Commentary on the Beginning of Damascius' De Primis Principiis

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28We find in this here a good instance of the importance and reasonedoriginality of D. in the context of Greek Metaphysics.6.18-19. We argued above for the intrinsic connectedness betweenἁπλούστατον and περιεκτικώτατον, of the most-simple, and the most-comprehensive.6.20-21. Well rendered by Chaignet (p. 11): “…puisque, m ême dans leschoses d’ ici-bas, ce qui, en s ’ élevant en haut, échappe toujours à nos pens ées estplus digne de notre vénération…”.6.22-23. The absolutely ultimate ground, so construed, dangerouslyapproaches the absolute Nothing. And there is an important connection between thetwo, as we shall soon see.6.26. ὥς φησι καὶ Πλάτων: Sophist, 238C.7.2. ὁμοίως: i.e. not in their orderly structure according to the prior andposterior. The ineffable principle does not produce the various realities as occupyingtheir definite positions in the structured system of reality; for if it were so, thatprinciple would have to produce first [57] this and then that, in which case it wouldinvolve and pre-contain the universal order of reality, and also in that case thepreviously produced would be nearer to it than the subsequently produced. But theineffable principle is absolutely beyond the real and its order, and a fortiori has nodefinite location in the chain of Reality, not even at its beginning (where the Onereigns s upreme); it rather engulfs the chain indiscriminately. More of this in thesequel.7.3. περιτρέπεσθαι [58] has a special force in D. as we shall often haveoccasion to notice. It means that in ascribing an attribute to something weviolate that very notion of it which the attribution was meant to convey . Itis precisely this predicament which occasions the long development beginning at9.11. For instance if we call the Ultimate Ground ineffable or unknowable in order toexpress its inconceivability, then we eo ipso assert its conceivability as inco nceivable.There is much more to this trouble than the dialectical quibble which prima facieappears to be, as we shall se in commenting on 9.11 sqq.7.6. ἀδύτου. The idea of the ineffable principle as the sacred sanctuary of theuniversal Temple of Reality is crucial to our correct understanding of it.7.7-8. Neoplatonic metaphysics and theology is not for the πολλοί.
29*7.9-9.10. The Ultimate Ground was found to be ineffable and inconceivable.But our anguish in trying to grasp, in however enfeebled a way, the One lead s in thesame result; our attempts are like birth-pangs without birth; they suffer περιτροπή(as it was explained above): the One must also be ineffabl e – and th is is supportedby highest authority.But if so, in positing a reality higher than that of the One are we positingsomething beyond the ineffable which the One is? Are we not mistakenly striving fora squared so to speak ineffability?D. counters this objection by 1) interpreting the Parmenides passage(brought forward as evidence for the objection) in a way consonant with his view(7.15-8.17); and 2) explaining that the inconceivability and ineffability of the ultimateground is absolute, whereas that of the One is in a certain (very important, ofcourse) sense. This second contention naturally leads to the long developmentbeginning on 9.11 about the precise sense of the absolute unknowability of theUltimate.7.11. Parmenides 141e- 142a. Rightly Chaignet (p. 12, n. 4) corrects R. ’sabsurd reference to Parm. 160b.7.15-18. D. ’s interpretation of Parm., differs in many respects from theNeoplatonic Orthodoxy finally formulated and established by Proclus [59]. One suchdifference, affecting the overa ll scheme and setting D. quite apart from all hispredecessors [60], is D. ’s contention that the first Parmenidean Hypothesis does notrelate to the absolutely primal principle, but only to the One. In a sense D. agreeswith all his predecessors; but this agreement, seen in the context of his positing aPrinciple superior to the One, turns to be substantial disagreement.We shall come back again to this point in commenting on 37.26 sqq. below.But we reserve the detailed comparative treatment of the main Ne oplatonic answersto the question about the highest Principles (those above Being) for the third sectionof this work.According to D., Plato wishes us (without explicitly stating it) to apply hisprocedure for arriving at the One, in order to transcend th e One itself. By thenegation of every definite determinate reality he led us to the One; he expcects us to
Page 2 and 3: 2GENERAL REMARKThe first section is
Page 4 and 5: 4Four reasons are, in aporematic fa
Page 6 and 7: 6ὐθύς, i.e. without any prior
Page 8 and 9: 8ἀμερές). Thus nothing is mi
Page 10 and 11: 10separate them. Basically, as Aris
Page 12 and 13: 12produced by, it; the principle in
Page 14 and 15: 14the fashion of its one-ness, i.e.
Page 16 and 17: 16[36] it may be. Now the def inite
Page 18 and 19: 18found, and (there found) in accor
Page 20 and 21: 20in its elf (apart from the orderi
Page 22 and 23: 22something whose immediate product
Page 24 and 25: 24clearer, as the system is further
Page 26 and 27: 26ἡνωμένον, which generate
Page 30 and 31: 30fully see his point, and to take,
Page 32 and 33: 32NOTES[1] Not quite “given” th
Page 34 and 35: 34forget that, for the time being,
Page 36 and 37: 36[28] The interpretation given to
Page 38 and 39: 38[39] It can be shown that there c
Page 40 and 41: 40being immersed in it, handling it

Commentary on the Beginning of Damascius' De Primis Principiis

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