Commentary on the Beginning of Damascius' De Primis Principiis

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20in its elf (apart from the ordering influence of the One functioning as regulatingprinciple) is not some-one-thing ex hypothesi.Proof of the second point: they can not be many causes (of themselves). Forsince in their pristine, uncontaminated condition they a re totally un-coordinated (achaotic mess – if one can speak even of a chaotic mess), it is not possible that“anyone” [44] of them can be a cause of any other; and the same is proven by theconsideration that were it so, we would end by making “one and th e same” itemsimultaneously cause and effect in the same respect [45]. So, if at all, each onewould be cause of itself. But their multiplicity as such would still remain uncaused;and we were investigating about the cause of πολλὰ, qua πολλά.So that cause is neither the Μηδέν, nor the Πολλά. It has, therefore, to be theOne.This exactly was the procedure – urges the objector. From which it is clearlyseen that there is no need of anything else than the One, as cause of the πολλά (Ἅλφου γὰρ οὐδενός… ἢ τοῦ ἑνὸς 5.6); therefore only the One is cause above theπολλά – and nothing else ( διὸ μόνον τὸ ἓν αἴτιον τῶν πολλῶν 5.6-7); in fact thiswas the reason for which we at all posited the One as αἴτιον to begin with, these arethe only and sole credentials for the sovereignty of the One ( διὸ καὶ τὸ ἕν πάντων αἴτιον, ὅτι τῶν πολλῶν αἴτιον δεῖ μόνον εἶναι τὸ ἕν 5.7-8). So what are the credentialsfor a principle beyond the One? What necessity necessitates us to posit such afurther principle [46].5.9. There is an anwkard textual situation here (see my textual note ad loc.).Perhaps we might read: ᾗ γὰρ ἀσύντακτα, [ καὶ] πῶς ἓν αἴτιον ἔσται τὰ πολλά; Orindeed: ἦ γὰρ ἀσύντακτα (for verily they (the πολλά) are un-coordinated), καὶ πῶςetc. Perhaps also, but I do not think it is likely, there is a lacuna here, to be suppliedso as to give the following sense, “The πολλά cannot be an ultimate cause; for eitherthey are coordinated or not; if the former, then there must be something which coordinatesthem, for in themselves they cannot generate order; if the second, how canthey be one αἴτιον, since they are totally and absolutely unconnected, so that thereis no sense in which they possess a unity of whatever kind or degree”.5.14-9.10. Here is D.’s reply to the objectio n urged above that the Onesuffices as an ultimate principle.
21He begins by acknowledging the force of the objection (5.17-18). He himselfputs in the mouth of the objector, what he evidently thinks is a strong point, namelythat if the One is the very limi t at which our conceiving powers (and these whenutterly strained for that matter) can reach, how can we entertain at all the notion ofsomething beyond the One. Obviously D. is far from Mysticism, in the modernEuropean sense of the term, he is a thorough Greek Rationalist. [47]The formulation in 5.17-20, leaves no doubt that the issue was deeply felt byD.: “We must begin with what is nearer to us and more graspable by our mind ( ἐκ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωριμωτέρων) [48], and building on this secure for our understa ndingfoundation, we must accustom ( ἀνεθιστέον) our mental unformulable travails, theanguish and pangs of a birth which cannot come to pass, to the ineffable awarenessor apprehension of that proud, sublime Truth” [49].5.19-20. οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως εἴπω qualifies the συναίσθησις: that sublime truth isnot the object of sensation, perception, imagination, reasoning, conception,intellection.There follow three arguments for the principle beyond the One: A. 5.20-6.7; B.6.8-17; C. 6.17-7.8.A. 5.20-6.7. For Neopla tonism, it takes power to possess uncontaminatedpurity; to be able to secure separate existence, to preserve one ’s own precious selfidentityapart and distinct from what is similar or dissimilar to itself, to keep clearfrom what other claims oneself as its own or from what else aspires to one andtherefore attempts to draw it down to fructify, as it were, the aspiring receptor, to becapable of “affirming” one ’s own nature so as to guard it unmolested fromextraneous mingling; untouched by foreign influences – these are marks of power, ofeminence, of value, of priority [50]. This is so everywhere, in this World and in thingstranscending this World, in men and in nature. Thus, in general, in each and everycase, before the related and co-ordinated lies t he relationless and un-coordinated,before that which in its own nature involves an ontological reference (be it strong orweak) to something else, there always lies that which, being disseve red fromanything else in the field examined, enjoys an unmolested, referenceless purity.But now this general metaphysical principle can be applied in two stages:firstly we recognize and posit by reason of it the principle or cause of any givenordered field as something over and above the field itself and its immanen t order, as
Page 2 and 3: 2GENERAL REMARKThe first section is
Page 4 and 5: 4Four reasons are, in aporematic fa
Page 6 and 7: 6ὐθύς, i.e. without any prior
Page 8 and 9: 8ἀμερές). Thus nothing is mi
Page 10 and 11: 10separate them. Basically, as Aris
Page 12 and 13: 12produced by, it; the principle in
Page 14 and 15: 14the fashion of its one-ness, i.e.
Page 16 and 17: 16[36] it may be. Now the def inite
Page 18 and 19: 18found, and (there found) in accor
Page 22 and 23: 22something whose immediate product
Page 24 and 25: 24clearer, as the system is further
Page 26 and 27: 26ἡνωμένον, which generate
Page 28 and 29: 28We find in this here a good insta
Page 30 and 31: 30fully see his point, and to take,
Page 32 and 33: 32NOTES[1] Not quite “given” th
Page 34 and 35: 34forget that, for the time being,
Page 36 and 37: 36[28] The interpretation given to
Page 38 and 39: 38[39] It can be shown that there c
Page 40 and 41: 40being immersed in it, handling it

Commentary on the Beginning of Damascius' De Primis Principiis

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