Commentary on the Beginning of Damascius' De Primis Principiis

35and scientific arguments proceeding from what is in itself prior ( πρότερον τῇ φύσει).In his writings both types of argumentation are intertwined continuously , althoughagain, they for the most part fall under his aporematic and s cientific treatment of theissues involved correspondingly . And arguments like the present one are intendedby him as nothing more than pieces of “dialectics” – always in his sense of the term.[24] Compare for instance the disparaging and just criticism that Syrianuslevels on such “dialectical” tricks (which dupe nobody, and least of all the all toosubtle thinking of a Neoplatonist) in his <strong>Commentary</strong> on B, M, and N of Metaphysics.(Γ is more positive and hence less affected by such “dialectical” fervor – at least in sofar as opposition to positions dear to a Platonist is concerned).[25] See esp. Fr. 34e Lang. Also Fr. 34a – and all the 34 ’s and 35’s Lang. It isof great importance that, according to the express testimony of Aristotle, at leastsome Pythagoreans were thinking along the same lines, which of course comes as nosurprise given the intimate relationship of the old Academy to PythagoreanPhilosophy. “Plato, the best Pythagorean” was considered as a commonplace inPlatonic tradition.[26] The already mentioned Fr. 34e Lang.[27] Perhaps, we may interpret « τι» adverbially. But this does not affect thephilosophical meaning of the sentence.Ross (<strong>Commentary</strong> to Aristotle’s Metaphysics, p. 489) unaccountably suggeststhat in moving from the proposi tion that the One is imperfect to the proposition thatit is not a being, “Aristotle draws a consequence of his own probably not drawn bySpeusippus”. This is a most extraordinary statement: at least he should, in conformitywith his suggestion, athetize t he « φησίν» in 1092a14! Aristotle begins his answerwith: εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα etc. in 1092a15.But perhaps Ross’ strange notion is the desperate child of discomfort at whathe thinks is entailed by μηδὲ ὄν τι. Because he (loc. cit.) takes this as “(the One ) isnot”. If so, we have here but one more of the innumerable instances wheremisunderstanding of « ὄν» leads modern thinkers to awkward solutions. This is notthe place to explicate the ancient metaphysical notion of being; but let it be said thatwhen Plato, even in his published works, made the Good beyond οὐσία and εἶναι, hedid not presumably wished to maintain that the absolutely First Principle is nonexistent,in the sense of unreal, totally absent from Reality, Nothing.