Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...

418 S. BarIt was Russia, however, that has been in Syrian eyes the most important counterbalanceto the U.S. Whereas in the past relations with Russia/USSR were necessary in order to balanceIsrael’s relations with Washington, today the U.S. is seen not merely as a superpowersupporting Syria’s regional archenemy, but as an enemy of Syria in its own right. Therefore,the Syrian need for a strong relationship with Russia has only increased. In January 2005,Bashar al-Asad visited Moscow, finally settling the issue of Syria’s $12 billion debt to theformer Soviet Union and holding talks on the possibility of the sale of advanced Russianweaponry to Syria. Russian spokesmen lauded Syria’s regional role and the special relationshipbetween the two countries. It is clear to Bashar, however, that he cannot expecthelp from Russia against U.S. and French plans in the UN, or if the U.S. makes a decisionto topple the Syrian regime by force.The United StatesThe United States has always been viewed from Damascus both as an adversary, given itsrole as Israel’s most important strategic ally, and as a necessary interlocutor. Therefore,even in times of high tension with the United States, Syria under Hafez al-Asad did not giveup on dialogue with Washington, and channels of communication remained open. The factthat President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” did not include Syria was seen as evidence that theSyrian regime, unlike those of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, essentially remained legitimatein eyes of the U.S. administration.This sense of assurance has eroded since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime. Syrianow sees Washington as moving inexorably toward delegitimization of the Syrian Ba’thregime as well. 147 This analysis is based on the following: The U.S. position on democratization as a major balm for the plague of terrorismplaces change of nondemocratic regimes—particularly those which are traditionallyhostile to the US and supporters of terrorism—high on the American political agenda.The identification of the Syrian regime as “Ba’thist,” like the former Iraqi regime,only exacerbates this feeling. Developments in Lebanon make Syria “low-hanging fruit” in regard to regimechange. Positive regime change in Damascus can be used by the administrationto show an achievement and to balance the lack of success in the Iraqi theater. The desertion of France, which had been a traditional friend of Syria and supportedBashar in his first days as president, leaves Syria without support from a strongEuropean ally. Syria fears that American delegitimization of the Syrian regime will harden Israelistance toward it and give it free run to react to Hezbollah attacks and terrorist attacksin Israel perpetrated by Syrian-based organizations. Under these circumstances, Syriabelieves that Israel will not enter into negotiations with Syria on the Golan. Negotiatonswith Israel or even willingness to hold them has always been a significant leverfor Syria to achieve international acceptance, in spite of its support of terrorism, lackof democracy, etc.Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Bashar would like to reach out to the U.S. Heis eager for any contact with the administration with which he can mitigate the Americanhostility toward him. Recognizing the priority of the war on terror for the U.S. Bashar hopedimmediately after 9/11 to acquire the good will of the administration through cooperation onintelligence on al Qaeda. However, his perception that the administration is intent on topplinghis regime limits his ability to enter into any real “give and take” dialogue over the few