Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...

Bashar’s Syria 415Iran Syria’s close relations with Iran clearly influenced the Syrian assessment. The Iranianregime regarded a stabilized oil-rich pro-American Iraq as a clear and imminentthreat to its own existence. Like Syria, it assessed that it would be next on theAmerican agenda if Iraq were to be stabilized. Immediately after the first stage of“Iraqi Freedom,” there ensued a flurry of high-level consultations between Syria andIran. Bashar was clearly receptive to the Iranian arguments that Syria and Iran shouldcooperate to avert the danger. The domestic consideration that allowing radical Islamists to act against the Americanpresence in Iraq would shift the focus of local Islamists away from acting againstthe regime. The logic of the Hafez al-Asad regime in providing safe haven to terrorist organizationsacting against neighboring countries (PKK and ASALA against Turkey, theJapanese Red Army, and various Palestinian organizations) and allowing them tooperate from Syrian soil was adopted by Bashar. According to this logic, such supportserved as a valuable bargaining chip for future negotiations with the challengedcountry.Relations between Damascus and Teheran have grown since the Islamic revolution into astrategic relationship. For Iran, the Syrian regime is unique in the Arab world, in that itis ruled by Alawites (who are considered by many Iranian Shi’ites to be a sect of Shi’iteIslam). Politically, Syria arguably is Iran’s major ally in the Arab world, having supportedIran both politically and militarily during the Iraq–Iran War despite the pro-Iraqi solidarityof most of the Arab world. Iran returned the favor by writing off Syrian oil debts incurredduring that period. The two countries have collaborated intimately on development ofsurface-to-surface missiles (SSMs), and Iran’s influence in Lebanon—one of the greatestachievements of the Islamic Republic’s foreign and “export of Revolution” policies—is dueto Syrian acquiescence and support. These relations have held fast despite incidents suchas the Syrian suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood rebellion in 1982 and unauthorizedIranian activity in Lebanon and Syria.Iran’s position with the Syrian leadership seems to have even strengthened since Basharcame to power, and further still since the fall of the Iraqi regime and the hostilities betweenIsrael and Lebanon in summer 2006. This has manifested itself both directly and throughthe relationship between Bashar and the leader of Hezbollah, Sheikh Hasan Nassrallah. Oneversion presents Syria’s present relationship with Iran as deriving from the same factors thatprompted it to support Iraq: a belief that such a country could serve as a strategic support (“astrategic rear”), admiration for a self-confident and proud leadership and for leaders who“stand up” to the U.S., a sense of “common fate” (fear that if the U.S. succeeds in topplingthat regime, it will surely come after the Ba’th regime in Syria). In the Iranian case, this isaugmented by the traditionally close relations between the two countries.These close relations notwithstanding, Syria under Hafez al-Asad knew to control Iran’sinvolvement in areas crucial to Syria’s strategic interests. Thus, Syria reduced the IRGC(Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps) contingent in Lebanon and occasionally put pressureon Hezbollah when the organization’s terrorist activities contradicted Syrian interests.Saudi ArabiaIn the Hafez al-Asad era, the Syrian relationship with Saudi Arabia was a major supportfor the regime and for Syria’s regional role. This relationship has been seriously damaged