Commentary on the Beginning of Damascius' De Primis Principiis
Commentary on the Beginning of Damascius' De Primis Principiis Commentary on the Beginning of Damascius' De Primis Principiis
30fully see his point, and to take, through the negation of the One itself, the ultimatestep towards the Ultimate.7.18-19. Only the posited, can be raised. Only the affirmed at a stage, can benegated at another. Thus D. after saying that Plato expects us to arrive at someintimation of the absolute Ultimate by the negation, the raising of the last realitywhich our strained efforts can after proper c onceptual purification attain to in anobscure way, i.e. by the cancellation of the One, he subtly remarks that even the Onerepresents an ontological affirmation, a certain “position” or “positedness” whichreflects its presence in reality, however this a ll-comprehending presence is to bedistinguished from the “rude” positedness or presence of every determinate in itslimitation as subordinate reality (something or other among the πάντα).Θέσις in D., when technically used, bears this sense of position or presence inreality.The reference is to Sophistes, 245b: πεπονθός τε γὰρ τὸ ὂν ἓν εἶναί πως οὐταὐτὸν ὂν τῷ ἑνὶ φαίνεται. But consult the entire development 242c-245e, theoffshoot of which is precisely to show that we must distinguish τὸ ἓν from τὸ ὄν, andthat the ὄν is one not by being the One, but by “suffering” (πάσχον) the action, as itwere, of the One – in this sense being dependent, and thus “inferior”, to the One,which in its turn need not such supporting influence from the ὄν in order to subsi st(= be present in reality).D. correctly understands the real meaning of Plato ’s argument there [61].Otiose as such a claim may sound amidst the prejudices of the modern age, it can besupported, but without going into the details of thehabitually stra ngelymisunderstood Platonic Theory of Participation. Countless cases like this, relate thesame story: modern scholarship as a result of a complete alienation from the truespirit of late (at least) Hellenism, more often than not blinkers even in itsunderstanding of Classical Greece.7.19-8.5. According to D. ’s interpretation, Plato is not speaking in theParmenides at all about the Ultimate Ground; he reverently stopped at the πρόθυραof the ἄδυτον, i.e. by the One.8.3. παρακινδυνευτικώτατος ὁ λόγος: cf. Sophistes, 245 b: φέρε δή, τίναἀρχήν τις ἄν ἄρξαιτο παρακινδυνευτικοῦ λόγου; This was said just at the beginningof the development, whose conclusion was referred to by D. above.
318.3. ἐκπίπτων εἰς ἰδιώτιδας ἀκοάς: sublime truths are only for the initiated, notfor the laity, as it were, for the πολλοί. Any doctrine passing the ordinary capability ofordinary men ’s understanding is certain to be laughed at by the multitude. Thisprofound triviality is explicitly stated by Plato in his Second Epistle: 314a1 -c6. Cf.also: op.cit. 312d7: φραστέον δή σοι δι᾿ αἰνιγμῶν, ἵν᾿ ἄν τι ἡ δέλτος ἢ πόντου ἢ γῆςἐν πτυχαῖς πάθῃ, ὁ ἀναγνοὺς μὴ γνῷ [62].This characteristically Platonic view, which is echoed and reflected with greateror lesser explicitness in numerous pass ages in the Platonic corpus, and which isfurther borne by the momentous fact of Plato ’s professing views (according to theexplicit testimony of, of all philosophers, Aristotle) which are never explicitlyformulated and articulated by him in his edited wo rks, is of course very near theheart and mind of every Neoplatonist, such as D.8.4. καὶ τὸν περὶ τοῦ μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς ὄντος (sc. λόγον) ἀνακινήσας: (sc. ὁΠλάτων): D. refers again to a passage in the Sophist [63], namely to thedevelopment 237a sqq., that is to the ἀπορία and argument about the μὴ ὄν which ismade by Plato to precede that about the ὄν (both ἁπορίαι being connected by him, v.243b-c).8.4. περιετράπη (sc. ὁ Πλάτων): Plato himself emphasizes the περιτροπήsuffered by his argument. V. 238d-239c: in saying that the μὴ ὄν is ἀδιανόητόν τε καὶἄρρητον καὶ ἄφθεγκτον καὶ ἄλογον, not a being ( ὄν) and not a something ( τι) – insaying these one affirms that the μὴ ὄν is something and is said after all, and issomehow conceived (i.e. as inconceivable) etc.D. faces a similar περιτροπή, but with reference to the μηδέν which transcendseven the maximum, the One – not in connection with that which fails to be even theminimum, i.e. an one, some-one-thing (cf. 6.22-26).8.5. εἰς τὸν τῆς ἀνομοιότητος πόντον, cf. Plato Politicus, 273d sqq.: διὸ δὴκαὶ τότ᾿ ἤδη θεὸς ὁ κοσμήσας αὐτὸν (sc. τὸν Κόσμον), καθορῶν ἐν ἀπορίαις ὄντα,κηδόμενος ἵνα μὴ χειμασθεὶς ὑπὸ ταραχῆς διαλυθεὶς εἰς τὸν τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἄπειρονὄντα πόντον δύῃ, … etc. The ἄπειρος πόντος τῆς ἀνομοιότητος is, of course, thereceptacle, ὑποδοχή – matter as space in its intrinsic disordered state, with order andform being imposed by the Demiurg, in the shaping of the Κόσμος.
- Page 2 and 3: 2GENERAL REMARKThe first section is
- Page 4 and 5: 4Four reasons are, in aporematic fa
- Page 6 and 7: 6ὐθύς, i.e. without any prior
- Page 8 and 9: 8ἀμερές). Thus nothing is mi
- Page 10 and 11: 10separate them. Basically, as Aris
- Page 12 and 13: 12produced by, it; the principle in
- Page 14 and 15: 14the fashion of its one-ness, i.e.
- Page 16 and 17: 16[36] it may be. Now the def inite
- Page 18 and 19: 18found, and (there found) in accor
- Page 20 and 21: 20in its elf (apart from the orderi
- Page 22 and 23: 22something whose immediate product
- Page 24 and 25: 24clearer, as the system is further
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318.3. ἐκπίπτων εἰς ἰδιώτιδας ἀκοάς: sublime truths are <strong>on</strong>ly for <strong>the</strong> initiated, notfor <strong>the</strong> laity, as it were, for <strong>the</strong> πολλοί. Any doctrine passing <strong>the</strong> ordinary capability <strong>of</strong>ordinary men ’s understanding is certain to be laughed at by <strong>the</strong> multitude. Thispr<strong>of</strong>ound triviality is explicitly stated by Plato in his Sec<strong>on</strong>d Epistle: 314a1 -c6. Cf.also: op.cit. 312d7: φραστέον δή σοι δι᾿ αἰνιγμῶν, ἵν᾿ ἄν τι ἡ δέλτος ἢ πόντου ἢ γῆςἐν πτυχαῖς πάθῃ, ὁ ἀναγνοὺς μὴ γνῷ [62].This characteristically Plat<strong>on</strong>ic view, which is echoed and reflected with greateror lesser explicitness in numerous pass ages in <strong>the</strong> Plat<strong>on</strong>ic corpus, and which isfur<strong>the</strong>r borne by <strong>the</strong> momentous fact <strong>of</strong> Plato ’s pr<strong>of</strong>essing views (according to <strong>the</strong>explicit testim<strong>on</strong>y <strong>of</strong>, <strong>of</strong> all philosophers, Aristotle) which are never explicitlyformulated and articulated by him in his edited wo rks, is <strong>of</strong> course very near <strong>the</strong>heart and mind <strong>of</strong> every Neoplat<strong>on</strong>ist, such as D.8.4. καὶ τὸν περὶ τοῦ μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς ὄντος (sc. λόγον) ἀνακινήσας: (sc. ὁΠλάτων): D. refers again to a passage in <strong>the</strong> Sophist [63], namely to <strong>the</strong>development 237a sqq., that is to <strong>the</strong> ἀπορία and argument about <strong>the</strong> μὴ ὄν which ismade by Plato to precede that about <strong>the</strong> ὄν (both ἁπορίαι being c<strong>on</strong>nected by him, v.243b-c).8.4. περιετράπη (sc. ὁ Πλάτων): Plato himself emphasizes <strong>the</strong> περιτροπήsuffered by his argument. V. 238d-239c: in saying that <strong>the</strong> μὴ ὄν is ἀδιανόητόν τε καὶἄρρητον καὶ ἄφθεγκτον καὶ ἄλογον, not a being ( ὄν) and not a something ( τι) – insaying <strong>the</strong>se <strong>on</strong>e affirms that <strong>the</strong> μὴ ὄν is something and is said after all, and issomehow c<strong>on</strong>ceived (i.e. as inc<strong>on</strong>ceivable) etc.D. faces a similar περιτροπή, but with reference to <strong>the</strong> μηδέν which transcendseven <strong>the</strong> maximum, <strong>the</strong> One – not in c<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong> with that which fails to be even <strong>the</strong>minimum, i.e. an <strong>on</strong>e, some-<strong>on</strong>e-thing (cf. 6.22-26).8.5. εἰς τὸν τῆς ἀνομοιότητος πόντον, cf. Plato Politicus, 273d sqq.: διὸ δὴκαὶ τότ᾿ ἤδη θεὸς ὁ κοσμήσας αὐτὸν (sc. τὸν Κόσμον), καθορῶν ἐν ἀπορίαις ὄντα,κηδόμενος ἵνα μὴ χειμασθεὶς ὑπὸ ταραχῆς διαλυθεὶς εἰς τὸν τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἄπειρονὄντα πόντον δύῃ, … etc. The ἄπειρος πόντος τῆς ἀνομοιότητος is, <strong>of</strong> course, <strong>the</strong>receptacle, ὑποδοχή – matter as space in its intrinsic disordered state, with order andform being imposed by <strong>the</strong> <strong>De</strong>miurg, in <strong>the</strong> shaping <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Κόσμος.
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