10.07.2015 Views

Commentary on the Beginning of Damascius' De Primis Principiis

Commentary on the Beginning of Damascius' De Primis Principiis

Commentary on the Beginning of Damascius' De Primis Principiis

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

38[39] It can be shown that <strong>the</strong>re cannot be more than <strong>on</strong>e absolutely simplereality. For if <strong>the</strong>re were, <strong>the</strong>y would have to be totally and absolutely unc<strong>on</strong>nected .For if <strong>the</strong>y entertained any communi<strong>on</strong> at all, if <strong>the</strong>y had anything in comm<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong>nthat would be isolabl e as a moment in <strong>the</strong>ir natures, since it could not exhaust <strong>the</strong>entirety <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir nature, o<strong>the</strong>rwise <strong>the</strong>y would coalesce into <strong>on</strong>e and <strong>the</strong> same entityand <strong>the</strong>y could not be more than <strong>on</strong>e. But <strong>the</strong>n, with an identifiable comp<strong>on</strong>ent in<strong>the</strong>ir nature, <strong>the</strong>y could be no more absolutely simple. And for <strong>the</strong> absurdity <strong>of</strong>c<strong>on</strong>ceiving <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m as entirely disc<strong>on</strong>nected, see following note. Far<strong>the</strong>r, arguing aposteriori, it can be shown that <strong>the</strong>re is just <strong>on</strong>e absolutely simple reality, <strong>the</strong> One.[40] If reality is going to have even <strong>the</strong> weakest and minimal coherence andc<strong>on</strong>nectedness, if realities are going to entertain some sort <strong>of</strong> communi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong>e withano<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> Ultimate Principle must be <strong>on</strong>e single reality; o<strong>the</strong>rwise we wouldbe able to c<strong>on</strong>ceive <strong>of</strong> two (or more) absolute ly desevered and totally unc<strong>on</strong>nectedUniverses – not merely spatially separated (like, say, Epicurean Worlds) or temporallydistinct (like, say, Stoic Worlds), but with absolutely no comm<strong>on</strong> feature, let it beabstract (like “being”, or “<strong>on</strong>e”, or “identical”) whatsoever.This view is indicated by Proclus, in Theologia Plat<strong>on</strong>ica II 2 p. 15.10-14and sqq. ed. Westerink and Saffrey. And see, <strong>on</strong> this subject in general <strong>the</strong> three firstchapters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sec<strong>on</strong>d book <strong>of</strong> that work.For Proclus <strong>the</strong>re is ano<strong>the</strong>r, less abstract, line <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> M<strong>on</strong>ism, c<strong>on</strong>sisting,mainly, in our actually seeing that anything whatsoever, being or n<strong>on</strong>-being inwhatever way and mode, does have in fact something in comm<strong>on</strong> with anythingelse – namely that i t is <strong>on</strong>e. This is what is presupposed in particular in <strong>the</strong>development in Ch. 3 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> menti<strong>on</strong>ed sec<strong>on</strong>d book.[41] V. e.g. 4.14. But v. 71.23 where <strong>the</strong> παντελὴς ἀδιάκριτος αἰτία is <strong>the</strong> One.[42] Not really “something”, as we shall see![43] It is <strong>on</strong>e <strong>of</strong> t he pr<strong>of</strong>oundest thoughts in Metaphysics, and it is D. ’s own,that in a certain sense, yes, <strong>the</strong>re must be an absolute Nothing at <strong>the</strong> absolutecommencement <strong>of</strong> Reality, as <strong>the</strong>re is at its end. See what is so<strong>on</strong> to follow.[44] In catachrestic use.[45] This is <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> διὰ τὸ κύκλῳ 5.10. The force <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> argument relies<strong>on</strong> our keeping in mind that we have to do with undifferentiated πολλά qua πολλά;so if <strong>the</strong>y can be cause <strong>of</strong> <strong>on</strong>e ano<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong>re is no sufficient reas<strong>on</strong> that this would

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!