Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...
Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ... Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...
Bashar’s Syria 387hopes on the 10th Regional Congress and were deeply frustrated by its lukewarm conclusion.These nascent reform tendencies have been further dampened by the international crisis inthe wake of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri and theMehlis report. The sense of a foreign conspiracy against Syria has been exploited by theleadership to shore up domestic support and suppress voices for reform.The question of the relations between the Ba’thist reformists and Bashar al-Asad isone of the most debated issues in Syria. On one hand there is no doubt that Bashar is closeto many of the reformists, particularly those affiliated with the Syrian Computer Society.Many of these, though, are academicians who are not active in the party or even are not partymembers. Even those reformists who are party activists are mid-level members without largeconstituencies and without patronage networks of their own. So even if Bashar likes theirideas, many of them are impractical on a political level. 72 This is because, at the end of theday, implementation of ideas in the Syrian regime requires the support of the bureaucracy,which believes it will be damaged by reforms and modernization.The 10th Regional Congress was held under the slogan of “development, renewal andreform” (tatwir, tahdith wa-islah). The “reformist” trend was evident already in the campaigningof the candidates for the 10th Regional Congress. Those who were elected did notmention Lebanon or Syria’s foreign relations; their focus was almost exclusively domestic.The candidates called for administrative reforms, improving the public sector, broadeningthe free market, and improving healthcare and schools. All asked for better qualified publicservants and administrative reform. Many of them criticized the opportunism of the partyleadership (stopping short of the president, of course) and the system of clientalism andpatronage.The results of the elections for the delegates to the Congress (April 2005) precipitatedprotest among Ba’th members in the branches of Damascus and the University of Damascus.The elections for the posts of secretary of the local branch (far’a) and sub-branches (shu’ba)returned all the old party officials without even one new candidate. Since party proceduresactually precluded simultaneous change of more than ten percent of the party leadership,there was no expectation of a sea change. The results, though, were seen as far exceeding themost cynical warnings. The frustration of the young party members found its way into thealternative press of “civil society” and the internet. They claimed that the incumbent partyleaders had prevented them from campaigning and presenting their resumes and positions,and did not even publish the names of candidates. Since both candidates and voters didnot hold frequent party meetings, most voters did not know the new candidates. A petitionwas circulated by prominent reform-minded party members (one name associated with thispetition was a Bashar confidante, Ayman ‘Abd al-Nour) complaining about the corruption ofthe elections and demanding that 100 known reformers be added to the Party Congress. Asa result, 100–150 delegates were added at the last moment, including the reformist Ayman‘Abd al-Nour, who had failed to be elected in his own branch. 73Nevertheless, the general sense among the reformists was one of failure. 74 Accordingto one individual who witnessed the preparations for the Congress and its deliberations,“the old vested interests won out . . . new reformers were closed out of the election processand almost all the old regional leaders and district leaders were voted back in because itwas illegal to campaign. The political machine ensured that its leaders would retain theircars, offices and privileges.” 75 This complaint was raised not only by young would-bedelegates, but by some older party members such as Dr. Zuhayr Ibrahim Jabour of TishreenUniversity 76 and Dr. Ahmad al-Hajj Ali, a member of the Ba’th “Committee to DevelopParty Thought” and ex-head of the Bureau of the Central Committee. 77 Even some of theparty’s official propagandists joined the call for democratization at the branch level that
388 S. Barwould allow the younger generation to come to the fore, and for “self-criticism,” purgingthe party of “flaws, exploitation, and interests” and of those who had “harmed the partyand the public morality and have contributed to the creation of an image unbecoming to theparty due to their personal or family behavior and due to their lack of integrity.” 78Despite the disappointment of the elections, the Congress was preceded by rumorsthat it would make “courageous decisions” and Bashar’s own declaration that the Congresswould be “the greatest leap in the history of Syria.” The Congress was expected to dealparticularly with the bleak domestic scene, 79 though it was also widely expected that theresolutions of the Congress would change the very essence of the party and of its holdon the regime. Some of the more far-reaching specific expectations that were voiced—including by delegates to the Congress included. 80 A new party law would permit: theformation of political parties outside of the NPF, as long as they are not based on “ethnicity,religion or regionalism” (i.e., neither Islamist nor Kurdish), and changing Article 8 of theconstitution, which defines the role of the Ba’th party in the state; 81 endorsement of freeparliamentary elections in 2007; granting citizenship to the 100,000 disenfranchised Kurdsin the Hasakah region; 82 abrogation of the state of emergency that has existed since 1963and of law 49 of 1980, which stipulates capital punishment for membership in the MuslimBrotherhood; changing the triple slogan of the party (Unity, Freedom, Socialism) to “Unity,Democracy, Social Justice” in a bid to gradually turn it into a “social democrat” party,along the lines of processes that Communist parties in the former Soviet bloc went through;dismantling the national (pan-Arab) leadership, and finally, changing the name of the partyto “The Ba’th Arab Socialist Party in the Syrian Region” (i.e. to downplay the pan-Arabideology of the party) or to the “Democratic (Ba’th) Party” (to emphasize the “democratic”character of the party), and defining the party as a “democratic socialist national (Qawmipan-Arabnational) political organization which struggles for achieving the great goals ofthe Arab Nation for Unity, Freedom and Socialism,” based on “the principles of citizenshipand democracy and respect of human rights and implementation of justice among thecitizens.”These expectations were, to a large extent, based on the assumption that Bashar was a“closet reformer” who could not show his true colors because of the interference of the “oldguard.” Many Syrians expected the 10th Congress to imitate the 1996 conference of theSoviet Communist Party under Gorbachev. These expectations were not unfounded; theytook their cue from Bashar’s own public statements and those of his confidants. 83 Most ofthe Ba’th reformers, though—and certainly the civil-society movement—had no illusionsthat they could achieve even some of those goals. They realized that the goal of the partyleadership was “to repair—not to reform,” and that this should be done step by step and notby leaps and bounds. One informed source claims that the reformists intentionally spreadrumors about far-reaching reforms in order to create a level of expectation that would helpset the stage for further pressure on the regime after the Congress failed to deliver.The 10th Congress was not the doctrinal watershed that pre-Congress rumors hadprophesied. The Ba’th doctrine was not changed, but rather played down and relegated tominor reiterations of the original ideals of the party. Article 8 of the constitution and the“internal regime” remained in force and none of the reforms listed above were adopted.Arab unity is mentioned en passant and the demand for revolution and socialism in theentire Arab world is not mentioned at all. In fact, the 10th Congress was used by Bashar torevive the party as a mainstay of the regime and as an instrument for control of the publicspace, which the civil society movement had encroached upon. This was reflected in thecomposition of the delegates, the newly elected bodies, the agenda and the final resolutionsof the Congress.
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Bashar’s <strong>Syria</strong> 387hopes on the 10th Regional Congress <strong>and</strong> were deeply frustrated by <strong>its</strong> lukewarm conclusion.<strong>The</strong>se nascent reform tendencies have been further dampened by the international crisis inthe wake of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri <strong>and</strong> theMehlis report. <strong>The</strong> sense of a foreign conspiracy against <strong>Syria</strong> has been exploited by theleadership to shore up domestic support <strong>and</strong> suppress voices for reform.<strong>The</strong> question of the relations between the Ba’thist reformists <strong>and</strong> Bashar al-Asad isone of the most debated issues in <strong>Syria</strong>. On one h<strong>and</strong> there is no doubt that Bashar is closeto many of the reformists, particularly those affiliated with the <strong>Syria</strong>n Computer Society.Many of these, though, are academicians who are not active in the party or even are not partymembers. Even those reformists who are party activists are mid-level members without largeconstituencies <strong>and</strong> without patronage networks of their own. So even if Bashar likes theirideas, many of them are impractical on a political level. 72 This is because, at the end of theday, implementation of ideas in the <strong>Syria</strong>n regime requires the support of the bureaucracy,which believes it will be damaged by reforms <strong>and</strong> modernization.<strong>The</strong> 10th Regional Congress was held under the slogan of “development, renewal <strong>and</strong>reform” (tatwir, tahdith wa-islah). <strong>The</strong> “reformist” trend was evident already in the campaigningof the c<strong>and</strong>idates for the 10th Regional Congress. Those who were elected did notmention Lebanon or <strong>Syria</strong>’s foreign relations; their focus was almost exclusively domestic.<strong>The</strong> c<strong>and</strong>idates called for administrative reforms, improving the public sector, broadeningthe free market, <strong>and</strong> improving healthcare <strong>and</strong> schools. All asked for better qualified publicservants <strong>and</strong> administrative reform. Many of them criticized the opportunism of the partyleadership (stopping short of the president, of course) <strong>and</strong> the system of clientalism <strong>and</strong>patronage.<strong>The</strong> results of the elections for the delegates to the Congress (April 2005) precipitatedprotest among Ba’th members in the branches of Damascus <strong>and</strong> the University of Damascus.<strong>The</strong> elections for the posts of secretary of the local branch (far’a) <strong>and</strong> sub-branches (shu’ba)returned all the old party officials without even one new c<strong>and</strong>idate. Since party proceduresactually precluded simultaneous change of more than ten percent of the party leadership,there was no expectation of a sea change. <strong>The</strong> results, though, were seen as far exceeding themost cynical warnings. <strong>The</strong> frustration of the young party members found <strong>its</strong> way into thealternative press of “civil society” <strong>and</strong> the internet. <strong>The</strong>y claimed that the incumbent partyleaders had prevented them from campaigning <strong>and</strong> presenting their resumes <strong>and</strong> positions,<strong>and</strong> did not even publish the names of c<strong>and</strong>idates. Since both c<strong>and</strong>idates <strong>and</strong> voters didnot hold frequent party meetings, most voters did not know the new c<strong>and</strong>idates. A petitionwas circulated by prominent reform-minded party members (one name associated with thispetition was a Bashar confidante, Ayman ‘Abd al-Nour) complaining about the corruption ofthe elections <strong>and</strong> dem<strong>and</strong>ing that 100 known reformers be added to the Party Congress. Asa result, 100–150 delegates were added at the last moment, including the reformist Ayman‘Abd al-Nour, who had failed to be elected in his own branch. 73Nevertheless, the general sense among the reformists was one of failure. 74 Accordingto one individual who witnessed the preparations for the Congress <strong>and</strong> <strong>its</strong> deliberations,“the old vested interests won out . . . new reformers were closed out of the election process<strong>and</strong> almost all the old regional leaders <strong>and</strong> district leaders were voted back in because itwas illegal to campaign. <strong>The</strong> political machine ensured that <strong>its</strong> leaders would retain theircars, offices <strong>and</strong> privileges.” 75 This complaint was raised not only by young would-bedelegates, but by some older party members such as Dr. Zuhayr Ibrahim Jabour of TishreenUniversity 76 <strong>and</strong> Dr. Ahmad al-Hajj Ali, a member of the Ba’th “Committee to DevelopParty Thought” <strong>and</strong> ex-head of the Bureau of the Central Committee. 77 Even some of theparty’s official propag<strong>and</strong>ists joined the call for democratization at the branch level that
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