Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...
Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ... Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...
Bashar’s Syria 395Syria-News, a website run by the Syrian Economic Center (SEC), which was establishedin 1995. Ramak is the holding company of the Makhlouf family, headed by Rami Makhloufand his sons, the twin brothers Hafez and Ihab. The Makhlouf family is arguablythe richest family in Syria. The main company of the family is Syriatel (Syria’s cellphone provider). Other enterprises associated with the family are the state “RealEstate Bank” (and through it access to available capital); free trade zones along theborder with Lebanon, imports of Mercedes cars, duty-free shops, the tobacco importmonopoly, luxurious shopping malls, etc. Rami Makhluf has extensive holdings inthe U.S. Virgin Islands, which have been the subject of litigation, 107 resulting in theappointment of his brother Ihab as caretaker for his U.S. company. Rami Makhloufalso is deeply invested with Maher al-Asad in various ventures in Lebanon. In mid-2005 Rami Makhlouf began to move part of his assets to the Gulf states. This wasinterpreted as indicating either that he had fallen out with his cousin Bashar or thathe feared that the anticorruption campaign the party had launched might choosehim as a scapegoat. This interpretation seems somewhat unlikely. Before he becamepresident, Bashar was linked to Rami Makhlouf’s business and used to make contactsfor him in his official meetings. 108 SES International is owned by the Shaleesh family. The company was accused ofinvolvement in deals as a go-between for more than fifty contracts for tens of millionsof dollars of military equipment for the Iraqi regime. The Khaddam Group is headed by Jihad Khaddam and his brother, Jamal. Itheld a monopoly on food processing ventures (‘Afiyya Nourishment) and variousrestaurant-related sectors in Syria. Since the 10th Congress, the family has graduallymoved its business outside of Syria and is now in exile. The Hamsho Family owns Hamsho International. The head of the family, MohammadSaber Hamsho, is a member of parliament and on the board of the Syrian ComputerSociety. The Inana Group is an IT company headed by Firas Bakour, a member of the SyrianComputer Society. The Nahhas Group is owned by Saeb Nahhas. His daughter is married to the son ofShafiq al-Fayad.Syrian control of Lebanon became a source of economic power for many of the above.Some examples include: The drug trade in the Baqa’a valley, which provided a financial base for many of thesenior officers in the Syrian army. Cellular telecommunications are a major source of revenue. The value of this marketis assessed at 30 million dollars. In 1994, two ten-year contracts were awarded totwo cellular phone companies, LibanCell and Cellis. The former is owned by Aliand Nizar Dalloul, sons of former Defense Minister Mohsen Dalloul, who was closeto Rafiq Hariri, Khaddam, Hikmat Shihabi, and Ghazi Kana’an, whereas the latterwas dominated by the Miqati family (Najib, Taha, and ‘Azmi), close friends ofBashar al-Asad. In addition, Rami Makhlouf operates an illegal telephone exchangenetwork in Lebanon through his proxy, Pierre Fatouch, a Lebanese businessman whoowns a whisky plant in Baqa’a, diverting phone calls from the Lebanese network toSyriatel. 109 Duty-free shops controlled by the Ramak group (Makhlouf).
396 S. Bar Other prominent Syrians who were involved in the Lebanese economy include GeneralMohammad Issa Duba (the brother of ‘Ali Duba, former head of Military Intelligence),Mohammad Hamsho (Syrian member of parliament, head of HamshoInternational, Iham Sa’id (the son of former GID director, Majid Sa’id), and MohammadNasef.The SunnisIn its early days the Ba’th regime formed a coalition with the rural Sunni elites, deposing theurban Sunni elites from their traditional predominance in Syrian society. This however haschanged. First, many of the “rural elites” have become part of a new urban elite; second, theregime gradually widened its base among the Sunnis and coopted many of the rich Sunnifamilies.The Sunni business elite of Damascus was upset at the assassination of al-Hariri, withwhom many had business connections and who was regarded as a symbol of economicsuccess. Some even claim that he was seen as a possible example of how the Sunni businesssector could regain power, even when military power was concentrated in the hands ofothers. The tension between Syria and Lebanon was not only bad for the business concernsof Alawite generals but also for Sunni businessmen. There are a few signs that the murderhas caused some rumblings in this community against the Alawite elite, but for the timebeing there are no signs of organized opposition by this group, which values, above all,stability.The Sunni tribes of Eastern Syria (mainly along the border with Iraq and with transborderaffiliations with the corresponding Iraqi tribes) had been sidelined during the decadesof the Hafez al-Asad regime. Bashar, however, is reputed to have made an attempt to cultivatetheir loyalty. This policy began even before the U.S. occupation of Iraq, but has acceleratedsince then. The prospects of a breakup of Iraq into Shi’ite, Kurdish, and Sunni areas wouldleave the Iraqi tribes with a stronger dependence on the Syrian tribes. The Syrian tribesparticipated in the monthly meetings of the Iraqi tribes and Ba’thists in Damascus fromOctober 2003 on, and in December 2004 Bashar himself honored the meeting with hispresence. 110Druze, Isma’ilis, Christians, and KurdsSyria’s religious minorities—Druze, Isma’ilis, and Christians—enjoy a special status underthe Ba’th-Alawite regime. They are, in effect, members of the “coalition” of social elementsthat Hafez al-Asad built over the years. The former two are well-integrated into the militaryand bureaucracy, whereas the latter play a pivotal role in the economy. All three communitieshave something to lose by the fall of the regime, particularly if the alternative is a Sunni—possibly Islamist—regime that would not safeguard their status and would impose SunniIslam on the heterodox Islamic sects or relegate them to second class citizenship.The Druze and the Isma’ilis are, like the Alawites, a heterodox Shi’ite sect which hasbeen coopted into the regime. The Druze of Syria mainly hail from the Golan and theLebanese border and have no history of clashes with the Alawites, most whom inhabit thefar north of the country. On the other hand, the Isma’ilis are traditional rivals of their Alawiteneighbors in the northwestern part of the country. This rivalry was manifested in bloodyclashes between Isma’ilis and Alawites in the towns of Qadmous and Misyaf in mid-2005,which resulted in attacks on Alawite houses and stores.
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Bashar’s <strong>Syria</strong> 395<strong>Syria</strong>-News, a website run by the <strong>Syria</strong>n Economic Center (SEC), which was establishedin 1995. Ramak is the holding company of the Makhlouf family, headed by Rami Makhlouf<strong>and</strong> his sons, the twin brothers Hafez <strong>and</strong> Ihab. <strong>The</strong> Makhlouf family is arguablythe richest family in <strong>Syria</strong>. <strong>The</strong> main company of the family is <strong>Syria</strong>tel (<strong>Syria</strong>’s cellphone provider). Other enterprises associated with the family are the state “RealEstate Bank” (<strong>and</strong> through it access to available capital); free trade zones along theborder with Lebanon, imports of Mercedes cars, duty-free shops, the tobacco importmonopoly, luxurious shopping malls, etc. Rami Makhluf has extensive holdings inthe U.S. Virgin Isl<strong>and</strong>s, which have been the subject of litigation, 107 resulting in theappointment of his brother Ihab as caretaker for his U.S. company. Rami Makhloufalso is deeply invested with Maher al-Asad in various ventures in Lebanon. In mid-2005 Rami Makhlouf began to move part of his assets to the Gulf states. This wasinterpreted as indicating either that he had fallen out with his cousin Bashar or thathe feared that the anticorruption campaign the party had launched might choosehim as a scapegoat. This interpretation seems somewhat unlikely. Before he becamepresident, Bashar was linked to Rami Makhlouf’s business <strong>and</strong> used to make contactsfor him in his official meetings. 108 SES International is owned by the Shaleesh family. <strong>The</strong> company was accused ofinvolvement in deals as a go-between for more than fifty contracts for tens of millionsof dollars of military equipment for the Iraqi regime. <strong>The</strong> Khaddam Group is headed by Jihad Khaddam <strong>and</strong> his brother, Jamal. Itheld a monopoly on food processing ventures (‘Afiyya Nourishment) <strong>and</strong> variousrestaurant-related sectors in <strong>Syria</strong>. Since the 10th Congress, the family has graduallymoved <strong>its</strong> business outside of <strong>Syria</strong> <strong>and</strong> is now in exile. <strong>The</strong> Hamsho Family owns Hamsho International. <strong>The</strong> head of the family, MohammadSaber Hamsho, is a member of parliament <strong>and</strong> on the board of the <strong>Syria</strong>n ComputerSociety. <strong>The</strong> Inana Group is an IT company headed by Firas Bakour, a member of the <strong>Syria</strong>nComputer Society. <strong>The</strong> Nahhas Group is owned by Saeb Nahhas. His daughter is married to the son ofShafiq al-Fayad.<strong>Syria</strong>n control of Lebanon became a source of economic power for many of the above.Some examples include: <strong>The</strong> drug trade in the Baqa’a valley, which provided a financial base for many of thesenior officers in the <strong>Syria</strong>n army. Cellular telecommunications are a major source of revenue. <strong>The</strong> value of this marketis assessed at 30 million dollars. In 1994, two ten-year contracts were awarded totwo cellular phone companies, LibanCell <strong>and</strong> Cellis. <strong>The</strong> former is owned by Ali<strong>and</strong> Nizar Dalloul, sons of former Defense Minister Mohsen Dalloul, who was closeto Rafiq Hariri, Khaddam, Hikmat Shihabi, <strong>and</strong> Ghazi Kana’an, whereas the latterwas dominated by the Miqati family (Najib, Taha, <strong>and</strong> ‘Azmi), close friends ofBashar al-Asad. In addition, Rami Makhlouf operates an illegal telephone exchangenetwork in Lebanon through his proxy, Pierre Fatouch, a Lebanese businessman whoowns a whisky plant in Baqa’a, diverting phone calls from the Lebanese network to<strong>Syria</strong>tel. 109 Duty-free shops controlled by the Ramak group (Makhlouf).
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