Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview Shmuel Bar ...

370 S. BarSimilar behavior on the part of Bashar has been recorded in his interactions with otherSyrians and Lebanese. One explanation proposed is that Bashar treats foreigners over whomhe has no power with deference but allows himself to intimidate those over whom he haspower—Syrians and Lebanese.One facet of Bashar’s personal behavior that came as a surprise to many has beenwhat seems to be an unabashed admiration of the personality of the leader of the LebaneseHezbollah, Hasan Nassrallah. The outward signs of this attitude are Bashar’s willingnessto invite Nassrallah to the presidential palace and even to allow Hezbollah fighters tomarch on special occasions in Latakiya. This openness to the leader of a Lebanese factiondiverges fundamentally from Hafez al-Asad’s policy of keeping the Lebanese factions atarms length and allowing the security bureaucracy to deal with them. There is, of course, noauthoritative explanation for Bashar’s seeming fascination with the Shi’ite leader; however,some observers have attributed it to a psychological need for a charismatic and authoritativerole model in lieu of his father. Others have noted that for Bashar, who is acutely aware of hisleadership deficiencies, became an admirer of a man who has the very leadership traits thathe lacks. This admiration—almost adulation—of Hasan Nassrallah has intensified sincethe last Israeli–Lebanese war in July–August 2006; Bashar’s speeches increasingly bear theimprint of the arguments and rhetoric of Hezbollah and Iran and Bashar’s commitment tohis alliance with Nassrallah has grown. The question may be raised as to what extent, underthese psychological conditions, the patron-proxy relationship between Syria and Hezbollahhas not been reversed.Bashar as a “Reformer”A major question frequently raised with regard to Bashar Asad is his commitment toreform—or at least to change—in the Syrian political system. The prevalent perceptionboth within Syria and in the West upon Bashar’s rise to the presidency had been that hecould be expected to initiate a process of political and economic liberalization.There is no consensus among observers regarding the commitment of Bashar al-Asad topolitical reform. Some have described Bashar as a “restrained reformer” whose interactionswith the Western world has convinced him that only political and economic reform canguarantee the survival of the regime. 44 According to this view, he is genuinely conscious ofSyria’s image in the West and the need to integrate into the global economy and the globalculture, and is aware that this can not be done without some degree of liberalization. Thisview is supported by Bashar’s credentials as a reformer, which began to evolve shortly afterhis return from London and his selection as heir apparent, when he led, during the secondhalf of the 1990s, an “anticorruption” campaign. Bashar’s youth, technophile proclivitiesand education in the UK, and medical profession were presumed to have opened him upto the West. Even his marriage to a British-born woman with Western views on politics,women’s rights, and other issues is widely interpreted as an indication of his reformist leanings.Various statements he himself had made, including remarks in his inaugural addressregarding democratic thinking and tolerance of political differences, fed expectations thathe would promote political reform and liberalization.Bashar contributed to this impression by a number of steps he took upon his ascendanceto power that seemed to show his awareness of the expectations of the Syrian public anddesire to meet those expectations. These included freeing political prisoners who had beenheld for years without due process of law, permitting Syrians who had left the country toreturn, a bid to draw wealthy expatriates, and liberalizing access to foreign media (particularlythrough satellite dishes). Realizing that the rampant corruption within the regime was