18found, and (<strong>the</strong>re found) in accordance with <strong>the</strong> One – as it befits <strong>the</strong> One”. Now thismight be possible; for instance <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>trast could be meant <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> One which is firstprinciple etc., and, <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> o ne hand, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Ineffable which is bey<strong>on</strong>d even <strong>the</strong>seh<strong>on</strong>ours, and <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand <strong>of</strong> anything that follows <strong>the</strong> One which maybe has<strong>the</strong>se or similar features, but in an inferior way and degree. But <strong>the</strong> presence <strong>of</strong> καὶπάντα τὰ ἄλλα makes this interpretati<strong>on</strong> unacceptably strained.I have adopted in <strong>the</strong> text <strong>the</strong> simple expedient <strong>of</strong> a<strong>the</strong>tizing καὶ (perhaps <strong>the</strong>same word or compendium was transcribed twice, as καὶ and as κατὰ?). One couldpropose ἐκεῖ μὲν
19is in this secti<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong>ly subservient to <strong>the</strong> elucidati<strong>on</strong> <strong>of</strong> that, and not carried <strong>on</strong> foritself.4.23. It is because <strong>the</strong> One is πάντα, that everything comes out from <strong>the</strong>One, devolves from it, winds <strong>of</strong>f from it.4.25-5.1. There is a nature <strong>of</strong> πολλὰ inherent in <strong>the</strong>m, internally c<strong>on</strong>stituting<strong>the</strong>m in <strong>the</strong>ir diverse multiplicity; and <strong>the</strong>re is a nature <strong>of</strong> πολλά transcendent to<strong>the</strong>m, externally c<strong>on</strong>stituting (i.e. producing) <strong>the</strong>m in <strong>the</strong>ir diverse multiplicity. Even τὰ πολλά, qua πολλά, have <strong>on</strong>e certain nature ( and <strong>the</strong>y “ are” or, better, is indeed<strong>on</strong>e <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> first principles, as we shall see); o<strong>the</strong>rwise <strong>the</strong>y could not subsist at all:<strong>the</strong> primal prerequisite for subsistence (i.e. presence in tot al reality) is<strong>on</strong>eness. (This should be c<strong>on</strong>nected with what we already said about <strong>the</strong>presuppositi<strong>on</strong> and derivati<strong>on</strong> order <strong>of</strong> reality).5.1-2. πᾶν and ὅλον are distinct from each o<strong>the</strong>r. But <strong>of</strong> this later, in itsappropriate place, where, descending in <strong>the</strong> s tructure <strong>of</strong> reality (i.e. following <strong>the</strong>derivati<strong>on</strong>–order <strong>of</strong> reality) we shall meet <strong>the</strong>m.*5.2-5.14. Here is <strong>the</strong> important protestati<strong>on</strong>: if <strong>the</strong> One is such as (roughlyand preliminarily) was described above by D., why is it not <strong>the</strong> absolutely primalprinciple? What sense can we give to <strong>the</strong> claim and <strong>the</strong>re is still “something” [42] elsebey<strong>on</strong>d (ἐπέκεινα) <strong>the</strong> One? Are we not proceeding in <strong>the</strong> void, having passed <strong>the</strong>bounds <strong>of</strong> reality (and sense) and merely indulging in c<strong>on</strong>ceptual hallucinati<strong>on</strong>s?The metaphysical ground <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> protestati<strong>on</strong> is this. What is nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> One,nor <strong>on</strong>e, it is μηδέν, i.e. nothing. So are we posing <strong>the</strong> Nothing as <strong>the</strong> absolutely andultimately Primal Principle? [43] Besides, what is <strong>the</strong> necessity forcing <strong>the</strong> Reas<strong>on</strong> toaccept such a principle bey<strong>on</strong>d <strong>the</strong> One? We have as certain datum <strong>the</strong> Many . Weask for <strong>the</strong>ir cause or principle. Such a cause cannot be <strong>the</strong> Nothing – for Nothing canbeget nothing. Nor can it be that <strong>the</strong> πολλὰ are self- caused; for <strong>the</strong>y cannotc<strong>on</strong>stitute ei<strong>the</strong>r a cause <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>mselves as such, or many causes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>mselves assuch; from which it follows that <strong>the</strong>y are no cause <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>mselves.Pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> first point: qua πολλὰ, qua indeterminate multiplicity, <strong>the</strong>y aredisordered, un-ordered (it is <strong>the</strong>ir proceeding from <strong>the</strong> One, that imposes <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>msome form <strong>of</strong> co-ordinati<strong>on</strong> necessary for <strong>the</strong>m in order to subsist even asπολλὰ); so in nowise can <strong>the</strong>y be a cause <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>mselves; for multiplicity as such and
- Page 2 and 3: 2GENERAL REMARKThe first section is
- Page 4 and 5: 4Four reasons are, in aporematic fa
- Page 6 and 7: 6ὐθύς, i.e. without any prior
- Page 8 and 9: 8ἀμερές). Thus nothing is mi
- Page 10 and 11: 10separate them. Basically, as Aris
- Page 12 and 13: 12produced by, it; the principle in
- Page 14 and 15: 14the fashion of its one-ness, i.e.
- Page 16 and 17: 16[36] it may be. Now the def inite
- Page 20 and 21: 20in its elf (apart from the orderi
- Page 22 and 23: 22something whose immediate product
- Page 24 and 25: 24clearer, as the system is further
- Page 26 and 27: 26ἡνωμένον, which generate
- Page 28 and 29: 28We find in this here a good insta
- Page 30 and 31: 30fully see his point, and to take,
- Page 32 and 33: 32NOTES[1] Not quite “given” th
- Page 34 and 35: 34forget that, for the time being,
- Page 36 and 37: 36[28] The interpretation given to
- Page 38 and 39: 38[39] It can be shown that there c
- Page 40 and 41: 40being immersed in it, handling it