Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...

Bashar’s Syria 413Bashar’s support of Iraq included: pro-Iraqi rhetoric such as his referral to Iraq asSyria’s “strategic depth”; political support for Iraq in the United Nations Security Council(Syrian support for UNSC resolution 1441 of November 2002 notwithstanding, as it wasviewed by Damascus as a means to tie the hands of the U.S.); economic support throughillicit trade, and opening of the oil pipeline; 137 and military support through smuggling ofmilitary components from Syria to Iraq. The regime, and Bashar himself, did not stop at pro-Iraqi statements, but escalated into direct anti-American rhetoric as well. Bashar accusedthe U.S. of a policy directed toward “gaining control over Iraqi oil and redrawing the mapof the region in keeping with its worldview,” and warned the Arabs that the American threatwas greater than the Sykes-Picot agreement, the Balfour declaration, and the establishmentof the State of Israel, and that U.S. friendship is “more fatal than its hostility.” 138 Later,during the American offensive, senior spokesmen for the Syrian regime declared Syria’stotal support for Iraq and even went as far as to compare George W. Bush to Adolf Hitler. 139Developments in Iraq in the wake of the fall of the Saddam regime have presentedBashar with a number of strategic challenges: First and foremost, the fall of the Iraqi Ba’th regime and the potential for democratizationis seen from Damascus as clarifying U.S. intentions towards the SyrianBa’th regime. Moreover, the American occupation of Iraq has made the U.S. Syria’s“neighbor.” The economic consequences of the halt of smuggled Iraqi oil to Syria and sanctionviolatingtrade between the two countries have undermined the Syrian economy. Theimmediate damage to the Syrian economy is assessed at billions of dollars a year(oil smuggling and illicit trade alone was assessed in 2002 as amounting to about $3billion). Syrian support, either active or tacit, for insurgent elements in Iraq has alienated theU.S. without delivering any real advantages to Syria. While Syria is attempting to reach out to the Shi’ite-Kurdish regime, it fears that thesuccess of the Kurds in Iraq may incite irredentism by Syrian Kurds.Bashar’s relations with the Saddam regime at a time that the Iraqi regime was undersiege and anticipating an American attack have been attributed to Bashar’s political naiveté,inability to read the strategic map, and adulation of self-confident leaders. For comparison,one may look at the pragmatic decision of the elder Asad during the first Gulf War (1991)to support the Coalition and even send forces. This was due to his animosity toward theIraqi regime his realistic analysis that the U.S.-led coalition would succeed in ousting Iraqfrom Kuwait, and his expectation that collaboration would bestow Syria with U.S. supportboth in Lebanon and in the Israeli–Syrian peace process. At the same time, while Saddam’spopularity was at its peak during the first Gulf War (much more than in the second round),Hafez al-Asad remained oblivious to populist considerations, knowing that public opinionwas fickle and that boosting the popularity of Saddam in Syria would limit his politicalroom for maneuver. The elder Asad had always remained prudent in his relations with theUnited States and rarely permitted the heights of anti-Americanism that Bashar allowed.Presumably, most of the considerations that brought Hafez al-Asad to cooperate withthe Coalition in the first Iraqi war should have been valid for Bashar. This is particularly truein the light of the fact that many of the factors that played a role in Hafez al-Asad’s decisionhave since become more prominent, the status of the U.S. as the world’s sole superpowerhad been enhanced, the events of 9/11 and the American invasion of Afghanistan had shownthe extent of the resolve of the present U.S. President, and Saddam’s Arab and international