Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...

Bashar’s Syria 359a-Zur province to which they belong. The main tribes of the area—the Shammar, ‘Anaza,Agadat, al-Jabouri and al-Fawzil—have most of their clans in Iraq. During the first Gulf War(1990–1991), the region was considered to be highly sympathetic to Saddam Hussein andwas a source of domestic unrest during the Syrian participation in the coalition. It has alsobeen claimed that historically, the Ba’th party in the region was closely affiliated with theMichel ‘Aflaq–Salah Jadid faction of the party that was deposed and exiled to Iraq. Later,Saddam Hussein was reputed to have cultivated close relations with many of the heads ofthe tribes in this area.Many Syrian sources—including those who were in opposition to the Hafez al-Asad—point out that Hafez al-Asad himself was not implicated directly in accumulating his ownpersonal fortune and lived an austere life. The system, though, was indispensable; in orderto control the country, Hafez al-Asad needed to guarantee the loyalty of the various powerbrokers. This could only be done through allowing them the perquisites that derive frompower. The system of corruption in the party and the regime, though, has been intermittentlyon the public agenda in Syria since the mid 1970s. Anticorruption campaigns were launched(August 1977–March 1978; January 1985–1987; and the campaign lead by Basil al-Asaduntil his death in 1993).The Ba’th Party. The Ba’th party portrays itself as the true representative of the masses inSyria. From the point of view of its presence among those masses, there is some justificationfor this claim. The number of members of the party in Syria is approximately 1.8 million,which accounts for about 18 percent of the adult population. 11 Here the party is a vehiclefor the maintenance of the nomenklatura, but it has not succeeded (or even made a seriouseffort) in inculcating the Ba’th ideology to wide strata of society.The Ba’th party originally arose as a middle-class movement, but was taken overby the military, which viewed the middle class with suspicion and excluded it. However,throughout years of the Ba’th rule, a new middle class emerged, incorporating parts ofthe old Syrian middle class and a new bourgeoisie, which grew under the Ba’th regimeand shared with the regime a vested interest in continued stability. This sector has beeneffectively incorporated into the Ba’th party through professional organizations and unionsthat serve both as vehicles for social promotion and instruments of the party for supervisionof these potentially subversive sectors.On the social level, the Ba’th Party is essentially a vehicle for social mobility and apatronage network for achieving perquisites from the regime. Since not all members ofextended families are party members, this number can also be viewed as representing alarger number of citizens who enjoy privileges by dint of their party-member relatives.While this network is based on the party, it is actually a transformation of the model of thetraditional “zaïm,” networks prevalent in much of the Arab world and specifically in Syriaand Lebanon – the old-style village boss or leader. The zu’ama play an intermediate rolebetween the citizens and the state, taking their share of concessions, controlling monopolies,and blocking any competition. They respect each others’ areas of control and have a commoninterest in preserving the system.The secularism of the party is an important source of legitimacy. It is estimated thatabout 25 percent of the population of Syria are non-Sunni Muslims (Alawites, Druze,Isma’ilis), or non-muslims (Christians). Others are Sunni non-Arabs (Kurds, Circassians,Turkomans) who are traditionally less orthodox than Sunni Arabs and also fear the riseof the Muslim Brotherhood. For this large minority, Ba’th secularism is a bulwark againstSunni domination and Islamic fundamentalism. 12 This message is exploited by the regime