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Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...

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Bashar’s <strong>Syria</strong> 401economic situation. <strong>The</strong> return to Islam is manifest in the wearing of traditional dress, in theplethora of Islamic book stores that have cropped up in Damascus <strong>and</strong> other cities, <strong>and</strong> in thegrowth of Islamic Institutes (600 new institutes for memorizing the Quran <strong>and</strong> madrasas)founded under the auspices of the regime in the time of Hafez al-Asad as a counterbalance tothe Muslim Brotherhood. Another salient phenomenon is the large number of <strong>Syria</strong>n familiesthat receive charity from Islamic NGOs (estimated at about seventy-five thous<strong>and</strong>).It is difficult to distinguish between the warnings of the <strong>Syria</strong>n regime that <strong>its</strong> downfallwould bring to power radical Islamic movements <strong>and</strong> the real threat that Islamism poses in<strong>Syria</strong>. It seems, though, that one of the main motivators of Islamic radicalism in <strong>Syria</strong> is thelegitimacy crisis that stems from the Alawite nature of the regime. <strong>The</strong> heterodox natureof the Alawite religion has been the Achilles heel of the regime. Whereas radical Islamistsin other Muslim countries had to prove the individual deviation of their rulers or regimesin order to warrant declaring them as infidels (<strong>and</strong> hence, legitimizing rebellion), viewingthe Alawites as non-Muslims provides adequate justification for rebellion. <strong>The</strong>refore, froman early stage the Asad regime set as one of <strong>its</strong> primary objectives boosting <strong>its</strong> Islamiccredentials <strong>and</strong> the Islamic legitimacy of the Alawites in general. This has been done invarious ways, as noted above. 116<strong>The</strong> main Islamist force in <strong>Syria</strong> arguably is the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). <strong>The</strong>movement was involved in a bloody uprising against the regime in the late 1970s <strong>and</strong>early 1980s, which resulted in the regime’s crackdown in the north of the country <strong>and</strong> totaldestruction of large parts of the city of Ham’ah in February 1982, with estimated tens ofthous<strong>and</strong>s of civilians killed. <strong>The</strong> ideology of the Brotherhood at the time based <strong>its</strong> rejectionof the regime on grounds of being takfir (declaring as heretics). Years after it was totallyuprooted in <strong>Syria</strong>, the movement began to reach an accommodation with the regime <strong>and</strong>many of <strong>its</strong> exiled leaders returned to <strong>Syria</strong>. Others drifted away from the focus on <strong>Syria</strong>. 117Today, the <strong>Syria</strong>n Muslim Brotherhood officially has renounced the use of violenceagainst the regime <strong>and</strong> is attempting to create a public image that may facilitate <strong>its</strong> integrationin the political process of the country, either in the course of “democratization” of the presentregime, or in the wake of <strong>its</strong> fall <strong>and</strong> the rise of a coalition of opposition forces. After Bashartook office the MB made efforts to reach out to him. In May 2001, the group prepared a“National Honour Pact,” accepting the democratic process <strong>and</strong>, for the first time, recognizingthe regime’s legitimacy. Later, in 2004, senior <strong>Syria</strong>n officials, including Bashar, met withleaders who had ties to the Brotherhood. In the end, however, the negotiations fizzled.<strong>The</strong> attempt on the part of the MB to project a moderate image focuses on four mainissues: violence (the MB leadership reiterates that it has renounced violence); willingnessto accept a democratic regime in <strong>Syria</strong>; retraction of the takfir of the Alawites; willingnessto accept the Islamic legitimacy of the Sufi trends, which are relatively strong in <strong>Syria</strong>;<strong>and</strong> refraining from calling for the destruction of Israel or taking anti-Semitic positions. Itis not clear, however, to what extent these positions, which are expressed in the PoliticalProgram of the <strong>Syria</strong>n Muslim Brotherhood” <strong>and</strong> in interviews with the exiled leader ofthe movement, ’Ali Sader a-Din Bayanouni, 118 are widely accepted by the rank <strong>and</strong> file ofthe movement or to what extent the mainstream of the MB represents the majority of theIslamic tendency inside <strong>Syria</strong>.<strong>The</strong> Islamist trend in <strong>Syria</strong>, though, is not solely domestically grown. It is encouragedby the double st<strong>and</strong>ard of the regime in openly supporting Palestinian Hamas <strong>and</strong> Jihad <strong>and</strong>Lebanese Hezbollah, while suppressing <strong>its</strong> own Islamist forces <strong>and</strong> by identification withthe al Qaeda attacks on the United States.Since the death of Hafez al-Asad, <strong>and</strong> increasingly since the fall of the Iraqi regime,the infiltration of anti-Alawite <strong>and</strong> anti-Shi’ite Wahhabi elements into <strong>Syria</strong> has intensified.

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