Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...
Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ... Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...
Bashar’s Syria 359a-Zur province to which they belong. The main tribes of the area—the Shammar, ‘Anaza,Agadat, al-Jabouri and al-Fawzil—have most of their clans in Iraq. During the first Gulf War(1990–1991), the region was considered to be highly sympathetic to Saddam Hussein andwas a source of domestic unrest during the Syrian participation in the coalition. It has alsobeen claimed that historically, the Ba’th party in the region was closely affiliated with theMichel ‘Aflaq–Salah Jadid faction of the party that was deposed and exiled to Iraq. Later,Saddam Hussein was reputed to have cultivated close relations with many of the heads ofthe tribes in this area.Many Syrian sources—including those who were in opposition to the Hafez al-Asad—point out that Hafez al-Asad himself was not implicated directly in accumulating his ownpersonal fortune and lived an austere life. The system, though, was indispensable; in orderto control the country, Hafez al-Asad needed to guarantee the loyalty of the various powerbrokers. This could only be done through allowing them the perquisites that derive frompower. The system of corruption in the party and the regime, though, has been intermittentlyon the public agenda in Syria since the mid 1970s. Anticorruption campaigns were launched(August 1977–March 1978; January 1985–1987; and the campaign lead by Basil al-Asaduntil his death in 1993).The Ba’th Party. The Ba’th party portrays itself as the true representative of the masses inSyria. From the point of view of its presence among those masses, there is some justificationfor this claim. The number of members of the party in Syria is approximately 1.8 million,which accounts for about 18 percent of the adult population. 11 Here the party is a vehiclefor the maintenance of the nomenklatura, but it has not succeeded (or even made a seriouseffort) in inculcating the Ba’th ideology to wide strata of society.The Ba’th party originally arose as a middle-class movement, but was taken overby the military, which viewed the middle class with suspicion and excluded it. However,throughout years of the Ba’th rule, a new middle class emerged, incorporating parts ofthe old Syrian middle class and a new bourgeoisie, which grew under the Ba’th regimeand shared with the regime a vested interest in continued stability. This sector has beeneffectively incorporated into the Ba’th party through professional organizations and unionsthat serve both as vehicles for social promotion and instruments of the party for supervisionof these potentially subversive sectors.On the social level, the Ba’th Party is essentially a vehicle for social mobility and apatronage network for achieving perquisites from the regime. Since not all members ofextended families are party members, this number can also be viewed as representing alarger number of citizens who enjoy privileges by dint of their party-member relatives.While this network is based on the party, it is actually a transformation of the model of thetraditional “zaïm,” networks prevalent in much of the Arab world and specifically in Syriaand Lebanon – the old-style village boss or leader. The zu’ama play an intermediate rolebetween the citizens and the state, taking their share of concessions, controlling monopolies,and blocking any competition. They respect each others’ areas of control and have a commoninterest in preserving the system.The secularism of the party is an important source of legitimacy. It is estimated thatabout 25 percent of the population of Syria are non-Sunni Muslims (Alawites, Druze,Isma’ilis), or non-muslims (Christians). Others are Sunni non-Arabs (Kurds, Circassians,Turkomans) who are traditionally less orthodox than Sunni Arabs and also fear the riseof the Muslim Brotherhood. For this large minority, Ba’th secularism is a bulwark againstSunni domination and Islamic fundamentalism. 12 This message is exploited by the regime
360 S. Bardomestically and in implicit messages to foreign audiences to buttress its legitimacy, as thelesser of two evils.The Ba’th party was founded in Syria in the 1940s as an Arab nationalist party advocatingArab unity, socialism and secular nonsectarianism. The “nonsectarianism” of the partyderived from French cultural influences, the preponderance of non-Muslims (Christians,Alawites and Druze) among the founders of the party, and the division into confessionalcommunities 13 of the population in Syria and Lebanon. The party grew in popularity andspread outside of the Levant during the heyday of Arab nationalism in the 1950s and the1960s. The idealism of the early Ba’th was demonstrated when it willingly dismantled itselfto be part of the United Arab Republic (1958–1961) which merged Egypt and Syria withEgyptian President Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser at the helm. 14The organizational principles of the Syrian Ba’th party are based on the “internalstatute” (nizam dakhili) that was approved by the last “National Congress” in July 1980.These principles closely resemble those of communist parties of the mid-twentieth century.They include:1. A transnational superstructure, the “National Command” (analogous to the Comintern 15of the Communist Party);2. Strict mechanisms for control of membership and stages for achieving full membershipin the party;3. A hierarchal structure, which duplicates itself in each level of the party (national, regional,and local);4. Formal electoral mechanisms for representation of the roots of the party with checksand balances to guarantee the predominance of the party leadership; and5. Committees and popular organizations for mobilization of the party membership, andmechanisms of “criticism” and “self criticism” to preserve ideological conformity;The pan-Arab elements of the party structure, like the revolutionarism of the Ba’thideology, have fallen into desuetude. The party in Syria is typical of a ruling one-partyregime. Its organs reflect organizational concepts of a small revolutionary party and of atransnational pan-Arab party. In fact, it is a Syrian party par excellence with only vestiges ofatrophied formal bodies that maintain the “pan-Arab” character of the party. The constituentbodies of the Syrian Ba’th party include the following:1. The National (Arab) Command,2. The Regional Secretary,3. The Regional Command,4. Bureaus and Committees of the Regional Command,5. The Central Committee,6. The Regional Congress,7. Popular Organizations,8. Workers and Professional Associations,9. Branches, Sub-Branches, Sections and Cells, and10. The party in the military and the security services.The relationship between the various bodies of the party is vertical and hierarchical withvery few perceptible horizontal interrelationships. There is no evidence of “interministerial”bodies composed of different bureaus or of ad hoc bodies for dealing with a specific problem.Thus, for example, even though the “Preparation Bureau” is the predominant body dealingwith ideological texts and control, it does not seem to have any foothold within the military,which is completely dominated by the Military Committee. Another example may be the
- Page 4 and 5: Bashar’s Syria 355of political im
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360 S. <strong>Bar</strong>domestically <strong>and</strong> in implicit messages to foreign audiences to buttress <strong>its</strong> legitimacy, as thelesser of two evils.<strong>The</strong> Ba’th party was founded in <strong>Syria</strong> in the 1940s as an Arab nationalist party advocatingArab unity, socialism <strong>and</strong> secular nonsectarianism. <strong>The</strong> “nonsectarianism” of the partyderived from French cultural influences, the preponderance of non-Muslims (Christians,Alawites <strong>and</strong> Druze) among the founders of the party, <strong>and</strong> the division into confessionalcommunities 13 of the population in <strong>Syria</strong> <strong>and</strong> Lebanon. <strong>The</strong> party grew in popularity <strong>and</strong>spread outside of the Levant during the heyday of Arab nationalism in the 1950s <strong>and</strong> the1960s. <strong>The</strong> idealism of the early Ba’th was demonstrated when it willingly dismantled <strong>its</strong>elfto be part of the United Arab Republic (1958–1961) which merged Egypt <strong>and</strong> <strong>Syria</strong> withEgyptian President Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser at the helm. 14<strong>The</strong> organizational principles of the <strong>Syria</strong>n Ba’th party are based on the “internalstatute” (nizam dakhili) that was approved by the last “National Congress” in July 1980.<strong>The</strong>se principles closely resemble those of communist parties of the mid-twentieth century.<strong>The</strong>y include:1. A transnational superstructure, the “National Comm<strong>and</strong>” (analogous to the Comintern 15of the Communist Party);2. Strict mechanisms for control of membership <strong>and</strong> stages for achieving full membershipin the party;3. A hierarchal structure, which duplicates <strong>its</strong>elf in each level of the party (national, regional,<strong>and</strong> local);4. Formal electoral mechanisms for representation of the roots of the party with checks<strong>and</strong> balances to guarantee the predominance of the party leadership; <strong>and</strong>5. Committees <strong>and</strong> popular organizations for mobilization of the party membership, <strong>and</strong>mechanisms of “criticism” <strong>and</strong> “self criticism” to preserve ideological conformity;<strong>The</strong> pan-Arab elements of the party structure, like the revolutionarism of the Ba’thideology, have fallen into desuetude. <strong>The</strong> party in <strong>Syria</strong> is typical of a ruling one-partyregime. Its organs reflect organizational concepts of a small revolutionary party <strong>and</strong> of atransnational pan-Arab party. In fact, it is a <strong>Syria</strong>n party par excellence with only vestiges ofatrophied formal bodies that maintain the “pan-Arab” character of the party. <strong>The</strong> constituentbodies of the <strong>Syria</strong>n Ba’th party include the following:1. <strong>The</strong> National (Arab) Comm<strong>and</strong>,2. <strong>The</strong> Regional Secretary,3. <strong>The</strong> Regional Comm<strong>and</strong>,4. Bureaus <strong>and</strong> Committees of the Regional Comm<strong>and</strong>,5. <strong>The</strong> Central Committee,6. <strong>The</strong> Regional Congress,7. Popular Organizations,8. Workers <strong>and</strong> Professional Associations,9. Branches, Sub-Branches, Sections <strong>and</strong> Cells, <strong>and</strong>10. <strong>The</strong> party in the military <strong>and</strong> the security services.<strong>The</strong> relationship between the various bodies of the party is vertical <strong>and</strong> hierarchical withvery few perceptible horizontal interrelationships. <strong>The</strong>re is no evidence of “interministerial”bodies composed of different bureaus or of ad hoc bodies for dealing with a specific problem.Thus, for example, even though the “Preparation Bureau” is the predominant body dealingwith ideological texts <strong>and</strong> control, it does not seem to have any foothold within the military,which is completely dominated by the Military Committee. Another example may be the
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