Commentary on the Beginning of Damascius' De Primis Principiis

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10separate them. Basically, as Aristotle says [20], it was this: if the very nature of theGood consists in the One, then the principle opposite to the One, namely theMultiplicity, must be the Evil; but Speusippus denied that there can be evil, indeedthe Evil, in the absolutely first principles. So he made the Good and the Evil to lie atthe completion of the derivation of reality rather than at the beginning (like in thefully developed animal rather than at the seed and sperm) – to use the metaphorSpeusippus himself may have employed [21].We know, of course, from Aristotle (and Theophrastus ’ little metaphysicaltract), even if we could not see it already right in Plato’s dialogues, that ascending tofirst principles from the given via the presuppos ition-ladder, and descending fromthem in a derivation attempt which aims at covering all reality and locatingeverything real at its appropriate place in the total Order of the Universe ofSubsistence in general – that these procedures were the preoccupat ion of the olderAcademy and of contemporaneous Pythagorean circles. But how is this specificallyconnected with our particular passage in D.?In fact there were those, who denied any direct connection, and accused D. ofmisunderstanding. Admirably enough they even pointed at a passage in Aristotle,which, they claimed, was misunderstood by D. [22]. The passage is in Met. N.1087b.25-33 (esp. b32, see also N. 1087b4-9), where admittedly the clause ἔσται γὰρ τὸ ἓν ὀλίγον matches well, in all externals, D.’s clause: οὐ γὰρ ἓν ὣς ἐλάχιστον.But in fact we have here just that kind of superficial interpretation which marsso much in modern attempts at understanding ancient philosophy in general, andGreek Metaphysics in particular, and most especially Neoplatonism. To see this clearlyin the present instance one should firstly notice the extreme frivolity of Aristotle ’spoint here [23]. The argument is this: Some philosophers claim that a pair ofcontraries ( ἐνάντια) are the ultimate principles of all reality. Som e (notablySpeusippus) maintain that this fundamental pair is the One and the πλῆθος. But thecontrary to Many is the Few (drawing on the ordinary-language opposition betweenthe few and the many). Hence their One must be the Few. As if one who wouldpropound the view concerning the ultimate nature of the contrariety between Oneand Πλῆθος, could possibly mean by Πλῆθος the Many, instead of the obviouslyintended Multiplicity, whether large or small.
11No philosopher could seriously be taken in by such an argument, nor be misledby it. Least of all a Neoplatonist [24], and less than least D. himself.It might seem presumptuous to reject an explanation (however futile) of whatD. is here referring to, without offering another one in its place. But I do not thi nkthat we should at all cost strive to pinpoint the sources of a testimony like the one wemeet here in D. To insist immoderately on this is the proximate cause of muchsuperficiality which has found its way into many a historical and interpretativeattempt. We may just be unable to reach a definite solution in some cases; crucialevidence may be lacking to us. In view of the hideous lacunae in the transmittedpicture of ancient philosophy under which we operate, it needs no extreme modestyto discard supe rficialities while at the same time confessing inability to reachdefinitive conclusions.Happily though, in our case we need not have recourse to such generalremarks. For it can be shown that D. had in mind something immeasurably moreimportant than a misunderstanding of a frivolous argument ad hominem.Speusippus, we saw, distinguished and separated the One and the Good,considering the former as first principle, the latter as final outcome in the derivationor construction of the totality of reality. No w Good implies perfection; and ifperfection appears or presents itself at the very last stage of the said construction ofreality (as the crowning achievement of the process of production, much as theperfected animal stands at the very end of the line of development whose firstinchoate beginning is given with the seed), then the further we are removed fromthat final stage the less perfect is the state of affairs in which we are. In this way firstprinciples must be imperfect par excellence [25].But how are we to conceive that imperfection of the first principles accordingto Speusippus? We have a valuable hint from Aristotle. In Met. N.1092a11-15 [26],he says in so many words that for some people (namely Speusippus and (some of?)the Pythagoreans) the first principles are so incomplete and imperfect ( ἀτελεῖς) thatthe One (one of the Ultimate Principles) is not even ὄν τι – it is not a being, oneamong the beings [27].Perhaps then we can amplify the Aristotelian hint [28]. Perhaps for Speusippus(or, at least, for a certain current interpretation of Speusippus ’ system) the prior hasnothing of the posterior which follows upon it, indeed which is derived from, or
Page 2 and 3: 2GENERAL REMARKThe first section is
Page 4 and 5: 4Four reasons are, in aporematic fa
Page 6 and 7: 6ὐθύς, i.e. without any prior
Page 8 and 9: 8ἀμερές). Thus nothing is mi
Page 12 and 13: 12produced by, it; the principle in
Page 14 and 15: 14the fashion of its one-ness, i.e.
Page 16 and 17: 16[36] it may be. Now the def inite
Page 18 and 19: 18found, and (there found) in accor
Page 20 and 21: 20in its elf (apart from the orderi
Page 22 and 23: 22something whose immediate product
Page 24 and 25: 24clearer, as the system is further
Page 26 and 27: 26ἡνωμένον, which generate
Page 28 and 29: 28We find in this here a good insta
Page 30 and 31: 30fully see his point, and to take,
Page 32 and 33: 32NOTES[1] Not quite “given” th
Page 34 and 35: 34forget that, for the time being,
Page 36 and 37: 36[28] The interpretation given to
Page 38 and 39: 38[39] It can be shown that there c
Page 40 and 41: 40being immersed in it, handling it

Commentary on the Beginning of Damascius' De Primis Principiis

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