Commentary on the Beginning of Damascius' De Primis Principiis

19is in this section only subservient to the elucidation of that, and not carried on foritself.4.23. It is because the One is πάντα, that everything comes out from theOne, devolves from it, winds off from it.4.25-5.1. There is a nature of πολλὰ inherent in them, internally constitutingthem in their diverse multiplicity; and there is a nature of πολλά transcendent tothem, externally constituting (i.e. producing) them in their diverse multiplicity. Even τὰ πολλά, qua πολλά, have one certain nature ( and they “ are” or, better, is indeedone of the first principles, as we shall see); otherwise they could not subsist at all:the primal prerequisite for subsistence (i.e. presence in tot al reality) isoneness. (This should be connected with what we already said about thepresupposition and derivation order of reality).5.1-2. πᾶν and ὅλον are distinct from each other. But of this later, in itsappropriate place, where, descending in the s tructure of reality (i.e. following thederivation–order of reality) we shall meet them.*5.2-5.14. Here is the important protestation: if the One is such as (roughlyand preliminarily) was described above by D., why is it not the absolutely primalprinciple? What sense can we give to the claim and there is still “something” [42] elsebeyond (ἐπέκεινα) the One? Are we not proceeding in the void, having passed thebounds of reality (and sense) and merely indulging in conceptual hallucinations?The metaphysical ground of the protestation is this. What is neither the One,nor one, it is μηδέν, i.e. nothing. So are we posing the Nothing as the absolutely andultimately Primal Principle? [43] Besides, what is the necessity forcing the Reason toaccept such a principle beyond the One? We have as certain datum the Many . Weask for their cause or principle. Such a cause cannot be the Nothing – for Nothing canbeget nothing. Nor can it be that the πολλὰ are self- caused; for they cannotconstitute either a cause of themselves as such, or many causes of themselves assuch; from which it follows that they are no cause of themselves.Proof of the first point: qua πολλὰ, qua indeterminate multiplicity, they aredisordered, un-ordered (it is their proceeding from the One, that imposes on themsome form of co-ordination necessary for them in order to subsist even asπολλὰ); so in nowise can they be a cause of themselves; for multiplicity as such and