26ἡνωμένον, which generates <strong>the</strong> divided, disting uished realities ( διακεκριμένα) whichfollow fur<strong>the</strong>r below in <strong>the</strong>ir orderly devolvement from <strong>the</strong> unitedness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ἡνωμένον [56].C. 6.17-7.8. The One is reached by a last strained effort <strong>of</strong> our c<strong>on</strong>ceptualpowers, by <strong>the</strong> utmost thorough purificati<strong>on</strong> <strong>of</strong> our “suspecting” or divining, ra<strong>the</strong>rthan properly intellectually c<strong>on</strong>ceiving, powers. But <strong>the</strong> absolutely ultimate Groundmust be absolutely unreachable, incomprehensible by any <strong>of</strong> our divining orc<strong>on</strong>ceiving faculties. From such absolutely ineffable principle everything must beineffably produced.We may ask “Why?” is that. More than that, we are entitled to ask “why?” inaccordance with Neoplat<strong>on</strong>ic Principles. For if I am right in c<strong>on</strong>str uing Neoplat<strong>on</strong>ism(and especially A<strong>the</strong>nian Neoplat<strong>on</strong>ism) as a methodologic ally Absolute Rati<strong>on</strong>alism(indeed as <strong>the</strong> unique system in <strong>the</strong> History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> World determinedly pushing to <strong>the</strong>very last c<strong>on</strong>sequences what is implied by such Rati<strong>on</strong>alism), <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>re must be,according to Neoplat<strong>on</strong>ism, an adequate and sufficient reas<strong>on</strong> for everythingincluding that which transcends in absolutely all ways Reas<strong>on</strong>.The answer to our legitimate questi<strong>on</strong>, is <strong>the</strong>n this. We ascend from <strong>the</strong>already given or reached to its presuppositi<strong>on</strong>, from <strong>the</strong> derivative to its principle,from <strong>the</strong> sec<strong>on</strong>dary to <strong>the</strong> primary, from <strong>the</strong> effect to its metaphysical cause. And werepeat <strong>the</strong> process again and again, to <strong>the</strong> extent that Reas<strong>on</strong> necessitates us to doso. And Reas<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>strains us to do so in all cases where <strong>the</strong> presupposed cannot betaken as <strong>the</strong> ultimate Datum, as not itself requiring a presuppositi<strong>on</strong>, as not standingin need <strong>of</strong> a fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>on</strong>tological explanati<strong>on</strong> <strong>of</strong> its presence in <strong>the</strong> Universal Reality.We can <strong>on</strong>ly stop , we are rati<strong>on</strong>alistically entitled to suspend fur<strong>the</strong>r movement,when we have ascended to so mething, in which Reas<strong>on</strong> acknowledges <strong>the</strong> Plat<strong>on</strong>icἀνυπόθετον.Retracing <strong>the</strong>n thus <strong>the</strong> derivati<strong>on</strong>-chain upwards we reach at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>the</strong>One. This is presupposed (in a structured and orderly way) by everything else whichwe can in whatever direct or devious way c<strong>on</strong>ceive. But does it presuppose in its turnsomething else? Or have we come to <strong>the</strong> rock bottom <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Universe, <strong>the</strong> ultimatefoundati<strong>on</strong> <strong>of</strong> all reality, <strong>the</strong> absolutely unpresupposing reality?To answer this crucial questi<strong>on</strong> let it be asked: Is <strong>the</strong> One “given” in reality insuch a way as to require no explanati<strong>on</strong> <strong>of</strong> its presence <strong>the</strong>re? Is <strong>the</strong> questi<strong>on</strong> “Why
27is <strong>the</strong>re at all an One to begin with?” totally devoid <strong>of</strong> meaning? To be sure, if whatis immediately given to us (say, this sensible World) subsists in <strong>on</strong>e way or o<strong>the</strong>r,and if its subsistence and nature ultimately presuppose <strong>the</strong> subsistence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> One,<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> One must subsist; fur<strong>the</strong>r, if everything presupposes <strong>the</strong> One, while <strong>the</strong>One presupposes nothing else (nothing which we can form some sort <strong>of</strong> c <strong>on</strong>cepti<strong>on</strong><strong>of</strong>), <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> One must be given as <strong>the</strong> fountainhead <strong>of</strong> all reality, as <strong>the</strong> beginningand <strong>the</strong> first link in <strong>the</strong> chain <strong>of</strong> reality. But why should <strong>the</strong>re be a sensible World atall? Why <strong>the</strong>re should be anything at all to begin with? True, if anything exists, <strong>the</strong>One must subsist as <strong>the</strong> firstly given reality. But this does not answer <strong>the</strong> questi<strong>on</strong>“Why and whence and How does <strong>the</strong> One subsist?” We, as Neoplat<strong>on</strong>ists, do notdoubt <strong>of</strong> its subsistence. But Reas<strong>on</strong> demands an explanati<strong>on</strong> for it.When we have thus clearly seen that to ask for an <strong>on</strong>tological explanati<strong>on</strong> <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> subsistence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> One is not to doubt its subsistence; and when we have alsoproperly understood <strong>the</strong> associated point that such a demand for <strong>the</strong> One ’spresuppositi<strong>on</strong> and derivati<strong>on</strong> cannot possibly be answered by an appeal in <strong>the</strong>certain existence <strong>of</strong> its products and effects (since this settles <strong>the</strong> questi<strong>on</strong> about <strong>the</strong>real subsistence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> One, and not that about <strong>the</strong> “Reas<strong>on</strong>” or ground for itssubsistence); <strong>the</strong>n we also see that <strong>the</strong> One is not <strong>the</strong> painfully sought after ultimatedatum. Reas<strong>on</strong> compels us to proceed fur<strong>the</strong>r.But to proceed fur<strong>the</strong>r whereto? We assumed that every c<strong>on</strong>ceivable realitydepends <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> One, without <strong>the</strong> One depending in any <strong>on</strong>e <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m. Therefore noc<strong>on</strong>ceivable realit y can in any way whatsoever provide <strong>the</strong> explanati<strong>on</strong> for <strong>the</strong>subsistence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> One. But “something”, as we have argued, must account for thatsubsistence. From which two propositi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>the</strong>re necessarily and rati<strong>on</strong>alisticallyfollow, that <strong>the</strong> ultimate ground and <strong>on</strong>tological explanati<strong>on</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> One and <strong>of</strong>everything c<strong>on</strong>ceivable is “Something” absolutely inc<strong>on</strong>ceivable; and since everyc<strong>on</strong>ceivable derivati<strong>on</strong> leads back to <strong>the</strong> One, <strong>the</strong> producti<strong>on</strong> <strong>of</strong> everything from thatinc<strong>on</strong>ceivable reality must also be inc<strong>on</strong>ceiva ble. Hence <strong>the</strong> most significantstatement, 6.26-7.2: “And if we inquire about a “use” for that ultimate groundinc<strong>on</strong>ceivable, <strong>the</strong>n this is <strong>the</strong> all-necessary “use”: that everything must proceed from<strong>the</strong>nce as if from a sanctuary, from <strong>the</strong> Ineffable in an ineffable way” etc. εἰ δὲ χρεἰαναὐτοῦ τινα ἐπιζητοῦμεν, αὔτη ἐστὶν ἡ πάντων ἀναγκαιοτάτη χρεία, τὸ ἐκεῖθεν, ὥσπερἐξ ἀδύτου, πάντα προιέναι, ἔκ τε ἀπορρήτου καὶ τὸν ἀπόρρητον τρόπον.
- Page 2 and 3: 2GENERAL REMARKThe first section is
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- Page 14 and 15: 14the fashion of its one-ness, i.e.
- Page 16 and 17: 16[36] it may be. Now the def inite
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