Commentary on the Beginning of Damascius' De Primis Principiis

12produced by, it; the principle in no way is what it generates, the cause what it causesto s ubsist. So we can better understand the sense in which a principle is moreimperfect than that of which it is a principle; it lacks that which its productpossess. And if this is so in general, then with an ultimate principle, like the One, wereach the li mits of dispossession, of metaphysical poverty; if everything comes tosubsist as a result, ultimately, of the One, then the One must lack everything; farfrom being πάντα (after its own peculiar fashion of course), it has no character, moreor less perfect, whatsoever, since every character comes after it, as a result of it. It isbereft of all full-blown reality, it is a “least”. We have here a doctrine of the derivationand construction of Reality diametrically opposed to D’s own.Were our only evidence Aristotle’s hint, still the above interpretation would bea fair inference, given the peculiar Speusippean view of the derivation of Reality as aprocession towards perfection. But we possess a striking confirmation of its validity ,as it will be shown elsewhere in the sequel.3.3. The syntax is ὅτι (causal) καὶ αὐτό (ἐστι) πάντα πρὸ τῶν πάντων.3.4-5. We have here, as in 2.20, four Principles: ἕν – πολλά – ἡνωμένον –διακεκριμένον. Their connection and hierarchy will be the subject of the followingsections. Here we see that anyone of them is πάντα, all-inclusive of any and everydeterminate reality; what differentiates them one from another is the different modeunder which each one is πάντα.3.5-13. Τὰ πάντα, the sum-total of definite reality, subsist, an d therefore canbe conceived, in at least three modes or ways: one-ly ( ἑνιαίως) and unitedly (ἡνωμένως) and multipliedly ( πεπληθυσμένως). The nature, differentiation andconnection of these three modes will be explained later, in following sections of thework. In the lower margin of 2R we have the following note by the first hand:a) πάντα κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν ἀδιάκριτον ἑνιαίωςb) πάντα κατὰ σχέσιν καὶ σύνταξιν τὴν ἡνωμένωςπρὸς ἄλληλαc) πάντα κατὰ διάκρισιν ἕκαστα πεπληθυσμένως.3.5. In order to gain a n adequate notion of τὰ πάντα we must “unfold” ourconception ( ἔννοια) to cover everything. It is always our conceptual powers whichstrive to be adequate to the intricate complexity of reality [29].