Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...

400 S. BarMany of the Muslim Brotherhood leaders who were convinced to return to Syria also werearrested. This behavior has been interpreted both as evidence of Bashar’s own duplicity andof his lack of control over the security services. There have been cases of opposition leaderswho have found themselves harassed by one intelligence organization and “protected” byanother. While some have interpreted this as sophisticated coordinated role-playing, othersclaim that the rivalry between the various security services is too deep to implement sucha game and that such actions represent real differences of opinion regarding how to dealwith a specific individual. In at least one case, an extremely vocal opposition figure hadhis passport taken away, then returned. Finally, he was offered a choice: to accept a post asminister in the cabinet or to go into exile. The person chose the second option.Opposition from Inside the RegimeThe deterioration of Syria’s international and regional status, the loss of control overLebanon, and the deteriorating economic and security situation are already generatingcriticism of Bashar’s performance as President. One apt description has it that, “Bashar inheriteda functional regime in a dysfunctional country and now has created a dysfunctionalregime in a dysfunctional country.”The main source of discontent is the remnants of the old guard, particularly those whohave been moved away from their levers of power or deposed. These include people likeHikmat Shihabi (with close ties to Israelis, the al-Hariri faction in Lebanon and Americans),Ali Duba; Mohammad Nasef Kheir Bek (representing the strong Kheir Bek Alawite clan),Abd al-Halim Khaddam (representing the old Ba’th and ideological rectitude), MohammadZuheir Masharka, Mustafa Tlas (usually perceived as doggedly loyal to the late presidentand who therefore probably would not try to overthrow his son), Bahjat Suleiman (formerconfidante and mentor of Bashar who was downgraded from his position in the GeneralIntelligence), Hassan Khalil (former Head of Military Intelligence), Adnan Badr al-Hassan(former Head of Political Intelligence), and Ali Aslan (former Chief of Staff).The al-Hariri affair, however, has the potential to initiate internal struggles. Bashar isalready notorious for folding under international pressure. His statement that Syria will holdan investigation of its own and punish those responsible for the assassination may be a ployto fend off international pressure. Some members of the regime—particularly those whofear that the investigation may serve as a tool for purging them—may decide to preemptsuch a step. The primary suspects in this regard are Asef Shawkat and Maher al-Asad. Itis unclear, however, to what extent the two are capable of cooperating. The conventionalwisdom in Syria is that the bad blood between them precludes such cooperation. 115Another potential threat from inside the regime comes from young officers, who maystage a traditional coup d’état. There is no way of knowing among whom or from where sucha coup may be brewing. It is, however, conceivable that a coalition of senior officers who havelost the economic benefits that Lebanon accorded may develop into an internal oppositioncapable of such a coup. In the past, it was assumed that the intelligence apparatuses werestrong enough to detect such a movement. This should not be taken for granted today, eitherbecause the capability of the Syrian intelligence has diminished or because its loyalty toBashar is not absolute.Islam and Islamic OppositionTwenty years after the suppression of the rebellion of the Muslim Brotherhood in northernSyria, there is a discernable drift in Syria towards Islam. This trend is characterized by areturn to the mosque, both as a reaction to the regime and as way to deal with the difficult