Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...

376 S. Barexcept for those with family, economic or tribal power bases of their own, beholden to himfor their status. But even the relatively independent status of these “oligarchs” is regimedependent. Unlike many of the “oligarchs” of the former Soviet Union (and the presentRussian leadership), who had metamorphosed from Soviet nomenklatura to post-Sovietleaders and oligarchs, the Syrian elite is well aware that in case of regime change “‘á laMiddle East,” they stand little chance of surviving as an elite (or even surviving physically),either collectively or individually. This understanding underlines the sense of “hang togetheror hang separately” within the regime.The ostensibly objective factors of resources (economy) and geopolitics are interpreteddifferently by various figures in the elite and these differences have a bearing on the entiredecision-making process. Many of the elite see a healthier economy as a sine qua non forregime resilience and survival and therefore call for economic reforms. Others point outthat Syria muddled through the entire Hafez al-Asad era with a sick economy, subordinatingeconomic considerations to those of regional politics (to achieve a strong regional statusfor Syria), domestic control, and elite cohesion (by providing economic perquisites to theelite and denying them to the general public).The predominance of regional politics also is debated. While some see Syrian regionalrelevance as a necessary condition for creating regional and international interest in thesurvival of the regime, others claim that Syria’s regional involvement (in Lebanon, and Iraq,and with the Palestinians) is actually counterproductive to the survival of the regime. Theprice of Syria’s support for Palestinian terrorism, Lebanese instability and Iraqi insurgency,they claim, far outweighs their benefits as tools for maintaining Syria’s regional status.It appears that this debate is integrated into the day-to-day decision-making process inDamascus.As a result, the “reading” of communications arriving from foreign powers (includingthe U.S.) is deeply colored by the composition of the people advising Bashar whenthe communication is dealt with. While the Syrian ambassadors in Washington and Londonare Bashar’s appointees, there is little indication that their reporting or advice carriesenough weight to counterbalance the combined advice of the people surrounding Basharin Damascus. 52 The regime’s incompetence in reading strategic conditions was manifestedin its behavior toward the Mehlis report. 53 There is no doubt that during the process ofthe Mehlis inquiry, the regime saw it and UNSC 1559 as no more than ploys for puttingpressure on Syria. It did not understand that it was incrementally losing its legitimacy andallowing the U.S. to set the stage for even harsher sanctions.Bashar, however, has retained one trait of his father’s policies: an aversion to directmilitary confrontation with Israel. This aversion was amply demonstrated when escalationbetween Israel and Hezbollah in the Har Dov/Shab’a area 54 between the Golan Heightsand Lebanon threatened to spill over into an Israeli–Syrian confrontation. Each time thatpossibility appeared, Asad took care not to respond, even to Israeli bombing of Syrianmilitary sites and a Palestinian training camp near Damascus.Decision making, of course, is only a point on a vector beginning with collection andanalysis of information regarding important issues and ending in implementation of thedecisions. The process under Bashar is weak not only in the first stage (collecting correctinformation) and in the decision making itself (weighing contingencies and consequences,hedging risks, and mapping courses) but also in the implementation of decisions.Hafez al-Asad was probably best known for his tough negotiating tactics—long hoursof meetings without any breaks, filibuster monologues on the history of the region, andrefusal to speak any language other than Arabic. He was, however, also known for hisreliability once an agreement was concluded.