response rates reported in Table 1 is close to69%, varying from a low of less than 30 percent in the case of the MPSGG, to animpressive high of over 90 percent in the case of the Ministry Agriculture.Of the individuals in the sample, slightly more than half (52 percent) were engaged inproviding direct services to the public, while only 12 percent were primarilyresponsible for creating, analyzing and monitoring policy. That shows that oursampling succeeded in the aim of over-sampling the officers involved in direct serviceprovision that are the face of the state and the government to the public.10.3 QUALITATIVE DATAThe third and final stage of data collection involved qualitative, semi structured indepthand focus group interviews to supplement the survey data. These interviewsare aimed at collecting data on perceptions about accountability, corruption, goodgovernance, and the challenges of implementation and monitoring for many publicinstitutions. We conducted 12 in-depth and three focus-group interviews of varyinglengths ranging from around 20 minutes to about three hours 35 . The focus groupdiscussions were open, participants asked lots of questions creating a good dialogueamong and between officials. Overall discussions were more forthright than thepersonal interviews.Some basic questions were asked of all respondents 36 , although other questionswere asked as well. Reactions to the questions broadly fell into three classes, (i)those who either missed the point, or chose to miss the point, (ii) those who agreedour project was the best thing that is happening to Zanzibar at the moment and (iii)those who, though supportive, were much more forthcoming in their critiques.Throughout the process, but especially during the initial phase of the project,observations by visiting the different agencies, selecting participants, and sites weregathered. Information gleaned from this process informed the semi structured indepthinterviews.35 All focus groups were made up of men, even though an effort was made to find some femaleparticipants36 “Please sir, my interview with you will be very short, I know how busy you are. I am following up to getyour true, honest views. In Ghana we say he who cuts a path in he bush doesn’t know when his hardwork gets crooked. Yet it is not everyone you ask to check your back for you. The advice of a fool ordeceitful man is worse than that of an enemy. So, please tell me no matter how harsh you think the truthis, truth is truth and you can’t make it smell nicer if it does not smell nice or look beautiful.So, sir, now 3 things:Now that you have had time to look at our survey what do you think?Also what are your thought, impressions and views after you have had a chance to look over our civilservants survey?And if you didn’t what are you thought about accountability, corruption and good governance now andthe future and what things do I need to keep in my for my work on these issues?“45

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and CorruptionAs with all studies of this nature, our time in Zanzibar was all too short. Importantfollow-up meetings with key people had to be forgone. The survey data collectioncould have been extended beyond the two-week period, but with these limitations thebaseline surveys and qualitative interviews went well.The following analysis combines survey base-line data of 1,295 public servants withthe data generated from our interviews and meetings key officials and focus groupinterviews in Unguja and Pemba to paint a more nuanced portrait of bureaucrats’attitudes towards accountability, corruption, good governance, and the challenges ofimplementation and monitoring. We attempt to capture Zanzibari voices by presentingqualitative data from a range of bureaucrats. Even though we did not ask, severalrespondents included comments on their questionnaires. This unexpected, but veryrich data has also proven to be a valuable source for elaborating on some of themechanisms suggested by the statistical data. The survey data was double coded bya professional survey agency and analyzed by the ILPI team using Stata/SE 11.1.46

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and Corruption11 APPENDIX 2: THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENTDue to Zanzibar’s autonomous position within the United Republic of Tanzania it hastwo sets of public institutions, those dealing with Union Matters 37 and those solely incharge of specific areas of governance in Zanzibar 38 . Several of the reports consultedin the course of carrying out this project described the Zanzibari government asoverly centralized. These charges were also echoed in some interviews with keyinformants. Even though this is not the venue to take up this debate, it needs to bementioned that we have found many instances where politicians and public servantsmistakenly conflate the issue of the separation of powers with the principle of, and thepossible merits of, devolution of power from the center to the periphery.That said there is no arguing that the size of the public service is disproportionatelylarge compared to the size of the country as we will see in the overview of thestructure of the main institutions of governance: the office of the President (underwhich a number of ministries fall), the Revolutionary Council/Cabinet, and the publicservice.11.1 THE EXECUTIVEA new Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar in the form of a Government ofNational Unity (GNU) was ushered into power in Zanzibar after the 2010 elections.The President and His Vice PresidentsThe President 39 is head of state and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council andappoints all members of the council, which also doubles as cabinet. The president isalso a member of the cabinet of the United Republic of Tanzania. As president heretains the discretion to listen to or ignore any advice offered by the Council.Theoretically, he employs all public servants (Zanzibar Constitution, sections 53 and54) and in practice appoints all upper level bureaucrats down to the level of directors.37 1. These are Central Statistics Collection, 2. Citizenship, 3. Civil Aviation, 4. Collection of revenuefrom income taxes, customs and excise duties on goods and services collected by the customsdepartment, 5. Defense and Security, 6. Emergency Powers, 7. External borrowing and trade, 8. Fiscalpolicy - currency coinage and regulation, banking, sets foreign exchange rates, 9. Foreign Affairs, 10.Harbors, Air Transport, Posts and Telecommunications, 11. Higher Education, 12. Immigration, 13.Industrial licensing, 14. Meteorology, 15. Mineral and oil resources, 16. Police, 17. Registration andregulation of political parties, 18. Research, 19. Service in the Government of the United Republic, 20.The Court of Appeal of the United Republic, 21. The National Examinations Council of Tanzania, 22.The Tanzanian Constitution38 1. Agriculture, 2. Communication and Transport, 3. Construction, 4. Culture and Sports, 5. Education,6. Energy and Land 7. Environment and Cooperatives, 8. Health and Social Welfare, 9. Industry, 10.Information, 11. Marketing, 12. Resources, 13. Tourism, 14. Trade, 15. Water, 16. Women and ChildrenDevelopment, 17. Youth and Employment39 President Shein, a medical doctor by training, was Vice President in the Union Government from 2001through 2010 and an MP from 1995 to 2000. He also served as the Minister for Health during the sameperiod. He was also one-time Minister of the Ministry Constitutional Affairs and Good Governance from2000-2001 when he was selected to be the Union Government Vice President.47

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and CorruptionAnd he is in charge of all three special ministries 40 .The First Vice President 41 is from CUF, the main opposition party and his principalrole is to “perform all other functions that will be assigned by the President” 42 . TheSecond Vice President 43 is from CCM the same party as the President, and hasessentially assumed the role of the Chief Minister as specified during the perviousgovernment in that he is primarily responsible for the running the RevolutionaryGovernment of Zanzibar’s daily activities as well as overseeing the activities in theHouse of Representatives.” 44This concentration of power raises a number of concerns. The issue of a clearseparation of powers between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary was arecurring theme in interviews with key informants. The concentration of power is apotential threat to the government’s commitment to good governance.The fact that the President also appoints the individual members of the RevolutionaryCouncil, who are also HoR members, undermines their ability to act autonomously asrepresentatives of the people and co-equals with the executive and judiciary when itcomes to the business of governing the country.The Revolutionary Council and CabinetThe unity government has led to an increase in the current cabinet from 13 to 16;nine (9) of who are from the ruling CCM and the other seven (7) are from the mainopposition party, CUF. The new cabinet is made up of 16 line ministers and threeministers without portfolios, 19 in total 45 . The new RGZ in the form of a government ofnational unity has also meant a division and/or reorganization of several ministries forthe accommodation of coalition partners. The implementation of this reorganizationhas been a slow and laborious process. Several departments or units are eitherdefunct or under-staffed. For example the Department of Food Security within theMinistry of Agriculture in Pemba was defunct, and the new department of Researchunder the President's Office and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council was still inthe process of getting its staff together during the time ILPI was compiling this report.Given the time period, the delays in implementation are to a certain degreeunderstandable, but also underscore the challenges of policy implementation ingeneral.The official functions of the Revolutionary Council are specified under section 43:1 ofthe Constitution of Zanzibar. The Council is made up of the President, his two vice40 Ministry at the President’s Office and Revolutionary Council, Ministry of Finance (Under ThePresident’s Office), and President’s Office, Ministry for Public Service and Good Governance.41 Maalim Seif Sharif Hamad is an experienced bureaucrat; he served as the personal secretary toPresident Jumbe and was once the Minster of Education (ILPI: 2010:5). Even though he was involved inthe selection and appointment of Principle Secretaries, there is no denying that a very experienced as itwould have if he was the revamped Chief minister.42 Unofficial Translation by ILPI of the 10th Amendment to the 1984 Constitution of Zanzibar Section 20amending section 39 of the Constitution 39(5). Ibid:6.43 Ambassador Seif Ali Iddi was a career diplomat, member of the Union Parliament and one timeDeputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Union Government. He is currently also an MP in to the UnionParliament. Cited in an IPLI Ibid:6.44 Ibid45 Compared to the thirteen line ministers and one minister without portfolio in the last administration.48

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and Corruptionpresidents, and all ministers – with and without portfolios, all of whom are alsomembers of the House of Representatives (sections 43 (2) and 44 (2)). Officially theCouncil is the main advisory body to the President, with coordinating powers over allgovernmental affairs including those of the President. In praxis, one can question thedegree to which the Council can autonomously carry out this mandate. The councilalso has coordination powers over the offices of the two vice presidents, as well asministerial activities at the regional and district levels. The Revolutionary Council iscollectively responsible to the House of Representatives and to the people for thedischarge of government functions. The secretary to the Revolutionary Council is alsothe Chief of the Public service [Section 49(2)], and thus head of all the civil servants.11.2 THE PUBLIC SERVICEThe main purpose of the public service is to translate the laws, policies, andregulations issued by the executive, legislature and the judiciary into concreteprogramming that it then implements. It also provides the main regulatory andinfrastructural environment for the daily business of governing the country. The publicservice is made up of ministries (see Table 2), departments and agencies (MDAs)established by the Executive Branch of Government for the purpose of deliveringservices to the public of Zanzibar. Among other things the public service providesadministrative support service to the Public Service Commission, the House ofRepresentatives Service Commission, the Judiciary and the Judicial ServiceCommission; as well as semi autonomous Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC), theOffice of the Controller and Auditor General (OCAG), the Office of the Director ofPublic Prosecutions (DPP), Zanzibar Revenue Board, and Zanzibar Water Authority.Table 2.Ministries of the Government of Zanzibar1. Ministry At President's Office And Revolutionary Council2. Ministry of Finance (Under The Presidents Office)3. Ministry of Public Service Good Governance (Under The President’s Office)4. Ministry of State (In The First Vice President’s Office)5. Ministry of State (In The Second Vice President’s Office)6. Ministry of Constitution and Law7. Ministry of Infrastructure and Communication8. Ministry of Education9. Ministry of Health10. Ministry of Social Development, Women and Children11. Ministry of Information, Culture, Tourism and Sports12. Ministry of Land, Settlements, Water, Energy13. Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Markets14. Ministry of Agriculture and Resources15. Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries16. Ministry of Labor, National Economic Empowerment, and CooperativesThe rules and regulations undergirding the public service are laid down in the PublicService Commission Act No. 14 of 1986, which provides for the creation of the PublicService Commission (CSC). As of the time of writing a Public Service RegulationPolicy was in the draft stages. The document, when finalized and signed into law willbe the main document regulating the Public Service.Getting the exact number of people employed in the public service has provenelusive for the ILPI team, but the figure seems to range somewhere between 29,000and 32,000. According to the Minister of Finance’s 2011 budget speech, the civilservice had a work force of 31,433, of which 14,748 (47 percent) are women, whilethe parastatal sector employees an additional 4,120 people. Based on the figures in49

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and Corruptionthe minister’s budget speech, the government directly or indirectly employs 35,553individuals. If this figure is correct, it represents approximately 3.5 percent of theestimated population of around one million.At the apex of the professional and administrative branches of the public service isthe Chief Secretary. The Chief Secretary is also the secretary to the RevolutionaryCouncil and Chair of the Committee of Principal Secretaries. The Chief Secretary’soffice is principally responsible for screening papers before their presentation tocabinet for consideration.There seems to be a blurring of roles in the governance structure even at this level.Both the Chief Secretary and Head of the Public service appear to be “a staffposition” rather than a “line position”. When interviewed, even key top-level officersthink the main functions of the Chief Secretary are concerned with the affairs of theRevolutionary Council and not the public service 46 . Some of the officials interviewedalso suggested more powers be devolved from the executive to the Chief Secretaryin matters relating to the public service.46 Interviews 19 th , 25 th July50

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and Corruption12 APPENDIX 3: EVALUATION TEAMProfessor Kjetil Tronvoll (Norway), Senior Partner at ILPI, carried out the finalquality control of the survey and the draft reports. Tronvoll is professor of humanrights (University of Oslo) and holds additional professorial competence in peace andconflict studies. His doctoral degree is in political anthropology from London School ofEconomics and Political Science (LSE). Additionally, Tronvoll has an M.Phil researchdegree from the University of Oslo. Tronvoll has carried out studies in Africa for over20 years and published eight books, and a number of articles and reports on issuesof conflict, peace processes, human rights, and democratization. His coregeographical areas of research is the Horn of Africa and Eastern Africa, where healso has been involved as an advisor to international initiatives on peace andreconciliation. Tronvoll has participated in and headed a number of election observermissions, and has carried out a wide range of consultancies on human rights,democratization and conflict. Since 2003, Tronvoll has closely observed the politicalreconciliation process in Zanzibar.Staffan I. Lindberg (Sweden) is Team Leader for the assignment and adjunct senioradvisor at ILPI. Lindberg holds a PhD from Lund University, Department of PoliticalScience, 2004). He is Associate Professor (on leave), Department of Political Scienceand the Center for African Studies, University of Florida. Lindberg is currentlyResearch Director for World Values Survey Sweden, Research Fellow at Quality ofGovernment institute, and Associate Professor, Department of Political Science,University of Gothenburg, Sweden, as well as Co-PI for the new global democracymeasurementproject Varieties of Democracy 1900-2010. He is the vice chair of”African Politics Conference Group”, elected member of IPSA’s Committee onConcepts and Methods, was the co-PI for the DfID-sponsored research consortium“African Power and Politics” 2007-2009, and has won several grants from both USand in European funders, and is member of several research advisory boards andsocial science journals. His research has dealt with state building, political clientelism,political parties, legislative-executive relations, women’s representation, votingbehavior, elections and democracy in Africa. His dissertation won the AmericanPolitical Science Association’s Juan Linz Prize for Best Dissertation in 2005. He is theauthor of Democracy and Elections in Africa (Johns Hopkins UP, 2006) and the editorof Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition? (Johns Hopkins UP2009), and his articles on women’s representation, political clientelism, votingbehavior, party and electoral systems, democratization, popular attitudes, and theGhanaian legislature and executive-legislative relationships have appeared in forexample Journal of Politics, Political Science Quarterly, Electoral Studies, Studies inInternational Comparative Development, Journal of Democracy, Government andOpposition, Journal of Modern African Studies, and Democratization. Lindberg hasdone fieldwork concerning several African countries, including South Africa, Namibia,and Botswana in Southern Africa. 1999 to 2001 he was a long-term consultantstationed in Ghana on a SIDA-sponsored West African program led by PGA.Lindberg has participated as election observer several times, was the Team Leaderfor the extensive evaluation of the Afrobarometer after Round 4 operating in 20countries, and has undertaken several other consultancies, including on goodgovernance and democratization in Zambia and Ghana.Njål Høstmælingen (Norway): Director Njål Høstmælingen is a Team Member to theassignment with a special responsibility for the anti-corruption bill. He is Director atILPI, Attorney at Law, holding an LL.M from the University of Oslo. Høstmælingen hasserved as deputy judge, head of administration at the Norwegian Centre for Human51

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and CorruptionRights, and head of the National Human Rights Institution. He has over the last 15years carried out consultancies for Norwegian ministries, non-governmentalorganizations, academic institutions, and business enterprises. Høstmælingen haspublished and edited a wide range of books and articles on national implementationof international human rights law, corporate social responsibility, and civil and politicalrights, and was editor of the Norwegian Human Rights Plan of Action. Høstmælingenis inter alia member of the Norwegian Biotechnological Advisory Board and the boardof the Norwegian International Law Association, and former editor of the NordicJournal of Human Rights.Keith R. Weghorst (USA) is a Team Member with special responsibility for theCitizen and Legislator survey components. Weghorst is a PhD Cand. in DepartmentPolitical Science at the University of Florida. He received an MA from the AfricanStudies program at the University of California, Los Angeles and a BA fromNorthwestern University in Political Science and Legal Studies. His research largelyfocuses on the relationship between voters and political parties in Africanelections. Keith also specializes in survey design, particularly on how to improvequestion design in order to reduce measurement error. He has conducted researchon democratization and elections extensively in Zanzibar and Tanzania, includingadministering three waves of household surveys in Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar, andan additional survey with students of the University of Dar es Salaam. Weghorst hasa number of research papers under review for publication and was recently publishedin Democratization for a study on elections and democratic accountability inGhana. He worked with the International Law and Policy Institute during 2010 as anobserver of the registration and referendum process, as well as an election observerfor the National elections in October 2010. In addition to his research in Tanzaniaand Zanzibar, he has also participated in research projects on democraticaccountability in Ghana, Mauritius, and Uganda. Keith is a native English speakerand is fluent in Swahili.Winifred Pankani (Ghana/USA) is a Team Member to the assignment with a specialresponsibility for the survey, focus groups, and qualitative interviews with civilservants. She is a PhD Cand. in the Department of Political Science and Center forAfrican Studies at University of Florida. She also holds an MA in Political Science,and an MA in International Studies as well as a Post-Graduate Certificate in Non-Profit Management from University of Oregon. Her research is carried out under theguidance of Professor Göran Hydén and Dr. Conor O’Dwyer, an expert inbureaucratic politics in the former Soviet Bloc. She has a solid training in amongother things statistical methods, survey research and methods, comparativequalitative and mixed methods, survey methods and analysis, political discourseanalysis, public administration, African politics, and democratic theory. In her ownresearch she has carried out independent survey research, as well as numeroussemi-structured interviews and focus groups. Her background includes being amember of the editorial board of African Studies Quarterly, research assistant for theWest African Research Association (WARA), consultant for the World Bank onorganizational and work ethics reform based on participatory approaches indeveloping nations; for Oxfam America on sustainable livelihoods, local NGOs andtrade issues; for Ghana Aids Commission on gender and HIV, policy analysis andorganizational reform. She has also worked as assistant to Professor Lindberg beforeboth on consultancies for HN Consultants including the extensive evaluation of theAfrobarometer survey research project after Round 4, and as field researcher on anumber of research projects concerned with several countries including Botswana,Ghana, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. She has worked as assistant to bothProfessor Herbert Kitschelt (Duke University) on a project on political parties across52

International Law and Policy InstituteCivil Servants’ Attitudes to Good Governance and Corruptionthe world. Pankani is a native from Ghana, speaks six African languages and hasEnglish as one of her mother tongues.Sterling Roop (USA) is a team member and local liaison for the project in Zanzibar.Sterling is the ILPI Program Director for East Africa and oversees the implementationof the institutions activities in the region. He has a M.A. in International Relations aswell as a Graduate Certificate in African Studies. Sterling has a background in publicadministration, African politics, survey and research methods, and economicdevelopment. He has been living in Zanzibar for the last two years working for ILPIfollowing the Zanzibar elections, reconciliation process and the new GNU. Sterlinghas been working on and off in Tanzania for the last 9 years working on a broadrange of development and governance issues including – rural finance, education,and local governance issues. He has an in-depth understanding of the governanceand development challenges in the Zanzibar context, and is fluent in Swahili.53