Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...

402 S. BarThese elements find resonance in the north of the country, which was the heart of the MuslimBrotherhood rebellion of the 1980s. 119 The weakening of the regime will contribute to theascendancy of these elements. At the same time, the traditional Muslim Brotherhood ofSyria remains a potential force, both as claimants for national leadership—if and when theregime falls—as rivals of the even more radical Wahhabis.Worldview and Defense StrategySyria’s geography and history have been pivotal factors in forming the regime’s strategy.The main elements of these and their effects are: Absence of a tradition of national unity (the regions that today comprise modern Syriawere completely separate provinces of the Ottoman Empire, with little in common), Strong neighbors (Israel and Turkey) allied with the United States with whom Syriahas ongoing territorial disputes, and Lack of natural riches.Syria’s regional role was the greatest achievement of Hafez al-Asad, who played a parton the Arab stage that transcended Syria’s objective geographical and economic significance.This did not seem to derive—as with Sadam Hussein—from dictatorial megalomania,but from an ideological attachment to the ideal of “Arabism” and anticolonialism, andfrom a belief that only through representation of Arabism in general could Syria play a rolein the region.His policies in this regard bore fruit. Throughout the decades of his rule, Syria becamethe main interlocutor for all things in Lebanon, and was seen as a central actor in the Israeli–Arab peace process (not only the Israeli–Syrian negotiations but also the Palestinian track).He used his relationship with Iran to counterbalance Iraq, to deter Israel, and to cultivatethe relationship with Saudi Arabia to guarantee Syria’s economy and support for Syria’sstatus in Lebanon.A major component of Syria’s strategic policy is calculated use, with relative impunity,of terrorist organizations. Syria is almost a “founding father” of the U.S. list of state sponsorsof international terrorism, providing Hezbollah, HAMAS, PFLP-GC, the PIJ, and otherterrorist organizations refuge and basing privileges. Its use of terror, though, has usuallybeen measured and with a clear view not to act in a manner that would precipitate an extremereaction on the part of the West or Israel. Thus, while Syria has encouraged and evenprovided material and planning support to Palestinian terrorist organizations, it consistentlyhas prohibited any terrorist attacks from the Golan Heights into Israel. Syria also wascautious in its use of terrorism against Turkey. It provided support through hosting of thePKK (and in the past the Armenian terrorist organization, ASALA) in Lebanon. However,when finally severely challenged by Turkey, Syria cut off its support of the PKK and ASALAand occasionally, under American pressure, has lowered the profile of its hosting certainPalestinian organizations. Syria also took care never to allow “the tail to wag the dog”;when necessary Syrian intelligence clamped down on recalcitrant terrorist organizationsand reduced the level of Iranian Revolutionary Guard activity in Lebanon. All terroristorganizations were customarily handled by the various security and intelligence apparatusesdedicated to that purpose (the “Fidayin Security” and parts of the DGI), and their leadersrarely saw the inside of the Presidential Palace.Hafez al-Asad’s strategic foreign policy had clear goals: to enhance Syria’s regionalstatus; to prevent a separate peace between Israel and Jordan, Lebanon, and the Palestinians;to cultivate good relations with external powers (Russia, Europe, and the Gulf Arabs);