Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...
Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ... Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...
Bashar’s Syria 373to the growing threat. Some analysts refer to “ultimatums” that the “old guard” issued tothe new president; (2) unilateral and unauthorized action on the part of the security forces,which forced a fait accompli on the president without first obtaining his acquiescence,(3) Bashar himself initiating steps against the reformists in order to ingratiate himself withthe “old guard,” hoping to win its support and consolidate his power and then implementfurther reforms, (4) and the rise of Ariel Sharon to power in Israel, which strengthened thehardliners in Damascus, which who Bashar then had to accommodate them.All these versions, though, do not do justice to Bashar’s own vested interest in thesurvival and continuity of the regime in its existing form. An alternative version which hasbecome more and more accepted by most Syria watchers and the opposition inside Syria isas follows: (1) Bashar believed he could open the door to incremental reforms and did notexpect the groundswell of demands for full civil liberties. Bashar had understood the needfor instruments of political expression as a means for “letting off steam,” but not as a form ofpopular participation in government. Neither Bashar nor the rest of the elite were prepared forthe rapid spread of demands for increasing freedom and the growing willingness to criticizethe regime, enabled by breaking of the “Complex of Fear.” (2) The crackdown reflectedBashar’s core beliefs that the direction that civil society took was incompatible with thevital interests of the regime and its survival. (3) The revitalization of the party at this stagealso is commensurate with Bashar’s own statements that the public desire for participation,which was manifested in the breakout of the civil-society movement, could be satisfiedby adjustments in the political structure of the Ba’th party and the PNF. (4) The attemptsto create a semblance of due process of law in arrests and indictment of oppositionistfigures does not represent an acceptance of the principle of separation of branches ofgovernment, but rather a shift from openly arbitrary authoritarianism to institutionalizedauthoritarianism. (5) The slogans of the Bashar al-Asad period in Syria, “change within theframework of continuity” and “reform and development,”—are indicative of these domesticpriorities.One of the arguments in favor of Bashar’s reformist image is the fact that he is considereda technophile; even before his appointment as president, Bashar was touted as a memberof the “internet generation” of leaders that had arisen in the Arab world, such as KingsMohammad VI of Morocco and Abdallah II of Jordan. The use of his medical title (Dr.Bashar al-Asad) in public statements and the allusions to expectation of change in thepersonality cult (Bashar’s pictures were captioned “the hope” and “the future”) also lendsitself to the notion that he is a new brand of leader. His Western education and affectionfor computer technology created the impression that he would promote modernization ofSyria on all levels—political, technological, and economic. This expectation that Bashar’stechnophile tendencies inexorably would lead him to political openness and liberalizationalso seems to have been a chimera. Bashar is definitely a technophile on the personal levelbut he by no means is a proponent of the free and anarchistic culture represented by theInternet revolution. Technology seems to be, for Bashar, a two-edged sword. He regards itas necessary for Syria to develop itself and win a place in the modern world. But, at thesame time, according to Bashar,a huge influx of information and ideas made possible by the communications andIT revolution . . . has made room for theories and projects, as well as lifestyleswhich have overwhelmed Arabs and threatened their existence and culturalidentity, and has increased the doubts and scepticism in the mind of young Arabs.The forces behind these events have created an illusory virtual reality . . . whichdrives us in a direction identified by others. . . . This leads in the end to the
374 S. Barcultural, political and moral collapse of the Arab individual and his ultimatedefeat even without a fight. 50The general impression from the above analysis and from various statements by Basharal-Asad—both public and private—is that he is not a “closet reformer” held hostage inthe hands of an “old guard,” but views political liberalization (as opposed to economic“opening”) as foreign, if not an existential threat to the regime. The reasons for this analysisinclude the following: First of all, the oft-invoked argument that Bashar is captive in the hands of an “oldguard” loses its credibility as time goes on and Bashar has strengthened his grip.During the last five years, the “old guard” that had served Hafez al-Asad has been allbut eliminated from key positions of authority and its ability to influence of pressurethe president has been greatly reduced. There is no doubt, even among those who see Bashar as a reformer, that, like hisfather, Bashar’s strategic goal is the survival of the regime. There are no signs that hesees himself as the “receiver” of the regime in the historic process of its dismantling orthat he desires to play the role of a Syrian Juan Carlos or Gorbachev. Bashar’s conceptof liberalization is borrowed from the Chinese reforms or the Egyptian infitah underSadat in the 1970s and not from the Soviet Glasnost under Gorbachev. Hence, hisdrive for liberalization remains qualified by his acceptance of the overriding priorityof regime survival. Bashar also remains true—at least on the rhetoric level—to the ideal of Arab nationalism.It seems that this is not merely a vestige of an obsolete strategic worldviewor a demonstration of filial fidelity to the father’s vision, but is a means for creatinga semblance of domestic cohesiveness and common identity in a society divided bylocal interests and communal identities.Decision Making under BasharThe model of hypercentralist decision making that characterized the regime of Hafez al-Asad faded with Bashar’s rise to power for various reasons: The “gang” surrounding the president did not have the same status with Bashar aswith his father. Bashar naturally felt the need for alternative channels of informationand advisors who were more attuned to his world view. The “fading away” of the “old guard” in Bashar’s regime and the integration ofyounger technocrats has changed some of the bureaucratic psychology in the partyand opened the door for more internal debate. Bashar’s ability to rely on the military and the mokhabarat is considerably less thanhis father’s and his tendency to accord the party a more central role as a power basehas altered the relationship between the party and the president. More than in thepast, the party has become a natural platform to influence the leader. On the other hand—and to a certain extent in contradiction to the enhanced status ofthe party—Bashar’s tendency to surround himself with nonparty member technocratsand Western-educated academicians has weakened the exclusivity of the party. Bashar clearly has neither the ability nor the proclivity of his father for multitasking,and micromanaging, and obviously prefers the delegation of authority. In many areas,Bashar is reported to preside over “consultations” with experts on various matters andis said to be willing to listen to opinions and advice on various issues, and not only
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Bashar’s <strong>Syria</strong> 373to the growing threat. Some analysts refer to “ultimatums” that the “old guard” issued tothe new president; (2) unilateral <strong>and</strong> unauthorized action on the part of the security forces,which forced a fait accompli on the president without first obtaining his acquiescence,(3) Bashar himself initiating steps against the reformists in order to ingratiate himself withthe “old guard,” hoping to win <strong>its</strong> support <strong>and</strong> consolidate his power <strong>and</strong> then implementfurther reforms, (4) <strong>and</strong> the rise of Ariel Sharon to power in Israel, which strengthened thehardliners in Damascus, which who Bashar then had to accommodate them.All these versions, though, do not do justice to Bashar’s own vested interest in thesurvival <strong>and</strong> continuity of the regime in <strong>its</strong> existing form. An alternative version which hasbecome more <strong>and</strong> more accepted by most <strong>Syria</strong> watchers <strong>and</strong> the opposition inside <strong>Syria</strong> isas follows: (1) Bashar believed he could open the door to incremental reforms <strong>and</strong> did notexpect the groundswell of dem<strong>and</strong>s for full civil liberties. Bashar had understood the needfor instruments of political expression as a means for “letting off steam,” but not as a form ofpopular participation in government. Neither Bashar nor the rest of the elite were prepared forthe rapid spread of dem<strong>and</strong>s for increasing freedom <strong>and</strong> the growing willingness to criticizethe regime, enabled by breaking of the “Complex of Fear.” (2) <strong>The</strong> crackdown reflectedBashar’s core beliefs that the direction that civil society took was incompatible with thevital interests of the regime <strong>and</strong> <strong>its</strong> survival. (3) <strong>The</strong> revitalization of the party at this stagealso is commensurate with Bashar’s own statements that the public desire for participation,which was manifested in the breakout of the civil-society movement, could be satisfiedby adjustments in the political structure of the Ba’th party <strong>and</strong> the PNF. (4) <strong>The</strong> attemptsto create a semblance of due process of law in arrests <strong>and</strong> indictment of oppositionistfigures does not represent an acceptance of the principle of separation of branches ofgovernment, but rather a shift from openly arbitrary authoritarianism to institutionalizedauthoritarianism. (5) <strong>The</strong> slogans of the Bashar al-Asad period in <strong>Syria</strong>, “change within theframework of continuity” <strong>and</strong> “reform <strong>and</strong> development,”—are indicative of these domesticpriorities.One of the arguments in favor of Bashar’s reformist image is the fact that he is considereda technophile; even before his appointment as president, Bashar was touted as a memberof the “internet generation” of leaders that had arisen in the Arab world, such as KingsMohammad VI of Morocco <strong>and</strong> Abdallah II of Jordan. <strong>The</strong> use of his medical title (Dr.Bashar al-Asad) in public statements <strong>and</strong> the allusions to expectation of change in thepersonality cult (Bashar’s pictures were captioned “the hope” <strong>and</strong> “the future”) also lends<strong>its</strong>elf to the notion that he is a new br<strong>and</strong> of leader. His Western education <strong>and</strong> affectionfor computer technology created the impression that he would promote modernization of<strong>Syria</strong> on all levels—political, technological, <strong>and</strong> economic. This expectation that Bashar’stechnophile tendencies inexorably would lead him to political openness <strong>and</strong> liberalizationalso seems to have been a chimera. Bashar is definitely a technophile on the personal levelbut he by no means is a proponent of the free <strong>and</strong> anarchistic culture represented by theInternet revolution. Technology seems to be, for Bashar, a two-edged sword. He regards itas necessary for <strong>Syria</strong> to develop <strong>its</strong>elf <strong>and</strong> win a place in the modern world. But, at thesame time, according to Bashar,a huge influx of information <strong>and</strong> ideas made possible by the communications <strong>and</strong>IT revolution . . . has made room for theories <strong>and</strong> projects, as well as lifestyleswhich have overwhelmed Arabs <strong>and</strong> threatened their existence <strong>and</strong> culturalidentity, <strong>and</strong> has increased the doubts <strong>and</strong> scepticism in the mind of young Arabs.<strong>The</strong> forces behind these events have created an illusory virtual reality . . . whichdrives us in a direction identified by others. . . . This leads in the end to the
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