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Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...

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Bashar’s <strong>Syria</strong> 409conflict with Israel. It was also a theatre for airing internal <strong>Syria</strong>n power struggles<strong>and</strong> for various individuals within the regime to strengthen their own status. <strong>The</strong>strategic importance of Lebanon, in a way, “rubbed off” on those senior <strong>Syria</strong>nswhose task it was to maintain it. Thus, disputes between Ghazi Kana’an <strong>and</strong>Mustafa Tlas first were aired in the Lebanese arena.• Personal prestige. Bashar presided over the “Lebanese File” <strong>and</strong> was personallyinvolved in the election of Lahoud as President of Lebanon. <strong>Syria</strong>n domination overLebanon—<strong>and</strong> the Arab legitimation of that domination—arguably was amongHafez al-Asad’s major strategic achievements. To lose that asset would be a blowto Bashar’s prestige.<strong>The</strong> <strong>Syria</strong>n domination of Lebanon was based on a number of instruments: Diplomatic agreements. <strong>The</strong>se included the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation,<strong>and</strong> Coordination between Lebanon <strong>and</strong> <strong>Syria</strong> (May 20, 1991) in which the twoagreed “to achieve the highest level of cooperation <strong>and</strong> coordination in all political,economic, security . . . as an affirmation of the brotherly relations <strong>and</strong> guarantee oftheir common destiny.” This treaty was augmented by the Lebanon-<strong>Syria</strong> Defense<strong>and</strong> Security Agreement (September 1 1991), which formalized the domination of<strong>Syria</strong>’s military <strong>and</strong> security services in Lebanon. Two years later, an Agreement forEconomic <strong>and</strong> Social Cooperation <strong>and</strong> Coordination outlined a program of economicintegration which, in practice, made Lebanon an outlet for <strong>Syria</strong>n goods <strong>and</strong> labor. Military occupation. This effectively was terminated in the wake of the “CedarRevolution” of Spring 2005. Security involvement. According to current information, <strong>Syria</strong> still maintains anintelligence presence in Lebanon under the guise of the Lebanese security services,which are still loyal to Damascus. Economic domination. This is partially formal, a result of the Agreement for Economic<strong>and</strong> Social Cooperation <strong>and</strong> Coordination, <strong>and</strong> partially due to the economicinvolvement of senior <strong>Syria</strong>n figures (including Maher al-Asad, Ghazi Kana’an,Rustum Ghazaleh, <strong>and</strong> Rami Makhluf). Political engineering. In the wake of defeats of pro-<strong>Syria</strong>n c<strong>and</strong>idates in municipalelections in 1998, a new electoral law was promulgated which gerrym<strong>and</strong>eredLebanon in a manner that neutralized most of the anti-<strong>Syria</strong>n elements. 133 <strong>Syria</strong> alsopressured the Lebanese Parliament into extending the six-year term of President Lahoudby three years (3 Septemeber 2004), a step that precipitated UNSC resolution1559, which called for a <strong>Syria</strong>n exit from Lebanon.<strong>The</strong> <strong>Syria</strong>n vision for future relations with Lebanon clearly was a continuation of the<strong>Syria</strong>n domination of the country at minimum, <strong>and</strong> possibly a closer formal relationship.<strong>The</strong> <strong>Syria</strong>n slogan of “one people in two states” is reminiscent of the Chinese proposalsfor Hong Kong <strong>and</strong> Taiwan (one country, two systems). <strong>The</strong> rise of Bashar, who wasperceived as less capable of holding on to <strong>Syria</strong>’s strategic assets in Lebanon <strong>and</strong> elsewhere,galvanized <strong>Syria</strong>’s traditional opponents in the country. <strong>The</strong> feeling that <strong>Syria</strong> had madeShi’ite Hezbollah <strong>its</strong> main ally in the country (after Lahoud) 134 created a coalition of Sunnis<strong>and</strong> Christians (who had lost their former predominance), <strong>and</strong> Druze (whose leader, WalidJoumblat, has a blood account with the Asads because of the assassination of his father at<strong>Syria</strong>’s h<strong>and</strong>s). This coalition found a formidable leader in Rafiq al-Hariri who had his closelinks to France <strong>and</strong> Saudi Arabia. In the wake of the American invasion of Iraq, internationalcircumstances favored change <strong>and</strong> allowed for UNSC 1559.

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