Bashar’s <strong>Syria</strong> 397<strong>The</strong> Christian community in <strong>Syria</strong> numbers about one million, about 6.5 percent of thepopulation. It is split into a number of sects. <strong>The</strong> sense of disintegration of authority in <strong>Syria</strong><strong>and</strong> the revival of the Assyrian community in Iraq ignited demonstrations by the AssyrianChristians in the city of Hasakah. In October 2004, thous<strong>and</strong>s of Assyrians protested thekilling of two Assyrians by Muslims, who accused them of supporting the Americans.Developments in Iraq have also affected the relations between <strong>Syria</strong>’s Christian Assyrians<strong>and</strong> the regime. <strong>The</strong> identification by <strong>Syria</strong>n Sunnis of the Assyrians with the U.S. in Iraqhas generated anti-Assyrian sentiment in <strong>Syria</strong>.<strong>The</strong> Kurds in <strong>Syria</strong> are second-class citizens. <strong>The</strong> regime’s attitude toward the twomillion-strongKurdish minority in the northeastern Hasakah province is symptomatic of<strong>its</strong> practice of raising hopes <strong>and</strong> then dashing them. Since Bashar came to power, theregime has made some overtures toward the Kurdish community, among them signalingthat a rectification of historic grievances may be in sight. Bashar himself visited Hasakahin 2002—the first such visit of the president ever.<strong>The</strong> rise of the Kurdish factor in Iraq had an effect on the Kurds in <strong>Syria</strong>. In March2004, a brawl between fans of Kurdish <strong>and</strong> Arab football teams in the northern Kurdishregion of Hasaka set off a tide of unrest that developed into widespread Kurdish antiregimeviolence, which spread to the Kurdish quarter of Damascus <strong>and</strong> the University of Damascus.Another significant incident that heightened the tensions between the regime <strong>and</strong> the Kurdswas the disappearance, apparent arrest, <strong>and</strong> subsequent death (apparently due to torture) ofthe eminent Kurdish Sheikh Mohammad Ma’shuq al-Khiznawi (May 2005), who had beenactive in calling for reforms in <strong>Syria</strong>.<strong>The</strong> Kurdish protests erupted against a historical background of discrimination againstKurds, including the constant refusal of the regime to accord <strong>Syria</strong>n citizenship to hundredsof thous<strong>and</strong>s of Kurds living in that region, <strong>and</strong> who were, according to the regime, of Iraqiorigin. Before the June 2005 Ba’th Party Congress, the regime allowed Kurdish groups tofield papers that would grant equal rights to Kurds, <strong>and</strong> particularly accord citizenship toabout 200,000 Kurds inside <strong>Syria</strong> who lack any citizenship (al-maktumin). <strong>The</strong> Congressdid not finally discuss the issue. In the wake of the pressures on <strong>Syria</strong> as a result of theMehlis report on the al-Hariri affair, <strong>Syria</strong>n Ba’th officials have been reviving the possibilityof enfranchisement of the stateless Kurds of <strong>Syria</strong>. 111Nevertheless, the options for these minorities are between an Alawite-led regime inwhich they have some stake <strong>and</strong> a Sunni—potentially Islamic-Salafi—regime that would bemuch more inimical to their interests. Fear of Sunni rule, which motivated their participationin the Ba’th regime’s coalition, seems to have increased because of events in Iraq. Hence,while there have been outbreaks of sectarian violence between Alawites <strong>and</strong> Isma’ilis, <strong>its</strong>eems that these minorities remain loyal to the regime, at least according to the slogan notedabove: ma fi gheiru—there is nothing else.Civil SocietyA civil society may be defined for the purposes of this study as voluntary social or politicalassociation within a “space” in a country that is not controlled by the government, <strong>and</strong>which is democratic <strong>and</strong> tolerant in that it is not exclusive; it accepts that organizationswith different values <strong>and</strong> interests all operate within the same space. <strong>The</strong> Ba’th regimewas in total control over the entire public space, relying on intimidation <strong>and</strong> deterrence tomaintain <strong>its</strong> hold over society, but did not really invest in mass ideological indoctrination.Like Machiavelli, Asad knew that it was better to be feared than to be loved.
398 S. <strong>Bar</strong><strong>Syria</strong>n civil society—such as it is after decades of Ba’th rule—came into the spotlighta short time after Bashar came to power. It existed in the preindependence era <strong>and</strong> came tothe fore for short bursts in the late 1970s <strong>and</strong> the late 1980s (in the wake of the fall of theSoviet bloc). This is, in essence, a movement of the Damascene middle class. Many of thefigures currently involved in the civil-society movement were involved in previous attemptsto forge a civil society <strong>and</strong> paid dearly, serving years in prison.During the second half of 2000 (the “Damascus Spring”), the expectation that Basharwould promote far-reaching reforms <strong>and</strong> liberalization encouraged intellectuals <strong>and</strong> youngBaathist backbenchers to preempt the anticipated reforms initiating a public debate on thenature of the regime <strong>and</strong> <strong>its</strong> policies. Some of the civil society forums, which were formedimmediately after Bashar came to power by known <strong>and</strong> tolerated civil libertarians, receivedat least tacit encouragement from key “old guard” figures in the regime, <strong>and</strong> this strengthenedthe feeling that the new president looked kindly on the movement. <strong>The</strong> movementtransformed quickly into a mass movement of the Damascene intelligentsia. <strong>The</strong> “DamascusSpring” reflected genuine expectations for change on the part of the intelligentsia,coupled with the popular perception that the new president was proreform. <strong>The</strong> “defection”of Bashar to the side of the “old guard”—whether on the basis of his own convictions orbecause he was weak <strong>and</strong> overruled—served to radicalize the opposition <strong>and</strong> <strong>its</strong> dem<strong>and</strong>s.<strong>The</strong> sense that the regime is less resolute than in the past, the spillover of the Lebanese“Cedar Revolution,” <strong>and</strong> international pressure on <strong>Syria</strong> all encourage the opposition inside<strong>Syria</strong> to continue to pressure the regime.<strong>The</strong> ideological basis of the <strong>Syria</strong>n civil-society movement counters the regime’s argumentagainst imitation or “import” of foreign social ideologies by tracing <strong>its</strong> own back tothe Ottoman Tanzimat <strong>and</strong> the rise of the concept of citizenship <strong>and</strong> voluntary association,in contrast to the status of “subjects” <strong>and</strong> organic affiliation. <strong>The</strong> basic documents of themovement—the Statement of the 99 <strong>and</strong> the later Statement of the 1000—are evidence thatit is well aware of the red lines of the regime <strong>and</strong> avoids crossing them. Thus, for example,dem<strong>and</strong>s included ending the state of emergency <strong>and</strong> granting political freedoms—ofexpression, economic rights, <strong>and</strong> women’s rights—but did not call for political pluralismor regime change. Later statements attributed to the same grouping also refrained fromradically confrontational dem<strong>and</strong>s <strong>and</strong> employed the regime’s own logic in attempting topersuade it to reform.As noted above, the “Damascus Spring” turned into a “Damascus Winter” by thebeginning of 2001 with the arrests of dissidents <strong>and</strong> closures of the political “clubs” that hadbeen formed. While this situation has not changed, some elements of the <strong>Syria</strong>n civil-societymovement have continued to promote their ideas. <strong>The</strong> latest document of this movement,<strong>The</strong> Damascus Declaration for Democratic National Change, 112 has stronger wording thanprevious documents <strong>and</strong> reflects the feeling that the regime is under siege <strong>and</strong> that only farreachingdemocratization may satisfy the West. It calls for “establishment of a democraticnational regime” in a process that must be “peaceful, gradual, founded on accord, <strong>and</strong>based on dialogue <strong>and</strong> recognition of the other.” Some opposition figures inside <strong>Syria</strong> (suchas Riyad al-Turk) have gone even further <strong>and</strong> dem<strong>and</strong>ed Bashar’s resignation (i.e., thedismantling of the regime) as an exit from the international crisis that the Mehlis report hascreated.One can distinguish three main schools of thought within the <strong>Syria</strong>n opposition regardingways to bring about regime change:1. “Gradualists” who feel that the regime can be deconstructed through incremental empowermentof the people <strong>and</strong> increasing restrictions on the arbitrary power of the regime.
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