Bashar’s <strong>Syria</strong> 389Hence, the Congress did not represent a trend for “de-Ba’thification” of the regime,but rather for “re-Ba’thification” after a decade of the party’s irrelevance under the strongleadership of Hafez al-Asad. <strong>The</strong> main changes therefore were personal: a large number ofoctogenarian delegates were sent home 84 <strong>and</strong> second-generation members took their place.<strong>The</strong> “rejuvenation” did not replace old mindsets with new ones, but rather fulfilled theneed of the thirty-nine-year-old president to promote people who would be committed tohim personally <strong>and</strong> to rid himself of his “uncles”—old Ba’thists who had been loyal to hisfather <strong>and</strong> who could conceivably serve as an “ideological compass” <strong>and</strong> might protest anydivergence from his father’s line.Nevertheless, the Congress was marketed to the <strong>Syria</strong>n public as having given <strong>its</strong> blessingto democratization, separation of the party from the government mechanism, economicreform, <strong>and</strong> a war against corruption. <strong>The</strong> first meetings of the Regional Comm<strong>and</strong> afterthe Congress (August 2005) were dedicated to these issues, particularly to the issue ofcorruption <strong>and</strong> forming a committee to draw up a new concept of the relationship betweenthe party <strong>and</strong> the regime. 85 It appears, though, that there is no longer any real anticipationin the <strong>Syria</strong>n public for real reform, <strong>and</strong> the declarations of the leadership are derisivelydubbed “declaration reform” (islah bilaghi).A central motif coming out of the 10th Congress was the need for “re-activation”(tanshit) of the party. However, there is no evidence that the party has become more activeor changed any of <strong>its</strong> traditional modes of operation. <strong>The</strong> personal changes in the party onthe eve of the Congress <strong>and</strong> in the Congress <strong>its</strong>elf have, in essence, frozen the situation forthe next few years. <strong>The</strong> next “target date” for possible changes in the party may be (butdoes not have to be) the proposed date for “free” elections in 2007. This is also the date thatmany of the party reformists are now aiming at to renew their pressure for changes in theparty structure <strong>and</strong> second-echelon leadership.<strong>Syria</strong>’s intelligence <strong>and</strong> security services (collectively known as the “intelligence”(mokhabarat) are the mainstay of the regime (see Figure 3). <strong>The</strong>y are ubiquitous <strong>and</strong>involved in all aspects of public activity: political, social, <strong>and</strong> economic. <strong>The</strong>ir authorizationis necessary for almost any civilian activity. <strong>The</strong>se apparatuses operate through a system ofredundancy which serves the president to monitor any possible internal threat.<strong>The</strong> main security <strong>and</strong> intelligence apparatuses in <strong>Syria</strong> include: General Security Directorate (GSD) (Idarat al-Amn al-’Amm) is the main intelligenceapparatus, with responsibility for three areas: internal security, external security, <strong>and</strong>Palestinian affairs. <strong>The</strong> GSD is organized into three branches dealing with these threeareas. It controls the civil police <strong>and</strong> the border guards, <strong>and</strong> has primary responsibilityfor maintaining surveillance over the Ba’th Party, the civilian bureaucracy, <strong>and</strong> thegeneral populace. <strong>The</strong> Political Security Directorate (PSD) (Idarat al-Amn al-Siyasi) is responsible forpolitical intelligence <strong>and</strong> security <strong>and</strong> monitoring <strong>and</strong> disrupting political dissent <strong>and</strong>foreign subversion, as opposed to criminal <strong>and</strong> civil policing. It is divided into theInternal Security Department (ISD) <strong>and</strong> the External Security Department (ESD). Military Intelligence (MI) (Shu’bat al-Mokhabarat al-’Askariyya) is nominally responsiblefor classic military intelligence <strong>and</strong> field security. It is, however, an extremelyinfluential force. MI controls the Military Police, who provide security forelements of the ruling elite, <strong>and</strong> the Office of the Chief of Reconnaissance, which isprobably responsible for strategic <strong>and</strong> tactical military intelligence collection, collation,<strong>and</strong> analysis. It is also responsible for carrying out unconventional warfareoperations <strong>and</strong> intelligence operations such as assassinations <strong>and</strong> terrorism.
390 S. <strong>Bar</strong>Figure 3. Heads of the <strong>Syria</strong>n Security Appartuses <strong>and</strong> their dates of appointment. Air Force Intelligence (AFI) (Idarat al-Mokhabarat al-Jawiyya) was the predominantapparatus under Hafez al-Asad <strong>and</strong> was responsible for operations against the Islamicopposition <strong>and</strong> terrorist operations abroad (e.g., the attempt to bomb an El-Al aircraftin London in 1986). 86Though these agencies are nominally subordinate to different comm<strong>and</strong>s (the military<strong>and</strong> the Interior Ministry), they in fact operate under the direct control of the president.Like their formal lines of comm<strong>and</strong>, the formal division of tasks between them is of littlerelevance. <strong>The</strong> different security services always have maintained a certain level of competition,<strong>and</strong> this is encouraged by the president. <strong>The</strong>y monitor each other no less than theydo the general public. <strong>The</strong> real indication of the relative predominance of one or another ofthe services is the intimacy of the head of that service with the president.Since Bashar’s rise to power <strong>and</strong> the subsequent changes in the comm<strong>and</strong> of the securityapparatuses, the rivalry between them seems to have worsened. In March 2005 the conflictbetween Asef Shawkat (who had just been appointed as Head of DMI) <strong>and</strong> Ghazi Kana’an(Minister of Interior) over areas of authority in northern <strong>Syria</strong> came to the surface.<strong>The</strong> “Young Guard” in Government. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Syria</strong>n government (the cabinet) is a body that“manages” the country but does not “rule” <strong>and</strong> has never held any real power. In the daysof Hafez al-Asad it was populated by Ba’th loyalists who did not presume to have any realinfluence on the decisions of the regime, but at the same time were not “technocrats” inthe sense that they had the professional backgrounds to perform their ministerial duties.In this sense, the Bashar era has changed the picture. <strong>The</strong> government, per se, is still notprivy to any real decision making on strategic matters or on areas relating to intelligence.However, it appears that economic ministers do have more power over their specific areasof responsibility.Like other components of the regime, the government was characterized by stagnation.Prime Minister Mohammad al-Zu‘bi was in the post for thirteen years, until March2000. <strong>The</strong> government began a process of rejuvenation toward the beginning of Bashar’s
- Page 4 and 5: Bashar’s Syria 355of political im
- Page 8 and 9: Bashar’s Syria 359a-Zur province
- Page 11: 362 S. Barof Lebanon, with which Sy
- Page 17 and 18: 368 S. Barnaturally come with the s
- Page 19 and 20: 370 S. BarSimilar behavior on the p
- Page 21 and 22: 372 S. Bardemocracy” must be foun
- Page 23 and 24: 374 S. Barcultural, political and m
- Page 25 and 26: 376 S. Barexcept for those with fam
- Page 27 and 28: 378 S. Barthe provisions for nonpro
- Page 29 and 30: 380 S. Bar The ups and downs in rel
- Page 31 and 32: 382 S. Barfamily is also linked by
- Page 33 and 34: 384 S. Bar2. The “second generati
- Page 35 and 36: 386 S. BarThe reformist trend withi
- Page 37: 388 S. Barwould allow the younger g
- Page 41 and 42: 392 S. Bar Disruption of the “hie
- Page 43 and 44: 394 S. Bar(Majlis Milli), composed
- Page 45 and 46: 396 S. Bar Other prominent Syrians
- Page 47 and 48: 398 S. BarSyrian civil society—su
- Page 49 and 50: 400 S. BarMany of the Muslim Brothe
- Page 51 and 52: 402 S. BarThese elements find reson
- Page 53 and 54: 404 S. BarIran’s proxy, Hezbollah
- Page 55 and 56: 406 S. BarWest—and specifically t
- Page 57 and 58: 408 S. BarBashar is well aware that
- Page 59 and 60: 410 S. BarBashar did not read these
- Page 61 and 62: 412 S. Bartoken withdrawal while ma
- Page 63 and 64: 414 S. Barlegitimacy had eroded. Ne
- Page 65 and 66: 416 S. Barin the wake of the al-Har
- Page 67 and 68: 418 S. BarIt was Russia, however, t
- Page 69 and 70: 420 S. Baror so, with competitive p
- Page 71 and 72: 422 S. Bar10. According to the well
- Page 73 and 74: 424 S. Bar44. See Flynt Everett, In
- Page 75 and 76: 426 S. Barinternet news site, all4s
- Page 77 and 78: 428 S. Bar100. As one Sunni Syrian
- Page 79 and 80: 430 S. Bar125. Radio Damascus, 21 O
- Page 81 and 82: 432 S. BarBengio, Ofra and Gabriel
- Page 83 and 84: 434 S. BarNews agencies and Newspap
- Page 85 and 86: Regional Command;Central CommitteeR
- Page 87 and 88: Main Figures in the Syrian Ba’th
- Page 89 and 90:
Main Figures in the Syrian Ba’th
- Page 91 and 92:
Main Figures in the Syrian Ba’th
- Page 93 and 94:
Main Figures in the Syrian Ba’th