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Commentary on the Beginning of Damascius' De Primis Principiis

Commentary on the Beginning of Damascius' De Primis Principiis

Commentary on the Beginning of Damascius' De Primis Principiis

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27is <strong>the</strong>re at all an One to begin with?” totally devoid <strong>of</strong> meaning? To be sure, if whatis immediately given to us (say, this sensible World) subsists in <strong>on</strong>e way or o<strong>the</strong>r,and if its subsistence and nature ultimately presuppose <strong>the</strong> subsistence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> One,<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> One must subsist; fur<strong>the</strong>r, if everything presupposes <strong>the</strong> One, while <strong>the</strong>One presupposes nothing else (nothing which we can form some sort <strong>of</strong> c <strong>on</strong>cepti<strong>on</strong><strong>of</strong>), <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> One must be given as <strong>the</strong> fountainhead <strong>of</strong> all reality, as <strong>the</strong> beginningand <strong>the</strong> first link in <strong>the</strong> chain <strong>of</strong> reality. But why should <strong>the</strong>re be a sensible World atall? Why <strong>the</strong>re should be anything at all to begin with? True, if anything exists, <strong>the</strong>One must subsist as <strong>the</strong> firstly given reality. But this does not answer <strong>the</strong> questi<strong>on</strong>“Why and whence and How does <strong>the</strong> One subsist?” We, as Neoplat<strong>on</strong>ists, do notdoubt <strong>of</strong> its subsistence. But Reas<strong>on</strong> demands an explanati<strong>on</strong> for it.When we have thus clearly seen that to ask for an <strong>on</strong>tological explanati<strong>on</strong> <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> subsistence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> One is not to doubt its subsistence; and when we have alsoproperly understood <strong>the</strong> associated point that such a demand for <strong>the</strong> One ’spresuppositi<strong>on</strong> and derivati<strong>on</strong> cannot possibly be answered by an appeal in <strong>the</strong>certain existence <strong>of</strong> its products and effects (since this settles <strong>the</strong> questi<strong>on</strong> about <strong>the</strong>real subsistence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> One, and not that about <strong>the</strong> “Reas<strong>on</strong>” or ground for itssubsistence); <strong>the</strong>n we also see that <strong>the</strong> One is not <strong>the</strong> painfully sought after ultimatedatum. Reas<strong>on</strong> compels us to proceed fur<strong>the</strong>r.But to proceed fur<strong>the</strong>r whereto? We assumed that every c<strong>on</strong>ceivable realitydepends <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> One, without <strong>the</strong> One depending in any <strong>on</strong>e <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m. Therefore noc<strong>on</strong>ceivable realit y can in any way whatsoever provide <strong>the</strong> explanati<strong>on</strong> for <strong>the</strong>subsistence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> One. But “something”, as we have argued, must account for thatsubsistence. From which two propositi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>the</strong>re necessarily and rati<strong>on</strong>alisticallyfollow, that <strong>the</strong> ultimate ground and <strong>on</strong>tological explanati<strong>on</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> One and <strong>of</strong>everything c<strong>on</strong>ceivable is “Something” absolutely inc<strong>on</strong>ceivable; and since everyc<strong>on</strong>ceivable derivati<strong>on</strong> leads back to <strong>the</strong> One, <strong>the</strong> producti<strong>on</strong> <strong>of</strong> everything from thatinc<strong>on</strong>ceivable reality must also be inc<strong>on</strong>ceiva ble. Hence <strong>the</strong> most significantstatement, 6.26-7.2: “And if we inquire about a “use” for that ultimate groundinc<strong>on</strong>ceivable, <strong>the</strong>n this is <strong>the</strong> all-necessary “use”: that everything must proceed from<strong>the</strong>nce as if from a sanctuary, from <strong>the</strong> Ineffable in an ineffable way” etc. εἰ δὲ χρεἰαναὐτοῦ τινα ἐπιζητοῦμεν, αὔτη ἐστὶν ἡ πάντων ἀναγκαιοτάτη χρεία, τὸ ἐκεῖθεν, ὥσπερἐξ ἀδύτου, πάντα προιέναι, ἔκ τε ἀπορρήτου καὶ τὸν ἀπόρρητον τρόπον.

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