Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...

Bashar’s Syria 397The Christian community in Syria numbers about one million, about 6.5 percent of thepopulation. It is split into a number of sects. The sense of disintegration of authority in Syriaand the revival of the Assyrian community in Iraq ignited demonstrations by the AssyrianChristians in the city of Hasakah. In October 2004, thousands of Assyrians protested thekilling of two Assyrians by Muslims, who accused them of supporting the Americans.Developments in Iraq have also affected the relations between Syria’s Christian Assyriansand the regime. The identification by Syrian Sunnis of the Assyrians with the U.S. in Iraqhas generated anti-Assyrian sentiment in Syria.The Kurds in Syria are second-class citizens. The regime’s attitude toward the twomillion-strongKurdish minority in the northeastern Hasakah province is symptomatic ofits practice of raising hopes and then dashing them. Since Bashar came to power, theregime has made some overtures toward the Kurdish community, among them signalingthat a rectification of historic grievances may be in sight. Bashar himself visited Hasakahin 2002—the first such visit of the president ever.The rise of the Kurdish factor in Iraq had an effect on the Kurds in Syria. In March2004, a brawl between fans of Kurdish and Arab football teams in the northern Kurdishregion of Hasaka set off a tide of unrest that developed into widespread Kurdish antiregimeviolence, which spread to the Kurdish quarter of Damascus and the University of Damascus.Another significant incident that heightened the tensions between the regime and the Kurdswas the disappearance, apparent arrest, and subsequent death (apparently due to torture) ofthe eminent Kurdish Sheikh Mohammad Ma’shuq al-Khiznawi (May 2005), who had beenactive in calling for reforms in Syria.The Kurdish protests erupted against a historical background of discrimination againstKurds, including the constant refusal of the regime to accord Syrian citizenship to hundredsof thousands of Kurds living in that region, and who were, according to the regime, of Iraqiorigin. Before the June 2005 Ba’th Party Congress, the regime allowed Kurdish groups tofield papers that would grant equal rights to Kurds, and particularly accord citizenship toabout 200,000 Kurds inside Syria who lack any citizenship (al-maktumin). The Congressdid not finally discuss the issue. In the wake of the pressures on Syria as a result of theMehlis report on the al-Hariri affair, Syrian Ba’th officials have been reviving the possibilityof enfranchisement of the stateless Kurds of Syria. 111Nevertheless, the options for these minorities are between an Alawite-led regime inwhich they have some stake and a Sunni—potentially Islamic-Salafi—regime that would bemuch more inimical to their interests. Fear of Sunni rule, which motivated their participationin the Ba’th regime’s coalition, seems to have increased because of events in Iraq. Hence,while there have been outbreaks of sectarian violence between Alawites and Isma’ilis, itseems that these minorities remain loyal to the regime, at least according to the slogan notedabove: ma fi gheiru—there is nothing else.Civil SocietyA civil society may be defined for the purposes of this study as voluntary social or politicalassociation within a “space” in a country that is not controlled by the government, andwhich is democratic and tolerant in that it is not exclusive; it accepts that organizationswith different values and interests all operate within the same space. The Ba’th regimewas in total control over the entire public space, relying on intimidation and deterrence tomaintain its hold over society, but did not really invest in mass ideological indoctrination.Like Machiavelli, Asad knew that it was better to be feared than to be loved.