Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...

394 S. Bar(Majlis Milli), composed of eighteen members of the tribes, which is purported to haveinfluence over the Alawite community and to which the president defers. 102 In the early1980s the Alawites organized themselves in a state-sanctioned militia, “Ali al-Murtada,”headed by Jamil al-Asad (Hafez al-Asad’s brother). In the past, the Alawite clerics, rijal aldin,were the leaders of the community as a whole. They played a pivotal role in representingthe Alawites before the French colonial rulers and in the early days of independence. Whilethere is no doubt that the Alawites are the main pillar of the Syrian regime, there todayis no sign of a separate leadership that wields such influence. The centralism of the Ba’thregime could not tolerate such a “shadow government,” particularly one with moral swayover the top leadership of the military and the security services. For example, it is claimedthat some of the Alawite religious leaders were against the actions of the regime in 1980in the North and that some officers refused to participate. The regime therefore acted toreduce the power of the rijal al-din and to reduce the hold of the Alawite religion over themembers of the community.This policy also coincided with the regime’s interest in countering the ideologicalrationale of the Muslim Brotherhood and in boosting its own Islamic credentials. Thishas been done in various ways: fatwas declaring the Alawites to be Shi’ite Muslims; 103emphasising the orthodox Islamic behavior of the president himself; 104 “Islamization” ofthe Alawites through building of Sunni style mosques 105 and minimizing any referenceto a distinct Alawite religion or Alawite region. 106 There are in Syria hundreds of Sunnireligious schools, while there is not a single school that specializes in teaching the Alawitereligion.Finally, the “old guard” Alawite elite created an intricate network of patronage to carefor the interests of their ancestral home towns. However, with the shift from the “old guard”to the “new guard” under Bashar, and Bashar’s own efforts at administrative modernization,these networks began to wane as a new system of economic alliances gradually replacedthe old patronage system. The bond of the big-city-born young guard to their parents’ homevillages and to their extended tribal relatives is considerably weaker, and they are naturallyless committed to supporting a community that cannot directly influence their day-to-daypower struggles. As a result, there is a growing dissatisfaction among the Alawites in theAlawite region. This may have the effect of weakening the loyalty of the Alawites to theal-Asad dynasty and result in a search for an alternative leadership that can preserve theprivileges of the community.These power bases are closely linked to the families and the tribal networks that buildthem. For many years, the economic power bases of the party officials were state companiesin which the major families had embedded their members. While the largest privatecompanies in Syria are owned by families with close ties to the al-Asad family, non-Baa’thentrepreneurs have become more and more visible over the last five years. Many of theseare identified with the second generation of the party nomenklatura. It should be noted thatmost of the “sons of the bosses” do not hold official positions in the party, though it maybe assumed that most are party members. Other private companies are linked to membersof the Syrian Computer Society. The most significant companies in the private sector thatare connected to the party or the regime are: The MAS (Min Ajli Suriya, “For the Sake of Syria”) Group is owned by the Tlasfamily (Firas Tlas). MAS has massive holdings in the defense acquisition, telecommunications,and media sectors. It has been rumored that Firas has close businesscooperation with Rifa‘t al-Asad’s sons. Since 2004, Firas has also funded