Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...

Bashar’s Syria 383The question arises as to what extent the links of these “purged” members of the oldelite remained intact and they can still wield influence. From observations of a number ofthese figures, it seems that their influence within the party waned a short time after they lefttheir positions of power. For example: Hikmat Shihabi spends most of his time outside of Syria (Paris and the U.S., wherehis sons live). He fled Syria via Lebanon when Hafez al-Asad was on his death bedand Syrian papers leaked that he was to be indicted for corruption. Sources claimthat his fall from grace was precipitated by his close relations with Rafiq al-Hariri. Mustafa Tlas has remained Head of the Military Committee, but has apparentlyretired to his “literary” occupations and intends to write his memoirs. He does,however, maintain a certain level of influence through his sons Manaf and Firas andthrough the incumbent Minister of Defense, Hasan Turkemani, who was his Chiefof Staff. Tlas does not enjoy a high esteem among the educated young generation ofthe party. 66 ‘Abd al-Halim Khaddam supported Bashar upon his father’s death, but nonethelesshe was forced out of his position as vice president and retained no official partyposition. His demotion in rank apparently was due to his close relations with Rafiqal-Hariri and his criticism of his assassination. Since the tenth Congress he has beenin Paris with his family and in January 2006 he openly broke with Bashar, insinuatingthat Syria was responsible for the murder of al-Hariri and that such an act could nothave been perpetrated without the President’s acquiescence. 67 Ali Duba fell from grace after he refused to support Bashar as successor. He is knownas a gambler who spends much of his time at the gambling centers of Europe. Of histwo sons (Mohammad and Samer), one has left Syria and works as a medical doctorin the UK and the other is in prison.The rest of the “old guard” (see the Appendix) has virtually disappeared from the radarscreen of Syrian politics. Even taking into account that most of them are septuagenarians,if not older, this seems to indicate that either they have lost their power bases or have cometo terms with their retirement.The “Young Guard.” With the “old guard” pushed aside, the regime is witness to the gradualcoming of age of a young guard. The nature of the young guard and the extent to which itwields power is therefore the cardinal question. The shift from the old guard to the new elitesurrounding Bashar al-Asad has disrupted the traditional patronage networks. The youngergeneration of those same families, however, feel and demonstrate much less of an affinityto their ancestral homes or even to their “Alawite” identity; Bashar and Maher are bothmarried to Sunni women, as are the sons of Mustafa Tlas and other “sons of the bosses”(abna’ al-mas’oulin). Since most of them were born and bred in Damascus—at best in thecity of Ladhaqiyya—they even lack the distinct Alawite accent and the savvy to curry favorwithin the intricate system of families and tribes. Their reference group is no longer theAlawite tribes they sprang from, but their associates in the military, business, or academicworlds in Damascus, most of them Sunnis.Within the young guard one can define four main groups:1. Sons and daughters of the “old guard.” These “princelings” were born into privilege andlearned from their fathers the art of wielding power in order to gain further privilege.