Commentary on the Beginning of Damascius' De Primis Principiis

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8ἀμερές). Thus nothing is missing, neither from the πολλά, nor from the One; whichmanifests the fundamental difference in the relationship between the One and theMany on the one hand, and the beginning and that of w hich it is the beginning, orthe summit and that of which it is the summit on the other. In effect D. protestsagainst being misled in the correct understanding of the abstract metaphysicalrelationships involved here by undue concern with certain less abstract models.But why, it may be asked, is it as it is said to be in 2.22-25? The answer isgiven without development in 2.25-3.5, and is of the outmost philosophicalimportance, being also uniquely, in a certain sense, characteristic of the Damasciansystem.A fuller analysis of the answer must await a more appropriate place, when weare at the interior of D.’s theory for good. But we can introduce here the future fullerdiscussion as follows.It was noted above that it is extremely difficult to derive reality, as opposedto show its presuppositions; we can now perhaps get an indication of where exactlythe difficulty lies. Suppose a reality B which metaphysically presupposes A; andsuppose that every other reality presupposed by B (if there is such an one) is alsopresupposed by A [14]. How can now B be derived from A (as it should, dependenceand presupposition being according to our explanation but the other side ofderivation)? B presupposes A, and this means that B (and B-things) could not bepresent in the Universe of Reality, if A was absent from it; but obviously thecharacter of B is not identically the same with that of A; and so how did it happenthat B came to be present, given that A was? We agreed, there is no possibility offoreign, extraneous influence, no possibility of analyzing B as A modified in a certainway M and then explaining that modification as proceeding from a source distinctfrom A. The modification must, if at all, proceed from A; but then it must be in A inone way or another; it could not be created ex nihilo; and so, B itself, whose peculiarcharacter (ἰδιότης) consists in that modification (since it is this modification which, exhypothesi, differentiates B from A), - B itself must be somehow included in A.We conclude from the above schematic development that nothing appearssuddenly at any place in the Chain of Reality. In order to present itself at any place,it must be already in its superior.
9But then what is the distinctive character ( ἰδιότης) of B vis- à-vis A? It is themode in which B “has” (or rather “is”) what is already in A under a different mode.But granted this, the mode under which everything present in A is in B isdifferent from the mode under which the same is in A, since the ἰδιότης of B is not,ex hypothesi that of A. And the exasperatingly difficult question of derivation presentsitself in a new, and connected, form: for how did the mode characterizing B comeabout to be present in reality as a reality given the mode characterizing A?If to this question we reply by positing not only (the content of) B, but thespecific mode B itself in A, we only begin an infinite regress. Another answer should,therefore, be sought.It is premature, as we said, to pursue further these questions which lie right inthe metaphysical heart of Neoplatonism. But enough has been said, in order toappreciate D.’s point in the passage in question. The One can be the source of πάντα(πάντα ἀπ᾿ αὐτοῦ 3.3), just because it itself is πάντα before πάντα.Thus, for D., the One is not just and only one; it is πάντα; it must be πάντα inorder to be able to “generate” πάντα. And so we meet here with a major modificationof Neoplatonic doctrine, the full significance of which will become apparent later [15].2.19. ἐξεφάνη: ἐκφαίνεσθαι is regularly used by Neoplatonists to signify firstappearance or presence in reality of a certain character, in most cases in connectionwith the question: where did X first appeared in the Chain of Reality = which is theprecise location of the X-reality in the ordered derivation of all reality from theUltimate Principle down to the thre shold to unreality. Cf. the orphic use of the termand the orphic Phanes.3.1. Σπεύσιππος. Here we have a good opportunity of showing, in a specificcase, how near the Neoplatonic speculations were (in respect to the kind of problemsfaced, and in the spirit of the answers given, as well as in many details of thesolutions offered) to the controversies in the Old Academy.Speusippus distinguished the One, the Νοῦς (which was the God for himproperly speaking) and the Good [ 16]. In fact he was prone to multiply hypostases(= levels of being) and their principles; which makes Aristotle complain that in thisway no coherent view of the World can be made [17]. Contrary to Plato [18] andother Platonist s who found in the One the very nature of the Good, Speusippusseparated them [19]. In fact we are fortunately able to know the reason why h e did
Page 2 and 3: 2GENERAL REMARKThe first section is
Page 4 and 5: 4Four reasons are, in aporematic fa
Page 6 and 7: 6ὐθύς, i.e. without any prior
Page 10 and 11: 10separate them. Basically, as Aris
Page 12 and 13: 12produced by, it; the principle in
Page 14 and 15: 14the fashion of its one-ness, i.e.
Page 16 and 17: 16[36] it may be. Now the def inite
Page 18 and 19: 18found, and (there found) in accor
Page 20 and 21: 20in its elf (apart from the orderi
Page 22 and 23: 22something whose immediate product
Page 24 and 25: 24clearer, as the system is further
Page 26 and 27: 26ἡνωμένον, which generate
Page 28 and 29: 28We find in this here a good insta
Page 30 and 31: 30fully see his point, and to take,
Page 32 and 33: 32NOTES[1] Not quite “given” th
Page 34 and 35: 34forget that, for the time being,
Page 36 and 37: 36[28] The interpretation given to
Page 38 and 39: 38[39] It can be shown that there c
Page 40 and 41: 40being immersed in it, handling it

Commentary on the Beginning of Damascius' De Primis Principiis

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