Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...

410 S. BarBashar did not read these signals of change and continued to try to manipulate theLebanese theater as Syria had done for over two decades (see discussion below on thedecision-making process in Bashar’s regime). According to numerous accounts, Basharwas also slow to read the portents of the Lebanese “Cedar Revolution” that broke out inthe wake of the assassination of al-Hariri. The Syrian response to these new currents inLebanon was to activate its proxies in the Lebanese theater in order to thwart calls for aSyrian withdrawal and silence those who dared to incriminate Syria in the assassination.This was done through a series of murders (or attempted murders) of critics of Syria 135and pro-Syrian demonstrations, mainly organized by Hezbollah. These acts were, however,counterproductive, as they generated more anti-Syrian sentiment and an escalation of thedemand for an immediate Syrian withdrawal from the country. The failure of these attemptsand the declared willingness of the main Syrian proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah, to negotiatedisarming itself were indications of the decline of the Syrian influence in this arena.Another salient case in point can be found in the volatile arena of Syria’s policy regardingLebanon. The jury is still out as to whether Bashar himself was involved in ordering themurder of al-Hariri, or in the subsequent murders of prominent Lebanese dissidents SamirKassir and George Hawi in June 2005. Bashar’s dislike of al-Hariri was no secret to hisinner circle—or to the general public. As the situation in Lebanon became more and morehostile to Syrian interests and this trend was linked in the eyes of the Syrian regime to thepolitical mechanizations of al-Hariri, it became clear to the inner circles of the regime thatthe al-Hariri “problem” had to be dealt with. It is also not disputed that the escalation ofthe Syrian conflict with al-Hariri did not escape the eyes of other international and regionalactors, and France and Saudi Arabia even cautioned Bashar not to harm al-Hariri. Underthese circumstances, the Syrian leadership could have assumed that France, Saudi Arabia,and the United States would not take an assassination kindly. Under the regime of Hafezal-Asad, the impossibility of plausible deniability would have precluded any senior officialtaking it upon himself to eliminate a prominent Lebanese politician with close ties to theUnited States, Saudi Arabia, and France.The various scenarios offered for the development of the al-Hariri affair are distinguishedin their depictions of the degree of control held by Bashar. These scenarios include: Over delegation of authority: The Bashar regime had lost its presidential “safetylatch” and had not replaced it with an alternative set of checks and balances. Consequently,according to this scenario, senior figures in the regime (those alluded toin the Mehlis report are Asef Shawkat and Maher al-Asad), acted upon their ownauthority and understanding of Syrian interests and did not feel the need for explicitorder. “Peer pressure”: According to this version, Bashar held consultations with his securityadvisors, who opted for elimination of al-Hariri. Bashar, as a “democraticleader,” accepted the verdict. Many Lebanese even claim to “know” that Bashar waspersonally involved in giving the order, while others claim that he and Ghazi Kana’anopposed the assassination, while Maher al-Asad and Asaf Shawkat were in favor ofit. Obviously, no one can provide proof for these claims. The decline of the old guard: The experienced and cautious old guard had lost mostof its clout within the regime and the assassination was the result of the rise of youngofficers in the intelligence community and neophytes surrounding Bashar, who lackthe discretion of their predecessors. Loss of control: This explanation is based on the fact that Bashar already had deposedmany of the old guard and many of them continued to maintain their links