Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...
Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ... Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...
Bashar’s Syria 417Not only Husni Mubarak but senior Egyptian policymakers as well have tended toview their Syrian counterparts as politically immature and unsophisticated. This feeling hasgrown since Bashar came to power. Relations between the two countries have been strainedon the Syrian side due to Egypt’s perceived support of the United States and of pressures onSyria regarding Lebanon. On the Egyptian side, pan-Arab/anti-U.S. policy statements madeby Bashar Assad, particularly at Arab summits have embarrassed the Egyptian leadership,and demonstrations initiated by the Syrian regime prior to the war on Iraq included attackson the Egyptian embassy in Damascus.TurkeySyrian–Turkish relations have always been problematic. For Syria, Turkey was: (1) pro-American (and a member state of NATO) in the period of the Cold War; (2) a Middle Easternstate with relations (and, during the last decade of Hafez al-Asad’s life, even strong strategicrelations) with Israel; (3) the source country of one of Syria’s main sources of water, the Euphrates,a cause of constant tension due to Syria’s contention that Turkish dams in southeastAnatolia were starving it of water; (4) a country with which Syria has a historic territorialdispute over the province of Alexendretta (Hatay); 144 and (5) a neighboring country witha formidable military capability and a willingness to use it to threaten Syria (as it did inOctober 1998 when it threatened military intervention if Syria did not expel the PKK’sleader, Abdallah Ocalan, who enjoyed sanctuary there).Relations between Syria and Turkey began to improve in the last years of Hafez al-Asad. Bashar’s period as president has witnessed further improvement of relations withTurkey. This was exemplified in Bashar’s visit to Ankara in January 2004 and a visit byTurkish Prime Minister Ragib Tayip Erdogan to Damascus in December 2004. During thisperiod, Syria attempted to reach an understanding with Turkey on the issue of Northern Iraq(rejecting the establishment of an independent Kurdish state, which would be an irredentistmagnet to the Kurds in both countries). Syrian expectations from this honeymoon withAnkara were expressed by the regime newspaper al-Ba’th: “the growing role of Turkey atregional and international levels that could make Turkey a vast gate to Syria towards theworld plus a strategic friend . . . (by virtue of) its confidence in dealing with domestic andforeign affairs, its relations with USA, (the talks for) . . . admission to the EU and its statusas an Islamic state.” 145The sticky issue of the Syrian claim on Alexandretta (Hatay), and Syrian support ofthe PKK, were also settled in an elegant manner. Syria did not formally renounce its rightsover Alexendretta but agreed not to continue with administrative steps that highlighted itsclaim to that area. 146 Nevertheless, Syrian school books and tourist sites continue to showthe area as part of Syria. Here, too, Bashar gave in to pressure of a stronger neighbor whilerefraining from any step that would be perceived as a strategic concession on a matter ofideological principle.Europe (EU) and RussiaThe European Union, and France in particular, has been seen historically by Damascus asa counterbalance to U.S. hostility. When Bashar came to power, French President JacquesChirac took him under his wing and defended Syrian behavior. The French position onLebanon therefore was a substantial blow to Bashar.
418 S. BarIt was Russia, however, that has been in Syrian eyes the most important counterbalanceto the U.S. Whereas in the past relations with Russia/USSR were necessary in order to balanceIsrael’s relations with Washington, today the U.S. is seen not merely as a superpowersupporting Syria’s regional archenemy, but as an enemy of Syria in its own right. Therefore,the Syrian need for a strong relationship with Russia has only increased. In January 2005,Bashar al-Asad visited Moscow, finally settling the issue of Syria’s $12 billion debt to theformer Soviet Union and holding talks on the possibility of the sale of advanced Russianweaponry to Syria. Russian spokesmen lauded Syria’s regional role and the special relationshipbetween the two countries. It is clear to Bashar, however, that he cannot expecthelp from Russia against U.S. and French plans in the UN, or if the U.S. makes a decisionto topple the Syrian regime by force.The United StatesThe United States has always been viewed from Damascus both as an adversary, given itsrole as Israel’s most important strategic ally, and as a necessary interlocutor. Therefore,even in times of high tension with the United States, Syria under Hafez al-Asad did not giveup on dialogue with Washington, and channels of communication remained open. The factthat President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” did not include Syria was seen as evidence that theSyrian regime, unlike those of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, essentially remained legitimatein eyes of the U.S. administration.This sense of assurance has eroded since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime. Syrianow sees Washington as moving inexorably toward delegitimization of the Syrian Ba’thregime as well. 147 This analysis is based on the following: The U.S. position on democratization as a major balm for the plague of terrorismplaces change of nondemocratic regimes—particularly those which are traditionallyhostile to the US and supporters of terrorism—high on the American political agenda.The identification of the Syrian regime as “Ba’thist,” like the former Iraqi regime,only exacerbates this feeling. Developments in Lebanon make Syria “low-hanging fruit” in regard to regimechange. Positive regime change in Damascus can be used by the administrationto show an achievement and to balance the lack of success in the Iraqi theater. The desertion of France, which had been a traditional friend of Syria and supportedBashar in his first days as president, leaves Syria without support from a strongEuropean ally. Syria fears that American delegitimization of the Syrian regime will harden Israelistance toward it and give it free run to react to Hezbollah attacks and terrorist attacksin Israel perpetrated by Syrian-based organizations. Under these circumstances, Syriabelieves that Israel will not enter into negotiations with Syria on the Golan. Negotiatonswith Israel or even willingness to hold them has always been a significant leverfor Syria to achieve international acceptance, in spite of its support of terrorism, lackof democracy, etc.Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Bashar would like to reach out to the U.S. Heis eager for any contact with the administration with which he can mitigate the Americanhostility toward him. Recognizing the priority of the war on terror for the U.S. Bashar hopedimmediately after 9/11 to acquire the good will of the administration through cooperation onintelligence on al Qaeda. However, his perception that the administration is intent on topplinghis regime limits his ability to enter into any real “give and take” dialogue over the few
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Bashar’s <strong>Syria</strong> 417Not only Husni Mubarak but senior Egyptian policymakers as well have tended toview their <strong>Syria</strong>n counterparts as politically immature <strong>and</strong> unsophisticated. This feeling hasgrown since Bashar came to power. Relations between the two countries have been strainedon the <strong>Syria</strong>n side due to Egypt’s perceived support of the United States <strong>and</strong> of pressures on<strong>Syria</strong> regarding Lebanon. On the Egyptian side, pan-Arab/anti-U.S. policy statements madeby Bashar Assad, particularly at Arab summ<strong>its</strong> have embarrassed the Egyptian leadership,<strong>and</strong> demonstrations initiated by the <strong>Syria</strong>n regime prior to the war on Iraq included attackson the Egyptian embassy in Damascus.Turkey<strong>Syria</strong>n–Turkish relations have always been problematic. For <strong>Syria</strong>, Turkey was: (1) pro-American (<strong>and</strong> a member state of NATO) in the period of the Cold War; (2) a Middle Easternstate with relations (<strong>and</strong>, during the last decade of Hafez al-Asad’s life, even strong strategicrelations) with Israel; (3) the source country of one of <strong>Syria</strong>’s main sources of water, the Euphrates,a cause of constant tension due to <strong>Syria</strong>’s contention that Turkish dams in southeastAnatolia were starving it of water; (4) a country with which <strong>Syria</strong> has a historic territorialdispute over the province of Alexendretta (Hatay); 144 <strong>and</strong> (5) a neighboring country witha formidable military capability <strong>and</strong> a willingness to use it to threaten <strong>Syria</strong> (as it did inOctober 1998 when it threatened military intervention if <strong>Syria</strong> did not expel the PKK’sleader, Abdallah Ocalan, who enjoyed sanctuary there).Relations between <strong>Syria</strong> <strong>and</strong> Turkey began to improve in the last years of Hafez al-Asad. Bashar’s period as president has witnessed further improvement of relations withTurkey. This was exemplified in Bashar’s visit to Ankara in January 2004 <strong>and</strong> a visit byTurkish Prime Minister Ragib Tayip Erdogan to Damascus in December 2004. During thisperiod, <strong>Syria</strong> attempted to reach an underst<strong>and</strong>ing with Turkey on the issue of Northern Iraq(rejecting the establishment of an independent Kurdish state, which would be an irredentistmagnet to the Kurds in both countries). <strong>Syria</strong>n expectations from this honeymoon withAnkara were expressed by the regime newspaper al-Ba’th: “the growing role of Turkey atregional <strong>and</strong> international levels that could make Turkey a vast gate to <strong>Syria</strong> towards theworld plus a strategic friend . . . (by virtue of) <strong>its</strong> confidence in dealing with domestic <strong>and</strong>foreign affairs, <strong>its</strong> relations with USA, (the talks for) . . . admission to the EU <strong>and</strong> <strong>its</strong> statusas an Islamic state.” 145<strong>The</strong> sticky issue of the <strong>Syria</strong>n claim on Alex<strong>and</strong>retta (Hatay), <strong>and</strong> <strong>Syria</strong>n support ofthe PKK, were also settled in an elegant manner. <strong>Syria</strong> did not formally renounce <strong>its</strong> rightsover Alexendretta but agreed not to continue with administrative steps that highlighted <strong>its</strong>claim to that area. 146 Nevertheless, <strong>Syria</strong>n school books <strong>and</strong> tourist sites continue to showthe area as part of <strong>Syria</strong>. Here, too, Bashar gave in to pressure of a stronger neighbor whilerefraining from any step that would be perceived as a strategic concession on a matter ofideological principle.Europe (EU) <strong>and</strong> Russia<strong>The</strong> European Union, <strong>and</strong> France in particular, has been seen historically by Damascus asa counterbalance to U.S. hostility. When Bashar came to power, French President JacquesChirac took him under his wing <strong>and</strong> defended <strong>Syria</strong>n behavior. <strong>The</strong> French position onLebanon therefore was a substantial blow to Bashar.
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