Forum za tranzicionu pravdu - Inicijativa za REKOM

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav du2Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav duSadržajAutori...............................................................................................................................7Uvod.................................................................................................................................9Civilno društvo i restorativna pravda na zapadnom Balkanu:od simboličke politike do konsolidovanja države..............................................................11Denisa KostovicovaREKOM: Novi pristup pomirenju i korektiv krivične pravde................................................14Nataša KandićI DEOMogućnosti i opcije za restorativnu pravdu........................................................................17Pravda izvan sudnice: Uključivanje društva u proces razumevanja prošlosti.....................19Eric GordyCivilno društvo i novi napori na normalizaciji tursko-jermenskih odnosa.......................24Armine IshkanianEvropske integracije i suočavanje sa komunističkom prošlošću........................................28John Gledhill5Komisije za istinu iz latinsko-američke perspektive: izazovi i lekcije..............................34Eduardo GonzalezII DEOTranziciona pravda iz ugla epistemološke zajednice..........................................................37Dražen Lalić........................................................................................................................39Diane F. Orentlicher ..............................................................................................................41Vladimir Petrović .................................................................................................................43Mladen Ostojić .....................................................................................................................45Jasna Dragović-Soso ..............................................................................................................47Christian Axboe Nielsen..........................................................................................................49Iavor Rangelov......................................................................................................................51Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav du8Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav duUvodOvaj posebni broj, čiji je cilj da doprinese debati o tranzicionoj pravdi na zapadnom Balkanu, se najvećimdelom pojavljuje zbog dva događaja. Prvi je jednodnevni seminar pod nazivom „Evropske integracije itranziciona pravda: perspektive i smerovi restorativne pravde na zapadnom Balkanu“, koji su organizovali bivšiCentar za proučavanje globalnog upravljanja Londonske škole za ekonomiju i političke nauke i beogradski Fondza humanitarno pravo. Ovaj seminar je održan u sedištu Evropske komisije u decembru 2009. Drugi događaj jeMeđunarodni forum za tranzicionu pravdu koji je organizovala Koalicija za REKOM, i koji je održan u Sarajevuu junu 2011. Veoma smo zahvalni Evropskoj komisiji, italijanskoj kompaniji za istraživanje javnog mnjenjaCompagnia di San Paolo i King Baudouin Foundation koji su omogućili održavanje ova dva skupa, i Programuza razvoj fakultetskog kadra u jugoistočnoj Evropi Fondacije za otvoreno društvo i Civil Rights Defenders koji supomogli izdavanje ovog broja Foruma za tranzicionu pravdu.9Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav du10Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav duCivilno društvo i restorativnapravda na zapadnom Balkanu:od simboličke politike dokonsolidovanja državeDenisa KostovicovaKoncept tranzicione pravde je donedavno prisvajalaretributivna pravda (tj. pravda koja se postižesuđenjem) kada su u pitanju javne rasprave na zapadnomBalkanu, debate o smerovima saradnje sa različitim spoljnimakterima kakva je i Evropska unija, kao i naglo rastući brojistraživanja u oblasti tranzicione pravde u regionu. Pristupikoji su okrenuti ka žrtvama u oblasti instrumenata restorativnetranzicione pravde na zapadnom Balkanu trebaju tekda privuku pažnju akademske javnosti i političara, koja ims pravom pripada, iako su nedavni naučni radovi dotaklitemu neuspelih pokušaja (koje su finansirale države) da seosnuju komisije za istinu i pomirenje na zapadnom Balkanu.Rad REKOM-a, koji je međunarodna inicijativa civilnogdruštva na zapadnom Balkanu pokrenuta sa ciljem da seustanove činjenice u vezi sa ratnim zločinima i teškimkršenjima ljudskih prava počinjenim za vreme ratova kojisu doveli do raspada Jugoslavije, nedavno je privukla pažnjuEvropske unije, ali i političara u regionu. Inicijativa zaREKOM je osnovana kao odgovor na slabosti i očiglednunedelotvornost mehanizama retributivne pravde, konkretnona rad Međunarodnog tribunala za ratne zločine, a kojisu trebali da dovedu do pravde i pomirenja. Uticaj REKOMase već proširio na ceo region, iako on još uvek nije postigaosvoj cilj – da postane regionalna komisija iza koje stojedržave, a u isto vreme je njegov rad nailazio na ponekadžestoko protivljenje predstavnika država i građanskogdruštva iz regiona. Stotine konsultacija o pitanjima vezanimza tranzicionu pravdu, uključujući i konsultacije o statutuove komisije, podstakle su među- i unutar-etničku raspravuo neophodnosti suočavanja sa prošlošću dok se ostaje veranosnovnoj usredsređenosti – na žrtve.Proces koji je REKOM pokrenuo zahteva razmatranje ulogecivilnog društva u odnosu na šire ciljeve tranzicione pravdei, pre svega, razmatranje našeg shvatanja o tome kakoaktivnosti građanskog društva mogu da učvrste ciljeve procesaevropskih integracija u regionu. Od posebnog značajau ovom izlaganju je značaj aktivizma u građanskom društvuu oblasti restorativne pravde za evropeizaciju zapadnogBalkana, koji obuhvata i pomirenje i izgradnju država nakonzavršenog sukoba.Rad Međunarodnog tribunala za bivšu Jugoslaviju, uokviru uslovljenosti Evropskom unijom, kao i „lokalna“ i„hibridna“ suđenja za ratne zločine na zapadnom Balkanu,svedočanstva su značaja retributivne pravde u kontekstutranzicije i post-konfliktnog društva. Pristup retributivnepravde je obuhvatio nekoliko ciljeva tranzicione pravde zaizgradnju mira. Ovi ciljevi uključuju identifikaciju zločinakroz kažnjavanje počinilaca, stvaranje istoričarskog zapisa,a takođe i formiranje lokalne sposobnosti da se izgradi vladavinazakona. Ali pre svega, rad Međunarodnog tribunalaza bivšu Jugoslaviju, na koji se može gledati kao na spoljnonametanje tranzicione pravde zapadnom Balkanu, oduzeoje mogućnost domaćim zakonodavcima i publici da zanemareprošlost. Postoji iskušenje, koje je naročito veliko uvremenu posle etničkog sukoba, da se usvoji stav „zaboravii produži dalje“, naročito ako postoji kontinuitet izmeđupredratnih aktera i poratnih vlasti. Činjenica da se tranzicionapravda ne može gurnuti na stranu će ostati najtrajnije11Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav du12i nesporno nasleđe ovog instrumenta tranzicione pravde,uprkos priznavanja činjenice da je sposobnost Tribunala daisporuči pravdu nesigurna.Zaista, čak i zločine koji su kažnjeni na međunarodnimkrivičnim suđenjima nisu nužno priznale sve straneumešane u sukob; javna rasprava o ratnim zločinimapočinjenim širom zapadnog Balkana je ostala ograničenana određene segmente građanskog društva; istoričarskitekstovi se još uvek opovrgavaju, a lokalna suđenja za ratnezločine često ilustruju slabosti pre nego snagu vladavineprava. Slično tome, domaća suđenja u regionu često pratipolitizacija, uključujući tu i mešanja političara i selektivnostzasnovanu na etnicitetu optuženih, udružena sa slabostimakoje proističu iz nedostataka kapaciteta, što za rezultat imasporo procesuiranje slučajeva i umnožavanje zaostataka,kao i ozbiljniji problem – neodgovarajući okvir za zaštitusvedoka, što se u praksi pokazalo i kao politički problem ikao problem sa kapacitetima. Dodatno se pojavilo više preprekana regionalnom nivou, kao što je nesposobnost nekihdržava da sklope ugovore o izručenju. Stoga je povećanjebroja suđenja za ratne zločine i njihov potencijal da ispunevišestruke ciljeve postkonfliktne izgradnje mira potrebnoposmatrati na fonu manjka javnog konsenzusa o prošlosti,na nacionalnom i regionalnom nivou.Dva tipa rascepa i dalje stoje na putu postizanja konsenzusao skoroj prošlosti na zapadnom Balkanu: jedan je međuetnički(između različitih nacionalnih grupacija – Srba iMuslimana, Srba i Albanaca, Muslimana i Hrvata, Albanacai Makedonaca) a drugi je unutar-etnički (sukobljene interpretacijeskore prošlosti u okviru nacionalnih grupa, tj.između Srba, Hrvata, Albanaca itd). Kako se ceo region sveviše približava Evropskoj uniji – u formalnom smislu, posmatranokroz ugovorne odnose – različite nacionalne grupeostaju međusobno onoliko podeljene koliko su podeljene iunutar sebe. Mehanizmi retributivne pravde koji trenutnodejstvuju ne mogu da prevladaju ove rascepe, pa ih u nekimslučajevima čak i pogoršavaju. Zbog toga pitanje tranzicionepravde, shvaćene u terminima otvaranja pitanja o zločinimaiz prošlosti, ostaje podložno neprestanoj politizaciji, doknikako ne može da dođe do svođenja računa.Simboličke politike i izgradnja kapaciteta su dve oblasti ukojima restorativna pravda, i naročito uloga civilnog društvau unapređivanju restorativne pravde, mogu da doprinesuizgradnji mira. Simboličke politike mogu da doprinesupremošćavanju među-etničkih i unutar-etničkih rascepa.Spajanje u okviru pojmova istine i pomirenja između iunutar grupa može se ostvariti jedino ako su napori u ovompravcu stekli legitimitet kroz osnaživanje i priznanje „odozdo“.Međutim, mada je samo po sebi bitno, usredsređivanjena simboličke politike često zasenjuje podjednako bitandoprinos restorativne pravde konsolidovanju države, kojeje ključno za evropeizaciju perspektivnih članica evropskogkluba. Bitno je shvatiti da se manjak konsenzusa u vezi sabliskom prošlošću može direktno povezati sa sporim tokomreformi na celom zapadnom Balkanu, u kritičkim oblastimareforme bezbednosnog sektora, vladavine zakona i korupcije,kao i usvajanju već prilagođene legislature kao rezultatpribližavanja Evropskoj uniji. Sukobljene interpretacije oprošlosti doprinose okoštavanju parcijalnih interesa koji suzasnovani na etnicitetu i(li) neformalnoj ekonomiji, a kojisu povezani sa organizovanim kriminalom. Ovi se interesičesto izražavaju ili kroz načelno opiranje reformama, ilikroz otpor primeni već usvojenih zakona i regulativa. Takviinteresi ometaju procese evropskih integracija, uprkosretoričke posvećenosti njima.Civilno društvo ima potencijal da prevaziđe ograničenjainicijativa na polju tranzicione pravde koje sprovode državei koje su zasnovane na suđenjima. Ono može pružiti osećajvlastitosti procesima suočavanja sa nedavnim zločinima,pošto je nedostatak tog osećaja vlastitosti često politizovaote procese. Štaviše, depolitizacija je nužan preduslov svakojsmislenoj konsolidaciji države, posmatranoj kroz sposobnostza izgradnju države.Sve od kraja neprijateljstava u bivšoj Jugoslaviji, civilnodruštvo je igralo kritičnu ulogu u promovisanju tranzicionepravde. Civilno društvo se pokazalo kao nosećistub lokalne podrške projektu Tribunala, a takođe i kaostručni kritičar uskog pristupa Tribunala koji je koncentrisanna počinitelja. Dosledno svom stavu o neophodnostisuočavanja sa kriminalnom prošlošću i fokusiranjuna žrtve povreda ljudskih prava, civilno društvo je predvodilodebatu posvećenu suočavanju sa prošlošću. Ono jepodvrglo zvanične autoritete nepopustljivom kritičkomispitivanju tokom svoje kritike zvanične retorike i politikekoje bi nagradile nekažnjivost. Nacionalna civilna društvau regionu nisu o ovim temama govorila jednoglasno. Ovoje pre svedočanstvo o živosti i elastičnosti ove debate negoznak slabosti – uključujući tu i osetljive teme kao što supitanja da li je ideološka delegitimizacija nacionalizma iz1990-ih preduslov tranzicione pravde, ili vice versa; da linacionalni pristup ima prednost nad regionalnim, itd. Takvaraznovrsnost u mišljenjima svedoči o važnoj demokratskojdimenziji tranzicione pravde u regionu. Međutim, takavpogled na civilno društvo pruža samo jednostranu slikuvišeznačnog doprinosa civilnog društva tranzicionoj pravdi.Baš kao što smo videli kako civilna društva u celom regionumukotrpno rade na pravdi i pomirenju, drugi segmentiFond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav ducivilnog društva su sebi postavili potpuno suprotne ciljevei ideje koji propagiraju ekstremne, neliberalne i isključiveideje i interese.U kontekstu neprekidnog preispitivanja post-konfliktnihrešenja, bez pokreta ili sa ograničenim napretkomu rešavanju pitanja nestalih osoba kao i instrumentalizacijepravde, civilno društvo će, i pored svih ograničenja„odozgo“ i „odozdo“, ostati noseći stub nade u pravdu ipomirenje na zapadnom Balkanu. Stoga je ključno pitanjekako se najbolje Evropska unija može povezati sa takvimsaveznikom na zapadnom Balkanu, i kakvi nivoi i oblicipodrške civilnom društvu i njegovim inicijativama na poljutranzicione pravde mogu unaprediti projekat evropeizacijedržava i društava u regionu.13Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav duREKOM: Nov pristup pomirenju i korektivkrivične pravdeNataša Kandić14Uspostavljanje [tranzicione] pravde je jedan od bitnihuslova za članstvo post-jugoslovenskih zemalja uEvropskoj uniji. Ta obaveza se odnosi na procesuiranjeratnih zločina i reformu institucija, s tim da EU finansijskipodržava i brojne nevladine inicijative za traženje istine oprošlosti. Ocena EU je da ima napretka. U februaru 2011.godine, Državno odvjetništvo i MUP Republike Hrvatskedoneli su Strategiju za istraživanje i procesuiranje ratnihzločina počinjenih u razdoblju od 1991. do 1995. godine.Bosna i Hercegovina je takođe donela strategiju procesuiranjaratnih zločina, a potom, u junu 2012. godine,Ministarstvo pravde i Ministarstvo za ljudska prava i izbegliceBiH su uputili na javnu raspravu dokument Strategijatranzicijske pravde u BiH, 2012 -2016. Pomenuta ministarstvasu u javnost izašla s predlogom o osnivanju vansudskogtela za kazivanje istine koje bi podsticalo stalni dijalogo prošlosti. U junu 2012. godine, Vlada Kosova je osnovalaRadnu grupu za tranzicionu pravdu.Regionalna saradnja državnih institucija u drugim oblastimatranzicione pravde se uglavnom svodi na učešćepojedinih predsednika država u komemoracijama žrtavaiz drugih etničkih zajednica i na lična izvinjenja za nedelapojedinaca iz vlastite etničke grupe. Predsednik HrvatskeIvo Josipović i bivši predsednik Srbije Boris Tadić su 2010.godine promovisali pomirenje među narodima nekadašnjeSFRJ kao cilj i vrednost regionalne saradnje. Te godine,obojica su snažno podržali civilnu inicijativu za osnivanjezvanične Regionalne komisije za utvrđivanje činjenica oratnim zločinima i drugim teškim povredama ljudskihprava zvane REKOM. Predsednik Hrvatske je ponovo ujunu 2011. godine, prilikom susreta sa članovima Koalicijeza REKOM, kada mu je uručena peticija za osnivanjeREKOM sa 543.000 potpisa građana iz svih post-jugoslovenskihzemalja, izrazio svoju punu podršku osnivanjuREKOM. U maju 2012. godine, u razgovoru sa javnimzagovaračima Inicijative REKOM, predsednik Josipović sesložio da je vreme da se konkretizuje verbalna političkapodrška, te je predložio da države u regionu ispitaju pravnei ustavne mogućnosti za osnivanje REKOM. Obećao je daće se u tome lično angažovati. U međuvremenu, u junu2012. godine došlo je do promene vlasti u Srbiji, što jedovelo do prekida zvanične komunikacije između Hrvatskei Srbije, a u Koaliciji za REKOM do preispitivanja strategijezagovaranja osnivanja REKOM. Verujući da pojačanajavna podrška može otkloniti nastalu političku blokadu,Koalicija je tokom septembra i oktobra 2012. godine organizovalajavne akcije pod nazivom REKOM za budućnost,tokom kojih su građani potpisivali peticiju za osnivanjeREKOM i slali razglednice predsednicima sa porukom daje vreme za političku odluku. Međutim, osim predsednikaMakedonije, koji je od javnih zagovarača InicijativeREKOM zatražio više informacija, ostali predsednici nisureagovali. U decembru 2012. godine, javni zagovarači supozvali predsednike država da odgovore na zahtev Koalicijei 545.000 građana za osnivanje REKOM. Tom prilikom,javni zagovarači su obavestili predsednike da su nevladineorganizacije izradile popis od oko 100.000 osoba koja se suizgubile život u vezi sa oružanim sukobima u bivšoj Jugoslaviji,od ukupno 130.000, ali da ostaju poslovi u kojimaone ne mogu zameniti zvanična tela, kao što je REKOM.Osim verifikacije prikupljenih podataka i činjenica o identitetužrtava, potrebno je utvrditi činjenice o političkimi istorijskim okolnostima koje su odlučujuće doprineleizbijanju oružanih sukoba i činjenju ratnih zločina, kao iorganizovati javno slušanje, čiji je neposredni cilj priznanjepatnji i nepravdi nanetih žrtvama.Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav duPre i nezavisno od Inicijative REKOM, Istraživačkodokumentacionicentar iz BiH i Fond za humanitarnopravo iz Srbije i sa Kosova 1 su započeli sa istraživanjemratnih zločina, stradanja civila, vojnika i policajaca uoružanim sukobima ili u vezi sa njima. U 2011. godini,Fond za humanitarno pravo i Fond za humanitarno pravoKosovo su objavili prvi tom Kosovske knjige pamćenja kojigovori o 2.056 ljudi, i okolnostima u kojima su izgubiliživot ili nestali tokom rata 1998. godine. U toku je proverapodataka o preostalih 9.816 žrtava rata od janura 1999. dojuna 1999. godine, kao i o 1.646 žrtava post-konfliktnihubistava i otmica na Kosovu. Istraživačko-dokumentacionicentar je u decembru 2012. godine, u saizdavaštvu sa FHPom,objavio četiri toma Bosanske knjige mrtvih, koja sadržiimena 95.540 ljudi koji su izgubili život ili nestali u ratu ili uvezi sa ratom u BiH, od aprila 1992. godine do kraja decembra1996. godine. U toku je dokumentovanje žrtava rata uHrvatskoj, na čemu zajedno rade Documenta iz Hrvatske iFond za humanitarno pravo.Nevladine organizacije širom nekadašnje SFRJ, kao iEU, podržavaju suđenja za ratne zločine kao najvažnijiinstrument za utvrđivanje pojedinačne krivice za nedela uprošlosti. Ali su nevladine organizacije svesne ograničenjakrivičnih suđenja u odnosu na potrebe žrtava za pravdom,zbog čega pokreću brojne inicijative za traženje istine ipomirenje. Otvaranje debate o pomirenju ne ide brzo ilako. Na regionalnom nivou, jednako kao i u BiH, debate osuočavanju s prošlošću, u kojima učestvuju lideri udruženjalogoraša, veterana i porodica nestalih, često se odvijaju uznaku „političkih istina“ o tome šta se dogodilo u prošlosti.Koalicija za REKOM, koja okuplja više od 1.900 organizacijacivilnog društva, pokušala je da se tome suprotstavi organizovanjemsesija nazvanih Glas žrtava, u kojima su žrtvesvedočile o svojim ličnim iskustvima. Na početku konsultativnogprocesa, lične ispovesti odigrale su ključnu uloguu promovisanju novog odnosa među i prema žrtvama, kojipolazi od saosećanja, solidarnosti i razumevanja prošlihdogađaja iz ugla drugog. Međutim, posle izvesnog vremena,lideri nekih udruženja žrtava i porodica nestalih supočeli da postavljaju uslove - da oni ili njihovi predstavnici„svedoče“ o tome šta se dogodilo u prošlosti. Tako su naForumu za tranzicionu pravdu u Crnoj Gori 2009. godine,lideri udruženja porodica nestalih Srba iz BiH zapretili daće, ukoliko njihov predstavnik ne „svedoči“ među prvima,napustiti skup. Zatim je, na Forumu za tranzicionu pravdu uHrvatskoj 2010. godine, lider jedne od udruga stradalih branitelja„svedočio“ o agresiji Srbije na Hrvatsku. Zbog togaje Koalicija za REKOM prekinula da organizuje sesije Glasžrtava, svesna snage ličnih ispovesti za izgradnju kulturesolidarnosti i saosećanja ali i svoje nemoći da spreči manipulacijužrtvama u političke svrhe. Ali REKOM, zahvaljujućiregionalnom karakteru, ima snagu da se suprotstavi svimpokušajima zloupotrebe i manipulacije žrtvama, i da organizujejavna slušanja koja će dovesti do javnog priznanjapatnji i nepravdi nanetih svim žrtvama.Postoji još jedan razlog koji nas upućuje na važnost osnivanjaREKOM-a. Reč je o ograničenjima krivične pravdeu odnosu na potrebe žrtava da njihova patnja bude javnopriznata. Sud se ne bavi patnjama i nepravdom premažrtvama, nema zadatak da dokumentuje sve individualnežrtve, kao ni okolnosti njihovog stradanja. Ima samojedan zadatak: da oceni dokaze i donese odluku o krivicioptuženog/ih. Iz tog razloga, u svim presudama Haškogtribunala naći će se imena tek desetak hiljada žrtava ratnihzločina, iako ih ima najmanje 45.000. Poseban problem sejavlja u vezi sa oslobađajućim presudama koje u javnostistvaraju utisak da ako nema individualne krivice nema nižrtava. Tako su oslobađajuće presude hrvatskim generalima,Anti Gotovini i Mladenu Markaču, kao i kosovskombivšem premijeru Ramushu Haradinaju, stvorile jak utisaku javnosti da u Hrvatskoj i na Kosovu nije bilo ratnihzločina prema Srbima. Međutim, tokom suđenja generalimaizneti su brojni dokazi o ubistvima najmanje 300srpskih civila, tokom i nakon vojno-policijske operacijeOluja, a na suđenju bivšem kosovskom premijeru dokazio ubistvima srpskih civila na teritoriji pod kontrolomOslobodilačke vojske Kosova 2 . U postupcima pred Haškimtribunalom, kao i pred domaćim sudovima, zbog visokihstandarda dokazivanja često se događa da sud utvrdi da suoptuženi odgovorni za smrt značajno manjeg broja žrtavaod broja stvarnih žrtava – zbog nedostatka forenzičkihizveštaja ili zbog toga što nisu pronađeni posmrtni ostacisvih žrtava. Te žrtve ne smeju biti zaboravljene. REKOM jejedini mehanizam koji ima potencijal da dokumentuje svežrtve. U tom smislu, REKOM je korektiv krivične pravde, inov pristup pomirenju.151 Tom poslu se 2009. godine pridružila i Documenta iz Hrvatske.2 Kosovska knjiga pamćenja, prvi tom, FHP, 2011. FHP je utvrdio identitet 41 srpskog civila koji je izgubio život na teritoriji Kosova podkontrolom Oslobodiličke vojska Kosova, kojom je komandovao Ramush Haradinaj.Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav du16Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav du18Fond za humanitarno pravo

Mogućnosti i opcije za restorativnu pravduPravda izvan sudnice: Uključivanjedruštva u proces razumevanja prošlostiEric GordyMeđunarodni krivični sud za bivšu Jugoslaviju (MKSJ),osnovan 1993. godine je najpoznatiji ali svakakone i jedini mehanizam uspostavljen u cilju utvrđivanjačinjenica koje bi doprinele razumevanju događaja izprošlosti, identifikovanja slučajeva kršenja ljudskih pravai kažnjavanja njihovih počinilaca, kao i zadovoljavanjuzahteva međunarodne zajednice za za utvrđivanje ličneodgovornosti. MKSJ nije trajni sud već je zamišljen kao sudskainstitucija koja ima ograničen životni vek sa mandatomkoji je limitiran samo na jedan segment međunarodnoghumanitarnog prava. Iako je osnovan u nadi da će doprinetiprocesu pomirenja u regionu, statut Tribunala neodražava njegovu funkciju vezanu za pomirenje a činjenicada je nastao izvan regiona čijom se istorijom bavi, dodatnopodriva kapacitet Tribunala u tom pogledu. Ozbiljan radna uspostavljanju socijalnog dijaloga i pokušaja stvaranjauslova da se razumeju događaji vezani za nedavni ratnisukob moraju biti obaveza ljudi i inistitucija u regionu.Svakako da je bilo inicijativa u tom pravcu - uglavnomgrađanskih inicijativa pre promene vlasti u Srbiji i Hrvatskoj2000. godine kao i nekih zvaničnih inicijativa uperiodu koji je usledio. Međutim, ove inicijative su bilesporadične i nesistematske, a neretko su bile uslovljenespoljno-političkim pritiscima, ponekad su sprovođene bezdobre volje i pristupano im je sa polovičnim merama što jenaravno rezultiralo nezavršenim poslom.Ovo nije naročito iznenađujuće jer cilj suočavanja saprošlošću podrazumeva proces koji po svojoj brzini i dubininema presedana u istoriji. To je proces koji obuhvata idomaće i međunarodne krivične postupke koji koristeobilje različitih procedura i praksi i koji nastoji da proizvedeefekat pokajanja koji podrazumeva istinsku transformacijuu svesti naroda – sve to bez uništavanja političkih i pravnihinstitucija i bez dopuštanja tim institucijama da ostanuonakve kakve su bile u trenutku kada su njihove državebile odgovorne za dela koje te iste institucije sada trebada kažnjavaju. Imajući na umu da posmatrane države nisudoživele ni odlučan vojni poraz ni kompletnu političkutransformaciju, činjenica da su se inicijative tranzicionepravde uopšte pojavile, a posebno da su u značajnoj meriprisutne u svakodnevnom životu, sama je po sebi veomaznačajna.Možemo raspravljati o tome da je više urađeno (mada itu ipak postoji samo delimičan rezultat) na procesuiranjupočinilaca ratnih zločina nego na postizanju drugih vidovapravde. Ovo može biti uslovljeno činjenicom da pitanjadokaznog materijala i procedure koje se koriste u krivičnompostupku, iako veoma složeni po prirodi, nisu ni izblizatako složeni kao široka pitanja javnog pamćenja i stvaranjalegitimnog istorijskog zapisa o predmetnim događajima.Ali, ako hoćemo da pokrenemo malo provokativniju raspravuovde, možemo tvrditi da relativni uspeh krivičnihpostupaka može sam za sebe da predstavlja prepreku upostizanju nekih ciljeva pravde. Prvenstveno zbog struktureovih suđenja koju određuju specijalna sudska veća i MKSJ,dogodilo se nešto što prvobitno nije bilo namera: određenidogađaji su sklonjeni iz polja odgovornosti a socijalna imoralna pitanja svedena su na politička i proceduralna.Ovim ne impliciram da ne treba voditi krivične postupke –naravno da se oni moraju voditi, već ističem da je potrebnodopuniti ih nekim procesima o kojima pravni i političkieksperti ne vole mnogo da razmišljaju, tačnije kulturnim isocijalnim procesima koji su spori, neizvesni i čiji je ishodteško predvideti.19Fond za humanitarno pravo

Mogućnosti i opcije za restorativnu pravduoseća otuđeno i uvređeno. Drugim rečima, potrebna je„ravnoteža“ a to je isto tako teško postići kao što je teškozamisliti da će bilo ko biti time zadovoljan. A „ravnoteža“sama po sebi nosi rizik – ona može imati efekat smanjivanjaili u praksi može biti doživljena kao komparativna viktimizacija,što može da funkcioniše kao vrsta izbegavanjaili poricanja. U nekom trenutku biće važno za sve žiteljedržava bivše Jugoslavije da generišu, kroz dijalog, debatui istraživačku delatnost, tumačenje koje priznaje sve onezločine koje su različite formacije počinile u ime raznih„nacionalnih“ interesa i identiteta. Međutim, da bi se ovodogodilo, verovatno će biti neophodno za sve ove zemlje dadosegnu nešto poput konsenzusa o sopstvenoj odgovornosti,i to barem delimično, neovisno o tome šta druge zemlječine po tom pitanju i kojim intenzitetom, i bez obaziranjana to da li međunarodna zajednica vrši isti pritisak na svevlade u regionu. Može se dogoditi da neki oblik regionalnogpristupa ovom pitanju ima jasne prednosti, ali teško jepredvideti organizovanje nekog regionalnog pristupa ukolikone postoji prethodno uspostavljena lokalna inicijativau ovom pravcu.Na šta se ovo u stvari svodi jeste potreba da se u ime pravdei pomirenja veoma ozbiljno pristupi pitanju istine, imajućiu vidu istinu mnogo širu od one vrste istine koju advokatiimaju na umu prilikom vođenja krivičnog postupka (iakoje uspostavljanje ove vrste istine takođe neophodno). Adosadašnji napori u zemljama regiona da se dođe do istineu najboljem slučaju se mogu okarakterisati kao sporadičnii retki. Slučaj Bosne i Hercegovine je najbolja ilustracijatoga: uprkos velikom broju različitih inicijativa, od kojih suneke potekle od civilnog društva, neke od međunarodnezajednice a neke od političkih partija i institucija, svakinapor da se oformi istraživačka komisija bio je efikasnozaustavljen osim jednog: Komisija Republike Srpske zaistraživanje zločina počinjenog u Srebrenici 1995. godine jejedina komisija koja je zaista sastavila izveštaj. Ovaj izveštajje naravno izazvao lavinu kritika na svoj račun.Jasna Dragović–Soso u izveštaju koji uskoro treba dabude objavljen 3 prati različite inicijative da se oforme iosposobe za rad „komisije za istinu“ u regionu i dolazi dogeneralnog zaključka da su svi ti napori osujećeni nedostatkompolitičke volje, uočavajući razne vidove obstrukcije,nedovoljnu podršku i nedostatak dobre volje da se tajposao uradi. Nedostatak istinske političke volje najmoćnijihličnosti u regionu da se konstruktivno uključe u processuočavanja sa bliskom prošlošću može se delom objasnitikomplikovanim odnosom sa međunarodnim faktorima,uključujući i MKSJ, koji su uticali na domaće sudske proceseza ratne zločine u meri da oni nisu uvek najproduktivnijiu nastojanjima da se dođe do „istine i pomirenja“.Ovaj problem se dalje pogoršava dubokim i još uvek prisutnimproblemom podeljenosti i fragmentarne vizije bliskeprošlosti na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije, koji se sreće ne samona među-entničkom nivou već i u okviru civilnih društavaiste nacionalne grupe.Da li je onda neophodno zahtevati da se nešto što jeapstraktno kao istina uopšte dovodi u pitanje? Zašto jednostavnone dozvolimo sudovima i tribunalima da radeono što najbolje znaju i ostavimo dokumentaciju da o njojraspravljaju istoričari u nedogled? To nam može pomoći dasagledamo jedan trenutak u tekućem procesu razumevanjaprošlosti Srbije kad se u javnost iznesu dokazi o naporimada se unište tragovi zločina premeštanjem tela žrtava sajedne lokacije na drugu, na mesta kao što je dno rekeDunav. Ovaj incident je inspirisao pokojnog novinara StojanaCerovića da se udubi u analizu odnosa legalističkih inelegalističkih inicijativa:Ako bismo hteli da izbegnemo Haški sud, to nipošto ne bismelo biti zato što ne verujemo da su se dogodili zločini – jerevo isplivaše dokazi – niti zato što imamo neka opravdanja– što su to radili i drugi – jer takvim opravdanjima ni samine verujemo. Hoću da kažem da, u meri u kojoj u namapostoji neko moralno osećanje, nije moguće preći prekoovakvih stvari, makar nikakav ovozemaljski sud nikad ništao tome ne saznao.Ako u ovakvim slučajevima ne tražimo krivce i ne mislimona kazne, onda nam nikakav sud, pa ni haški, ne može dapomogne. To bi značilo da smo, kao društvo, već kažnjenivraćanjem u rajsku beslovesnost. Ili, ako neko više volilokalnu mitologiju, to bi ličilo na gubitak oba ona carstvakoja su pominjana baš u vezi s Kosovom 4 .213 Jasna Dragović-Soso i Eric Gordy, „Transitional justice and reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia“ / „Tranziciona pravda i pomirenjeu zemljama bivše Jugoslavije“, D. Đokić i J. Ker-Lindsay (eds.), New perspectives on Yugoslavia: Key issues and controversies / Noveperspektive u Jugoslaviji: ključna pitanja i kontroverze (Routledge, 2010).4 Stojan Cerović, “Zločin i tajna” / “Crime and Secret", Vreme Weekly Magazine, br. 540, 10. maj 2001. Dva ,,carstva” koje Cerovićpominje u poslednjoj rečenici odnose se na mitski ciklus o Kosovskom boju koji je Car Lazar izgubio nakon što je izabrao ,,carstvonebesko” nad ,,carstvom zemaljskim”.Fond za humanitarno pravo

Mogućnosti i opcije za restorativnu pravduU skoro svakoj oblasti popularne i visoke kulture, od literaturedo pozorišta do filma i popularne muzike, zajedničkointeresovanje za tu vrstu aktivnosti u Srbiji, Hrvatskoj iBosni i Hercegovini zadržava visok nivo kakav se zaistai može očekivati među zemljama koje dele zajedničkilingvistički prostor. Iako je većina ovih događaja orijentisanana tržišnu laku zabavu, povremeno se pojavljuju i intenzivnijiintelektualni i umetnički izrazi koji prelaze regionalnegranice. Na primer, što se filmskih ostvarenja tiče, filmJasmile Žbanić „Grbavica“ (2006) koji nudi kritički osvrt naperiod rata, kao i filmovi Gorana Paskaljevića „San zimskenoći“ (2004) i Vinka Brešana „Svjedoci“ (2003), naišli su naveoma pozitivan odjek kod publike širom regiona. Sasvimje moguće da kako se društva u regionu pomeraju dalje oddogađaja iz devedesetih i kako umetnička dela koja se baveovom tematikom trpe sve manji upliv od strane ljudi koji subili direktno umešani u događaje iz tog perioda, ovakva delaće biti primana sa više entuzijazma od strane mlađe publikekoja je željna projekata i ostvarenja koja nude odgovore imogućnost za razumevanje naše bliske prošlosti.Da li se odavde može izvući opšta poruka? Ponovljenipogrešan početak neke inicijative za iznalaženje istinepokazuje da je mnogo lakše pitanje prošlosti obraditi proceduralnonego postići neku vrstu katarzičnog suočavanjasa njom. Inicijative tranzicione pravde nisu premostilekognitivne podele koje podrivaju čitav proces pomirenjau regionu. Može se raspravljati o tome da „suočavanjesa prošlošću“ predstavlja jedan difuzan koncept komenedostaje jasna definicija i da je u istoj meri teško reći dali je došlo do suočavanja sa prošlošću ili ne. Na određenomnivou određene primedbe da zahtevi koji se namećuSrbiji u ime vrednosti kojima nedostaje i jasnoća i istorijskipresedan imaju smisla. Istovremeno, nijedan ozbiljniposmatrač ne može a da ne primeti do koje mere političkii kulturni razvoj i dalje ostaje talac nasleđa ratova vođenihu toku raspada bivše Jugoslavije, a na štetu gotovo svakogstanovnika regiona. Ovo postaje još jasnije jer su vezeizmeđu ratnih zločina i organizovanog kriminala, koje seposebno jasno vide u slučaju atentata na bivšeg premijeraSrbije Dr. Zorana Đinđića u martu 2003. godine, sveočiglednije i predstavljaju sve veću pretnju za individualnedržave.Skoro je izvesno, međutim, da poravnavanje računa iz ratai spori proces pomirenja neće zavisiti samo od krivičnogprocesuiranja osumnjičenih za ratne zločine. Političari ikreatori nacionalnih politika moraće da odigraju presudnovažne uloge kroz reformu obrazovanja i kulturu kao i krozstalno unapređivanje dijaloga među ljudima koji sada delegranice nekih novih država. Paralelno sa procesima kojise vode kroz međunarodne institucije kao što je MKSJ,ponekad uz njihovu pomoć a ponekad uprkos onome štoone rade, svedoci smo sporog i ne sasvim izvesnog napretkau kreiranju svesti potrebne da bi se pristupilo sistematskomi metodičnom ispitivanju prošlosti što bi omogućilo odvijanjenepristrasnog i neostrašćenog dijaloga. Ali, najverovatnijese sve to neće dogoditi odjednom.Moguće je da je doprinos krivičnih postupaka limitiranna usko definisano polje. Jedan širi vid pravdezahtevaće drugačije oblike angažovanja. U biti, zahtev za„suočavanjem“ sa prošlošću dobija oblik zakona i politikeali i dalje ostaje potreba da se u taj napor uvrste i dalekoširi društveni i kulturni procesi. Uloga države je presudna,ali država je uspešnija u stvaranju klime povinjavanjanego u davanju značajnih doprinosa. Država ne treba dapokušava da promoviše ili da guši narativne sadržaje većumesto toga treba da ohrabruje narativnu aktivnost. To jesastavni deo kulturološkog pristupa razumevanju činjeniceda će se različite verzije događaja iz prošlosti elaborirati itakmičiti jedna sa drugom. Književnici, filmski stvaraoci,umetnici i muzičari već razvijaju novi dijalog i stvarajudijaloge koji su usmereni boljem razumevanju prošlosti.Naravno, oni nailaze na malo zvanične ili međunarodnepažnje jer njihove aktivnosti ne rezultiraju izveštajima ilipresudama. Ali, kroz ovakve intervencije nova generacijapolitičkih aktera, neopterećenih saradnjom sa prethodnimrežimima, stiče preduslov da razvije jedan sasvim novpristup pitanju događaja iz prošlosti. Samo deset godina odzavršetka oružanog sukoba verovatno ne iznenađuje da seova vrsta razumevanja još nije pojavila. Pravne i političkeinicijative poslednjih nekoliko godina pomažu da se ponudineophodan, mada nekompletan, doprinos razvoju novevrste dijaloga. Forma ovih dijaloga i karakter debate kojuoni podstiču uzeće ovaj doprinos u obzir, ali možda nećenužno od njih krenuti na predvidiv način.23Fond za humanitarno pravo

Mogućnosti i opcije za restorativnu pravduistočne Anatolije, ili su namerno delovali sa tim ciljem, itime imali ono što je potrebno kako bi se mogla utvrditigenocidna namera.... Za te događaje, posmatrane kolektivno,zato može da se kaže da uključuju sve elemente zločinagenocida, onako kako je on definisan u konvenciji, i pravnistručnjaci, kao i istoričari, političari, novinari i drugi bi biliu pravu kada bi nastavili da ih tako opisuju. 2Međutim, MCTP je pažljivo istakao da ne bi smelo bitiretroaktivne primene sporazuma. Stoga, nikakvi pravni,finansijski ili teritorijalni zahtevi ne bi mogli da budu podnetiu vezi sa genocidom Jermena u Otomanskom carstvu.Iako je napredak oko tursko-jermenskog približavanjaunekoliko posustao 2004. Goidne sa zatvaranjem TARC,proces je povratio zamah 2008. i 2009. godine, kada suJermenija i Turska žrebom određeni da igraju u istojkvalifikacionoj grupi za Svetsko prvenstvo u fudbalu 2010.godine. 2008. godine, novoizabrani predsednik Jermenije,Serzh Sargsyan je oživeo debatu o tursko-jermenskimodnosima kada je pozvao svog turskog kolegu, predsednikaAbdullaha Güla u Jerevan kako bi zajedno gledaliutakmicu. To je bio istorijski događaj, i iako je Gulovoprisustvo bilo dočekano sitnim protestima nacionalnihgrupa u Jerevanu, poseta je ocenjena kao uspeh na putupribližavanja. Četiri dana pre nego što je revanš utakmicatrebalo da se odigra u Turskoj, 10. oktobra 2009. godine,jermenski i turski ministri spoljnih poslova su potpisali dvaprotokola usmerena ka normalizaciji odnosa između te dvezemlje. To su bili „Protokol za uspostavljanje diplomatskihodnosa između Republike Jermenije i Republike Turskei Protokol o razvoju odnosa između Republike Jermenijei Republike Turske“. Ceremoniji potpisivanja su prisustvovalibrojni visoki strani gosti, između ostalih i državnasekretarka SAD Hillary Clinton, ruski ministar stranihposlova Sergei Lavrov, bivši francuski ministar spoljnihposlova Bernard Kouchner i bivši visoki predstavnik EU zazajedničku spoljnju i bezbednosnu politiku Javier Solana.Prisustvo ovih visokih gostiju je većini posmatrača ukazaloda postoji velika međunarodna podrška normalizacijiodnosa. Ali, postoje dve sporne tačke koje su zaustavileproces ratifikacije. Prva se tiče međunarodnih napora napriznavanju genocida organizacija jermenske dijaspore (ijermenska navodna podrška takvim naporima), a drugaje u vezi sa rezolucijom o Karabah konfliktu. U vezi sameđunarodnim priznavanjem genocida, Turska se čvrstoprotivi obeležavanju masakra i deportacija Jermena kojisu živeli u Otomanskom carstvu kao genocida. Turskizvaničnici, uključujući i premijera Recepa Tayyip Erdogana,tvrdili su da pitanje da li ,,događaji od 1915. godine” trebada budu nazvani genocidom treba prepustiti istoričarima.Oni ukazuju na istorijsku potkomisiju koja je pomenuta uprotokolima kao instituciju kroz koju to može da se uradi.Jermenski zvaničnici, međutim, tvrde da je genocid širokoprepoznata istorijska činjenica, i uskraćuju podršku bilokakvoj komisiji koja će pokrenuti pitanje istinitosti genocida.Kod drugog pitanja, nerešeni konflikt između Jermenijei Azerbejdžana oko Nagorno Karabaha je doveo dotvrde opozicije nekih turskih političara. Vladini zvaničnici,pa čak i neke grupe civilnog društva, tvrde da rešenje kojefavorizuje Azerbejdžan mora biti preduslov razvoja bilateralnihodnosa između Turske i Jermenije. Jermenska stranatvrdi da je konflikt između Jermenije i Azerbejdžana, i danjegovo razrešenje ne bi ni na koji način trebalo da utiče narazvoj bilateralnih odnosa između Jermenije i Turske.Razrešenje Karabah konflikta nije sadržano u protokolima,i turski zvaničnici su ga tek kasnije pomenuli kao preduslovratifikacije protokola. Stanje od marta 2010. godine je takvoda protokole tek treba da ratifikuje bilo koja od strana.Pristupi restorativne pravde normalizaciji turskojermenskihodnosa: neki primeriIako većina mehanizama tranzicione pravde - uključujućitribunale, komisije za istinu, panele za lustraciju i amnestije -ne može biti primenjena na istorijski kontekst, drugi pristupi,uključujući napore na memorijalizaciji, socijalnoj rekonstrukcijii dijaloge civilnog društva, jesu korišćeni u tursko–jermenskomslučaju. Na primer, tokom prošle decenije bilo je višesastanaka i zajedničkih projekata između turske i jermenskeomladine, ženskih grupa, grupa za zaštitu životne sredine,muzičara, umetnika, fotografa, itd. Ti projekti i razmenefinansirali su međunarodni donatori, uključujući bilateralneagencije, međunarodne nevladine organizacije i privatne fondacije.Iako su te razmene bile male i ograničenog obima,one jesu uspele da ospore očvrsnule stereotipe o ,,drugima”,stvarajući prostor za raspravu o prošlosti, i gradeći mostoveizmeđu pojedinaca i zajednica u te dve zemlje.Pored ovih inicijativa, neke međunarodne organizacije sutakođe finansirale inicijative za trgovinu preko granice,uključujući i proizvodnju i distribuciju proizvoda poputkavkaskog sira i čaja. Pretpostavka koja je vodila te napore252 Međunarodni centar za tranzicionu pravdu (2003): „Primenjivost konvencije UN o prevenciji i kažnjavanju zločina genocida udogađajima koji su se odigrali u ranom dvadesetom veku: Pravna analiza pripremljena od strane Međunarodnog centra za tranzicionupravdu“. Njujork, MCTP, strana 17.Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav du26na uspostavljanju trgovine je da ako Jermeni i Turci trgujujedni sa drugima, poverenje i pouzdanje će se razvijati, akada ti elementi bubu prisutniji, oni onda mogu da odlučeda se pozabave mnogo težim pitanjima. Kao što je rekaojedan predstavnik međunarodne organizacije koja finansiratakve inicijative:Mi smo liberali i mi promovišemo slobodnu ekonomiju idijalog. Mi ne govorimo o razrešenju konflikta, već o slobodnojekonomiji. Mi verujemo da će pokretanje ekonomskesaradnje, otvaranje granice i skidanje barijera trgovinivoditi razvoju, a to će voditi do rešenja svih drugih pitanja[između Jermena i Turaka]. (19. april 2009. godine.)Iako nema empirijskog dokaza u prilog pretpostavci darazvoj trgovine vodi normalizaciji i pomirenju, taj pristup,bez obzira, ostaje popularan među nekim donatorima inevladinim organizacijama. To je primer koji je TrudyGovier zvala pristup ,,indirektnog pomirenja”. Ako uzmemoda tradicionalno ili direktno izmirenje uključuje sledećekorake: 1. priznanje nepravdi iz prošlosti; 2. izgrađivanjepoverenja; 3. neki stepen pomirenja; i 4. saradnju pomirenihstrana, indirektno izmirenje okreće taj redosled i,,zajednička praktična aktivnost” prethodi i samom prihvatanju,a kamoli priznanju, počinjenih zločina 3 .Konačno, na nivou i civilnog društva i države, preduzimanisu koraci ka memorijalizaciji. Na primer, ponovno otvaranjejermenske apostolske crkve svetog krsta na ostrvu Ahtamaru Vanu je označeno kao gest dobre volje turske vlade, kojaje finansirala renoviranje i restauraciju freski unutar crkvei reljefa na spoljašnjosti. Međutim, pošto je crkva formalnootvorena kao muzej bez krsta u 2007. godini, otvaranje jekritikovano kao politički poduhvat.Sada se vode nove rasprave, u kojima su neki od učesnikakoje sam intervjuisala pomenuli rekonstrukciju starogmosta u Mostaru, govoreći o zajedničkom tursko-jermenskomnaporu da ponovo izgrade drevni most Anipreko reke Ahurian koja ide uz granicu dve zemlje. Turskipredsednik Gül je prihvatio plan, a očigledno su i jermenskevlasti zainteresovane 4 . Most bi pružio priliku za turizampreko granice ukoliko bi granica bila otvorena, i predstavljaobi primer tursko-jermenske saradnje.Pored renoviranja arhitekturalnih struktura, postojali supokušaji ustanovljavanja kulture sećanja posvećeni otomanskojjermenskoj populaciji. Na primer, 24. aprila 2009.godine, 5 Komitet turske asociacije za ljudska prava protivrasizma i diskriminacije je organizovao memorijalni događaju Istambulu pod naslovom ,,Jermenski intelektualci i 24. april1915. godine - bili su uhapšeni, proterani, nisu imali čak nisvoje grobove”. Tom događaju, koji je bio održavan drugugodinu za redom, prisustvovalo je oko 300 ljudi. Organizatoridogađaja su predstavili smrt jermenskih intelektualaca nesamo kao gubitak za jermensku zajednicu, već kao kolektivangubitak za kojim bi trebalo da žale svi građani Istambula.Jedan od organizatora je rekao: ,,Smrt ovih intelektualaca jepredstavljala gubitak ne samo za jermenski jezik, kulturu,misao i naučni svet, već, takođe, i za otomansko društvo u tovreme, kao i za nas i naš svet, koji živimo u njemu danas.” 6Jedan puno javniji napor na razvijanju kulture sećanja jeodržan decembra 2008. godine – kampanja izvinjenja civilnogdruštva. Kampanju su vodili brojni turski akademici,pisci i novinari koji su bili poznati po svom kritičkom stavuprema tezi zvanične Turske u vezi sa ,,jermenskim pitanjem”.Tekst izvinjenja:Moja savest ne prihvata bezosećajnost koja je pokazana iporicanje ogromne katastrofe kojoj su izloženi otomanskiJermeni u 1915. godini. Odbijam tu nepravdu, i, što se menetiče, izražavam empatiju sa osećanjima i bolom moje jermenskebraće. Izvinjavam im se. 7Sa preko 30,000 potpisnika, izvinjenje je izazvalo napetudebatu u Turskoj. Dovelo je do desetak kampanja za antiizvinjenje,koje su započele nacionalističke grupe koje su prikupileviše od 30,000 potpisa. Iako je kampanja za izvinjenjedočekana sa zahvalnošću u nekim jermenskim krugovima,ostali su je gledali sa sumnjom, a jedna tvrda nacionalističkaorganizacija ju je čak odbacila tvrdeći da ako je njihova grupazaista spremna da se izvini, trebalo je da koristi reč ,,genocid”,a ne ,,veliku katastrofu” (Meds Yeghrin) 8 .3 Govier, Trudy (2009): ,,Dijalekt priznanja” u Pomirenje: tranziciona pravda u post-konfliktnim društvima, ur. Joanna R. Quin.Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, strana 49.4 The Economist (2010), ,,Cena rekonstrukcije”, 11. mart 2010.5 24. april je zvanični komemorativni dan u čast žrtava armenijskog genocida.6 Bianet (2009), “220 intelektualaca prognanih 1915“ – komemoracija.7 Engleski prevod teksta turskog izvinjenja za zvaničnog sajta www.ozurdiliyouruz.com.8 Fraza ,,velika katastrofa” je prevod Jermenskog „Meds Yegrin“. Tu frazu je iskoristio predsednik Barack Obama u svom obraćanju od2009. godine tokom komemoracije 24. aprila. Neki Jermeni vide tu frazu kao politički kompromis usmeren ka udovoljavanju Turskoj,čiji je cilj izbegavanje upotrebe reči „genocid“.Fond za humanitarno pravo

Mogućnosti i opcije za restorativnu pravduZaključakRazgovori o normalizaciji između Turske i Jermenijesu počeli fundamentalno da osporavaju dugo negovanaverovanja i ideje o naciji, sebi i drugome, čime su izazvaliponovno osmišljavanje kategorija i pozicija koje suneki stručnjaci tumačili kao statične i okoštale. 9 Taj procesje intenzivirao rasprave i debate u Jermeniji, Turskoj, i uzajednicama jermenske dijaspore širom sveta o prošlosti,sadašnjosti i budućnosti.Ljudi su podstaknuti da ponovo razmisle o svojim ukorenjenimstavovima, a to znači da nekada marginalna iliivična pozicija zastupana od strane disidenata koji supodržavali dijalog, sada postaje manje radikalna ideja, takoda se pojedinci koji se protive dijalogu sve češće definišukao ,,tvrdokorni nacionalisti” ili ,,ivične figure” koji morajuda obrazlože svoje opozicionarstvo da bi učestvovaliu dijalogu. Ali, ja bih pozvala na snažan oprez premapreterano optimističkim procenama trenutnih izgleda zanormalizaciju kao i prema predominantno normativnimprocenama potencijala civilnog društva da popravi odnose.Drugim rečima, treba da prihvatimo masivne promenekoje su se dogodile, ali istovremeno treba da obuzdamonaš entuzijazam u vezi sa brzom normalizacijom. Zato postoje dva razloga. Prvo, kao što postoje oni aktericivilnog društva koji teže stupanju u dijalog i popravljanjuodnosa, postoje takođe i oni koji odbacuju bilo kojuformu približavanja kao vid ustupaka i kapitulacije predneprijateljem. Nacionalističke organizacije sa obe stranegranice nastavljaju da uživaju široku podršku masa. Tozahteva dublju diskusiju i analizu za koju nemam prostorau ovom poglavlju. Drugo, dok inicijative civilnog društvakoje kreću od najširih društvenih slojeva jesu bile važneu omogućavanju veza između ljudi, pružanju prostora zadebatu i izmenu tvrdih stereotipa (bar do neke mere), navladama ostaje da promene politiku, primene institucionalnereforme i uključe se u fundamentalan procesrazrešenja konflikta i izgrađivanja mira, u meri u kojoj tosamo civilno društvo nije u stanju da uradi.Proces pristupanja Evropskoj uniji je imao veoma snažanuticaj na turski politički razvoj – stavio je veći naglasakna jačanje ljudskih prava, demokratiju i vladavinu prava uTurskoj. Evropska komisija vidi ulogu civilnog društva kao,,ključnu u utvrđivanju brzine i kvaliteta procesa pristupanja,kao i generatora javne podrške pristupanju“. 10 Jedanod ispitanika kojeg sam intervjuisala u Turskoj je rekao:Svi sada zaboravljamo da su pregovori o pristupanju EUpromenili sve. Svi duhovi su izašli iz svojih boca. Mek uticajEU je izgurao sve duhove iz Pandorine kutije. 1999. bilo jeskoro nemoguće govoriti o ovim stvarima (o jermenskim ikurdskim pitanjima). Ljudi su skloni da zaborave da je EUglavni vozač koji je otvorio ta pitanja. Nije moguće vratitiduhove u flaše sada. 20. april 2009. godineIako su legislativne reforme sprovedene u okviru zakona oharmonizaciji [EU] dovele do proširenja sloboda kroz amandmaneu ustavu i abolicije određenih zakona, uključujući iizbacivanje smrtne kazne, član 301 Turskog krivičnogzakonika se i dalje koristi za progon pojedinaca, uključujućinovinare i javne intelektualce, koji govore o teškom nasleđutursko-jermenskih odnosa. Ovi akti se tumače ka uvrede,,turskosti”. Pojedinci optuženi prema članu 301 uključuju idobitnika Nobelove nagrade autora Orhana Pamuka, piscaElifa Şafaka, i Hranta Dinta, pokojnog tursko-jermenskognovinara koji je ubijen januara 2007. godine. Tako, dok jeproces turskog približavanja EU doveo do povećane dinamikeunutar turskog civilnog društva i njegove spremnostida se upušta u političke debate, takođe je bilo i ograničenjauticaja EU u normalizaciji tursko-jermenskih odnosa. Dosada, Evropska komisija je prihvatila pristup da se direktnone meša i nevoljna je da se na bilo koji način upušta ilifinansira prekogranične inicijative. U intervjuima i diskusijamasa zvaničnicima komisije u Briselu iz septembra 2009.godine, bilo je jasno da je jedan od razloga te nevoljnostito što je Turska kandidat, a Jermenija član novostvorenogistočnog partnerstva, i da zato oni potpadaju pod različitebudžetske kategorije, što znači da nema zajedničkogbudžeta ili instrumenta koji bi omogućio finansiranjetursko-jermenskih projekata.Tako, dok su inicijative na Balkanu, poput REKOM, imaleogromnu korist od EU podrške, nikakva podrška – nifinansijska ni tehnička – nije predviđena za slučaj podrškenormalizaciji odnosa između Turske i Jermenije. U ovomtrenutku, zamah u vezi sa protokolima je posustao, ali jesituacija i dalje veoma fluidna. Jasno je da će normalizacijabiti dugoročan proces, i samo vreme će reći kako će serazviti.279 Akcam, Taner (2001), „Dijalog preko međunarodne podele: eseji u cilju tursko-jermenskog dijaloga“, Boston, The Zoryan Institute.10 Dijalog sa civilnim društvom, hhtp://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/civil-society-development/index)en.htm.Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav duEvropske integracije i suočavanje sakomunističkom prošlošćuJohn Gledhill28Evropska Unija (EU) je, u najboljem slučaju, bilanekonzistentna u formulisanju svoje strategije za tranzicionupravdu na zapadnom Balkanu. 1 Iako za žaljenje,ta nekonzistentnost je donekle razumljiva; iako su EU iorganizacije koje su joj prethodile možda proizvodi naporana izgradnji mira nakon Drugog svetskog rata, sama EUima malo iskustva kao spoljni graditelj mira. Zapravo, EUgeneralno ima malo iskustva kao spoljno-politički akter.Tako, imajući u vidu da su države zapadnog Balkana vangranica EU, možda ne iznenađuje da Brisel nije bio u stanjuda deluje sa zajedničkim, konzistentnim stavom po pitanjutranzicione pravde u bivšoj Jugoslaviji. Međutim, od 2004.godine, Brisel je sve više bio pozivan da dâ podršku procesimatranzicione pravde unutar granica EU. Konkretno,nakon što se 10 bivših komunističkih država centralnei istočne Evrope pridružilo Uniji 2004. i 2007. godine,Brisel je bio pozvan da predvodi kolektivno suočavanje sakomunističkom prošlošću u novim državama članicama.U ovom kratkom radu istražujem uticaj evropskih integracijana napore usmerene ka suočavanju sa komunističkomprošlošću u centralnoj i istočnoj Evropi (CIE). Konkretno,dokumentujem uticaj evropske regionalizacije na vidljivosti intenzitet dve forme istorijskog suočavanja: društvenei kulturne projekte usmerene ka oblikovanju kolektivnihsećanja na komunizam, i zakonske projekte usmereneka ispravljanju navodnih nepravdi komunističke vladavine.U oba slučaja dolazim do zaključka da je EU bilanevoljna da započne ili sa vrha rukovodi suočavanjem sakomunističkom prošlošću širom Evrope. Međutim, evropskeintegracije su ipak poslužile kao podstrek procesimaistorijskog suočavanja u CIE, obzirom da su omogućileanti-komunističkim aktivistima da ad hoc pristupe resursimaevropskih institucija (resursima organizacija EU, alii ostalih regionalnih organizacija). Ovi evropski finansijskii politički resursi su zatim omogućili zastupnicima istorijskogsuočavanja u državama CIE da udahnu novi životprojektima koji su započeti na nacionalnom nivou, alisu poklekli suočeni sa lokalnim finansijskim i političkimograničenjima.Evropska integracija i komemoracija komunističkeprošlostiNaniže: od Brisela do država članicaKao što je izneto, EU je uglavnom bila nevoljna da započneili razvija bilo kakve društvene ili kulturne projekte usmerenesa vrha koji bi promovisali izgradnju pan-evropskogsećanja na komunističku vlast u CIE. Stav Evropskekomisije je da je komemoracija prošlosti pitanje kojimtreba da se bave države članice EU, ukoliko to žele, podsopstvenim uslovima i – što je možda najvažnije – svojimnovcem. Takav stav je očigledan u odgovorima predstavnikaEvropske komisije na pozive komisiji da započne, rukovodii finansira raznovrsne projekte sećanja (pan-evropskekomemorativne praznike, muzeje, konferencije, obrazovneprograme et alia). Konkretno, suočen sa takvim zahtevima,bivši potpredsednik Evropske komisije, Jacques Barrot,izjavio je da ,,starije zemlje članice treba u većoj meri1 Pogledati Strategija tranzicione pravde EU – praznine i prilike Dicka Oostinga, Od ad hoc mera do strategije suočavanja sa prošlošćuVesne Teršelič, EU i tranziciona pravda: od retributivne do restorativne pravde na zapadnom Balkanu koji je uredila DenisaKostoviceva (Fond za humanitarno pravo, Beograd, 2009. godine).Fond za humanitarno pravo

Mogućnosti i opcije za restorativnu pravduda budu svesne tragične prošlosti novih država članica”.Međutim, on je takođe bio čvrst u svom stavu da je ,,na svakojdržavi članici da pronađe sopstveni način za bavljenjepitanjem sećanja na... [zločine totalitarnog režima]”. 2 JanFigel, bivši predstavnik Evropske komisije za obrazovanje,obuku, kulturu i omladinu, iskoristio je slične argumentekada je bio pozvan da učestvuje u parlamentarnoj raspravio ,,evropskoj savesti i totalitarizmu”. U toku te rasprave,Figel je potvrdio potrebu za podizanjem svesti o zločinimakomunizma, ali je naglasio i da je ,,naravno, na državamačlanicama da pronađu sopstveni način kojim će krenutinapred” u izgradnji kolektivnih sećanja na komunističkuprošlost. Komisija će podržati lokalne projekte suočavanjasa prošlošću, ali neće aktivno rukovoditi bilo kakvimkomemorativnim programima. 3Naviše: od država članica do Brisela (i Strazbura)Uprkos nevoljnosti Brisela da započne projekte kolektivnogsećanja, pristupanje država CIE Evropskoj Uniji jeipak dovelo do oživljavanja društvenih i kulturnih projekatanegovanja kolektivnog suočavanja sa komunističkomprošlošću – usmerenih naviše. Pristupanje EU je dalopodstrek revitalizaciji projekata sećanja koji su originalnoosmišljeni ili implementirani na nacionalnom nivou, alisu zatim utihnuli, suočeni sa raznim lokalnim izazovima.Tamo gde su ti izazovi bili u formi nedostatka lokalnogfinansiranja za projekte suočavanja sa prošlošću, ad hocpristup sredstvima EU je pružio ekonomski podstrek kojije bio neophodan za ponovno pokretanje komemorativnihprojekata. Tamo gde su ti izazovi bili u formi težnji bivšihkomunističkih elita da uguše nacionalnu raspravu o potrebisuočavanja sa prošlošću, pristup Evropskom parlamentu jeposlužio stvaranju novog foruma za raspravu. I, tamo gde suizazovi bili ukorenjeni u opštoj javnoj apatiji prema pozivimaza komemoracijom komunističke prošlosti, mogućnostpristupanja EU je poslužila delimičnom preokretanjute apatije, stvarajući normativan kontekst koji je podrazumevaoda se sa nasleđem komunističke prošlosti trebasuočiti odmah, kako bi se prigrlila ,,evropska” budućnost.Obradiću nakratko svaki od tih izazova na nacionalnomnivou, i njegova trans-nacionalna rešenja.Izgradnja kolektivnih sećanja na prošlost je skup proces;potrebno je unajmiti istraživače, finansirati konferencije,osmisliti obrazovne programe i tekstove, i izgraditi javnememorijale. Troškovi u vezi sa tom vrstom projekatabi opteretili budžet bilo koje države, a za ograničenebudžete država CIE, takvi komemorativni projekti bi predstavljalinemoguće zahteve. Kao posledica toga, većiniprojekata sećanja u CIE na nacionalnom nivou je donedavnododeljivana samo minimalna državna podrška, štoje dovelo do toga da oni budu suočeni sa konstantnimfinansijskim izazovima. Međutim, evropska integracija jeomogućila lokalnim istraživačima i zastupnicima kolektivnekomemoracije da delimično prevaziđu te izazove,tako što im je otvorila nove izvore finansiranja. Jedan takavizvor je Evropska komisija. Iako je komisija bila obazrivapri pružanju sistematske podrške projektima kolektivnogsećanja, nacionalni istraživački instituti, poput rumunskogInstituta za istraživanje zločina komunizma (IIZKR), 4 bilisu u mogućnosti da ad hoc pristupe sredstvima komisije,postavljajući konkretne projekte u okvir kulturnih programai prijavljujući se zatim za sredstva iz kulturnog i obrazovnogbudžeta komisije, ili budžeta predstavnika komisije udržavama CIE. IIZKR je takođe dobio i sredstva za podrškuorganizaciji takmičenja u okviru kog se od učenika srednjihškola tražilo da odgovore na pitanje: ,,Šta komunizam značiza mene?” Dodatna ad hoc podrška komisije projektimaIIZKR/IIZKRPRE bila je dodeljena 2010. godine. 5 Iako su tasredstva do sada bila prilično skromna i obezbeđivana samoza pojedinačne projekte, grantovi EU mogli bi da postanupouzdan izvor finansiranja. 6Drugi novi izvor sredstava za projekte kolektivnog sećanjase pojavio kada su države CIE bile na položaju rotirajućegpredsedništva Saveta Evropske unije – kao što je bio slučajsa Slovenijom 2008. godine i Češkom republikom 2009.292 Jacques Barrot, komentari izneti tokom ,,predložene sednice Komisije o zločinima genocida, zločinima protiv čovečnosti i ratnimzločinima počinjenim od strane totalitarnih režima”, (Evropski parlament, Strazbur, 21. april 2008. godine). Dostupno na adresi: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20080421+ITEM-015+DOC+XML+V0//EN.3 Jan Figel. komentari izneti tokom rasprave u Evropskom parlamentu o ,,evropskoj savesti i totalitarizmu”. (Evropski parlament,Strazbur, 25. mart 2009. godine). Dostupno na adresi: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20090325+ITEM-010+DOC+XML+V0//EN.4 Institut je kasnije preimenovan u Institut za za istraživanje zločina komunizma i sećanja Rumuna u egzilu (IIZKRPRE).5 Pogledati stranicu rumunskog Instituta za istraživanje zločina komunizma: http://www.crimelecomunismului.ro/ro/proiecte/proiecte_educationale/elevi/concursuri.6 Na osnovu komentara Raluce Grosescu, šef Kancelarije za dokumentaciju i istraživanje pri IIZKR, Bukurešt. Intervju sa autorom od30. jula 2009. godine.Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav du30godine. U oba slučaja, vlade tih država su odvojile značajnasredstva za kulturne i društvene događaje koji su trebali dabudu održani tokom šest meseci njihovog predsedavanja. I,u oba slučaja, anti-komunistički aktivisti su lobirali da deotih sredstava bude odvojen za društvene i kulturne projekteusmerene ka komemoraciji komunističke prošlosti. 7Lobiranje je bilo posebno efikasno u slučaju Češke, irezultat je bio značajan porast u podršci inicijativamakoje je predložio češki Institut za studije o totalitarnimrežimima u toku prvih šest meseci 2009. godine. 8 Naprimer, u martu 2009. godine, Institut je dobio sredstva zaorganizovanje dva javna saslušanja u saradnji sa Evropskimparlamentom - ,,Kako Evropa treba da izađe na kraj sasvojim totalitarnim nasleđem?” i ,,Naša zajednička istorija:zajednička evropska platforma”. Institut je takođe dobiosredstva i za organizovanje dodatnih konferencija u Pragukoje su se bavile sećanjem, kao i za organizovanje nekolikoizložbi i publikacija koje su komemorisale zločine komunizma.Iako je neposredni porast u aktivnostima suočavanjaopao sa okončanjem češkog predsedavanja u julu 2009.godine, očekuje se da će litvansko (2013) predsedavanje bitiizloženo sličnom pritisku anti-komunističkih aktivista dapruži podršku društvenim i kulturnim projektima usmerenimka podizanju svesti o komunističkoj prošlosti. 9Evropske integracije nisu samo pružile finansijski podstrekprojektima kolektivnog sećanja, već su u formi Evropskogparlamenta otvorile i jedan novi, trans-nacionalni forum zajavnu debatu o potrebi za suočavanjem sa komunističkomprošlošću. Pristup takvom forumu je važan jer su vremenombivši komunistički aktivisti u nekim državama CIEpokušali da spreče ili diskredituju rasprave o komunističkojprošlosti na nacionalnom nivou. U Rumuniji, na primer,relativno brojne bivše komunističke elite, koje i dalje sedeu parlamentu, uložile su velike napore kako bi ugušilejavnu raspravu o komunističkoj prošlosti – posežući čak iza fizičkim i verbalnim nasiljem kada su učinjeni pokušajida se komunizam osudi pred rumunskim parlamentom2006. godine. 10 Evropske integracije su omogućile onimakoji su se zalagali za komemoraciju zločina komunizma dazaobiđu tu vrstu političke opozicije na nacionalnom nivou,pružajući im pristup podijumu Evropskog parlamenta (iparlamentarnoj skupštini Saveta Evrope). Do sada su uEvropskom parlamentu održane dve rasprave o potrebiza osudom i komemoracijom zločina komunizma - jednau aprilu 2008, druga u martu 2009. godine. U oba slučaja,situacija je bila daleko od opšte saglasnosti poslanika opitanju da li komunizam treba zvanično osuditi, i još daljeod saglasnosti o tome da li takva osuda treba da budeizrečena na evropskom nivou. Uprkos tome, za poslanikeEvropskog parlamenta iz centralne i istočne Evrope, poputIstvana Szent-Ivanyia (Mađarska) i Laszla Tokesa (Rumunija),samo prenošenje debate o zločinima komunizma natrans-nacionalni nivo predstavljalo je poželjan razvoj, jerje time dat novi glas njihovim pozivima za suočavanjemsa prošlošću – pozivima koji delimično nisu bili čuti ilisaslušani na nacionalnom nivou. 11Kako komunistička prošlost postaje sve udaljenija, takođepostaje i sve manje jasno zašto na pozive za komemoracijomkomunizma treba odgovoriti odmah. Oni koji aktivnopodržavaju suočavanje sa komunističkom prošlošću udržavama CIE bili su suočeni sa izazovom prevazilaženjaapatije u lokalnoj javnosti prema njihovim zahtevima.Evropska integracija je generisala normativan kontekst uokviru kojeg je ta apatija delimično osporena, tako da sunapori na izgradnji kolektivnog sećanja o komunističkojprošlosti na kraju bili shvaćeni kao neka vrsta političkogprioriteta. Konkretno, kada su države CIE pristupile EvropskojUniji, izgrađen je normativan pritisak oko ideje daevropska budućnost ne može biti efektivno prihvaćenasve dok se ne reši komunistička prošlost. Rumunski slučajgovori o načinu na koji je taj normativan pritisak poslužioda pokrene inače samrtne pokušaje istorijskog suočavanjana nacionalnom nivou.Tokom 16 godina koje su prethodile pristupanju RumunijeEU, kulturni i istorijski projekti koji su bili usmereni na7 Slovenačko predsedavanje je, na primer, organizovalo javno evropsko saslušanje o ,,zločinima počinjenim od strane totalitarnihrežima” i proizvelo propratAni materijal od 316 strana koji je dostupan na adresi: http://www.arhiv.mp.gov.si/fileadmin/mp.gov.si/pageuploads/2005/PDF/publikacije/Crimes_committed_by_Totalitarian_Regimes.pdf8 Za spisak događaja koje je priredio Institut tokom perioda češkog predsedavanja pogledati: http://www.ustrcr.cz/en/activities-eu.9 Zoltan Dujisin, ,,Komunistička ideologija, podjednako loša kao i nacizam?”, Inter pres servis, 6. april 2009. godine. Dostupno na adresi:http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=46407.10 ,,Vadim Tudor a încercat să-i dea afară din lojă pe Patapievici şi Pleşu”, Realitatea.net, 18. decembar 2006. godine. Dostupno na adresi:http://www.realitatea.net/vadim-tudor-a-incercat-sa-i-dea-afara-din-loja-pe-patapievici-si-plesu_31331.html.11 Pogledati govore u okviru debate o ,,Evropskoj savesti i totalitarizmu”, Evropski parlament, Strazbur, 25. mart 2009. godine.Kompletan transkript debate je dostupan na adresi: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20090325+ITEM-010+DOC+XML+V0//EN.Fond za humanitarno pravo

Mogućnosti i opcije za restorativnu pravdubavljenje komunističkom prošlošću su u Rumuniji bili retki,uglavnom zato što su bivše komunističke elite i dalje držaleprominentne položaje u post-komunističkim vladama. 12Međutim, kada je priključivanje EU 2006. godine biloizvesno, počeo je da se stvara javni konsenzus oko ideje dapoglavlje o komunizmu treba zatvoriti, pre nego što budemoguće otvoriti poglavlje o ,,evropskoj” budućnosti Rumunije.U tom normativnom kontekstu, predsednik i premijerRumunije su, obojica, 2006. godine preduzeli nagle korakekako bi demonstrirali svoju privrženost rešavanju tekućegnasleđa komunističke vladavine. Konkretno, u razmaku odsamo parmeseci, predsednik Traian Basescu i premijer CalinPopescu-Tariceanu su obojica uspostavili istraživačke projektevelikih razmera - ,,Komisija za analizu komunističkediktature u Rumuniji” koju je podržao predsednik, i IIZKRkoji je podržala vlada. Kada je reč o predsedničkoj komisiji,potreba za suočavanjem sa prošlošću, kako bi se prihvatilabudućnost, bila je očigledna u planu rada komisije i prirodiBasescuove prezentacije Konačnog izveštaja komisije.Uprkos tome što je zadatak stvaranja zvanične istorijekomunizma u Rumuniji bio ogroman, komisiji je datosamo šest meseci da iznese svoje nalaze, jer je krajnji rokza objavljivanje Konačnog izveštaja odabran kako bi prethodiopristupanju Rumunije EU 1. januara 2007. godine.Odobravajući Konačni izveštaj 18. decembra 2006. godine,Predsednik Basescu je govorio o potrebi Rumuna kao,,budućih građana Evropske Unije” da se izbore sa ,,otvorenomranom” komunističke prošlosti zemlje. 13 Obziromda je predstojalo pristupanje EU, njegova komisija se tomranom bavila na brzinu, ali se ipak jeste njom bavila.Kao što u opštim crtama sugerišem iznad, evropske integracijesu pružile zastupnicima tekućeg suočavanja sakomunističkom prošlošću skup tranzicionih alatki zaprevazilaženje nekih od ekonomskih, političkih i normativnihizazova sa kojima su bili suočeni u ostvarivanju svojihprojekata suočavanja na nacionalnom nivou. Svakako se činida su sami zastupnici suočavanja postali svesni prilika kojeevropske integracije predstavljaju za njihove projekte. Tasvest je bila očigledna na konferenciji o ,,evropskoj savestii komunizmu”, održanoj u Pragu juna 2008. godine. Većinaonih koji su prisustvovali konferenciji je dugo pozivala nasuočavanje s komunističkom prošlošću u svojim matičnimzemljama. Međutim, oni su u Pragu izabrali da kolektivnopreusmere svoj fokus sa nacionalnog nivoa ka trans-nacionalnomnivou. Potreba za komemoracijom zločina komunizmanije više bila predstavljana kao nacionalna obaveza,koja zahteva podršku na nacionalnom nivou. Umestotoga, zvanična tema konferencije je bila da je ,,komunizamzajedničko evropsko nasleđe... [i da] Evropa ne može bitiujedinjena sve dok ne prihvati svoju zajedničku prošlost ishvati svoju zajedničku odgovornost”. 14 Dvodnevni simpozijumje kulminirao objavljivanjem Praške deklaracije –dokumenta koju su potpisali renomirani anti-komunističkiaktivisti poput pokojnog Václava Havela i (sadašnjegpredsednika Nemačke) Joachima Gaucka, u kom su iznetesmernice za suočavanje sa komunističkom prošlošću uokviru evropskog konteksta. 15Evropske integracije i zakonsko suočavanje sakomunističkom prošlošćuNaniže: od Brisela i Strazbura do država članicaKao što se Evropska Unija pokazala nevoljnom da sa vrhainicira bilo kakve društvene i kulturne programe usmereneka negovanju kolektivnih sećanja na komunizam, tako sui evropske institucije odbile da implementiraju programeusmerene naniže, ka promociji sistematskog zakonskogsuočavanja sa komunističkom prošlošću. Zapravo, evropskeinstitucije su u nekoliko prilika preduzele korake kakobi aktivno obeshrabrile konkretne procese tranzicionepravde u državama članicama i državama koje pretendujuna članstvo. Na primer, Evropski savet, Evropski parlamenti evropski sekundarni regionalni akteri (Savet Evrope iOEBS) su svi zauzeli čvrste stavove protiv uvođenja oštrihzakona o lustraciji u Poljskoj i Albaniji.U Poljskoj, Konzervativna partija prava i pravde je 2007.godine predložila zakon o proveri koji je zahtevao od svihPoljaka na ,,položajima od javnog poverenja” da sačineafidavite u kojima će detaljno opisati svoju kolaboraci-3112 Vladimir Tismaneanu, ,,Demokratija i sećanje: Rumunija se suočava sa svojom komunističkom prošlošću”, Anali američke akademijepolitičkih i društvenih nauka, tom 617, br.1 (maj 2008): str. 166-180.13 ,,Discursul preşedintelui României, Traian Băsescu, prilejuit de Prezentarea Raportului Comisiei Prezidenţiale pentruAnaliza Dictaturii Comuniste din România”, 18. decembar 2006. godine. Dostupno na adresi: http://www.presidency.ro/?_RID=det&tb=date&id=8288&_PRID=ag.14 Evropska savest i komuniza, Senat Parlamenta Češke Republike, 2-3. jun 2008. godine, naslovna strana.15 Ceo tekst Praške deklaracije se nalazi na adresi: http://www.victimsofcommunism.org/media/article.php?article=3849Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav du32ju (ili nedostatak iste) sa poljskom tajnom policijom izkomunističke ere. Domet zakona je bio dubok; procenjujese da je preko 700,000 Poljaka iz javnog i privatnogsektora bilo obuhvaćeno proverom. Svakome ko je odbioda sarađuje bilo je zabranjeno da ostane na položaju ,,odjavnog poverenja” na 10 godina. 16 Nedugo nakon objavljivanja,i Savet Evrope i Evropski parlament su izneli jakeprimedbe na taj zakon. Predstavnik Komisije za ljudskaprava Saveta Evrope, Thomas Hammarberg, izjavio je daobim i invazivnost zakona fundamentalno podrivaju individualnaprava Poljaka. 17 Članovi Evropskog parlamentasu na sličan način bili zabrinuti oko implikacija zakona uvezi sa radnim pravima Poljaka. Takođe su izrazili zabrinutosti u vezi sa primenom zakona van granica Poljske,obzirom da su, bar na papiru, poljski građani zaposleni uevropskim institucijama u Briselu i Strazburu takođe bilipodložni procesu provere. Kada je jedan poljski poslanik uEvropskom parlamentu, Bronislaw Geremek, bio suočen samogućnošću da bude uklonjen sa svog evropskog položajazato što je odbio da sarađuje sa drakonskim procesom provere(jer je prethodno već nekoliko puta bio pod istragompoljskih vlasti i oslobođen optužbi), članovi Evropskog parlamentasu se usprotivili. 18 Taj protest, zajedno sa primedbamaSaveta Evrope, ohrabrio je protivnike zakona o proveriu Poljskoj, i, nakon što je iznet pred poljski Ustavni sud,zakon je poništen.U nešto skorijoj prošlosti, Evropski savet i Savet Evrope suse, oba, snažno usprotivili pokušajima vlade Sali Berisheda uvede takozvani lustrativni zakon o ,,čistim rukama” uAlbaniji. Taj zakon, koji je prvi put objavljen krajem 2008.godine, trebalo je da dâ vladi diskreciona ovlašćenja daotpusti bilo kog tužioca ili sudiju koji je bio na tom položajutokom komunističke vladavine u Albaniji. Iako su sličnizakoni o lustraciji bili doneti u ostalim zemljama CIE ranihdevedesetih godina, postojale su zabrinutosti o političkimmotivima iza albanskog zakona, jer je Berisha imao istorijuperiodičnog čišćenja državne administracije od potencijalnihpolitičkih protivnika. Ta zabrinutost se odrazila krozopštu osudu od strane evropskih institucija koja je pratilaobjavljivanje tog zakona. Evropski Savet je odmah izdaodemarš kojim je ,,ohrabrivao vladu Albanije da razmotrizakonske i političke posledice zakona o lustraciji”. 19 OEBSje otvoreno zauzeo stav da ,,zakon krši nekoliko članova[albanskog] ustava”. 20 Takve stavove je zauzeo i SavetEvrope, identifikujući konkretne probleme u zakonu, poputnedostatka vremenskog ograničenja lustracije i preteranooštrih sankcija predviđenih za one koji su procenjeni kao,,prekršioci”. 21 Iako je Berisha inicijalno iz mesta odbaciotakve evropske kritike, zakon je kasnije poslat albanskomUstavnom sudu na pregled.Naviše: od država članica do StrazburaKao i u području kolektivnih sećanja, iako su evropske institucijeodbile da ponude podršku usmerenu sa vrha zakonskomi sudskom suočavanju sa prošlošću, ima indikacija daevropske integracije služe oživljavanju dugo odlaganih procesatranzicione pravde - ka vrhu, naviše. Konkretno, tamogde su zakonski izazovi u vezi sa komunističkom prošlošćupokrenuti na nacionalnom nivou, ali su zatim bili zaustavljenizbog neefikasnosti ili politizacije nacionalnog sudstva,lokalni akteri su delimično bili u stanju da prevaziđu tebarijere prenoseći svoje zahteve za pravdom na evropskinivo. Podnosioci zahteva su do sada bili u stanju da prenesudve vrste slučajeva na Evropski sud za ljudska prava u Strazburu:slučajeve povreda ljudskih prava počinjenih tokomperioda komunističke vladavine i tranzicije iz komunizma;i slučajeve u vezi sa povraćajem imovine koja je bila konfiskovanaod strane države pod komunizmom.Nekoliko krivičnih slučajeva i slučajeva povreda ljudskihprava je preneto na evropski nivo iz Rumunije – na primer,tamo gde su postojale lokalne barijere procesuiranju prijavau vezi za zločinima počinjenim tokom krvave revolucije u16 Cynthia Horne, ,,Kasni programi lustracije u Rumuniji i Poljskoj: podrška ili podrivanje demokratskih tranzicija”, Demokratizacija, 16:2(april 2009. godine) str. 344-376.17 ,,Procena napretka učinjenog na implementaciji preporuka Saveta Evrope iz 2002. godine, predstavnik komisije za ljudska prava”, SavetEvrope, CommDH(2007)13, Strazbur, 20. jun 2007. godine. Dostupno na adresi: https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1155005&Site=COE#P423_71145; Thomas Hammarberg, ,,Lustracija ne sme da se pretvori u osvetu nad bivšim kolaboratorima”, pogledi Saveta Evrope,19. mart 2007. godine.18 ,,Rasprava o mandatu poljskog poslanika Bronislawa Geremeka”, Evropski parlament, 25. april 2007. godine. Dostupno na adresi:http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&type=IM-PRESS&reference=20070425IPR05853.19` ,,Deklaracija Predsedništva u ime EU o albanskom zakonu o lustraciji”, Savet Evropske Unije, 6481/09 (Presse 40) Brisel, 13. februar2009. godine. Dostupno na adresi: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/106063.pdf.20 ,,OEBS: Albanski zakon o lustraciji je neustavan”, Pogledi na Balkan, 16. januar 2009. godine. Dostupno na adresi: http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/15625/.21 ,,Savet Evrope osuđuje albanski zakon o lustraciji”, Pogledi na Balkan, 16. januar 2009. godine. Dostupno na adresi: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/council-of-europe-pans-albania-lustration-law.Fond za humanitarno pravo

Mogućnosti i opcije za restorativnu pravdutoj zemlji iz decembra 1989. godine. Posle 20 godina odbijanjadržavnih tužilaca da prihvate kompromis, jedna nevladinaorganizacija koja zastupa interese ,,revolucionara” jenedavno podnela formalnu prijavu protiv države RumunijeEvropskom sudu za ljudska prava (ESLJP). U toj prijavi jenavedeno da je žrtvama revolucije uskraćeno pravo danjihovi slučajevi budu razrešeni u ,,razumnom roku” – štoje pravo garantovano Članom 6 Evropske konvencije oljudskim pravima. ESLjP je presudio u korist podnosilacatužbe, kaznio državu Rumuniju sa 20,000 evra i pozvao dase preduzmu koraci na otvaranju dosijea o revoluciji. 22 Kaoodgovor, rumunska vlada se složila da otvori sve dosijee idokumente u vezi sa revolucijom.Pravni tim iz rumunskog IIZKRPRE takođe razmatra da naevropskom nivou iznese optužbe za zlostavljanja od stranepripadnika rumunske tajne policije iz komunističke ere,Securitate-e. Takva promena nivoa je možda neophodna,obzirom da je u Rumuniji nastupila statutarna ograničenja(zastarelost) zločina počinjenih pod komunističkom vladavinom,i zato se za slučajeve poput slučaja Vasilea Paraschiva,koji optužuje Securitate za zlostavljanje u trajanjuod 20 godina, više ne može suditi lokalno. Međutim, predESLjP ne postoji zastarevanje slučajeva koji su u vezi sapovredama ljudskih prava ili zločinima protiv čovečnosti.Na taj način, ukoliko pravni tim IIZKRPRE bude u stanju dapostavi svoje optužbe u okvir jezika povreda ljudskih prava,biće u stanju da iznese te slučajeve pred ESLjP, i time oživisvoje napore na ostvarivanju retributivne pravde za zločinekomunizma. 23Rumuni su takođe bili u mogućnosti da iskoriste pristupESLjP kao osnovu za osiguravanje restitucije imovine kojaje nacionalizovana pod komunizmom. Rumunija se tokomdevedesetih godina pokazala kao zemlja koja u toj oblastikasni, jer njene vlade nisu donosile efektivne zakone orestituciji, a čak su i intervenisale kako bi blokirale sudskeprocese koji su bili usmereni na rešavanje slučajeva u vezisa povraćajem imovine. Suočena sa tom blokadom, grupaRumuna je odlučila da iznese svoje slučajeve pred ESLjP,koji je, između 2002. i 2004. godine, saslušao 58 rumunskihzahteva za restitucijom. U većini slučajeva, ESLjP jepresudio u korist podnosilaca zahteva i državi Rumuniji jenaređeno da isplati ukupno 4.6 miliona evra kao kompenzacijuonima čija imovina je bila nacionalizovana. 24Zaključak: Evropeizacija i homogenizacijaprošlosti?Ovaj kratki pregled uticaja evropskih integracija na procesedruštvenog i zakonskog suočavanja sa komunističkomprošlošću u centralnoj i istočnoj Evropi je ukazao na jedanjasan trend - iako je Evropska Unija bila nevoljna da povedenapore na suočavanju sa komunističkom prošlošću u zemljamaCIE, pojedinci i organizacije unutar zemalja CIE subili u stanju da ad hoc uvuku evropske institucije u naporeistorijskog suočavanja. Neposredna posledica tog trenda jebila ukupni porast vidljivosti projekata suočavanja u centralnoji istočnoj Evropi.Dugoročne uticaje evropskih integracija na suočavanja sakomunističkom prošlošću je teže izmeriti, ali ima naznakada istorijsko suočavanje u okviru evropskog kontekstamože da služi ,,homogenizaciji” kolektivnog sećanja nakomunističke vladavine u zemljama CIE. Da bi zastupniciistorijskog suočavanja u državama CIE bili u stanju danastave da koriste podršku evropskih institucija u svojimprojektima suočavanja, moraće da nastave procespostavljanja nasleđa komunizma u okvire zajedničkog,,,evropskog” tereta, koji zahteva zajedničku, ,,evropskupodršku”. Takav okvir, koji je jasno iskorišćen u Praškojdeklaraciji, zahteva konstantno naglašavanje zajedničkihosobina komunističke vladavine širom Evrope, i konstantnuminimalizaciju ogromnih razlika koje su postojale međutim sistemima. Efekat tih procesa je zamena shvatanja finihmeđusobnih razlika koje su karakterisale komunističkuvladavinu u Mađarskoj, Poljskoj, Čehoslovačkoj i Rumuniji– jednim opštim, tupim shvatanjem komunizma kaohomogenog oblika vlasti, koji se prostirao preko celecentralne i istočne Evrope. Za zemlje CIE koje sada delezajedničku, trans-nacionalnu budućnost, svakako postojikorist u prepoznavanju zajedničkih osobina svojih različitihautoritarnih prošlosti. Međutim, bilo bi za žaljenje ukolikobi to prepoznavanje za cenu imalo gubitak suptilnih razlikau kolektivnim sećanjima komunističkog autoritarizma itotalitarizma u centralnoj i istočnoj Evropi između 1945. i1989. godine.3322 ,,România a fost condamnată la CEDO pentru ,,osarul Revoluţiei”, Realitatea TV Online, 8. decembar 2009. godine. Dostupno naadresi: http://www.realitatea.net/romania-a-fost-condamnata-la-cedo-pentru-dosarul-revolutiei_691071.html.23 Vidi raspravu kod Mirela Corlăţan, “Rechizitoriu inutil pentru torţionarul Enoiu?”, Evenimentul zilei, 30. Jun 2010. godine. Dostupnona adresi: http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/rechizitoriu-inutil-pentru-tortionarul-enoiu-899431.html.24 Lavania Stan, ,,Krov nad našim glavama: restitucija imovine u Rumuniji”, Dnevnik komunističkih studija i tranziciona politika, broj 22:2(jun 2006. godine): 180-205.Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav duKomisije za istinu iz latinsko-američkeperspektive: izazovi i lekcijeEduardo Gonzalez34Potraga za istinom i sećanjem se trenutno smatrajuključnim elementima post-konfliktne rekonstrukcije1 . Postojalo je puno komisija za istinu širom sveta, ipraktično u svakom post-konfliktnom prostoru, institucijepoput Ujedinjenih nacija (UN) i Evropske Unije (EU) supodržavale te institucije. Trenutno se vode pregovori uNepalu o uspostavljanju komisije za istinu. Postoji jednakomisija za istinu koja započinje svoje aktivnosti u Keniji,jedna na Solomonskim ostrvima, i jedna u Kanadi, koja ćese baviti nasilnom asimilacijom starosedelačke indijanskepopulacije u toj zemlji. 2To nije samo praktičan proces, već, takođe, i normativan:razvoj i prihvatanje načela da postoji ,,pravo na istinu” jevažna činjenica koju treba uzeti u obzir. Deklaracija UN opravu je usvojena u Savetu za ljudska prava, koji je pozvaozemlje koje su pretrpele konflikte da razviju svoje pristupetom pravu žrtava povreda ljudskih prava. To pravo jepriznato i u pravnoj nauci specifičnih ustavnih i vrhovnihsudova širom sveta.Pravo na istinu podrazumeva pravo da se sazna šta se dogodilo,činjenice, posledice, kontekst povreda ljudskih prava,i za direktne žrtve, ali i za njihove zajednice: ono što je upočetku nastalo, u međunarodnom humanitarnom pravu,kao pravo porodice pojedinca da sazna lokaciju ili sudbinunestale osobe, evoluiralo je u pravo društva, u komesu se dogodile masovne zloupotrebe. To pravo, zajednosa priznanjem žrtava, nosi sa sobom takođe i obaveze zadržave – da se bore protiv poricanja, protiv revizionizma,da čuvaju istorijsku bazu za sećanja.To je, svakako, jedan kompleksan koncept. Postoji punoslojeva istine, i puno verzija istine. Ono što članovi komisijau čuvenom dictumu kanadskog pisca Michaela Ignatieffarade je ,,smanjivanje polja dopustivih laži”, što znači da,makar, osiguravaju da ogromne laži ili poricanja povredaljudskih prava ne dobijaju podijum tako lako. Ono štokomisije za istinu rade je omogućavanje žrtvama da podelesvoja iskustva, i pronađu, u tome što su sve zajedno žrtve,mogućnost da potvrde određene nove demokratske vrednostiu istoriji, sada očišćene od bilo kakvog opravdavanjabrutalnosti.Komisije za istinu su organizovane u mnogim zemljama,međutim, one su i dalje veoma mlade institucije. Prva istragakoju prepoznajemo kao ,,komisiju za istinu i pomirenje”bila je Nacionalna komisija o nestalim osobama u Argentini,koja je uspostavljena pre više od 25 godina. Pošto sumlade, one su i dalje veoma plastične institucije. Na primer,fleksibilne su i prilagodljive konkretnim lokalnim situacijama.Zato koncept i model komisije za istinu primenjen uJužnoj Africi, na primer, nikada nije mogao biti primenjen uČileu, ili u Gvatemali, a svakako ne na zapadnom Balkanu.Komisije za istinu su i dalje dovoljno fleksibilan instrumentza civilno društvo i političare da bi ih dizajnirali na načinna koji možda reflektuje prave potrebe žrtava i političkog1 Kao učesnik procesa peruanske Komisije za istinu i pomirenje, uspostavljene po padu Alberta Fujimorija, autor predstavlja latinskoameričkuperspektivu tranzicione pravde.2 U pitanju su komisije koje su osnovane tokom 2008, i 2009. godine i već tada su započele sa svojim radom. (prim.ur.)Fond za humanitarno pravo

Mogućnosti i opcije za restorativnu pravduprocesa pomirenja: komisije za istinu, za razliku od suđenja,bile su veoma otvorene prema ulozi civilnog društva da ihmodeluje prema svojim potrebama.Istovremeno, treba da prepoznamo kako su neke komisijeza istinu zapravo bile neuspešne u ostvarivanju svojihciljeva. Neke komisije za istinu su pokrenute u situacijamabez preduslova za njihov uspeh. Videli smo bolanneuspeh napora da se stvori komisija za istinu i pomirenjeu Demokratskoj Republici Kongo, posle mirovnih sporazuma,jer je uspostavljanje komisije uključivalo predstavnikeratnih komandanata, i žrtve nisu bile u stanju da verujutakvom naporu. Takođe smo videli i neuspeh indonežanskekomisije za istinu. Rezultujući zakon je bio toliko faličan,da je zakon kojim je uspostavljena komisija konačno bioodbačen pred ustavnim sudom te zemlje.Neki preduslovi moraju biti uzeti u obzir kako bi seuspešno uspostavila komisija za istinu. Potrebno je dapostoji minimum političke spremnosti: političari, oni koji utome imaju svoje uloge – svi oni treba da imaju priliku daizrade konsenzus oko ideje potrage za istinom, i moraće daveruju da će institucija koja će biti stvorena biti dovoljnoobjektivna, dovoljno neutralna, i dovoljno profesionalna dasasluša sve njihove glasove. Komisija u začetku treba da imapodršku civilnog društva, i zato, ono što se događa sada saREKOM-om je fundamentalno – civilno društvo zapadnogBalkana pokušava da iskorači izvan tradicionalnih grupaorganizacija za ljudska prava, mirovnih pokreta i udruženjažrtava, i da se obrate jedni drugima, i drugim institucijamai stanovništvu.Komisije za istinu su obično stvarane u demokratskomproleću, u periodima aktuelne socijalne mobilizacije. Posletog prozora i prilike njihovo stvaranje može biti teže. Zatoje potrebno malo više podrške da bi se zaista ušlo u proceskonsultacije koji će mobilizovati ostale sektore. To zahtevaradni mandat, realistične parametre istrage, kako se nebi stvorila institucija koja je prekomplikovana za vođenjekonkretnih istraga, i koja će biti u stanju da na vreme sačiniizveštaj i dâ preporuke.Sa tim na umu, REKOM je suočen sa veoma konkretnimi do sada neviđenim izazovima. Nikada nije postojalaautentična komisija uspostavljena na nivou više zemalja.Komisije za istinu su, klasično, institucije jedne zemlje,stvorene kako bi se bavile specifičnim situacijama u tojzemlji. Naravno, za REKOM je od ključnog značaja da radivan granica samo jedne zemlje, jer je takva priroda konfliktakoji je doveo do raspada bivše Jugoslavije. Ali, to je ijasan izazov, i jasno je da je takav napor do sada potpunonepoznat. Postojao je samo jedan pokušaj koji je izgledaokao inicijativa dve zemlje, a to je inicijativa koju su pokrenulevlade Indonezije i Istočnog Timora pre nekoliko godina,takozvana ,,Komisija za istinu i prijateljstvo”. Međutim,tu komisiju su kritikovale organizacije za ljudska prava icivilno društvo kao, u osnovi, politički dogovor izmeđudve zemlje da pronađu rešenje za zločine koji su se odigralitokom borbe za nezavisnost Istočnog Timora 1999. godine.Obe vlade su imale svoj interes u stvaranju te institucije i utome da ona počne da radi. Međutim, ta komisija je patilaod nedostatka legitimnosti i podrške civilnog društva. Zatoće, u suštini, REKOM biti prva komisija pokrenuta u višezemalja. Moraće da se bavi brojnim naracijama, brojnimviktimizacijama, često od suseda (ili susedima) koji sadažive u susednoj zemlji.Na kraju, i proces stvaranja ove komisije i sama komisija sunapor vezan za konsenzus.Postoji razlog zašto ovo neće biti brz proces. U LatinskojAmerici, većina komisija za istinu je bila stvorenapredsedničkim dekretom. Korišćena je kratkotrajna prilikatokom demokratskog proleća. Preduzimanje potrebnihakcija je bilo pitanje meseci, a ne godina. Države i društvasu se bavile veoma konkretnim, veoma specifičnim pitanjimau jednom političkom entitetu. U slučaju REKOM-a,stvaranje konsenzusa će zahtevati duži proces, odpojedinačne zemlje naviše.Otkrivanje istine na zapadnom Balkanu će morati da uključii Evropu. Ovo je, pre svega, najgori konflikt koji se odigraona teritoriji Evrope nakon Drugog svetskog rata. To je kontekstkoji je nametnuo ogromne izazove, ne samo političkei bezbednosne izazove, već takođe i moralne, za Evropu.Zato je ovo proces koji mora biti međunarodan od samogpočetka: međunarodan u smislu uključivanja zemalja bivšeJugoslavije, ali takođe i uključivanja pažnje čitave Evrope.Zato, postoje brojni specifični izazovi sa kojima se suočavajuevropski prijatelji inicijative za regionalnu komisiju.Prvi je taj da političari u post-jugoslovenskim republikamatreba da osete glas Evrope - jasno i glasni u znak podrškeovoj inicijativi. REKOM-u će biti potreban jedan veomadelikatan akt političke veštine – biće potrebno da sedamrazličitih satova odzvone u isto vreme. To je izuzetno teško,i to će, sigurno, zahtevati da lideri tih zemalja znaju da jeEvropa ozbiljna u pomirenju, sećanju i pravdi, i da razumepotonji koncept ne samo kao specijalizovan proces u tribunalu,već i kao moralan i kulturni proces na ulicama, ujavnom diskursu i stvaranju istorijskih naracija.35Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav duDrugi izazov je taj da Evropa treba da pažljivo podržava tajkompleksan, i možda neravan put prema stvarnoj konsultacijiu balkanskom kontekstu. On će imati svoje pomake inazadovanja. Spremaju se izbori u Bosni, a zatim i u jednojdrugoj zemlji, i biće opozicije jednog ili drugog sektora,sumnji i oklevanja. 3 To je u suštini uspostavljanja komisijeza istinu; to je upravo ono što se dogodilo u mnogimdrugim zemljama - počeci su uvek ekstremno teški, čak iteži za takvu institucije bez presedana. Tako Inicijativa zaREKOM, i sve grupe koje učestvuju u ovim konsultacijama,treba da veruju da ih Evropa prati. Bila bi dobra ideja daimamo razne predstavnike različitih evropskih institucijakoji zaista posmatraju ove procese, rasprave i stvaranjekonsenzusa. Bilo bi važno za ljude na zapadnom Balkanuda shvate da su njihovi procesi shvaćeni ozbiljno i da imajupodršku.Treće, a to je nešto u čemu smo izrazili naš interes u nastavljanjusa podrškom REKOM-u putem Međunarodnogcentra za tranzicionu pravdu - to je živi prenos informacijao komisijama za istinu, o tome šta se događalo u drugimzemljama, dovođenje u ovaj proces konsultacija ljudi kojisu zaista učestvovali u komisijama za istinu, u dobrim, alii u lošim momentima, koji će biti u stanju da podele svojustručnost, i pruže neke skromne ideje-vodilje o nekim odaspekata ovog procesa.I na kraju, bilo bi suštinski da prepoznamo da će proceszaštite prava na istinu u ovom veoma, veoma kompleksnomregionu, morati da bude predstavljen na globalnoj sceni.To je, pre svega, jedan svet u kom smo već imali preko30 komisija za istinu. To iskustvo ne sme biti protraćeno– potrebno je da bude preneseno na zapadni Balkan, ipodeljeno sa onima koji imaju ulog u tome. Ali, istovremeno,mutatis mutandis, iskustvo na zapadnom Balkanutreba da bude preneseno negde drugde, jer puno konflikataje u svojoj prirodi međunarodno, i potraga za istinomtakođe treba da bude međunarodna. Nije moguće razumetikonflikte u Liberiji i Sijera Leoneu u izolaciji jednogod drugog. Biće nemoguće pokrenuti pravi proces istinei pomirenja u Demokratskoj Republici Kongo (DRC), bezuzimanja u obzir toga da su ratovi u DRC uključivali mnogedruge afričke zemlje. Ova konkretna inicijativa, biće ključnau zemljama kao što su centralna Azija, Bliski Istok, SrednjiIstok, Velika Jezera. Stvaranje globalnih zajednica prakse irasprave će biti apsolutno esencijalno, i predstavljaće jedannačin podrške za REKOM.363 Opšti izbori u BIH su održani u oktobru 2010. (prim.ur.)Fond za humanitarno pravo

Tranziciona pravda iz ugla epistemološke zajedniceII DEOTranziciona pravda iz uglaepistemološke zajednice37Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav du38Fond za humanitarno pravo

Tranziciona pravda iz ugla epistemološke zajedniceDražen LalićProfesor sam na Fakultetu političkih znanosti u Zagrebu.Dva su osnovna razloga zbog kojih se zanimam zasuočavanje s prošlošću. Prvi razlog je knjiga „Suočavanjes prošlošću u Republici Hrvatskoj: stavovi i mišljenjaaktera i javnosti u poraću“. Napisali smo je Kruno Kardov,ovdje prisutna Vesna Teršelič, voditeljica Documente ija, na osnovu velikoga istraživanja fenomena suočavanjas prošlošću u Hrvatskoj. U njemu smo koristili različitemetode, i kvantitativne i kvalitativne. Drugi razlog seodnosi na jednu bizarnu činjenicu iz moga života. Naime,za zločine počinjene u proljeće 1945. godine na Bleiburgui drugim lokacijama saznao sam tek 1985. godine, značiu dobi od 25 godina. Vjerojatno sam za te zločine saznaotako kasno zato što potječem iz obitelji koja je u Drugomsvjetskom ratu bila na strani partizana - moj djed je utom ratu ubijen zbog svoga antifašističkog opredjeljenja,pa se o tome u mojoj obitelji nije razgovaralo. Saznavšiza te zločine, razgovarao sam o tome s nekim ljudima,pa sam shvatio da neki moji prijatelji ili dobri poznaniciimaju djedove s druge strane, dakle ustaške, pa i to da sudjedovi pojedinih mojih prijatelja i poznanika nastradalina Blajburgu ili tzv. Križnom putu. Meni je to bila strašnačinjenica, uz ostalo i zato što sam u svojoj mladosti mogaootvoreno govoriti o svome djedu, dok ti moji prijateljii poznanici svoje djedove nisu mogli spominjati predvećinom drugih ljudi. Teško sam se zbog toga osjećao, i tokako kao čovjek zbog svog odnosa prema tim prijateljimai poznanicima, tako i kao akademski građanin (u to samvrijeme diplomirao na studiju politologije u Zagrebu).Okupili smo se baš zbog toga da se ne ponovi takva situacija,da jedan akademski obrazovani građanin u jednomtotalitarnom sustavu, ili sustavu koji je naizgled demokratskia zapravo je totalitarni, nema spoznaje o zločinima kojisu se dogodili, primjerive ubojstvima ratnih zarobljenikabez suđenja. Bez obzira na prethodno ponašanje, nikoga sene smije ubijati tako bez suđenja i bacati u jame, i slično.Većina ovdje prisutnih je živjela u bivšoj Jugoslaviji, ali sesistem promijenio, a mi bismo trebali živjeti u demokracijiu kojoj se takvi zločini ne događaju, a zločini iz prošlosti seosuđuju.Dosad rečeno je začetak moga shvaćanja Tranzicijskepravde iz kuta epistemološke zajednice. Uvodno još trebampojasniti kako određujem osnovne pojmove ove paneldiskusije. Tranzicijsku pravdu shvaćam ponajprije u smislusuočavanja s prošlošću. U toj velikoj društvenoj promjeni,dakle u dugotrajnom i složenom tranzicijskom procesuprelaska od autoritarnog do demokratskog sistema, mi kaograđani zemalja nastalih nakon raspada bivše Jugoslavijemoramo se suočiti s istinom i s pravdom, posebno vezanoza zločine i različito teško nasilje koji su se dogodili u ratovimatokom devedesetih godina. Mnogi građani Hrvatske,a siguran sam i drugih zemalja, imaju veliku potrebu zatom istinom i pravdom. U tom smislu netko koristi pojam“tranzicijska pravda”, netko “odrađivanje prošlosti”, netko“svladavanje prošlosti”, a ja koristim pojam “suočavanje sprošlošću”. Drugi je pojam - epistemološka zajednica. Smatramkako se u stvari radi o više zajednica. Naime, postojerazličiti načini na koje dobivamo saznanja i spoznaje o ratnimzločinima, ubojstvima i svemu onome mučnome što sedogodilo u ratovima na području bivše Jugoslavije. To nijesamo akademska zajednica kojoj osobno pripadam. Ovdjemeđu nama su i neki stručnjaci. Zar spoznaje o suočavanjus prošlošću ne donose i brojni psiholozi, defektolozi i drugikoji izravno rade sa žrtvama? Konačno, ovdje su i mnoginovinari. Zar i ti stručnjaci ne doprinose suočavanju sprošlošću, pogotovo prikupljanjem informacija i inter-39Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav dupretiranjem činjenica vezanih za rat? Osim znanstvenikai stručnjaka, time se bave i umjetnici. U sklopu rečenogaistraživanja Vesna Teršelič, Kruno Kardov i ja smo ustanovilida je vrlo važan taj subjektivni odnos prema nasilnojprošlosti. Znači, dogodila se promjena koja se dogodila odDrugog svjetskog rata, i pogotovo Prvog svjetskog rata,kada pojedinačne ljudske sudbine i nisu toliko bile važne,do situacije vezane za ratove na području bivše Jugoslavije ineka druga ratnim zbivanja posljednjih desetljeća u kojimaindividualno postaje jako važno. Mislim da baš u tom smisluumjetnici mogu dati i daju posebno veliki doprinos. Mnogiautori umjetničkih djela su nam pomogli kao aktivistima ushvaćanju toga problema - nema aktivista u ovom područjukoji nije gledao filmove kao što je „Sofijin izbor“ Alana J.Pakule i čitao knjige poput „Zar je to čovjek?“ Prima Levija.Znači, umjetnici su nam jako važni. Dakle, epistemologijuu ovom smislu shvaćam kao različito prikupljanje saznanjai spoznaja o mučnim događajima i ratnim zločinima koji suvezani za ove ratove. To je ono osnovno što sam htio rećivezano za sadržaj, temu ovoga panela.Polazim od jedne rečenice, u stvari to je bio njegov moto,Michela de Montaigne, velikoga francuskog filozofa koji seupitao: “Što znam?” Slijedom toga se možemo upitati štoznamo o ratnim zločinima i drugim nesretnim događajimaiz ratne prošlosti. A kad pogledamo istini u oči, ondamožda shvaćamo da je jednako važno sljedeće pitanje:što ne znamo o tome? Naše znanje o ratnim zločinima jevrlo ograničeno. Znači: koliko znamo i koliko ne znamo?Sljedeće je pitanje kako društveni kontekst u našim zemljamautječe na ono što znamo i ono što ne znamo o tome.Nadalje, mislim da je vrlo važno odgovoriti na pitanje kakokritički vrednovati ono što znamo i ono što ne znamo, ada sve to bude zasnovano na objektivnoj spoznaji, bez damotrimo isključivo iz kuta svoje etničke ili druge zajednice.Naposlijetku, kako možemo pridonijeti tome da unaprijedimosvoje znanje i smanjimo svoje neznanje o tome?Koji nam akteri u tome mogu pomoći? Što političke i drugeinstitucije rade na tome da nam pomognu, nama iz civilnogdruštva, nama iz znanosti ili medija i drugim akterima, pa idruštvu u cjelini da se unaprijedi to znanje? Kako možemostimulirati vlasti da pomognu u stjecanju onakvoga znanjao ratnim zločinima i nasilju iz prošlosti koje bi bilo istinito,znači zasnovano na istini; koje bi bilo argumentirano, značizasnovano na činjenicama; koje bi bilo plodno, znači služilobi kao osnova za široku akciju, ne samo nevladinih organizacijai civilnog društva, nego različitih aktera društva?Mislim da bez takve, široke i objektivne, spoznaje ne možebiti uspješnog suočavanja sa prošlošću, odnosno tranzicijskepravde.40Fond za humanitarno pravo

Tranziciona pravda iz ugla epistemološke zajedniceDiane F. Orentlicherproteklih dvadesetak godina, na međunarodnomU nivou se ulaže ogroman napor u jednu veoma značajnuoblast tranzicione pravde, a to je zadovoljenje pravde udruštvima u kojima su počinjeni teški zločini. Tokom togperioda, mnogi stručnjaci i istraživači razvili su različiteteorije o tome šta mere međunarodnog prava i tranzicionepravde u post-konfliktnim društvima - poput suđenja,komisija za istinu, reparacija i drugih procesa - znače zadruštva koja su doživela teške zločine. Između ostalog, ovemere mogu pomoći sprečavanje budućih zločina, unapreditivladavinu prava, povratiti osnovne vrednosti ljudskogdostojanstva koje su bile brutalno kompromitovane nasiljem,ubrzati pomirenje u podeljenim društvima, promovisatistabilnu tranziciju ka demokratiji i izlečenje društva.U tom duhu, dozvolite mi da kažem nekoliko reči o onomešto sam ja saznala iz istraživanja koje sam sprovodila neposrednopre nego što sam se pridružila Obaminoj administraciji.To istraživanje je bilo pokušaj da shvatim uticajHaškog tribunala na društva u Srbiji i Bosni. Zaključak kojise vrlo jasno nametnuo tokom proučavanja situacije u Bosnije nešto što je, mislim, veoma očigledno narodu Bosne, a štose često gubi u akademskim štivima na temu tranzicionepravde – pravda sama po sebi je jedan od najvažnijihrazloga zbog koga su žrtve želele da se osnuje sud kao štoje Međunarodni krivični tribunal za bivšu Jugoslaviju. Unaučnim raspravama o međunarodnim sudovima čestoćete naići na fino nijansiranu raspravu o sprečavanju nasilja,pomirenju i drugim vrednostima vezanim za pitanjemeđunarodnog pravosuđa, ali iznenađujuće malo je rečenoo onome što su mnogi s kojima sam razgovarala opisivalikao „pravdu zarad pravde“.Kada sam ljude u Bosni pitala da mi kažu šta oni očekuju odHaškog tribunala i kako je zaista doprineo njihovom ličnomdoživljaju pravde, odgovori koje sam dobijala najčešćesu počinjali prilično dugom kritikom Haškog tribunala.Ljudi s kojima sam razgovarala identifikovali su nekolikospecifičnih aspekata delovanja Haškog tribunala, kao ilirazočaravajuće ili izuzetno poželjne. Kao negativan aspektnajčešće je isticano da sudski postupci frustrirajuće dugotraju i da to znači dugo iščekivanje izricanja pravde. Drugočesto pominjano nezadovoljstvo je neadekvatna dužinazatvorskih kazni za lica odgovorna za teške zločine ili njihovoprevremeno puštanje na slobodu. Takođe sam otkriladuboko nezadovoljstvo odlukom Tribunala da dopustioptuženima da se sami brane i koriste suđenja kao političkuplatformu. U vezi sa ovim primetila sam da ih posebnouznemirava nekompetentnost Tribunala da sankcionišeovakvo ponašanje optuženih.Najveći izvor nezadovoljstva koji sam iznova slušala iz godineu godinu prilikom poseta Bosni predstavlja činjenica dasu Ratko Mladić i Radovan Karadžić toliko dugo proveli naslobodi. I dok je to bilo tako, ljudi u Bosni su mi govorili dačinjenica da su oni na slobodi nakon što je protiv njih podignutaoptužnica još 1995. Godine između ostalog i za genocid,činjenica da su i dalje nekažnjeni, baca senku na sveostale rezultate rada Haškog tribunala. Njihova zakasnelahapšenja su otklonila ovu senku, ali ne mogu i da otkloneštetu nanetu dugotrajnom nekažnjivošću u kojoj su uživali.Jedan od interesantnih zaključaka koji se nametnuotokom mojih razgovora sa ljudima u Bosni jeste da oni nedoživljavaju pravdu kao nešto što ili dobijete ili ne postignete,već pre kao nešto što možete parcijalno dobiti, nešto štoneće biti savršeno dostignuće. Iako zahvalni što su zločinci41Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav duprivedeni pravdi, mnogi su očekivali da Tribunal ispuni ineke druge potrebe. Osobe koje su izgubile članove svojihporodica tokom oružanih sukoba su naglašavali važnostsaznanja o sudbini njihovih najmilijih i smatrali da je neophodnoda se od počinilaca zahteva da pruže ovakvu vrstuinformacija, pogotovo u slučajevima sporazuma o priznanjukrivice koji su sklapali sa tužilaštvom.Ljudi sa kojima sam razgovarala takođe su često izražavalinadu da će svojim radom MKSJ doprineti još jednomvažnom cilju – priznavanju činjenice da su i pripadnicinaše sopstvene etničke grupe odgovorni za kršenja ljudskihprava. Međutim, iako su mi mnogi od njih rekli da se nadajuda će činjenice utvrđene kroz postupke vođene pred Tribunalompodstaći ovakvu vrstu spoznaje, mnogi su izrazilirazočaranje realnom mogućnošću Tribunala da to i ostvari.Međutim, na kraju svih ovih razgovora oni bi se uvek izrazitopozitivno izrazili o značaju koji za njih ima osnovnačinjenica da Tribunal izriče pravdu. Vrednost koju za njihima pravda često se ne može svesti ni na jednu druguvrednost, a mnoge žrtve su odlučno tvrdile da je to biloveoma značajno za njih. Uprkos tome, kao što sam ranijepomenula, prevladavalo je mišljenje da je pravda izrečenau sudnicama Haškog tribunala daleko bolja nego nikakvapravda i da bi je trebalo biti još mnogo više.42Fond za humanitarno pravo

Tranziciona pravda iz ugla epistemološke zajedniceVladimir PetrovićPostoji jedan paradoks na koji vredi skrenuti pažnjuovog skupa. On se tiče pitanja učešća istoričara uprocesu suočavanja sa prošlošću. Lako se dâ primetiti da uaktivnostima ove vrste, uz izuzetke koji se podrazumevaju,istoričari ne prednjače ni brojem ni prirodom angažmana,što je pomalo čudno ako se ima u vidu da je težište njihovoginteresovanja upravo na proučavanju prošlosti, i da su oniobučeni da se njome bave.Moguća su razna objašnjenja ovog paradoksa: neka odnjih su filozofska, neka metodološka, a neka sasvimpolitička. Upravo je zloupotreba istorije predstavljala jedanod ključnih mehanizama rastakanja Jugoslavije, širenjameđunacionalne mržnje i prerastanja ovog rastakanja urat. Istorijska nauka ne samo što nije mnogo učinila usuprotstavljanju ovom trendu, već ga je umela značajnopodsticati i još uvek to čini. Daleko bilo, naravno, da sviistoričari učestvuju u tom ratu sećanja. Radi se o jednojmanjini, ali manjini koja je bučna i neobično dobro organizovana,čiji su pogledi na prošlost prilično koherentnia svest o sopstvenoj nacionalnoj misiji izoštrena. Takva jesituacija u Srbiji, a nije mnogo bolja ni u drugim bivšimjugoslovenskim republikama. Prirodno je onda da, kada seotvori pitanje šta bi ta disciplina mogla da učini na tomeda se postjugoslovenska društva suoče sa najneugodnijimaspektima sopstvene nedavne prošlosti, nailazimo na probleme.Kako očekivati od ljudi koji su svoje karijere uložili uodređeni politički projekat da u jednom trenutku reše da sekritički osvrnu na svoj sopstveni angažman i na taj političkiprojekat? To se dešava, ali nije ni često niti lako i na to nemožemo računati.Šta onda da se radi? Pokušao bih da u odgovoru opišemluk inverzijom pitanja kojim je profesor Lalić otvorio ovajpanel. On se pitao šta mi o prošlosti zapravo znamo, a jabih tome dodao pitanje - šta o njoj ne znamo? Tačnije,šta nam ne daju da znamo? Hoću da kažem da bi bilo vrlosvrsishodno razdvojiti epistemološku dimenziju problemaspoznaje od praktične. Na epistemološkoj ravni ne možemoočekivati konsenzus o pitanjima spoznaje, koja zavise odfilozofskog uverenja, pa i od ličnog senzibiliteta. Našašansa, po meni, leži na heurističkom nivou, na kojem nas neinteresuje nužno šta je istina, već kakvu to svoju istinu nekopokušava da sakrije od nas.Stara je poslovica da je istina prva žrtva rata. Država i uredovnim uslovima nastoji da očuva kontrolu nad informacijamakoje proizvodi, što vidimo na primeru JulianaPaul Assangea i drugde, a u vanrednim situacijama tajrefleks poprima razmere nacionalnog interesa i propagandnograta. Svemu tome smo svedočili tokom raspadaJugoslavije i ne moramo se na tome zadržavati.Svedočimo, međutim, još jednom potpuno suprotnomfenomenu. Eksplozija informacija koja je pratila implozijuJugoslavije veoma je otežala ovo zataškavanje, a formiranjeHaškog tribunala ga je zapravo onemogućilo. Istraživačiovog perioda prošlosti su zapravo u epistemološki privilegovanojsituaciji. Dokumenta koja bi inače po prirodi stvari ipo slovu arhivskog zakonodavstva još dugo bila nedostupna,a odnose se na rad najviših državnih organa, vojnog ibezbednosnog aparata, a pre svega na rat i ratne zločine,našla su svoj put do haških i domaćih sudnica. Mnoga sukorišćena kao sudski dokazi i tako postala dostupna javnosti.Zapravo, tako mnoga da najveći istraživački problem ležiu njihovom obilju, u potrebi da se ona selektuju, kritičkiobrade i prezentuju na razumljiv način.43Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav duTu ja vidim ulogu epistemološke zajednice, a pre svegaistorijske nauke u procesu tranzicione pravde. Dakle, dobroje što posla imamo. Loše je što ne uspevamo da zainteresujemodovoljno ljudi da se njime bave, budući da se radio poslu koji zahteva strpljenje i sistematski pristup. Šta tumože da se uradi? Naravno, nikome ne možemo reći štatreba da radi, svako ovom problemu pristupa po svojojsavesti i znanju. Međutim, mogu sa svoje strane da kažemšta radi Institut za savremenu istoriju, iz koga dolazim,u saradnji sa Fondom za humanitarno pravo. Mi smo sezajednički upustili u projekat pod imenom Jugoslovenskakriza, kroz koji nastojimo da izdvojimo dokumenta imaterijale po našem sudu najrelevantnije za razumevanjeraspada Jugoslavije, rata i ratnih zločina, sa ciljem da ihkritički priredimo i predočimo javnosti u štampanoj i u elektronskojformi. Osnovna namera projekta je unapređivanjenaših spoznaja o ovom aspektu prošlosti, a time i snaženjefaktografske baze ovih naših rasprava. Namerno upotrebljavamtaj pomalo staromodan termin, da bih još jednom podvukaoda ćemo teško odgovoriti na pitanje šta je istina, alinas to ne sme sprečiti u sprečavanju sistematskog pokušajaskrivanja informacija koje do nje vode. Meni se čini da jeuloga epistemološke zajednice u svojim različitim granamada se takvom pokušaju suprotstavi.44Fond za humanitarno pravo

Tranziciona pravda iz ugla epistemološke zajedniceMladen OstojićOvo izlaganje se zasniva na mojoj doktorskoj disertaciji outicaju Haškog suda na političke prilike u Srbiji u periodunakon pada Miloševića (2000-2010). Jedna od najvažnijihpouka iz rada Haškog suda je da međunarodni tribunali, bezpodrške domaćih političkih elita, ne mogu kazniti počinioceratnih zločina i promovisati suočavanje sa prošlošću.Tokom devedestih, rad tribunala praktično je bio blokiranzbog odsustva saradnje srpskih i hrvatskih vlasti koje sumahom štitile optuženike za ratne zločine. Nakon smrtiTuđmana i pada Miloševića, srpske i hrvatske vlasti supostepeno, pod velikim pritiskom međunarodne zajednice,izručile haške optuženike. Međutim, domaće vlasti nisu bilespremne da javno iznesu istinu o ratnim zločinima i da timesame pospeše suočavanje sa prošlošću, a Haški sud se s drugestrane pokazao prilično nesposobnim u obraćanju domaćojjavnosti. Samim tim, suđenja za ratne zločine pred Haškimsudom nisu dovela do podizanja svesti o ratnim zločinimaniti su podstakla njihovu osudu u srpskom društvu.Ovakav ishod često se pripisuje srpskim političkim elitamakoje su pragmatički pristupale saradnji sa Hagom i pravdaleekstradiciju optuženika dobijanjem ekonomske pomoći ilinapretkom u evropskim integracijama. ‘Instrumentalizacija’Haga je mahom tumačena kao odraz većinskog nacionalizmasrpskih političkih elita i negacije ratnih zločina.Međutim, moje istraživanje pokazuje da je suštinski razlogza neiskren odnos prema Tribunalu činjenica da su srpskevlasti doživljavale Haški sud kao pretnju za stabilnost ilegitimnost države.Pravda vs. stabilnostHapšenje, te izručenje optuženih lica Haškom sudu ugroziloje političku stabilnost u Srbiji iz nekoliko razloga.Najpre, postojala je duboka podela u vezi sa ekstradicijomoptuženika po tom pitanju unutar same vlasti nakon smeneMiloševića. Premijer Đinđić zalagao se za punu saradnjusa Tribunalom, dok je tadašnji predsednik SRJ VojislavKoštunica insistirao na poštovanju postojećih zakonskihokvira koji su onemogućavali ekstradiciju optuženika. Njihovoneslaganje u vezi s izručenjem Miloševića dovelo je dorascepa u okviru vladajuće koalicije. Otuda je sposobnostVlade Srbije da hapsi lica optužena za ratne zločine uvelikosmanjena zato što je Koštunica de facto pružao otporsaradnji sa Hagom.Drugo, vojska i službe bezbednosti, koje nisu reformisanenakon pada Miloševića, aktivno su opstruirale hapšenjeoptuženika. Mi danas znamo da su se Ratko Mladić i VeselinŠljivančanin krili u vojnim objektima bar do 2002. godine.Pored toga, pripadnici bezbednosnih službi su se okrenuliprotiv Vlade iz straha da će i oni jednog dana završiti uHagu. Tako je Jedinica za Specijalne Operacije (JSO) diglapobunu u novembru 2001. godine tražeći prekid saradnje saHaškim sudom. Dve godine kasnije, njeni pripadnici izvršilisu atentat na premijera Đinđića u okviru akcije ‘Stop Hagu’.Plašeći se nestabilnosti, vlasti su sve više težile da nagovoreoptuženike da se sami predaju, umesto da pristupe njihovomhapšenju. Ključni trenutak u tom procesu bilo jehapšenje Veselina Šljivančanina, katastrofalno izvedeno ujunu 2003. Godine. Vlada je zatim uvela finansijske i pravnepodsticaje za predaju optuženika Haškom sudu. Opisanapraksa kulminirala je takozvanom politkom „dobrovoljnihpredaja“ koju je Koštunica uveo tokom svog prvog mandata2004. Godine. „Dobrovoljna predaja“ podrazumevala jeprebacivanje optuženika u Hag uz državne počasti. U medijima,njiho va predaja je prikazana kao doprinos evropskim45Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav du46integracijama i odbrani Kosova. Optuženici, koji su pritomprimali zamašne sume novca, su, dakle, predstavljeni kaomučenici koji idu u Hag da bi obavili svoju patriotskudužnost. Oni koji su odbijali da se predaju su uhapšeni, alisu njihova hapšenja prikazana kao dobrovoljne predaje.Politika „dobrovoljnih predaja“ dovela je do izručenja16 optuženih lica u Hag u roku od godinu dana, ali je uisto vreme narušila ciljeve tranzicione pravde i dovelado socijalizacije ratnih zločinaca u društvu. Posledicastrategije „dobrovoljnih predaja“ jeste da su optuženicidoživljeni kao heroji u javnosti, što objašnjava i slabupodršku radu Tribunala. U protekloj deceniji, tek 15 postostanovništva Srbije imalo je pozitivan stav prema Haškomsudu i izručenjuhaških optuženika . 1Pravda vs. legitimnostVlada Srbije izručila je Miloševića u nadi da će podići ugleddržave u svetu i da će ovo suđenje doprineti individualizacijikrivice za ratne zločine. Srpske vlasti nadale su se ida će suđenje podstaći suočavanje sa ratnim zločinima uSrbiji, te da će dodatno diskreditovati bivši režim i ojačatipodršku novim vlastima. Dakle, vlasti nisu bile spremne dasame izađu u javnost sa podacima o ratnim zločinima, ali suočekivale da će Haški sud to učiniti umesto njih. Međutim,suđenje Miloševiću pokazalo je da Haški sud nije biodorastao opisanom zadatku, jer je Miloševićeva popularnostu stvari porasla tokom prvih nedelja suđenja. Prenossuđenja učvrstio je negativan stav javnosti prema Tribunalui diskreditovao isti u očima liberalne političke elite.Takođe, suđenje Miloševiću izazvalo je strah kod srpskihvlasti da bi presuda mogla implicirati odgovornost državeza genocid. Optužnica protiv Miloševića za zločine uHrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini podignuta je tek u jesen2001. godine, nakon njegovog izručenja. Deo optužniceu vezi sa zločinima u Bosni teretio je Miloševića zagenocid, izazvavši pritom veliku zabrinutost vlasti u Beogradubudući da je Bosna pokrenula spor za genocid potivSRJ pred Međunarodnim Sudom Pravde (MSP).. Srpskipolitičari očekivali su da će Bosna odustati od spora nakonpada Miloševića, međutim to se nije desilo. Da je Miloševićbio osuđen za genocid pred Haškim tribunalom, Bosna biimala veće izglede da dobije spor pred MSP. U tom slučaju,Srbija bi bila prva zemlja ikada osuđena za genocid. Poredplaćanja zamašnih reparacija BiH, pomenuta osuda bidovela i do potpunog urušavanja međunarodnog legitimitetaSrbije.Strah od ishoda spora za genocid, iako prećutan u javnosti,u mnogom je uticao na odnos srpskih vlasti prema Haškomsudu. Država je stoga tajno pružala pomoć Miloševićojodbrani, što se jasno videlo u njegovom nastupu u sudnicina početku suđenja. Kasnije je obelodanjena činjenica daje opisana pomoć pružana posredstvom Vojne komisije zasaradnju sa Haškim tribunalom koja je naknadno ukinuta2003. godine. Pored toga, vlasti su zatražile zaštitne mereza osetljive dokumente, pre svega za zapisnike VrhovnogSaveta Odbrane. Bilo je dosta polemika i kontroverzi uvezi sa dodeljivanjim zaštitnih mera i uticaju istih na ishodspora za genocid. Ja ne želim da ulazim u te rasprave. Onošto želim da naglasim ovde je da je Miloševićevo suđenjesuštinski dovelo u pitanje legitimitet države Srbije i da jetime Haški sud izgubio podršku onih političara u Srbiji kojisu bili iskreno privrženi izvršenju pravde i suočavanju saprošlošću. Haški tribunal je, u tom kontekstu, suzio prostorza kazivanje istine u Srbiji.ZaključakNa osnovu postojećeg iskustva, može se zaključiti dabuduće inicijative za tranzicionu pravdu mogu uspeti samoukoliko se uvide njihove političke konsekvence. Jedan odosnovnih ciljeva tranzicione pravde je da se povrati legitimitet,kredibilitet i poverenje u državne institucije. Akote inicijative imaju suprotne efekte, one su osuđene naneuspeh. Dakle, inicijativa za REKOM može uspeti samouz podršku vlasti država u regionu. Ta podrška će izostatiukoliko vlasti dožive Komisiju kao pretnju za stabilnost ilegitimnost institucija.1 „Stavovi prema ratnim zločinima, Haškom tribunalu i domaćem pravosuđu za ratne zločine“, Beogradski centar za ljudska prava,OEBS i Strategic Marketing Research, April 2009.Fond za humanitarno pravo

Tranziciona pravda iz ugla epistemološke zajedniceJasna Dragović-SosoMoja današnja prezentacija usmerena je na dva pitanja:prvo, gde se tačno nalazimo u kontekstu tranzicionepravde u regionu i drugo, šta nam još nedostaje. Konkretno,sastali smo se ovde u prvom redu zbog Inicijative zaREKOM (uprkos opštoj prirodi Foruma) i bilo bi veomakorisno da se skoncentrišemo i na pitanje gde bi seREKOM najbolje uklopio u širi kontekst tranzicione pravdeu regionu bivše Jugoslavije.Moje kolege su već pomenule čitav niz važnih dostignućai ja se potpuno slažem sa iznetim ocenama. I ja bih podvuklaznačaj obimne dokumentacije o ratovima vođenimdevedesetih godina koja danas postoji zahvaljujući raduMeđunarodnog krivičnog tribunala i ne manje zahvaljujućinevladinim organizacijama koje su bile veoma posvećeneprikupljanju dokumentacije. Dakle, što se tiče regiona bivšeJugoslavije, raspolažemo nezapamćeno velikim brojeminformacija od kojih je većina dostupna javnosti.Druga tema je vreme. U delovima regiona bivše Jugoslavije,tokom poslednjih nekoliko godina došlo je do niza pozitivnihpomaka u sferi tranzicione pravde, posebno u smisluhapšenja preostalih haških begunaca i njihovog izručivanjaHaškom tribunalu, kao i u pravcu obnavljanja veza i saradnjemeđu državama. Prevladavajući osećaj je da se političkaklima menja, na šta u velikoj meri utiče pro-evropskaorijentacija država regiona. Ali, uprkos obilju nerešenihproblema, čini se da postoji veća odlučnost državnogvrha da se bavi pitanjima ratnih zločina, iako, kao što jepokazano u mom nedavnom članku, na način koji je i daljeprvenstveno definisan političkim kalkulacijama i ciljevimameđunarodne politike (od kojih je najuočljivije nastojanjedržava da obezbede članstvo u EU). Uprkos očiglednimnedostacima nedavno izrečenih javnih izvinjenja državnihzvaničnika i ostalih instrumenata tranzicione pravde, ja bihrekla da ipak ima više prostora sada nego ikad pre za pokretanjenovih inicijativa kojima bi se privukla pažnja javnostina događaje iz nedavne ratne prošlosti.Treća pozitivna stavka koju bih želela da istaknem je ulogakoju su odigrale nevladine organizacije, i drago mi je štomogu da konstatujem da su i dalje izuzetno aktivne. Važnoje shvatiti koliko napora i energije odlazi u inicijativetranzicione pravde, pogotovu one kao što je Inicijativa zaREKOM, i koliko faktori kao što je vremenska udaljenost oddogađaja, društvena apatija i nepoverenje zvaničnika predstavljajuočigledne prepreke u obavljanju ovih aktivnosti.Rekavši ovo, jasno je da, naravno, postoje mnogi nerešeniproblemi, od kojih su neki pomenuti u prethodnim diskusijama.Meni je bilo posebno interesantno da čujem izlaganjapredstavnika organizacija žrtava i kako oni funkcionišuu uslovima u kojima ne postoje adekvatni odgovori naveoma konkretna, često praktična pitanja i potrebe. Njihoviproblemi kreću se u dijapazonu od pitanja finansijskekompenzacije, potraživanja nepokretnosti, nedostatkaodržive zdravstvene nege i psihološkog staranja do pitanjarešavanja sudbine nestalih članova porodice. Nizak nivointeresovanja i loš zvanični odziv na ove probleme i pitanjapredstavljaju ozbiljan problem u politici tranzicione pravdeu regionu. Takođe smo dosta čuli i o trajnim problemimau reformi pravosuđa i o neadekvatnoj reformi institucijaširom regiona. Svi ovi problemi su već više puta istaknutiu brojnim izveštajima međunarodnih tela i domaćih nevladinihorganizacija. Međutim, jedno zvanično i autoritativnotelo – poput regionalne komisije za istinu – moglobi obezbediti toliko željeni podstrek za promene u ovojoblasti. U najmanju ruku, ovakvo jedno telo može da obje-47Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav du48dini postojeće analize, da obezbedi jedinstvenu autoritativnuprocenu pomenutih problema i da preporuči mogućenačine rešavanja istih.Drugi problem s kojim sam se susrela u svom radu tiče senedostatka prave javne debate o prošlosti. Postoji mnogorazloga zašto je to tako, uključujući stavove političkog vrha(koji se, čak i kada se bave implementacijom politike kojase odnosi na prošlost – kao što je hapšenje osumnjičenihi optuženih za ratne zločine i javna izvinjenja za počinjeneratne zločine – uzdržavaju od prave diskusije o tome šta sedesilo, ko su žrtve a ko počinitelji određenog zločina i kakvusu ulogu odigrale tadašnje vlade i njihove bezbednosneslužbe), kao i određeni pripadnici građanskog društva(koji često zauzimaju preterano moralističke i apstraktnestavove o pitanjima kolektivne krivice koji ne mogu imatiodjeka kod šire publike). U mojoj svesti, ono što bolnonedostaje je jedna veoma „svedena“ debata zasnovana načinjenicama o tome šta se događalo devedesetih godinaprošlog veka i otvoreno razbijanje i danas opšteprisutnihmitova vezanih za kolektivno doživljavanje čitave nacije kaožrtve, međunarodne zavere i istorijske nepravde – svegaonoga što i dalje predstavlja temelj za nepoverenje i neprijateljstvomeđu etničkim grupama širom regiona. Jedan odnajuočljivijih utisaka svih nas koji pratimo javni diskurstokom poslednjih godina jeste koliko su se malo stavovi iargumentacija promenili i evoluirali tokom godina.Ovo je očigledno oblast u kojoj REKOM – ako dođe donjegovog osnivanja – može da odigra važnu, možda čak ipresudnu ulogu. Ovakvo jedno telo – pod pretpostavkomda je istinski autoritativno i zastupljeno, i sa pravim publicitetomi medijskom pažnjom (očigledno je da su ovo velikiizazovi) – moglo bi da obezbedi polaznu tačku i podsticajza debate. Koristeći razumljive i opšteprihvaćene metode iunakrsnu proveru podataka iz različitih izvora, ovakvo telobi moglo da utvrdi obilje suštinski važnih činjenica o ratovimavođenim devedesetih godina, što bi se moglo koristitikao osnova za dalje debate o skorijoj istoriji regiona. Akoje moguće organizovati javna svedočenja pojedinaca kojisu bili faktori odlučivanja u nedavnim događajima, njihovdruštveni domet bi bio ogroman – posebno imajućiu vidu nedostatak poverenja javnosti u institucije, kaošto je pomenuo Eric Gordy. Ovakva saslušanja bi moglapredstavljati neposrednu, direktnu konfrontaciju javnostisa iskustvima pojedinaca i – sudeći po njihovim uticajimau drugim slučajevima – mogla bi podstaći nivo ličnogpreispitivanja i emocionalnog učešća koji nužno ne prateusvajanje zvaničnih dokumenata i izveštaja ili sudskihpostupaka. Naravno, REKOM ne može svima biti sve, i naREKOM se ne sme gledati kao na univerzalni lek; važno jeda očekivanja budu skromna i realistična. Međutim, ovo su,za mene lično, načini na koje ova inicijativa može doprinetirazvoju prave, korisne javne debate o prošlosti, i u regionu ina nivou pojedinačnih nacionalnih zajednica.Fond za humanitarno pravo

Tranziciona pravda iz ugla epistemološke zajedniceChristian Axboe NielsenJa svake godine kažem svojim studentima u Danskoj dane bi bilo teško napuniti čitavu biblioteku samo knjigamao ratovima u bivšoj Jugoslaviji. Neverovatno je koliko jeknjiga napisano o ovom predmetu, koji je svakako jedanod najvažnijih u najnovijoj svetskoj i evropskoj istoriji. Akopostoji jedna stvar oko koje se skoro svi autori tih knjigaslažu, onda je to da je nacionalizam bio možda najvažnijiuzrok raspada Jugoslavije i oružanih sukoba na područjute bivše zemlje. Ja ne bih osporio tu tezu, a mislim da onai dalje do određene mere stoji. Međutim, moje iskustvo,proisteklo iz analize delovanja policije u ratu u Bosni iHercegovini, govori da je delovanje nacionalizma samojedan deo veće priče. Ja sam nekoliko godina radio utužilaštvu Haškog tribunala, a kao analitičar zadužen zaanalizu MUP-a Republike Srpske (te i saradnje MUP-aRS sa MUP-om Republike Srbije), imao sam priliku daprikupljam i proučavam obimnu ratnu dokumentacijutih organa. Proučavanjem tih dokumenata došao sam dozaključka da je nacionalizam za veliki deo tadašnjeg rukovodstvabio sredstvo i paravan, a ne cilj. Dakle, kad govorimoo policiji, otkrio sam da su policajci raznih naroda inarodnosti, koji su trebali čuvati Jugoslaviju, ustvari krenulika rušenju te zajedničke države. Sjajan primer toga vidimou zajedničkom starom MUP-u Socijalističke RepublikeBosne i Hercegovine u ključnom razdoblju između prvihvišestranačkih izbora u novembru 1990. godine i početkarata u aprilu 1992. godine. Tadašnje rukovodstvo ministarstvase sastojalo od Bošnjaka, Hrvata i Srba koji uvelikoj meri potiču iz prve generacije rođene posle Drugogsvetskog rata. Tu je ministar Alija Delimustafić, tu suMomčilo Mandić, Branko Kvesić i drugi. Oni su odrasliu «zlatnom dobu» socijalizma i bratstva i jedinstva. Nekisu radili kao čuvari Jugoslavije za Državnu bezbednost ilivojnu bezbednost, neki su iskoristili prve pojave slobodnogtržišta u osamdesetim godinama kako bi napravili maletrgovinske imperije – neki su radili i jedno i drugo. Takoje Delimustafić dospeo od saradnika vojne kuhinje (podoptužbom za finansijske malverzacije) preko osnivača lancatrgovačkih punktova do – ministra policije.Bez obzira čiji su kadrovi – SDA-ovi, SDS-ovi ili HDZ-ovi– svi su oni gurali «svoje» ljude posle pobede tih stranakana izborima. Na taj su način lagano iskorenjeni profesionalnikadrovi, dok su u saradnji sa svojim strankama širiliantagonizam i strah od drugih stranaka. A kad je konačnodošlo do rata, većina ih je otišla u «svoje» MUP-ove -novonastale MUP RS, MUP Herceg Bosne i, naravno, MUPRepublike BiH. Svojim narodima su pričali o nemogućnostidaljeg zajedničkog života, o egzistencijalnim pretnjama,o opasnosti od novih genocida. Tako Mićo Stanišić, prviministar unutrašnjih poslova RS-a, na samom početku ratagovori o strašnom neprijatelju srpskog naroda, o «ustaškojdžamahiriji».Sve se ovo lepo uklapa u standardni narativ o nacionalizmui ratu. Međutim, tu ima dosta – široj bosanskoj javnostijoš uvek nepoznatih – detalja. Na primer, imamo sjajanrazgovor sa početka maja 1992. godine, kada MomčiloMandić i Mićo Stanišić sa Pala vode dugačak telefonskirazgovor sa Brunom Stojićem i Brankom Kvesićem uMostaru. Razgovor počinje na srdačan način, to su stariprijatelji koji se čuju: „Kako ste, braćo ustaše“ – „Kako ste,braćo četnici“. Istina, malo jesu živčani kad pričaju o tome,tačno gde će ta granica biti između hrvatskih i srpskihdelova Bosne i Hercegovine – ali inače se svi lepo slažu okorazbijanja zajedničkog MUP-a. Znamo da koliko god suSrbi i Hrvati ratovali u Bosni, nije im nimalo problematično49Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav du50bilo da trguju dok je narod ginuo. „Šta hoćete? Kafu, naftu,cigare, brašno? Nije problem“. Na kraju krajeva, nije ni biloproblema prodavati „neprijatelju“ municiju i oružje, akoje to bilo u ekonomskom interesu pojedinaca. Nije ovdeslučajno što je Mandić prilično brzo nestao iz ratne Bosne.Otišao je on na Dedinje, u vilu Bosanka, gde je kao šef BiroaRepublike Srpske držao sve konce.Koliko je nacionalizam bio sredstvo, a ne cilj rata, vidimo iu delovanju najnasilnijih paravojnih formacija koje su širileteror i smrt u Bosni. Tu ću samo spomenuti dva primera.Poznato je da je Arkan sa svojom jedinicom došao u Bosnui da su tamo počinili stravične zločine protiv nesrpskogcivilnog stanovništva. Radi se o klasičnom primeru gdedržava (u ovom slučaju stara savezna Služba državne bezbednosti)svesno angažuje notornog pripadnika notornogkriminala pod geslom „ako radiš za nas, onda više nećeš bitikriminalac nego patriota – a sve što prikupljaš od ratnoglova biće tvoja zarada“. Tako je Arkanova jedinica pljačkala„pod zastavom“.. Iz te Arkanove jedinice je nastala famoznaJedinica za specijalne operacije. Svi znamo kako se ta pričazavršava: ubistvom premijera Đinđića i Legijom u bekstvu– sa lažnim hrvatskim pasošem. Na kraju je patriotskaJSO završila kao međunarodna, nimalo patriotska mrežaplaćenih ubica i krijumčara opojnih droga.Drugi primer su Žute ose, paravojska koja je bila veomaaktivna u istočnoj Bosni u prvim ratnim mesecima 1992.godine. Kao pravi patriote, učestvovali su u etničkomčišćenju Podrinja. Doveli su ne samo dobrovoljce iz Srbijena ratište, nego i kamione i šlepere na koje su tovarili ratniplen, da bi ga onda odvozili preko Drine. Njima je prvameta bila muslimansko stanovništvo, ali kad njega više nijebilo, onda je paravan nacionalizma pao – počele su Oseda ubadaju i srpsko stanovništvo. Republika Srpska – istatvorevina koja ih je pozvala u Bosnu – našla se u veomaneprijatnoj situaciji da mora da brani sebe protiv takvih„osa, vukova, pantera i drugih opasnih životinja“ kojima jenacionalizam bio ipak samo isprika za ratno profiterstvo ibogaćenje. U danima na kraju jula 1992. godine, specijalnabrigada milicije RS-a je morala da drži Zvornik pod opsadomkako bi konačno uhapsila Žute ose. Većina ih je poslekratkog informativnog razgovora bila prebačena na teritorijuSrbije – a posle toga nikome ništa.Prošle godine sam slušao izjave sa jedne konferencije zaštampu, i koje čudo – ispalo je da se ja slažem sa IvicomDačićem, što nikada ranije u životu nisam, ali gospodin lepokaže: „kad se raspala Titova Jugoslavija, preživelo je samobratstvo i jedinstvo kriminalnih grupa koje traje do danas“.Ono što jasno proizlazi iz ove priče, dakle iz one cele pričekoju sam ja proučavao, jeste da su ratni kriminal i organizovanikriminal dve strane iste kovanice, u svim republikamabivše Jugoslavije. Ta veza, kao što je Dačić rekao,počinje već krajem osamdesetih godina, a bogami traje ido dan-danas u svim MUP-ovima bivše Jugoslavije. A zamene kao istoričara i analitičara traganje za nekom objektivnijom– neću reći objektivnom, ali za nekom objektivnijomistorijom o raspadu Jugoslavije i o ratovima na ovompodručju – podrazumeva ozbiljno proučavanje te sinergijei ključnih veza ratnog i organizovanog kriminala. Ali svi midobro znamo da je za budućnost ovih zemalja puno važnijeprocesuiranje, nego proučavanje tih zločina i zločinaca. Kaošto su predstavnici nekih organizacija rekli na skupu: „svipočinioci su u velikoj meri još uvek među nama“. Ponekadsu na visokim funkcijama u MUP-u, u državnim službamai tako dalje, i zato je najvažnije, po mom mišljenju, istražitido dna sistematske i strukturalne veze između ratnog iorganizovanog kriminala od početka raspada Jugoslavije dodanas. Ako ne radimo, i kao naučnici i kao tužioci, i daljena rasvetljavanju kriminalnih vodećih struktura u bivšojJugoslaviji, imaćemo potpuno nekompletnu sliku istorije, aliimaćemo i važne probleme sa kojima ćemo se i dalje moratisuočavati u ovim društvima i koji će stvarati ogromne preprekeza evropsku budućnost ove regije.Fond za humanitarno pravo

Tranziciona pravda iz ugla epistemološke zajedniceIavor RangelovTema ovog članka su dva pitanja koja se javljaju u vezi sapostojećom inicijativom civilnog društva za osnivanjeREKOM-a u post-jugoslovenskim državama i širim raspravamao restorativnoj pravdi. Prvo pitanje se tiče civilnogdruštva u regionu: Kakav je karakter civilnog društva?Koji akteri čine civilno društvo? Ovde je cilj da se ukažena raznolikost aktera unutar civilnog društva koji moguimati uticaj na restorativnu pravdu, kao i na širi procestranzicione pravde na Zapadnom Balkanu. Drugo pitanjekoje ću na kratko pomenuti u ovom članku se tiče ulogeovih aktera u tranzicionoj pravdi: Treba li da podstičemocivilno društvo u regionu da se bavi ovim aspetktompravde? Tačnije, koji je značaj procesa restorativne pravdepoput ovog koji pokušavamo da istaknemo u kampanji zaosnivanje REKOM-a?Smatram da civilno društvo na Zapadnom Balkanu treba dabude organizovano kao višestruko, izdeljeno i suprotstavljeno.Ima nekoliko različitih načina na koji se možegovoriti o civilnom društvu i pomenuti i višestrukost isuprotstavljenost koji definišu njegovu prirodu. Mogu se,na primer, naglasiti različite funkcije koje akteri civilnogdruštva teže da obavljaju. Treba se povući razlika izmeđunevladinih organizacija koje se bave pružanjem usluga ikoje čak mogu da predstavljaju zamenu za državu, s jednestrane, i organizacije koje sebe vide kao borce za određeneciljeve i predstavljaju kontratežu državi, s druge strane.Drugi način da se govori o civilnom društvu jeste da senaglase granice, ili čak rascepi koji postoje unutar civilnogdruštva u regionu. Postoje nacionalne granice i postojeetničke granice, koje su postavljene ne samo strašnim ratovimatokom devedesetih godina, nego i klimavim miromkoji je uspostavljen nakon sukoba.Može se govoriti i o ideološkim podelama unutar civilnogdruštva koje često postaju najuočljivije u diskusijamao tranzicionoj pravdi. Pitanje pravde i odgovornosti zanasleđe zločina iz devedesetih služi da se naglasi intenzitetpolitičkog sukoba umesto vrednosti i inicijative širomregiona. Primer kojeg se mnogi verovatno sećaju je mitingu Splitu i kontramiting u Zagrebu 2001. Godine. Civilnodruštvo je protestovalo, a ista stvar je pokrenula i jedani drugi događaj (sud u Rijeci je podigao optužnicu protivhrvatskog generala za ratne zločine), ali je i intenziviralosukob preko vrednosti i projekata za hrvatsku državu.Trenutni sukob u Srbiji između boraca za ljudska prava ičlanova takozvanog „patriotskog bloka“ takođe govori ocivilnom društvu kao o sukobljenom i suprotstavljenomprostoru.Ono što proizilazi iz ove analize jeste činjenica o raznovrsnostiaktera unutar civilnog društva na Zapadnom Balkanu:postoje oni koji funkcionišu širom regiona i onikoji su ograničeni na državu i lokalne zajednice; borci zaodređene ciljeve i oni koji pružaju usluge; urbane nevladineorganizacije i ruralna udruženja žrtava; borci za ljudskaprava i vojni veterani; mediji i javne ličnosti – intelektualci.Ukoliko svi ovi akteri čine civilno društvo u regionu, ondazaista moramo civilno drušvo da shvatimo kao prostorvišestrukosti i pobijanja.Ovo se odnosi na drugo pitanje koje se ovde postavlja:Da li treba podsticati civilno društvo da se bavi pitanjempravde i koja je uloga REKOM-a u ovom procesu?Mnogi posmatrači su ukazali na to da pitanje pravde moževoditi daljoj polarizaciji i sukobu u post-jugosovenskimdruštvima. I zaista, moja analiza ukazuje na rascepe unutarsamog civilnog društva. Ali, želim da ukažem na to da51Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav durazličiti stavovi o prošlosti i rešavanju problema iz prošlosti,takođe, mogu predstavljati i prednost. Civilno društvo naZapadnom Balkanu, kao i civilno društvo bilo gde drugo,u javnom domenu artikuliše raznovrsne stavove i nedaćestanovništva koji već postoje u društvu i poziva i drugačijeglasove da se uključe u debatu koja sledi. Ovo je prednostinicijative za REKOM i obećanje za moguću regionalnukomisiju: da se društveni sukob i neslaganja ne potiskuju,već da se dozvoli da se reše na polju politike, putem javnedebate i rasprave, nenasilnim sredstvima i uz poštovanjeprincipa vladavine prava. Ukoliko treba suditi na osnovuinicijative civilnog društa za osnivanje REKOM-a, transformativnipotencijal procesa restorativne pravde u regionubi mogao da bude daleko veći nego što to očekuju neki odnjegovih zagovornika.52Fond za humanitarno pravo

Tranziciona pravda iz ugla medijaIII DEOTranziciona pravdaiz ugla medija53Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav du54Fond za humanitarno pravo

Tranziciona pravda iz ugla medijaREKOM i medijska strategijaTihomir LozaŠto se tiče pravosuđa, međunarodni i nacionalni procesivođeni u poslednjih 15 godina sa zadatkom da procesuirajupočinioce ratnih zločina počinjenih tokom konfliktakojim je praćen raspad bivše Jugoslavije, mogu se ocenitikao uglavnom uspešni. Za desetine visoko rangiranihdržavnih službenika osuđenih za ratne zločine obezbeđenisu korektni sudski postupci a samo dva važna optužrniks sui dalje van dometa pravde. Ali, čak i veoma blagonaklonimposmatračima učiniće se da je politički i socijalni dometovih suđenja za ratne zločine na društva zapadnog Balkanaprilično ograničen.Važno je razumeti da većina žrtava ratnih zločina neoseća da je do njih doprla pravda. Većina ih i dalje živiu siromaštvu i u uslovima društvene izolovanosti. Čestose žale da je kažnjavanje ratnih zločina veoma blago i davećina osuđenih zatvorske kazne služi u komfornim zatvorimau državama zapadne Evrope. Preuranjeno puštanjena slobodu osuđenih za ratne zločine žrtve doživljavaju kaoličnu izdaju.Tužioci u Međunarodnom krivičnom sudu za bivšu Jugoslaviju(MKSJ) su sasvim razumljivo insistirali na suđenjimakrupnim figurama rata na Balkanu i normalno je da su ovasuđenja privlačila mnogo veću pažnju nego suđenja direktnimpočiniocima ratnih zločina. U međuvremenu, stotine,a možda i hiljade onih koji su počinili ratne zločine i daljeostaju van domašaja pravde. Osim što su pomogla da seučvrsti ideja da suđenja za ratne zločine služe za raspodelupolitičke krivice, fokusiranje na krupne političke figuredovelo je i do toga da ih većina žrtava ne doživljava kaonešto što je u direktnoj vezi sa njihovim ličnim tragedijama.Veoma mali broj ljudi smatra da su suđenja pred Haškimtribunalom i nacionalna suđenja za ratne zločine doprinelaprocesu pomirenja i suočavanja sa prošlošću u globalu.Veliki broj završenih postupaka i dalje izaziva međuetničkupodelu. Jedan takav primer je i potez odlazećeg predsednikaHrvatske, Stjepana Mesića, koji je u januaru 2010.godine, u trenutku očitog političkog ludila, smanjio zatvorskekazne za dva počinioca ratnih zločina – za jednogSrbina koji je bio čuvar u logoru u kome su mučeni Hrvatii za jednog Hrvata, pukovnika čuvenog po tome što je bioakter verovatno najgnusnijih zločina počinjenih protivSrba u Hrvatskoj. Ovaj Mesićev potez izveden na samomkraju njegovog predsedničkog mandata šokirao je i uplašiomnoge, od hrvatskih veterana, bivših ratnih zarobljenikaposebno, do članova srpske manjinske zajednice u Hrvatskoji Vlade Republike Srbije.Ne sme se dozvoliti zamena pojmova reintegracije i pomirenja.Uprkos novim međunarodnim i unutrašnjim granicamakoje ih sada administrativno dele, etničke grupesa prostora bivše Jugoslavije su zaista uspostavile mnogepredratne veze, u kulturi i trgovini posebno, u meri u kojojsu one postojale u predratnom periodu i to uprkos činjenicida nisu uspeli da ostvare međusobno pomirenje. U stvari,ove grupe su bile neuspešne čak i u pokušajima da dođu dozajedničkog tumačenja događaja iz prošlosti, što, naravno,ne dokazuje da je pomirenje nepotrebno, već možda preotkriva postojanje suštinske trajnosti veza koje među njimapostoje.Zastanimo na trenutak pred činjenicom da su sve postjugoslovenskedržave prihvatile saradnju sa Haškim tribunalomi pristale da pružaju podršku nacionalnim sudovimaza ratne zločine. Ali, čak i najliberalniji među njima vrlooprezno podržavaju procesuiranje ratnih zločina i predsvojim biračkim telima interpretiraju tu podršku skoroisključivo u sklopu premise da je saradnja sa Hagom dobarpotez na putu ka ostvarenju integracija njihovih država umeđunarodnu zajednicu, Evropsku Uniju i posebno NATO.Istovremeno, većina njih pruža finansijsku i pravnu pomoćoptuženima za ratne zločine i članovima njihovih porodica55Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav du56i organizuje herojske dočeke osuđenima za ratne zločinenakon povratka sa izdržavanja zatvorske kazne.Bivša predsednica Republike Srpske, Biljana Plavšić,osuđena za ratne zločine pred sudskim većem Haškog tribunala,koja je pre isteka zatvorske kazne puštena na sloboduiz zatvora u Švedskoj u oktobru 2009. godine, doletela jeiz Švedske kući avionom koji je po nju poslala vlada jednogBiH entiteta. Nekoliko dana kasnije, srpski stanovnici BanjaLuke priredili su joj srdačnu dobrodošlicu na zaprepašćenjeBošnjaka iz cele zemlje. A osuđeni počinioci ratnih zločinanisu zaboravljeni ni dok su iza rešetaka. Deca u nekimhrvatskim školama u Bosni pišu božićne čestitke Hrvatimaosuđenim za ratne zločine.Neuspeh da se suđenjima za ratne zločine više doprinesepribližavanju suprotstavljenih mišljenja o događajima izprošlosti ne može se otpisati na nesposobnost Haga ililokalnih sudova da shvate značaj jake outreach aktivnosti.Svakako, kako u Hagu tako i širom regiona, uspostavljanjepravde nije uvek shvaćeno kao pravda. Ali, često postojedruge vrste nepredvidivih strukturalnih prepreka kojeumanjuju spremnost bivših jugoslovenskih republika da sesuoče sa prošlošću na konstruktivan način čemu se moždamora dati više značaja u razmatranju ovog problema.Zločini o kojima se ovde radi nisu počinjeni iz čiste mržnje,iako mržnje nikad nije nedostajalo, već u ime političkihciljeva koje su podržavali milioni ljudi. To nisu bili tekneki obični politički ciljevi već težnje usmerene ka pukojegzistenciji pripadnika drugih etničkih grupa, težnje poputnacionalnog suvereniteta, graničnih pitanja, identiteta,ustavnog položaja, ili dugoročne stabilonosti.Same po sebi ove težnje nisu bili nelegitimne. Nije biloničega nelegitimnog ili nezakonitog u nastojanju bosanskihSrba da žele da se odvoje unutar teritorije Bosne iHercegovine ili u težnji Hrvata iz Hrvatske da postanusamostalna država, ili težnje Srba da zadrže Kosovo unutarsvojih granica ili pak težnje kosovskih Albanaca da postanunezavisna država. Ali, neke ili većina radnji preduzetih ucilju ostvarivanja ovih težnji su bile nezakonite.Naravno, moguće je raspravljati o tome da su neke od ovihtežnji bile ilegalne same po sebi jer je njihova implementacijapodrazumevala upotrebu sile, ali to je komplikovanadebata i trenutak za takvu raspravu je odavno prošao.Međutim, ove političke aspiracije su uveliko nadživelekonflikt. One su delimično ili u potpunosti realizovane ikao takve smatraju se nedvojbenim istorijskim tekovinamaučvršćenim u ustavnim aktima zemalja aktera, ili, ako nisuu potpunosti realizovane, one i dalje žive na konceptualnomkao i pravnom nivou kao što je slučaj Srbije po pitanjuKosova.Drugim rečima, post-jugoslovenska društva su osnovana– i međunarodno prihvaćena kao takva – na aspiracijama,bile one realizovane ili ne, u ime kojih su članovi ovihdruštava počinili nepojmljive zločine.Kad dođe do rasvetljavanja zločina počinjenih u ime ovihaspiracija, koji god da je način u pitanju, ono što mi tražimood ovih društava da urade jeste da se uzdignu iznad samihsebe i naprave distinkciju između svojih političkih aspiracijai zločina počinjenih u njihovo ime. To je intelektualnoi emocionalno veoma zahtevan predlog, ne samo za širokenarodne slojeve, već i za liberalne manjine, takođe.U redu, evo vam vaša Republika Srpska, ali molimo vaspokažite nam masovne grobnice koje čine njene temelje ipokažite malo saosećanja za porodice tih žrtava. A moždabiste mogli i da pomognete u obnavljanu stotina džamijauništenih u ime stvaranja Republike Srpske? Hrvatska,čestitamo vam na postignutoj nezavisnosti! Odlično ste touradili! A sad predajte one generale i molim vas popravitekuće koje ste spalili dok ste terali Srbe iz Hrvatske, one isteSrbe za koje sad kažete da biste voleli da se vrate. Ovo nikadnije moglo lako da se uradi, ako je uopšte i bilo želje.Iako ratni zločini nisu bili jedino sredstvo korišćeno ustvaranju aktuelne političke mape regiona, retko izgovorenaistina je da su ratni zločini zaista bili važno sredstvo. Iz tograzloga se pokušaji rasvetljavanja individualne odgovornostivisokih državnih zvaničnika optuženih za ratne zločinekroz sudske postupke, u zajednici iz koje ti zvaničnicipotiču, najčešće doživljavaju kao udar na same temeljete zajednice. Zato se događa da, inače ispravni, pristojnigrađani jednog društva, koji poštuju zakon u svakom smislui koji nikad ne bi došli u situaciju da opravdavaju „obične“zločine, ostaju ravnodušni kada se otkrije neki ratni zločin.U suštini, ljudi često na ratne zločine gledaju kroz prizmunekih apstraktnih uslova, kao da su oni počinjeni u nekojdrugačijoj stvarnosti u kojoj vlada drugačiji poredak odonog u kome oni žive. Drugim rečima, dok su ona moždaposlužila u druge svrhe, suđenja za ratne zločine nisuništa postigla u smislu pružanja satisfakcije žrvama nitisu doprinela u značajnijoj meri uspostavljanju pomirenjaizmeđu etničkih grupa u regionu.To je upravo mesto gde Inicijativa za REKOM ima smisla.Ali, koja je verovatnoća da će države u regionu pristati daprihvate ovakav predlog u skorijoj budućnosti? Možda nijesasvim izvesno, ali nije ni totalno nemoguće.Fond za humanitarno pravo

Tranziciona pravda iz ugla medijaArhitektura osnovnih političkih sentimenata u regionusugeriše da je osnovni preduslov da se ovo dogodi simultanapodrška ovoj inicijativi od vlada dva najvažnija centrau regionu: Beograda i Zagreba. Gotovo je nezamislivo da biPodgorica, Sarajevo i Priština odbile da se priklone ovakvojinicijativi jednom kad je prihvate Zagreb i Beograd. Anjihova podrška inicijativi bez podrške bilo Zagreba biloBeograda bila bi gotovo beznačajna.Iako je teško zamisliti da bilo koja vlada u regionu svojomvoljom oberučke prihvata ovu inicijativu kao prioritet, samalo sreće i sa malo malo umerenog pritiska Beogradi Zagreb bi mogli da odigraju ispravnu kartu na kraju.Obe zemlje su u poslednje vreme bile prilično srećne uizboru svojih lidera. Prošlog leta, sada osramoćeni premijerHrvatske Ivo Sanader, mislio je da je imenovanje JadrankeKosor predstavljalo zapravo ustoličenje njegovog naslednikau premijerskoj fotelji, da bi se vrlo brzo ispostaviloda se Jadranka Kosor nezaustavljivo razvija u neustrašivogigrača spremnog da transformiše ne samo vladajući aparat ivladajuću stranku, već i izgeld čitave države. Dajući ogromnupodršku predsedničkom kandidatu Ivi Josipoviću naizborima održanim u januaru, Hrvatska je dobila umerenog,staloženog i izuzetno inteligentnog predsednika. Umeđuvremenu, bivši predsednik Srbije Boris Tadić nastavioje da stvara uslove za kreiranje umerinijeg imidža Srbije odonog koji smo navikli da doživljavamo kroz novinske naslove.Iako se ovo ne može uvek lako uočiti kroz događaje kojimaobiluju dnevne vesti, nesumnjivo se glavni politički pravcisporo, ali sigurno kreću u ka stvaranja umerenog političkogsentimenta. I Tadić i Josipović su izjavili da smatraju da jerazvoj odnosa između Srbije i Hrvatske njihov prioritet.Mediji u regionu, međutim, mogu predstavljati veću preprekuza REKOM. U stvari, može se sasvim odgovornotvrditi da, kad se radi o suočavanju sa nedavnom prošlošćuširom regiona bivše Jugoslavije, značajni delovi političkescene, bar u Srbiji i Hrvatskoj imaju više medijskog prostoraod tipične informativne kuće u ovim zemljama. Medijskescene su pasivne i biće još dugo vremena pod dominacijomurednika čija je intelektualna platforma formirana tokomraspada bivše Jugoslavije i vlasnika medija ili političarakoji ih štite a kojima je u interesu da održavaju u životusentimente iz devedesetih godina, mada u nešto izmenjenomformatu. Rad MKSJ i organizacija poput Fonda zahumanitarno pravo je postepeno učinio da zamukne onogromoglasno poricanje ratnih zločina tako da u poslednjevreme toga nema mnogo u medijima. Ono što smo najčešćemogli da vidimo u deceniji iza nas je da je većina medijana neki način postala indiferentna na ratne zločine. Osuđenjimaa i ostalim verodostojnim izvorima informacijao ratnim zločinima ili se polovično izveštava, na način kojiizgleda kao da urednik odobrava izveštavanje o događajimanižeg prioriteta, ili se o njima izveštava u programima kojisu pola informativni a pola zabavnog karaktera, kao što jeslučaj sa suđenjima Šešelju i Miloševiću, skrivanju generalaGotovine ili povratku Biljane Plavšić. A kad se priznaje ratnizločin počinjen od strane članova etničke grupe kojoj seodređeni medij obraća, što se ponekad događa, priznanjeda je taj ratni zločin počinjen obično je urađeno na načinkoji ne zadire u uzrok koji je doveo do počinjenja zločina.Ovo, naravno, lako može biti objašnjeno s obzirom naprirodu i ishod raspada Jugoslavije, ali je takođe i veomaloše u smislu napora da se promoviše pomirenje međunarodima koji žive na ovim prostorima.U stvari, najteži deo problema sa kojim će se Inicijativaza REKOM suočavati jeste činjenica da nove elite kojekontrolišu medije nisu mnogo zainteresovane za ratnezločine i pitanja iz prošlosti osim kad im to služi u svrhubrzog senzibiliranja i homogenizovanja sopstvenih glasača,ali ne više u cilju održavanja konflikta već u svrhu pružanjapredizborne podrške odabranim kandidatima, uvećavanjutiraža ili gledanosti. Preuzimanje medija u regionu odstrane različitih interesnih grupa je deo onoga što možemonazvati proces porobljavanja države, što, naravno, nije svojstvenosamo bivšoj Jugoslaviji. Ono što je zaista specifičnarazlika u slučaju bivše Jugoslavije u poređenju sa ostatkomkomunističkog sveta uglavnom, jeste postojanje ogromnogtereta prošlosti satkanog od ratnih zločina i grubihkršenja ljudskih prava tokom nedavnog konflikta o kojimatek treba govoriti. Medijski napori koji bi mogli doprinetikvalitetnom obrađivanju ove teme ne postoje, a ono što jenajgore jeste procena da nema mnogo razloga za optimizamda će se ovo promeniti u skorije vreme s izuzetkomčinjenice da se priroda medija u principu brzo menja.Ono što elite oformljene tokom devedesetih kontrolišujesu tradicionalne medijske kuće koje još uvek dominirajulokalnom medijskom scenom. Ta dominacija će bez sumnjeopstati još neko vreme. Ali, nadolazeći novi mediji ćenužno doneti promene sa sve više čitalačke publike kojaizvor informisanja nalazi na internetu, gde su i produkcijai distribucija mnogo jeftiniji i svakog dana bivaju još jeftiniji.Dalje,veoma jeftino otvaranje novih medijskih kuća jetakođe pogodno za distribuciju vesti putem tradicionalnihkanala, što predstavlja elemenat koji će sigurno pojačati pritisakda se pristup uređivačkoj politici iz korena promeni.Ovde se takođe nazire tračak nade za REKOM.Umesto da se čeka da trenutno dominantne dnevne novineili nacionalne TV stanice pristupe ovoj temi ozbiljno,REKOM treba da osnuje sopstvenu snažnu multimedi-57Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav dujsku produkciju kao i da ojača svoje prisustvo na internetuputem stvaranje moćnog multimedijskog portalačiji sadržaj će se odslikavati kroz čitav balkanski internetprostor, što će biti način da se vrši naizmenični pritisak natradicionalne medijske kuće da shvate REKOM sa velikomdozom ozbiljnosti.58Fond za humanitarno pravo

Tranziciona pravda iz ugla medijaUloga i obaveza medijau procesu posleratnog pomirenjaFlorence HartmannTranziciona pravda, osim krivičnih gonjenja, reparacija,sprečavanja nekažnjivosti i unapređenja zakona,obuhvata i ciljeve koji se odnose na kazivanje istine,izgradnju mira, stvaranje kulture poštovanja ljudskih pravai demokratije, čuvanje uspomene na žrtve i vraćanje dostojanstvažrtvama. Sve ovo zajedno predstavlja preduslovza pomirenje. Pored sudskih procesa, instrumentiza ostvarivanje ovih ciljeva su i komisije za istinu poputREKOM-a i komemoracije. Ali, ovakvi procesi uvek bivajunekompletni ukoliko nisu praćeni i promenama istorijskenaracije kod naroda koji su bili uključeni u sukob.Obrazovanje je dugo bilo odsutno iz teorija i diskusija otranzicionoj pravdi. Širi obrazovni sistem i istorijska naukasama po sebi – šta se uči i kako – retko su bili predmetanalize institucija koje je trebalo reformisati kroz procesetranzicione pravde.Članom 45 Predloga Statuta REKOM-a traži se konkretanmandat za davanje preporuka o mehanizmima koji bi omogućilida se utvrđene činjenice integrišu u obrazovni sistem državačlanicasporazuma. Ali, biće potrebno dosta vremena da seREKOM osnuje, da finalni izveštaj bude objavljen, da se preporukeiz izveštaja unesu u udžbenike, da se objave stručnitekstovi i da se nastavnicima pruži adekvatna obuka.U ovom trenutku, imamo čitavu posleratnu generacijukoja je odškolovana na različitim, najčešće konfliktnimistorijskim štivima, u sistemu u kome se istorijska naukai tranziciona pravda kreću različitim kolosecima i u komenijedan tribunal, ni međunarodni ni domaći, nije u svojmandat uključio produkciju didaktičkih materijala posebnousmerenih ka reformi obrazovanja.Svi se slažu da interpretacije događaja iz prošlosti utiču napost-konfliktna društva. Ali do sada su, uglavnom, da nekažem uvek, ova tumačenja poveravana onima kojima je ciljda se održava razdor među grupama uključenim u konfliktumesto da odgovaraju na potrebe društva za mirom, pravdom,demokratizacijom i među-etničkim pomirenjem. Ovevažne teme su prepuštene ljudima na vlasti čija je reputacijaukaljana vezama sa prethodnim zločinačkim režimima ilikojima je jednostavno u interesu da promovišu pomirenjekao sredstvo društvene amnezije.Proces preuređivanja udžbenika istorije nakon periodamasovnih kršenja ljudskih prava obično traje veoma dugo.Ali, i pre nego što mehanizmi tranzicione pravde i znanjastečena kroz te procese ostvare svoj uticaj na reformuobrazovanja, na razne druge načine se može uticati napromenu društvene svesti o nedavnoj ratnoj prošlosti i nadruge načine se može doprineti, zajedno sa građanskimdruštvom, uvođenju promena u stvaranje istorijskog zapisakod grupa zahvaćenim konfliktom. Tu na prvom mestumislim na medije.Mediji mogu pomoći da se utvrđene činjenice plasirajuu javnost, da se prihvaćenom istorijskom naracijom nemaskiraju zlodela koja su nanela veliku patnju i da se nezanemaruju bolna iskustva drugih grupa, uključujući inasilje počinjeno od strane klikaških državnih aparata uslučaju međunarodnog sukoba kao što je bio slučaj u bivšojJugoslaviji.Veoma mali broj medija i novinara u regionu je prihvatiloovaj zadatak. Mediji su u prošlosti najčešće igrali značajnuulogu u eskalaciji nasilja i masovnih kršenja ljudskih pravašireći govor mržnje, dehumanizujući protivničku stranui promovišući ratnu politiku. Oni, stoga, imaju posebnudužnost da se „iskupe“ za ratno-huškačko novinarstvotako što će pomoći da se smanji broj laži koje i dalje nes-59Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav du60metano opstaju u nacionalnim diskursima, što je jedan odnajvažnijih ciljeva mehanizama tranzicione pravde.Mediji mogu u velikoj meri pomoći da se stvori kontraretorikakoja će predstavljati izazov za postojeće stereotipeukorenjene među njihovom čitalačkom publikom ili moguponuditi onu vrstu retorike koju odobravaju različite straneu konfliktu i koja ne briše različitosti čak i kad su doneklekontradiktorne.Kroz prenose suđenja za ratne zločine ili izveštavanje oaktivnostima u procesima govorenja istine, mediji imajumogućnost da stvore novu platformu za javni diskurs,diskusije i analize u koje bi se uključila neka nova publikai mlađa populacija post-konfliktnih društava. Ovakvauloga medija posebno je važna kad znamo da ne postojemehanizmi države kojima bi se činjenice utvrđene predmeđunarodnim ili domaćim sudovima institucionalizovalei uvrstile u školske programe.Mediji takođe mogu igrati značajnu ulogu u stvaranjukritičkog mišljenja i razvijanja empatije, kreiranja volje dase preispituju uprošćeni modeli i sposobnost da se izrazineslaganje sa interpretacijama prošlosti i njihovim implikacijamana trenutna društvena pitanja bez pribegavanjaupotrebi sile i novih zločina i nepravdi.Medijski izveštaji sa suđenja za ratne zločine, svedočenja iudžbenici istorije u očima žrtava i drugih struktura javnostisluže za procenu iskrene namere društva kojima su bivšipočinioci ratnih zločina pripadali da spreče ponavljanjeprošlosti, kao i za ocenu da li se neka politička i društvenagrupa zaista promenila u meri da bi se mogla smatratipouzdanim partnerom u procesima tranzicione pravde.U većini slučajeva, međutim, umesto da doprinesu jačanjuprocesa stvaranja kritičke svesti, mediji često koriste polarizovanepristupe i jezičke formulacije u svojim izveštajima sasuđenja za ratne zločine – ukoliko uopšte o njima izveštavaju.Za direktne prenose suđenja za ratne zločine, TV stanicenajčešće nisu obezbeđivale adekvatne komentatore koji bigledaocima pomogli da razumeju kontekst. Umesto raskidanjasa nasilnom prošlošću, izveštavanjem o suđenjimaza ratne zločine, mediji nastavljaju da održavaju u životu(drugim sredstvima) ratne stereotipe i mržnju. Suđenjapred Haškim tribunalom imala su za cilj da dokažu dasu zločini počinjeni, kao i da spreče da se nastavi sazaluđivanjem nacije i stvaranjem novog mita u kome seta nacija pojavljuje isključivo kao žrtva. Ovaj pokušaj nijeuspeo u velikoj meri zbog neprofesionalnog izveštavanja saovih suđenja.Nivo obrazovanja novinara je uglavnom nizak i uobičajeninovinarski pristup najčešće podrazumeva nekritičnu misaoi nedostatak novinarske samostalnosti u odnosu na političkei institucionalne strukture. Razumljivo je da ovakav naglasakna ulogu medija u procesima tranzicione pravde možeizgledati idealistički. Međutim, napor da se mediji na tajnačin iskupe za godine širenja govora mržnje i ratnohuškačkogizveštavanja koje je dovelo do eksplozije nasiljau regionu mora biti očigledan. Mediji danas imaju obavezuda daju ozbiljan doprinos bavljenju spornim pitanjima i dapomognu da se istorijska nauka i procesi tranzicione pravdenađu na zajedničkom koloseku.Fond za humanitarno pravo

Tranziciona pravda iz ugla Haškog tribunalaIV DEOTranziciona pravdaiz ugla Haškog tribunala61Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav du62Fond za humanitarno pravo

Tranziciona pravda iz ugla Haškog tribunalaJohn HockingRatko Mladić, haški begunac je konačno uhapšen i izručenHaškom tribunalu. Njegovim hapšenjem računica sesvodi na to da je od 161 lica optuženih za ratne zločinena slobodi samo jedan, Goran Hadžić. Tribunal je završiosudske postupkeu odnosu na 126 optuženih. U ovommomentu 34 optužene osobe ili čekaju na presudu ili sunjihova suđenja u toku. 1 Tribunal je učinio dostupnimjavnosti milione strana dokumenata iz političkih i vojniharhiva. Preko 6000 svedoka je svedočilo u postupcimapred Haškim tribunalom pričajući svoje priče. Iz njihovihsvedočenja, utvrđene su brojne činjenice o zločinimapočinjenim u bivšoj Jugoslaviji tokom devedesetih. Licaproglašena odgovornim za te zločine su kažnjena. UspehTribunala daleko prevazilazi čak i najsmelija očekivanjanjegovih osnivača. Haški tribunal je san o utvrđivanjuodgovornosti pretvorio u realnost. Najviši ešaloni vlastinisu više nedostupni pravdi. Svest o odgovornosti najvišihzvaničnika se sada širi po čitavom svetu.Međutim, važno je konstatovati da krivični postupci nisujedini način suprotstavljanja kršenjima ljudskih prava.Veliki broj različitih mehanizama tranzicione pravdetakođe obezbeđuje instrumente za društvenu transformaciju.Krivično pravo je kritično važan elemenat, ali nije,niti treba da bude jedini. Dokaz da je to tako je upravodanašnji Forum.Ujedinjene Nacije prepoznaju značaj zauzimanja šireg frontau bavljenju post-konfliktnim društvima i često zauzimajuvodeću ulogu u tom procesu. Prethodni Generalni sekretarUjedinjenih Nacija izjavio je svojevremeno da pravda, miri demokratija nisu ciljevi koji se međusobno isključuju, većda su to ciljevi koji se uzajamno jačaju.Ukoliko se u bavljenju post-konfliktnim društvima koncentrišemosamo na jednu instituciju ili ako ignorišemo građanskodruštvo ili žrtve, ti napori će biti uzaludni. To znači da seovim pitanjima mora pristupiti na sveobuhvatan način. Morajuse osluškivati sve institucije koje su u međusobnoj zavisnostii mora se imati sluha za potrebe ključnih grupa. Takođe semora voditi računa o tome da je potrebno da mehanizmi tranzicionepravde budu komplementarni.Tribunal je međunarodni sud koji je fizički veoma udaljenod mesta događanja zločina. Ali njegov uticaj ne sme bitiograničen na sudnice u Hagu. Outreach program je ključniinstrument tranzicione pravde Haškog tribunala. Outreachprogram je pomogao Tribunalu da ostvari širi pristup okome je govorio Generalni sekretar. Svakako je zadovoljenjepravde neophodan preduslov za mir, ali kako se mandatTribunala bliži kraju, misija MKSJ i posebno Outreachprogram Tribunala postaju važniji nego ikad pre. Preostalihnekoliko godina rada Tribunala predstavljaju poslednjupriliku da Tribunal obezbedi da dokazi koji su prikupljeni– svedočanstva preko 6000 svedoka i izrečene presude – daovaj ogromni broj objektivno proverenih činjenica postanedostupan javnosti, i nacionalnim sudovima za ratne zločinei građanima u regionu, bez etničke ili političke pristrasnosti.631 Izlaganje Johna Hockinga na Međunarodnom forumu za tranzicionu pravdu održanom u junu 2012., u Sarajevu. Goran Hadžić,poslednji begunac je uhapšen 20. jula 2012. godine, čime je MKSJ postao jedini međunarodni sud koji je osigurao hapšenje svihoptuženih.Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum za tran zi ci o nu prav du64Iz tog razloga sam, kao Sekretar Haškog tribunala, učiniosve da Outreach program postane ključno strateško opredeljenjetokom preostalih nekoliko godina rada Tribunala.Posao koji budemo uradili u ovom periodu, zapečatiće zauvekono što ostavljamo u nasleđe generacijama iza nas. Onošto radimo danas definisaće naše mesto u istoriji.Rad Tribunala je uvek bio u potpunosti u vezi sa svimlokalnim aktivnostima – to je uvek bio vodeći principOutreach inicijativa Tribunala. I to je ono što vezu izmeđuTribunala i Inicijative za REKOM čini veoma dobrom.Inicijativa REKOM otvara novo poglavlje u post-konfliktnojtransformaciji bivše Jugoslavije. Ideja REKOM-a predstavljaalternativni glas onih koji žele da ispričaju svoje priče bezograničenja i onih koji žele da se otvori debata o zločinimapočinjenim u prošlosti i o tome kako da nastavimo daživimo sa njima. To je nešto što društvo radi za društvo.Tokom proteklih četvrt veka, mnoge zemlje su pokušavaleda se bore sa tragičnim nasleđem sukoba. Neke zemljesu formirale svoje komisije za istinu koje su odražavalepotrebe tog određenog društva. REKOM ide istim putem.Iskustvo nas uči da ovakvi mehanizmi imaju potencijalada transformišu društvo. Pogledajte samo iskustvaJužnoafričke Republike, Argentine i Ruande.Suočavanje sa prošlošću nije jednostavan proces i mojeje mišljenje da su za to potrebna dva elementa. Jedan jesposobnost da se razume i prihvati prošlost. Drugi je dase snosi odgovornost za ono što se dogodilo u prošlosti.Mehanizmi govorenja istine i krivično gonjenje odgovornihza zlodela iz prošlosti mogu doprineti i jednom i drugomelementu. Inicijative govorenja istine, kakva je i Inicijativaza REKOM, više su usmerene ka procesu razumevanjaprošlosti. Krivično gonjenje, Haški tribunal i domaći sudoviigraju dominantnu ulogu u utvrđivanju odgovornosti zazločine iz prošlosti. Međutim, iako se njihove specifičnemetode razlikuju, oba ova načina suočavanja sa prošlošćuna kraju idu ka istom suštinskom cilju i, dopunjujući semeđusobno, daju doprinos post-konfliktnom oporavkudruštva.Ali, ipak, važno je razumeti da ova dva načina imaju različiteuloge, različite ciljeve i različite procedure. Pomenućusamo nekoliko razlika.Predmeti kojima se Haški tribunal bavi koncentrišu sesamo na određene incidente, u vezi sa kojima se dokazipredstavljaju na način koji odgovara strogim kriterijumasudske procedure. Tokom sudskih procesa koji se vodepred Tribunalom, ogroman broj dokaza se predstavlja iproverava kroz rigoroznu sudsku proceduru. Cilj svega togaje utvrđivanje lične odgovornosti van osnovane sumnje.Dokazi predstavljeni Haškom tribunalu nemaju primarnuulogu da stvore sveobuhvatni istorijski zapis. Oni to prostone mogu postići.Komisije za istinu poput REKOM-a, sa druge strane, imajudrugačiju nameru – da sačine što širi zapis o događajima izprošlosti, uključujući i analizu uloge nacionalnih institucija.To je nešto što se ne može postići kroz sisteme krivičnepravde. Procesi govorenja istine ne podležu rigoroznimkriterijumima prihvatljivosti kao što je slučaj sa dokazimakoji se žele uvesti u sudsku proceduru, niti podležu pravilimaunakrsnog ispitivanja koji su od suštinskog značaja zakrivične postupke. Ovo ima svoje prednosti, ali i ograničenjai veoma je važno razumeti ih i prihvatiti.Oba procesa stvaraju zapis u kome centralno mesto zauzimažrtva. Uloga žrtve u krivičnim postupcima u Haškomtribunalu je presudna. Bez svedoka i njihovog svedočenjane bi bilo sudskih postupaka. Hiljade hrabrih svedokakoji su došli da svedoče pred Tribunalom omogućili suda se glas mnogih žrtava čuje i zapamti. U tom kontekstu,krivični postupak, pored suštinskog cilja da se kazneodgovorna lica, služi i interesima javnosti i interesu žrtavada se njihov glas čuje.Komisije za istinu žrtvu stavljaju još dublje u kontekstprocesa, pokušavajući da steknu kompletan uvid u njihovostradanje. Govorenje istine je važna komponenta individualnihi javnih saslušanja. To se događa u oba konteksta,ali pod potpuno drugačijim uslovima i imajući potpunodrugačiji cilj pred sobom.Obrazovanje takođe igra važnu ulogu u sprečavanjubudućeg opresivnog ponašanja, a ima i kritičnu ulogu uučvršćivanju vladavine prava.I domaći i međunarodni krivični sudovi i mehanizmi zapronalaženje istine funkcionišu kao sredstva za edukovanjedruštva o zlodelima počinjenim u prošlosti. Tribunal to činikroz sudske postupke, kroz presude i kroz svoj Outreachprogram. Slično tome, REKOM takođe ima obrazovni karakteru tome što kao jedan od svojih glavnih ciljeva navodisprečavanje širenja laži u javnosti.Važno je da se razlike u ova dva pristupa jasno precizirajukako bi i očekivanja bila realistična. Potrebe žrtava se mogusuštinski razlikovati od pojedinca do pojedinca. Neće svakažrtva biti zadovoljna ako je krivična sankcija izražena samou obliku zatvorske kazne. Mnoge žrtve često osećaju datakve mere ne mogu kompenzovati njihovu patnju i gubitakFond za humanitarno pravo

Tranziciona pravda iz ugla Haškog tribunalai jedino mogu naći utehu u ne-retributivnim mehanizmimakakve nude tela za kazivanje istine.Regionu bivše Jugoslavije potrebna je pravda i pomirenje.Nijedna pojedinačna institucija niti mehanizam ne možesamostalno zadovoljiti tu potrebu. Krivični postupci, biloda su vođeni pred Haškim tribunalom ili pred domaćimsudovima, i alternativni mehanizmi govorenja istine imajupodjednako važne uloge u ovom procesu. Mora se izbećisvako poređenje ova dva procesa i mora se ići u pravcuholističkog pristupa pravdi, kako bi se našli interaktivniprocesi za uspešnu izgradnju trajnog mira u regionu.65Fond za humanitarno pravo

Forum for Transitional Justice66Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional JusticeTRANSITIONAL JUSTICEIN POST-YUGOSLAV STATES:POLITICAL WILLAND PUBLIC SUPPORTFOR THE RECOM PROCESS67Edi ted by De ni sa Ko sto vi co vaHumanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional Justice68Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional JusticeCon tentsCon tri bu tors.....................................................................................................................71In tro duc tion ....................................................................................................................73Civil Society and Restorative Justice in the Western Balkans: From SymbolicPolitics to State Consolidation..........................................................................................75Denisa KostovicovaRECOM: A New Approach to Reconciliation and a Corrective for Criminal Justice................78Nataša KandićPART IProspects and Policy Options for Restorative Justice...........................................................81Justice Outside the Courtroom: Engaging Society in Understanding the Past.....................83Eric GordyCivil Society and Recent Efforts at Normalizing Turkish Armenian Relations ...................88Armine IshkanianEuropean Integration and Confrontations with the Communist Past ................................93John Gledhill69Truth Commissions from the Latin American Perspective: Challengesand Lessons......................................................................................................................100Eduardo GonzalezPART IITransitional Justice: Views of the Epistemic Community....................................................103Dražen Lalić ........................................................................................................................105Diane F. Orentlicher ..............................................................................................................107Vladimir Petrović..................................................................................................................109Mladen Ostojić .....................................................................................................................111Jasna Dragović-Soso ..............................................................................................................113Christian Axboe Nielsen..........................................................................................................115Iavor Rangelov......................................................................................................................117Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional JusticePART IIITransitional Justice from the Media Perspective................................................................119RECOM and the Media Strategy ...........................................................................................121Tihomir LozaThe Role and the Duty of the Media in Post-Conflict Reconciliation.................................124Florence HartmannPART IVTransitional Justice From the ICTY Perspective..................................................................127John Hocking .......................................................................................................................12970Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional JusticeContributorsJasna Dragović-Soso, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Department of Politics, Goldsmiths, Universityof London, United KingdomJohn Gledhill, Departmental Lecturer in the Politics of Security Governance, Department of InternationalDevelopment, University of OxfordEduardo Gonzalez, Director, Truth and Memory Program, International Center of Transitional JusticeEric Gordy, Senior Lecturer in South East European Politics, School of Slavonic and East European Studies,University College LondonFlorence Hartmann, formerly a Spokesperson for the Chief Prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The HagueJohn Hocking, Registrar ICTYArmine Ishkanian, Lecturer, Department of Social Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science,London71Nataša Kandić, Process RECOM CoordinatorDenisa Kostovicova, Senior Lecturer in Global Politics, Department of Government, London School ofEconomics and Political ScienceTihomir Loza, Editor, Transitions-On LineDražen Lalić, Professor of the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Zagreb, CroatiaChristian Axboe Nielsen, Assistant Professor of Southeast European Studies and Bosnian/Serbian/Croatian,University of Århus, Institute for History and Area Studies Århus, DenmarkMladen Ostojić, Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies, Central European University (CEU-IAS)Diane F. Orentlicher, Professor of International Law, Washington College of Law, American University, UnitedStatesVladimir Petrović, Researcher, NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Amsterdam,NetherlandsIavor Rangelov, Global Security Research Fellow, Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit, Departmentof Development, London School of Economics and Political ScienceHumanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional Justice72Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional JusticeIntroductionThis special issue, whose aim is to contribute to the debate on transitional justice in the Western Balkans,is largely based on two events. One is a day-long seminar entitled ‘European Integration and TransitionalJustice: Prospects and Policy Options for Restorative Justice in the Western Balkans’, organised by the formerCentre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics and Political Science, and theHumanitarian Law Centre, Belgrade, held at the European Commission in Brussels in December 2009. The otheris the International Forum for Transitional Justice organised by the Coalition for RECOM, held in Sarajevo inJune 2011. The support of the European Commission, Compagnia di San Paolo and King Baudouin Foundationthat enabled organising these events, and the support of the Open Society Faculty Development Programmein South East Europe and Civil Rights Defenders for the publication of this issue of the Forum for TransitionalJustice are gratefully acknowledged.73Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional Justice74Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional JusticeCivil Society and Restorative Justice inthe Western Balkans: From SymbolicPolitics to State ConsolidationDenisa KostovicovaThe concept of transitional justice has until recentlybeen appropriated by retributive justice (i.e. justiceby means of a trial) in the public debates in the WesternBalkans, policy debates with different external actorssuch as the EU as well as in a rapidly growing scholarshipon transitional justice in the region. Victim-centredapproaches to restorative transitional justice instrumentsin the Western Balkans are yet to receive their due academicand policy attention, despite recent academic scholarshipthat has begun to address failed state-sponsoredattempts to establish truth and reconciliation commissionsin the Western Balkans.The work of RECOM, which is a transnational civil societyinitiative in the Western Balkans aimed at establishingthe facts of war crimes and gross human rights violationscommitted during the wars of Yugoslavia’s dissolution,has recently attracted attention both of the EU and thepolicy makers in the region. The RECOM Initiative wasestablished as a response to weaknesses and outrightineffectiveness of retributive justice mechanisms,specifically, those of the ICTY to bring about justice andreconciliation. The RECOM’s impact has already beenwide-ranging throughout the region even though it has yetto reach its goal of the regional state-backed commission,while its work has encountered sometimes vehementopposition both by representatives of states and civilsocieties in the region. Hundreds of consultations on issuesrelated to transitional justice, including the consultationson the commission’s Statute, has invigorated an inter- andintra-ethnic debate about the necessity of facing the pastwhilst remaining true to its primary focus on victims.The process that the RECOM has set in motion callsfor a reflection on the role of civil society in relation tobroader goals of transitional justice, and, even more so,on our understanding of how civil society activities canfurther the aims of European integration processes in theregion. What is of particular interest in this contributionis the importance of civil society activism in the area ofrestorative justice for the Europeanisation of the WesternBalkans, which concerns both reconciliation and statebuildingin the aftermath of conflict.The work of the ICTY, within the scope of the EU conditionality,and ‘local’ and ‘hybrid’ war crimes trials in theWestern Balkans are a testimony to relevance of retributivejustice in a transitional post-conflict context. Theretributive justice approach has addressed a number ofpeace-building goals of transitional justice. These goalsinclude the identification of crimes by means of the punishmentof perpetrators, the creation of a historical recordas well as building local capacity in the area of the rule oflaw. But, first and foremost, the work of the ICTY, whichcan be understood as an external imposition of transitionaljustice to the Western Balkans, has removed fromthe hands of domestic law makers as well as publics thepossibility to ignore the past. The temptation, particularlystrong in the aftermath of ethnic conflict, is to adopt anapproach of ‘forget and move on’ especially if there is continuitybetween war time actors and post-war authorities.The fact that the transitional justice could not be sidelinedwill stand as the longest lasting and uncontested legacyof this transitional justice instrument, despite the recog-75Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional Justice76nition of the fact that the ability of the ICTY to projectjustice is more ambiguous.Indeed, even the crimes which were sanctioned ininternational criminal trials have not necessarily beenacknowledged by all sides involved in the conflict, a publicdiscussion of war crimes throughout the Western Balkanshas remained limited to certain segments of civil societies,the historical record is still disputed while local trialsthemselves often illustrate the weaknesses rather than thestrength of the rule of law. Similarly, domestic trials inthe region have been accompanied by their politicisation,including political interference, and selectivity based onthe ethnicity of those indicted, coupled with weaknessesstemming from a lack of capacity, resulting in slowprocessing of cases and building up of backlog of cases,and, more seriously, inadequate framework for witnessprotection, which has emerged both as a capacity andpolitical problem. In addition, a number of regional-levelobstacles have also surfaced, such as inability of somestates to reach agreements on extradition. Therefore, theproliferation of war crimes trials and their potential tomeet multiple goals of post-conflict peace-building has tobe viewed against a backdrop of a lack of public consensusnationally and regionally about the past.Two types of cleavages persist and remain in the way ofachieving a consensus on the recent past in the WesternBalkans: one is inter-ethnic (between different nationalgroups – Serbs and Muslims, Serbs and Albanians, Muslimsand Croats, Albanians and Macedonians) and theother is intra-ethnic (conflicting interpretations of one’snation recent past within national groups, i.e. amongSerbs, Croats, Albanians, etc.). As the region approximatesthe European Union -- in a formal sense based on the contractualagreements -- different national groups remainas divided among themselves as they are divided withinthemselves. Ongoing retributive justice mechanisms havenot been able to address these cleavages, and even exacerbatedthem in some cases. That is the reason why the issueof transitional justice understood in terms of opening upquestions about past crimes remains open to constantpoliticisation, while the reckoning remains elusive.Symbolic politics and capacity building are two areaswhere restorative justice, and, in particular, civil society’srole in advancing restorative justice, can contribute topeace-building. Symbolic politics can contribute to bridginginter-ethnic and intra-ethnic cleavages. Coalescingaround the notions of truth and reconciliation betweenand within groups can be done only if legitimacy ofefforts undertaken in this direction is earned throughempowerment and entitlement from below. However,while important in itself, the focus on symbolic politicsoften tends to overshadow an equally important contributionof restorative justice to state consolidation, which iscritical for the Europeanisation of prospective membersof the European club. Importantly, a lack of consensus onthe recent past can be directly correlated with a slow paceof reforms across the Western Balkans, in critical areasof security sector reform, rule of law and corruption, aswell as implementation of the already adapted legislationas a result of the approximation to the EU. The contestedinterpretations about the past contribute to the entrenchmentof partial interests formed around ethnicity and/or informal economy, with links leading to organisedcrime. These interests often find their expression eitherin the opposition to reforms in the first instance, or in theresistance to implementation of the already adopted lawsand regulations. As such, they obstruct the processes ofEuropean integration, despite rhetorical commitment tothe EU integration.Civil society has a potential to overcome the limitationsof state-led and trial-based transitional justice initiatives.It can give a sense of ownership to processes of reckoningwith the recent crimes, while the lack of a sense of ownershiphas often lent these processes to politicisation. Furthermore,depoliticisation is a necessary precondition forany meaningful state consolidation, understood in termsof state-capacity building.Since the end of hostilities in former Yugoslavia, civilsociety has played a critical role in promoting transitionaljustice. Civil society emerged as a key pillar of local supportof the ICTY project, as well as an informed critic ofa narrow perpetrator-centred ICTY approach. Consistentwith its vantage point of necessity of reckoning with thecriminal past and focus on victims of human rights violations,civil society spearheaded the debate aimed at facingthe past. It subjected official authorities to unrelentingcritical scrutiny in its critique of the official rhetoric andpolicies that would award impunity. National civil societiesin the region have not spoken on these issues with aunitary voice. Rather than a weakness, this is a testimonyto the vibrancy and resilience of this debate – includingsensitive issues such as whether ideological delegitimisationof nationalism of the 1990s is precondition for transitionaljustice, or vice versa; whether national as opposedto regional approach is preferable, etc. Such a diversity ofviews speaks to an important deliberative dimension oftransitional justice in the region. However, such a perspec-Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional Justicetive on civil society provides only one side of civil society’smore ambiguous contribution to transitional justice. Justas we have seen civil societies across the region that haveworked painstakingly on justice and reconciliation, othersegments of civil society have had exactly the oppositeaims and ideas endorsing extreme, illiberal and exclusiveideas and interests.In the context, where there is a sense of continued contestationof the post-conflict settlement, no movementor limited progress on resolving the issue of missing personsas well as instrumentalisation of justice, liberal civilsociety, will despite all the constraints, from above andfrom below, remain a key pillar of hopes for justice andreconciliation in the Western Balkans. Therefore, the keyquestion is how best the European Union can engage withsuch an ally in the Western Balkans, and what levels andforms of support to civil society and its initiative in thearea of transitional justice would further the project of theEuropeanisation of the states and societies in the region.77Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional JusticeRECOM: A New Approach toReconciliation and a Correctivefor Criminal JusticeNataša Kandić78The establishment of transitional justice is an essentialcondition for post-Yugoslav countries’ membershipof the European Union. This obligation involves processingwar crimes and reforming institutions, with theEU financially supporting numerous non-governmentalinitiatives in their quest for the truth about the past.The EU is of the opinion that progress has been made.In February 2011, the State Attorney’s Office and theMinistry of the Interior (MUP) of the Republic of Croatiaadopted a strategy for investigating and prosecuting warcrimes committed between 1991 and 1995. Afterwards,Bosnia and Herzegovina also adopted a strategy for prosecutingwar crimes, when in June 2012 its Ministry ofJustice and Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees putforward for public debate a document entitled TransitionalJustice Strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina 2012-2016.The two ministries went public with a proposal to set upan extrajudicial body for truth-telling, to encourage anongoing dialogue about the past. In June 2012, the KosovoGovernment also set up a Working Group for TransitionalJustice.The regional cooperation of state institutions in otherareas of transitional justice comes down mostly to certainstate presidents attending commemorations for victimsbelonging to other ethnic communities and making personalapologies for crimes committed by individualsbelonging to their own ethnic groups. In 2010, CroatianPresident Ivo Josipović and former Serbian President BorisTadić promoted reconciliation among the nations of theformer SFRY as an objective, and as an asset of regionalcooperation. That year, they both strongly supported thecivic initiative to set up RECOM, an official RegionalCommission to determine the facts about war crimesand other grave breaches of human rights in the formerYugoslavia. The Croatian President again voiced his fullsupport for the establishment of RECOM when, in June2011, he met members of the Coalition for RECOM andwas presented with a petition, signed by 543,000 peoplefrom all the post-Yugoslav countries, in support of establishingthe Commission. During a meeting with the publicadvocates of the RECOM Initiative in May 2012, PresidentJosipović agreed that the time had come to concert theverbal political support and proposed that the states inthe region explore the legal and constitutional possibilitiesfor establishing RECOM. He also promised to make apersonal commitment to this end. However, the change ofgovernment in Serbia in June 2012 resulted in a breakdownof official communication between Croatia and Serbia and,within the Coalition for RECOM, a reconsideration ofthe strategy for advocating the establishment of RECOM.Believing that the political barriers could be overcome byintensified public support, the Coalition launched duringSeptember and October 2012 public campaigns under thename of RECOM for the Future, during which membersof the public signed a petition in support of establishingRECOM and sent picture postcards to their presidentsbearing the message that the time for a political decisionwas ripe. However, except for the President of Macedonia,who requested further information from the publicadvocates of the RECOM Initiative, the presidents failedto respond. In December 2012, the public advocates calledon the state presidents to respond to the demand of theHumanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional JusticeCoalition and the 545,000 petition signatories to establishRECOM. The public advocates informed the presidentsthat, while certain NGOs had drawn up a list of some100,000 persons, out of a total of 130,000, who had losttheir lives in the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia,there remains work to be done which only an official bodysuch as RECOM can perform. In addition to verifying theavailable information and facts about the identity of thevictims, it is necessary to establish the facts about thepolitical and historical circumstances which had a crucialbearing on the outbreak of the armed conflicts and thecommission of the war crimes, as well as organizing publichearings with the prime object of acknowledging the sufferingand injustice inflicted on the victims.Prior to and independently of the RECOM Initiative, theResearch and Documentation Centre in Bosnia and Herzegovinaand the Humanitarian Law Centers in Serbia andin Kosovo 1 began investigating the war crimes and deathsof civilians, soldiers and policemen during the armed conflictsor as a result of them. In 2011, the Humanitarian LawCentre and the Humanitarian Law Center of Kosovo publishedthe first volume of the Kosovo Memory Book, recordingthe names of 2,056 people and the circumstances inwhich they lost their lives or went missing during the warin 1998. These two NGOs are currently checking informationabout the remaining 9,816 victims of the war for theperiod January-June 1999, as well as about the 1,646 victimsof post-conflict killings and kidnappings in Kosovo. InDecember 2012, the Research and Documentation Centreand the Humanitarian Law Center jointly published fourvolumes of the The Bosnian Book of Dead, which containsthe names of 95,540 people who were killed or went missingduring the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina or as a resultof it between April 1992 and the end of December 1996.The victims of the war in Croatia are currently being jointlydocumented by Documenta in Croatia and the HumanitarianLaw Center.NGOs throughout the former Yugoslavia as well as theEU support trials of war crimes as the most importantinstrument for establishing individual guilt for crimescommitted in the past. However, NGOs keep launchingnumerous truth-seeking and reconciliation initiativesbecause they are aware of the limitations of criminal trialswith respect to victims’ needs for justice. Opening a debateon reconciliation is neither quick nor easy. At the regionallevel, as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, debates onconfronting the past attended by leaders of associations ofcamp inmates, veterans and relatives of missing personsare often overshadowed by the ‘political truth’ about whathappened in the past. The Coalition for RECOM, whichbrings together more than 1,900 civil society organizations,tries to counter this by organizing sessions called TheVoice of the Victims, at which victims tell of their personalexperiences. At the beginning of the consultative process,personal accounts played a key part in promoting a newattitude among and towards the victims, an attitude basedon sympathy, solidarity and understanding of past eventsfrom the point of view of the others. However, after a whileleaders of a number of associations of victims and relativesof missing persons began to set conditions, insisting thatthey or their proxy ‘give evidence’ about what happenedin the past. For instance, at a session of the Forum forTransitional Justice in Montenegro in 2009, leaders ofassociations of relatives of missing Serbs from Bosniaand Herzegovina threatened to walk out unless theirrepresentative could be among the first to ‘give evidence’.Later, at a session of the Forum for Transitional Justice inCroatia in 2010, a leader of an association of fallen homelanddefenders ‘gave evidence’ about Serbia’s aggression againstCroatia. This is why the Coalition for RECOM stoppedorganizing further The Voice of the Victims sessions;although it is aware of the effect of personal accountsin building up a culture of solidarity and sympathy, it isalso aware of its powerlessness to prevent manipulationof victims for political purposes. However, thanks to itsregional character, RECOM has the strength to stand up toany attempt to abuse and manipulate the victims and thecapacity to organize public hearings furthering recognitionof the suffering and injustice inflicted on all victims.There is yet another reason why establishing RECOM is ofsuch importance. It concerns the limitations of criminaljustice with respect to the need of victims that their sufferingshould be publicly acknowledged. A court does notconcern itself with the suffering and injustice inflicted ona victim; its brief does not include documenting every individualvictim, nor the circumstances of his or her death.The court has only one task: to evaluate the evidence anddecide on the guilt of the accused, if any. For this reason,the judgments rendered by the Hague Tribunal contain791 The undertaking was joined in 2009 by Documenta in Croatia.2 The Kosovo Memory Book, Vol. I, Humanitarian Law Centrer, 2011. The Center identified 41 Serb civilians who lost their lives on theterritory of Kosovo controlled by the Kosovo Liberation Army under Ramush Haradinaj’s command.Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional Justicethe names of only about 10,000 victims of war crimes,although there are at least 45,000 of them. Judgements ofacquittal pose a special problem, because the public is ledto believe that if no individual guilt is established thereare also no victims. Thus, the acquittal of the Croatiangenerals Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markač, as well asof the former Kosovo Premier, Ramush Haradinaj, helpedcreate the strong impression among the public that the warcrimes committed against Serbs in Croatia and Kosovowere considered not to have happened at all. However,during the trial of the generals, the prosecution submittednumerous items of evidence about the murder of atleast 300 Serb civilians during and after Operation Stormconducted by the Croatian military and the police; andduring the trial of the former Kosovo Prime Minister, theprosecution submitted evidence about the murders of Serbcivilians on the territory under control of the Kosovo LiberationArmy. 2 Owing to the high standards of evidenceemployed, in proceedings held both before the HagueTribunal and before domestic courts it often happens thatthe accused is found guilty of the death of a considerablysmaller number of victims compared with the actual numberof victims, either because of lack of forensic reportsor because the mortal remains of all the victims have notbeen found. Those victims must not be forgotten. RECOMis the only mechanism having the potential to documentall the victims. In this sense, RECOM is a corrective forcriminal justice and a new approach to reconciliation.80Humanitarian Law Center

Prospects and Policy Options for Restorative JusticePart IProspects and Policy Optionsfor Restorative Justice81Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional Justice82Humanitarian Law Center

Prospects and Policy Options for Restorative JusticeJustice outside of the Courtroom:Engaging Society in Understandingthe PastEric GordyThe International Criminal Tribunal for the FormerYugoslavia (ICTY), established in 1993, is thebest known but certainly not the only mechanism thathas been generated to produce accounts and promoteunderstandings of the past, identify violations ofhumanitarian law and penalise their perpetrators, andsatisfy international demands for accountability. Thetribunal, that is not a permanent court, was envisioned ashaving a time-limited institutional life, and has a mandaterestricted only to a portion of international humanitarianlaw. While it was founded with the hope that it wouldcontribute to reconciliation in the region, its charter doesnot accord it functions related to reconciliation and itsorigins outside the region undermine its capacity in thatregard. The serious work of engaging social dialogue anddeveloping an understanding of the events of the war hasto be the work of people and institutions in the region.There have been initiatives along these lines: mostly citizens’initiatives before the change of government in Serbiaand Croatia in 2000, and some official ones in the periodsince then. However, these initiatives have operated in fitsand starts, often in response to conditionality imposedfrom outside, sometimes in bad faith and frequently inhalf measures or through processes that remain incomplete.This may not be especially surprising, as the goal ofconfronting the past requires a process which, in its depthand speed, has no close parallel in history. It involves bothdomestic and international criminal proceedings thatuse an eclectic mixture of procedures and practices andto produce gestures of penance which embody a genuinetransformation in popular consciousness – all this withoutdestroying political and legal institutions nor permittingthem to remain as they were when their states were complicitin deeds that they now have to punish. Consideringthat the states involved have experienced neither a decisivemilitary defeat nor a complete political transformation,the fact that transitional justice initiatives have occurredon a meaningful scale at all is in itself noteworthy.It might be possible to argue that more has been done(even though it has inevitably been partial) to prosecutecriminals than to achieve other forms of justice. This maybe because the issues of evidence and procedure involvedin prosecution, however complex, are nowhere near ascomplex as broad questions of public memory and thegeneration of legitimate shared historical accounts. Butit might be possible to be a bit more provocative here,and argue that the relative success of criminal prosecutionmight itself constitute an obstacle to achieving someof the goals of justice. This is primarily because as it isstructured by special chambers and the ICTY, it has theunintended consequence of removing events from the fieldwhere responsibility operates and of reducing social andmoral issues to political and procedural ones. This is notto imply that criminal prosecutions should not be done– of course they need to be – but rather that they needto be supplemented by some processes that specialists inlaw and politics do not like to think about too much, bycultural and social processes that are slow, uncertain andhard to predict.What kinds of processes are we talking about? At the riskof going too far, let me cite a couple of social-legal theorists83Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional Justice84who have taken on this question in different ways. MarkOsiel foregrounds the trial as a site of contestation, wherean exchange takes place but a determination is made:As ritual expressions of collective conscience, trials foradministrative massacre have decidedly not been simpleand unmediated reflections of moral sentiments alreadyuniversally felt within the society toward the accused […][T]he criminal courtroom will inevitably be viewed by allconcerned as providing a forum in which competing historicalaccounts of recent catastrophes will inevitably bepromoted, in search of authoritative recognition, and thatjudgments will inevitably be viewed as endorsing one oranother version of collective memory. 1Ruti Teitel moves forward from the moment of trial to thediffusion of outcomes and their eventual repercussions inpopular consciousness:Making the truth “official” presumes a degree of democraticconsensus; yet, in transition, democratic processesare often not fully consolidated, with implications forthe authority and legitimacy of transitional productionof knowledge. In transitional truth-telling, accordingly,there is a concerted attempt to make historical and politicalaccountability converge […] Consensus on the historyproduced is predicated on the truth’s dissemination andacceptance in the public sphere. […] For what is at stake isa contested national history. 2I think that there are two categories implied here thatworth highlighting, and they are both controversial ones:First, there seems to be posited a value called “truth”; andsecond, there seems to be a constitution of somethingcalled “the past” from which it is necessary to “break”.These terms are appearing in quotations not because Iwant to dispute their applicability but because every timethey are used they create a need for definition. Under stableand predictable circumstances this would be a lot toask from a political society – in conditions of uncertaintyand risk the task is really very large and very difficult.The demand to “break with the past” does not come exclusivelyfrom outside, and is not wholly empty of content.Nobody would be likely to confront any difficulty at all infinding people in any of the countries of the former Yugoslaviawho would agree that the recently ended past was auniquely painful period which caused long-lasting damage,and that any effort to overcome the difficulties whichremain would have to involve, on some level, a declarationthat this period has ended and an effort to understandmore fully what was involved in the past.But breaks with the past do not take place automatically;they need to be the product of some form of general consensus.This consensus does not presently exist in any partof the former Yugoslavia. There are inescapable controversiesinvolving questions like:1) when does the past begin?2) who were the victims of the past?3) which elements of the past are most important?4) is the past to be approached throughmechanisms of guilt or responsibility?and5) who has the authority to decide?In the effort to develop answers to these questions,one dilemma is confronted repeatedly. These questionsare urgent, while the only way they can be answered isthrough a political process which is bound, for manyreasons, to be slow. Powerful international actors, in theirefforts to produce a quick answer (of a particular nature)through intervention might bring about the unintendedeffect of preventing any sort of conscious “break with thepast” from occurring at all.To take an example, we can try to approach the questionof who the victims are. We know three things: 1) therewere victims from every ethnic and national group, 2)there are large numerical imbalances in the number ofvictims from each, and 3) any effort to try to account forboth of these facts is bound leave some important groupof people alienated and offended. That is to say, there is aneed for “balance” and this is as difficult to achieve as it isto imagine anybody being satisfied with it. And “balance”itself carries a risk – it can become a type of reduction, ortake on the form of comparative victimization, which canfunction as a type of avoidance or denial. At some point itwill be essential for citizens of all of the countries of theformer Yugoslavia to generate, through discussion, debate1 In Hesse and Post (eds.), Human rights in political transitions: Gettysburg to Bosnia (NY: Zone Books, 1999), pp. 218, 219.2 Ruti Teitel, Transitional justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 83, 84.Humanitarian Law Center

Prospects and Policy Options for Restorative Justiceand research, an account which recognises all of the thingswhich various forces did to people in the name of various“national” interests and identities. In order for this tohappen, though, it will probably be necessary for each ofthose countries to reach something like a consensus abouttheir own responsibility, at least partly without regard towhether other countries are doing so at the same pace orwith the same intensity, or whether powerful internationalactors are placing equal demands on every government. Itcould be that some sort of coordinated regional approachwould have clear advantages, but it is difficult to see howa regional approach could be generated at all if it is notpreceded by local approaches.What this amounts to is a contention that approaches tojustice and reconciliation need to be serious about truth, ina sense that is broader than the type of truth that lawyershave in mind when they are conducting a criminal trial(although establishing this sort of truth is also essential).Here the record on truth-seeking initiatives in the regionhas been spotty at best. The case of Bosnia-Hercegovina iscertainly illustrative: despite a number of initiatives, someof them originating with civil society, some with internationalactors and some with political parties and institutions,every effort to create an investigative commissionhas been effectively blocked except one. The RepublikaSrpska commission to produce an account of the crimesaround Srebrenica in 1995 is the only commission to haveactually produced a report. This report, of course, was theobject of a great number of criticisms.Jasna Dragović-Soso in her forthcoming research 3 has tracedthe various efforts to generate and operate „truth commissions“in the region, and reached the general conclusionthat efforts have been held back by lack of political will,perceived interference, inadequate support and bad faith.The lack of genuine political will among power-holdersin the region to engage constructively with processes ofconfronting the recent past can be traced in part to a complicatedrelationship with international actors, includingthe ICTY, which have shaped domestic processes in waysthat have not always been conducive to quests for ‘truthand reconciliation’. The problem is exacerbated by a deepand still enduring problem of divisive and fragmentedvisions of the recent past throughout the former Yugoslavia,encountered not only on an inter-ethnic level but evenwithin civil societies of the same national group.Is it fair then to ask why something as abstract as truthneeds to be confronted at all? Why not simply let thecourts and tribunals do what they know how to do andleave the documentation for the historians to argue overin perpetuity? It may help to look at one moment in theongoing process of understanding the past in Serbia, whenevidence was made public about efforts to destroy evidenceof crimes by moving the bodies of victims – to placeslike the bottom of the Danube River. The incident inspiredthe late journalist Stojan Cerović to reflect on the relationbetween judicial and nonjudicial initiatives:If we want to avoid the Hague Tribunal, the reason canabsolutely not be that we do not believe that crimes werecommitted—because we can see the evidence swimmingto the surface—nor that we think we have some justification—likethat other people did the same thing—becausewe do not believe those justifications ourselves. What Imean is that, to the extent that we have any kind of moralsensibility at all, it is not possible to paper this sort of thingover, even if no earthly judge were ever to find out about it.[….]If in this case we do not find the guilty parties and donot think about their punishment, then no court in theworld, not even the Hague, can help us. It would meanwe as a society have already been punished by being sentback to Edenic moral idiocy [beslovesnost]. Or if you preferlocal mythology, it would mean that we have lost both ofthe kingdoms which are mentioned exactly in relation toKosovo. 4Here we are perhaps taking refuge on moral ground. Butit may make sense here to think of the term that is inthe background of all these discussions: responsibility.The first part of the word is of course “response.” In hisessay on “Responsibility” in the Hastings Encyclopaediaof Religion and Ethics, David Fyffe invents the synonym853 Jasna Dragović-Soso and Eric Gordy, „Transitional justice and reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia“, in D. Đokić and J. Ker-Lindsay(eds.), New perspectives on Yugoslavia: Key issues and controversies (Routledge, 2010).4 Stojan Cerović, “Zločin i tajna,” Vreme, no. 540, 10 May 2001. The two “kingdoms” Cerović mentions in the last sentence are areference to the mythological cycle of the battle of Kosovo, in which King Lazar loses the battle after choosing “the kingdom ofheaven” over “the earthly kingdom.”Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional Justice86“answerableness.” 5 The analytic point works in Serbo-Croatianas well: the root of the word odgovornost (responsibility)is odgovor (answer). In the interpretation here, responsibilityis taken to mean the ability to respond—both thesense that there is a need to produce answers, and an effortto produce those answers. Approached from this point ofview, both people who are willing to see legal action andpeople who resist it might be described as acting fromthe same motivation: because they believe that what willcome out any trial would reflect somehow on them, andhave repercussions on their sense of self and their feelingsof identity. This may be where the discussion that needsto take place – and that cannot be held in a courtroom –might begin.The organisation of criminal prosecutions has certainlybeen necessary, and the effort has constituted both anachievement and a new set of opportunities. At the sametime, however, it is accompanied by a danger that mightnot be immediately apparent: of all of the cultural, politicaland intellectual efforts to develop understandings beingdisplaced by a discourse that is by its nature both technicaland manipulable.Post-ICTY tribunals have tried to take account of thisproblem and integrate this understanding into their structures.In East Timor and Sierra Leone, the process ofestablishing historical truth has been separated institutionallyfrom the process of indicting and trying suspects.In Cambodia the opportunity for victims to be heard andreceive recognition for their experience has been integratedinto a process simultaneous with and parallel tothe conduct of criminal proceedings. As for the countriesregulated by the ICTY generation of tribunal design – theex-Yugoslav countries and Rwanda – there have been avariety of efforts to fill the gap. In Rwanda the governmenthas actively promoted reconciliation with a narrative element.This effort has succeeded in part because it has hadthe backing of the state and because of the widely sharedperception that failing to participate in reconciliationwould bring new danger.Most of the time it appears that neither prominent politiciansnor international judicial institutions have provedthemselves helpful in bringing about the sort of confrontationwith the past that would go further than sendinga small number of travellers on visits to the Hague ofindefinite length. At the same time, it would be a mistaketo confuse the rhetoric of leading politicians forthe entirety of official behaviour. Not every event ofimportance receives publicity in the media. Domestic andcross-border initiatives are moving forward – led quietlyby professionals who are doing their jobs without makingregular statements to the press. Though public officialson both sides deny it, part of the reason that there was littleviolence following the declaration of independence byKosovo (the great exception, of course, being an incidentorganised by political parties in Belgrade) was that localand low-ranking officials communicated across borders toprevent the instigation of violence and contain its spread. 6Dramatic events also pointed toward the necessity ofcooperation in law enforcement: for example, the murderof Croatian newspaper editor Ivo Pukanić and an associatewas quickly traced to organised crime groups in Serbia. 7Similarly, exposure to similar risks pointed to the necessityof regional cooperation in the provision of basic needs.When a trade conflict between Russia and the Ukrainesuspended natural gas supplies to the region in January2009, Serbia’s delivery of gas to Bosnia and Hercegovinawas not only a gesture of friendship but also an expressionof understanding that all the countries of the regionface similar pressures together. Finally it bears notingthat however much diplomatic and political rhetoric mayhave escalated, travel through most of the region remainsmostly free and economic exchange continues to increase.As for the level of unofficial behaviour, here any conclusionswould have to be less certain. In almost every fieldof popular and high culture, from literature and theatreto film and popular music, mutual interest in the activityof Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina hasregained the high levels one would expect in a sharedlinguistic space. While most of this activity is concentratedaround market-oriented light entertainment, it has5 David Fyffe, “Responsibility,” in James Hastings, John A. Selbie and Louis H. Gray (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics(Edinburgh: T & T Clark Co., 1980 [1905]), p. 739.6 Officially, of course, there is no communication. This point was made by local officials and activists speaking to the author off therecord.7 P.P., “Prst uperen u zemunski klan,” 24 October 2008, available online at http://www.rtl.hr/index.php?cmd=show_clanak&clanak_id=359.Humanitarian Law Center

Prospects and Policy Options for Restorative Justicecertainly included some more intensive intellectual andartistic exchange. To take film as an example, audiencesthroughout the region responded positively to criticalreflections on the war period like Jasmila Žbanić’s Grbavica(2006), Goran Paskaljević’s San zimske noći (2004) andVinko Brešan’s Svjedoci (2003). It is entirely possible thatas the whole region moves farther away from the eventsof the 1990s and the cultural reflection on it ceases to bedominated by people who were directly involved, this willfind a more enthusiastic reception on the part of a youngeraudience seeking to understand the recent past.Is there a general message to be derived here? The repeatedfalse starts of ‘truth seeking’ initiatives underscore thepoint that it is easier to approach the past procedurallythan it is to achieve a cathartic confrontation withit. Transitional justice initiatives have not bridged thecognitive divisions that undermine reconciliation in theregion. It could be argued that ‘confronting the past’ is adiffuse concept lacking in clear definition, and that it iscorrespondingly difficult to tell whether the past has beenconfronted or not. On a certain level there could be somesense in the objection that demands are being imposed onSerbia in the name of values which lack both clarity andprecedent. At the same time, no serious observer couldfail to note the extent to which political and culturaldevelopment remain hostage to the legacy of the wars ofYugoslav succession, to the detriment of nearly everybody.This becomes more clear as the connections between warcrimes and organised crime, highlighted in the assassinationof Zoran Đinđić in 2003, become more apparent andmore threatening for individual states.There can be little doubt, however, that the settling ofaccounts from the war and the slow process of reconciliationwill not depend entirely on the prosecution ofcriminal cases. Crucially important roles have to playedby politicians and policymakers, through education andculture, and through the ongoing development of dialogueamong people divided into new states. Parallel to the internationallyled processes taking place through institutionslike ICTY, sometimes with these institutions’ help andsometimes in spite of them, we are witnessing the slowand not yet certain development of the will for the kind ofsystematic and methodical examination of the past thatwould make disinterested discussion possible. It will probablynot develop all at once.It is possible that the contribution of criminal trials is limitedto a narrowly defined field. A broader type of justicewill call for different forms of engagement. In essence,the demand to ‘confront’ the past takes the shape of lawand politics but is a demand involving far broader socialand cultural processes. The role of the state is essential,but the state is better at generating compliance thanat producing contributions of substance. It should notattempt to promote or suppress narratives but instead toencourage narrative activity. It is in the cultural process ofunderstanding that versions of the past will be elaboratedand compete with one another. Writers, filmmakers, artistsand musicians are already developing new discoursesand generating dialogues deployed to understand the past.These have received little official or international attentionbecause they do not result in reports or convictions.But it is through these interventions that a new generationof political actors unburdened by complicity with therecent regimes will develop an approach to the past. Justten years since the end of the last armed conflict, it is probablynot surprising that this new understanding has notyet emerged. The legal and political initiatives of the lastseveral years have helped offer a necessary if incompletecontribution to the development of new discourses. Theshape of those discourses and the character of the debatesthey generate will take this contribution into account, butmay not follow on from it in predictable ways.87Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional JusticeCivil Society and Recent Effortsat Normalizing Turkish ArmenianRelationsArmine Ishkanian88Following the end of the Cold War, the language andlogic of transitional justice, as an approach to postconflictpeace building, became one of the master, globalnarratives. The essence of the transitional justice approachis for societies that have been involved in violent conflict,atrocities and genocide to face and reckon with past injusticesand to begin building a sustainable, positive peacewhich will, ideally, foster democracy, stability and perhapseven reconciliation between former enemies. In the countriesof the former Yugoslavia, a number of transitionaljustice mechanisms have been employed and these areaddressed in the other chapters. In this chapter I turn toa much lesser known case, that of Turkey and Armenia,and I use the transitional justice framework to examinerecent efforts at normalizing relations between Turkey andArmenia and to consider how civil society has contributedto those efforts. I consider both the achievements as wellas the limitations of civil society-led actions.Background and ContextGiven the difficult history between Turkey and Armenia,even when Armenia gained independence from theSoviet Union in 1991, the two countries did not establishdiplomatic relations and the border remains closed todate. For nearly a decade following Armenia’s declarationof independence, there was hardly any contact betweenthe two sides. Instead of contact there was a great deal ofhatred, animosity, fear, suspicion and resentment whichwas further exacerbated by the conflict between Armeniaand Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh. This conflict ledTurkey to close its border with Armenia as a show of supportto its ethnically Turkish Azerbaijani brethren.Beginning in 2000, however, high and low profile contactsbegan to take place between Turks and Armenians. Iidentify the Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission(TARC), which was created under the auspices of theUS State Department Track Two Program on Turkey andthe Caucasus, as the starting point of rapprochement andnormalization efforts. TARC was formally established in2001 and was inspired by the South African Truth andReconciliation Commission. Although consisting primarilyof ex-diplomats, TARC framed itself as a Track Twoeffort and represented its work as the coming togetherof “civil society representatives.” While TARC did notachieve the lofty (and indeed overly ambitious) aim ofreconciliation between Turks and Armenians, it had twoimportant achievements. First, by drawing the first fire,TARC opened the door to future engagements amongTurkish and Armenian civil society actors which continuetoday. 1 Second, TARC commissioned the New York based1 Phillips, David L. (2005) Unsilencing the Past: Track Two Diplomacy and Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation. New York: BerghahnBooks, page 5.Humanitarian Law Center

Prospects and Policy Options for Restorative JusticeInternational Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) towrite a report about the events of 1915 and whether theycould be characterized as genocide. The ICTJ conducteda legal analysis of the situation and reached the followingconclusion:…notwithstanding the efforts of large numbers of “righteousTurks” who intervened on behalf of the Armenians,at least some of the perpetrators of the Events knew thatthe consequence of their actions would be the destruction,in whole or in part, of the Armenians of eastern Anatolia,as such, or acted purposively towards this goal, and,therefore, possessed the requisite genocidal intent….theEvents, viewed collectively, can thus be said to include allof the elements of the crime of genocide as defined in theConvention, and legal scholars as well as historians, politicians,journalists and other people would be justified incontinuing to so describe them. 2But the ICTJ was careful to point out that there could notbe retroactive application of treaties. Therefore no legal,financial or territorial claims can be made in relation tothe genocide of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.Although the developments around Turkish Armenianrapprochement stalled somewhat in 2004 with the closureof TARC, the process regained momentum in 2008 – 2009when Armenia and Turkey were drawn to play in the same2010 World Cup qualifying group. In 2008 the newlyelected president of Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan, reigniteddebates about Turkish Armenian relations when he invitedhis Turkish counterpart, President Abdullah Gül, to Yerevanto watch the match together. This was a historic eventand although Gül’s attendance at the match was met withsmall scale protests by nationalist groups in Yerevan, thevisit was deemed a success on the path to rapprochement.Four days before the return leg was played in Turkey, on 10October 2009, the Armenian and Turkish Foreign MinistersArmenian and Turkish foreign ministers signed twoprotocols aimed at normalizing relations between the twocountries. These were the Protocol for the Establishmentof Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Armeniaand the Republic of Turkey and the Protocol on the Developmentof Relations between the Republic of Armenia andthe Republic of Turkey. The signing ceremony was attendedby a number of high level foreign dignitaries includingUS Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Russian ForeignMinister Sergei Lavrov, the then French Foreign MinisterBernard Kouchner, and the then EU High Representativefor Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solanaamong others. The presence of these high level dignitariesindicated to most observers that there was a great dealof international support for the normalization of relations.But there are two points of contention which havestalled the ratification process. The first has to do withinternational genocide recognition efforts by ArmenianDiaspora organisations (and Armenia’s perceived supportfor such efforts) and the second is related to the resolutionof the Karabakh conflict. With regard to internationalrecognition of the genocide, Turkey vehemently objectsto the labelling of the massacres and deportations of theArmenians living in the Ottoman Empire as genocide.Turkish officials, including the Prime Minister RecepTayyip Erdogan, have argued that the matter of whetherthe ‘events of 1915’ should be called genocide or not shouldbe left to historians. They point to the historical subcommissionmentioned in the protocols as the institutionthrough which this can occur. Armenian officials howeverargue that the genocide is a widely recognized historicalfact and deny support for any commission which willraise questions about the veracity of the genocide. On thesecond issue, the unresolved conflict between Armeniaand Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh has led to staunchopposition from some Turkish politicians, governmentofficials and even civil society groups who argue that aresolution favouring Azerbaijan must be a preconditionto the development of bilateral relations between Turkeyand Armenia. The Armenian side argues that the conflictis between Armenia and Azerbaijan and that its resolutionshould not in any way affect the development of bilateralrelations between Armenia and Turkey. The resolution ofthe Karabakh conflict was not mentioned in the protocolsand has only been subsequently raised by Turkish governmentofficials as a pre-condition to the protocols’ ratification.Thus as of March 2010, the protocols have yet to beratified by either side.Restorative Justice Approaches to NormalizingTurkish Armenian Relations: some examplesAlthough most of the transitional justice mechanisms,including tribunals, truth commissions, lustration panels,and amnesties cannot be applied to a historical context,892 International Center for Transitional Justice (2003) The Applicability of the United Nations convention on the Prevention andPunishment of the Crime of Genocide to Events Which Occurred During the Early Twentieth Century: Legal Analysis Prepared for theInternational Center for Transitional Justice”. ICTJ, page 17.Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional Justice90other approaches including memorialisation efforts, socialreconstruction, and civil society dialogues have been usedin the Turkish Armenian case. For instance, over thepast decade there have been a number meetings and jointprojects between Turkish and Armenian youths, women’sgroups, environmental groups, musicians, artists, photographers,etc. These projects and exchanges have beenfunded by international donors including bilateral agencies,international NGOs and private foundations. Whilethese exchanges have been small and limited in scope,they have succeeded in challenging hardened stereotypesof the ‘other’, creating space for discussing troubled past,and building bridges between invidiuals and communitiesin the two countries.Alongside these initiatives, some international organisationshave also funded cross border trade iniativies includingthe production and distribution of such products asCaucasian cheese and tea. The assumption driving thesetrade efforts is that if Armenians and Turks trade withone another, trust and confidence will develop and oncethose elements are present, then they can decide to tacklethe more difficult issues. As the representative of one suchinternational organization that funds such initiatives said,We are liberals and we promote a free economy and dialog.We don’t talk of resolution of conflicts but a free economy.We suggest that starting economic cooperation, openingthe border, and abolishing barriers to trade will leadto development and this will lead to all the other issues[between Armenians and Turks] being sorted. (19 April2009).While there is no empirical evidence to support theassumption that small scale trade will lead to normalizationand reconciliation, nonetheless this approach remainspopular among some donors and NGOs. It is an example ofwhat Trudy Govier has called the “indirect reconciliation”approach. If traditional or direct reconciliation involvesthe following steps: 1) acknowledgement of past injustices;2) trust building; 3) some degree of reconciliation; and 4)the reconciled parties working cooperatively. Indirect reconciliationreverses that order and “joint practical activity”precedes acknowledgement, let alone recognition, of theatrocities or crimes committed. 3Finally, at both the civil society and state levels there havebeen memorialisation efforts. For instance, the reopeningof the Armenian Apostolic Church of the Holy Cross onAkhtamar Island in Van was defined as a gesture of goodwillon the part of the Turkish government which fundedthe renovation and the restoration of the frescoes insidethe church and the relief carvings on the exterior. However,since the church was formally opened as a museumand without a cross, in 2007, the reopening of the effortwas criticised for being a political exercise.There are now discussions, which some respondentsI interviewed likened to the reconstruction of the OldBridge in Mostar, concerning a Turkish Armenian jointeffort to rebuild the ancient bridge of Ani across theAkhurian River which runs along the border separatingthe two countries. Turkish President Gül has embracedthe plan and apparently the Armenian authorities are alsointerested. 4 The bridge would provide an opportunity forcross-border tourism if the border were to open and be anexample of Turkish Armenian cooperation.In addition to renovating architectural structures, therehave been memorialisation efforts dedicated to the OttomanArmenian population. For instance, on 24 April2009 5 , the Turkish Human Rights Association’s Committeeagainst Racism and Discrimination organised a memorialevent in Istanbul titled “Armenian Intellectuals and24 April 1915 – They were Arrested, Exiled and Did NotEven Have Grave Stones”. This event, which was being heldfor the second year in a row, was attended by nearly 300people. The event organizers’ represented the deaths of theArmenian intellectuals not only as a loss for the Armeniancommunity, but a collective loss that should be mournedby all citizens of Istanbul. As one of the organizers said, “...the death of these intellectuals represented a loss not onlyfor the Armenian language, culture, thought and scienceworld, but also for the Ottoman society of the time and for‘the world of all of us today.’” 63 Govier, Trudy (2009) “A Dialectic of Acknowledgment” in Reconciliation(s): Transitional Justice in Postconflict Societies ed. Joanna R.Quinn. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, pages 48-49.4 The Economist “The cost of reconstruction” 11 March 2010.5 April 24th is the official commemoration day in honour of the victims of the Armenian Genocide.6 Bianet (2009) “220 Intellectuals Exiled in 1915 Commemorated” in http://bianet.org/english/other/114092-220-armenian-intellectualsexiled-in-1915-commemorated.Last accessed 18 March 2010.Humanitarian Law Center

Prospects and Policy Options for Restorative JusticeA much more widely publicized memorialisation effortwas the December 2008 civil society apology campaign.This campaign was led by a number of Turkish academics,writers, and journalists who are known for their criticalposition on the official Turkish state thesis concerning the“Armenian Question”. The text of the apology reads:My conscience does not accept the insensitivity showed toand the denial of the Great Catastrophe that the OttomanArmenians were subjected to in 1915. I reject this injusticeand for my share, I empathize with the feelings and pain ofmy Armenian brothers. I apologize to them.” 7With over 30,000 signatures, the apology sparked intensedebate in Turkey. It led to over a dozen anti-apology campaignsinitiated by nationalist groups which gathered farmore than 30,000 signatures. While the apology campaignwas met with gratitude in some Armenian circles, othersviewed it with suspicion and one hard-line nationalistorganisation even wrote it off saying if they group wastruly apologetic they should have used the world ‘genocide’and not ‘Great Catastrophe’ (Meds Yeghern). 8ConclusionNormalization talks between Turkey and Armenia havebegun to fundamentally challenge long held beliefs andnotions of nationhood, self and other, thereby forcing arethinking of categories and positions that some scholarshad referred to as static and ossified. 9 This process hasintensified discussions and debates in Armenia, Turkeyand in Armenian Diaspora communities around the globeabout the past, present and future.As people are being challenged to rethink their entrenchedpositions, this has meant that what was once the marginalor fringe position advocated by dissidents who were proponentsfor dialogue, is now becoming somehow a lessradical idea such that individuals who oppose dialogue areincreasingly being defined as ‘hard-line nationalists’ andas ‘fringe figures’ who must qualify their opposition fordialogue. But I would strongly caution against any overlyoptimistic assessments of both the current prospects fornormalization as well as the overly normative assessmentsof civil society’s potential for improving relations. In otherwords, we should acknowledge the massive changes thathave taken place, but at the same time we should curbour enthusiasm for rapid normalization. This is for tworeasons. First, because just as there are those civil societyactors which seek to engage in dialogue and to improverelations, there are also those that reject any form of rapprochementas conceding and capitulating to the enemy.Nationalist organisations, on both sides of the border,continue to enjoy broad support among the masses. Thiswarrants more in-depth discussion and analysis whichI do not have space for in this chapter. Second, whilebottom-up civil society initiatives have been importantin developing people to people ties, providing space fordebate, and changing hardened stereotypes (at least to acertain extent), it remains with governments to changepolicy, implement institutional reforms, and to engage inmore fundamental processes of conflict resolution andpeace building than civil society alone is able to carry out.The EU accession process has had a very importantimpact on Turkey’s political development; it placed greateremphasis on strengthening human rights, democracy andrule of law in Turkey. The European Commission viewsthe role of civil society as “crucial in determining the paceand quality of the accession process, as well as generatingpublic support for accession”. 10 One of the respondents Iinterviewed in Turkey said,Everyone now forgets that it was the EU membership talksthat changed everything. All the jinns came out of theirbottles. The EU soft power has pushed all jinns out of Pandora’sBox. In 1999 it was almost impossible to talk of thesethings [the Armenian and Kurdish issues]. People tend toforget that the EU is the main driver that opened up theseissues. It is impossible to put the jinns back in the bottlenow (20 April 2009).Although legislative reforms under the EU HarmonisationLaws have led to the enlargement of freedoms throughamendments in the constitution and abolition of certainlaws including the removal of the death penalty, Article917 English-language text of Turkish apology from the official website. www.ozurdiliyoruz.com8 The phrase ‘Great Catastrophe’ is a translation of the Armenian Meds Yeghern. It is the phrase used by President Barack Obama in his2009 address during the 24 April commemoration. Some Armenians view the phrase as a political compromise aimed at appeasingTurkey by avoiding the use of the word - genocide.9 Akcam, Taner (2001) Dialogue Across an International Divide: Essays Towards a Turkish – Armenian Dialogue. Boston: The ZoryanInstitute.10 Dialogue with Civil Society http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/civil-society-development/index_en.htm. Last accessed 10 March 2010.Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional Justice301 of the Turkish criminal code continues to be used toprosecute individuals, including journalists and publicintellectuals, who invoke the difficult legacy of Turkish-Armenian relations. These acts are interpreted as insultson ‘Turkishness’. Individuals charged under Article 301include Nobel Prize winning author Orhan Pamuk, writerElif Şafak, and Hrant Dink, the late Turkish-Armenianjournalist who was assassinated in January 2007. Hencewhile Turkey’s EU accession process has led to the increasingdynamism within Turkish civil society and its willingnessto engage in political debates, there are also limits tothe EU’s impact on the normalization of Turkish Armenianrelations. Until now, the European Commission hasembraced a hands-off approach and is reluctant to engageor fund any cross-border initiatives. In interviews and discussionswith Commission officials in Brussels conductedin September 2009, it was clear that one of the reasonsbehind this reluctance was that Turkey as a candidatecountry and Armenia as a member of the newly createdEastern Partnership come under different budget categoriesand therefore there is no common budget or instrumentthat would allow for funding a Turkish – Armenianprojects.Thus while initiatives in the Balkans, such as RECOM,have benefitted enormously from EU support, no support– financial or technical – has been forthcoming in the caseof supporting the normalization of relations between Turkeyand Armenia. At the time of writing, the momentumsurrounding the protocols has slowed but the situation isvery fluid. It is clear that normalization is going to be along term process and only time will tell how these processeswill develop.92Humanitarian Law Center

Prospects and Policy Options for Restorative JusticeEuropean Integrationand Confrontations withthe Communist PastJohn GledhillThe European Union (EU) has been inconsistent, atbest, in formulating its strategy on transitional justicefor the Western Balkans. 1 Although regrettable, thatinconsistency is somewhat understandable; the EU andits predecessor organizations may have been productsof peacebuilding efforts that followed World War II, butthe EU itself has little experience as an external peacebuilder.In fact, the EU has little experience as a foreignpolicy actor in general. So, given that states of the WesternBalkans lie outside the borders of the EU, it is perhapsunsurprising that Brussels has failed to act with a single,consistent voice on the issue of transitional justice in theformer Yugoslavia. Since 2004, however, Brussels hasbeen increasingly called upon to support processes oftransitional justice within the EU’s borders. Specifically,since ten former communist states of Central and EasternEurope acceded to the Union in 2004 and 2007, there havebeen calls for Brussels to lead a collective confrontationwith the communist past in its new member states.In this short piece, I examine the impact of Europeanintegration on efforts to reckon with the communist pastin Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Specifically, I documentthe impact of European regionalization on the visibilityand intensity of two forms of historical reckoning:social and cultural projects aimed at shaping collectivememories of communism, and legal projects aimed atrighting the alleged wrongs of communist rule. In eachcase, I find that the EU has been reluctant to initiate ormanage a top-down, Europe-wide confrontation with thecommunist past. However, European integration has stillserved to boost processes of historical reckoning in CEE,since it has allowed anti-communist activists to accessthe resources of European institutions (both the EU andother regional organizations) on an ad hoc basis. ThoseEuropean financial and political resources, in turn, haveallowed advocates of historical reckoning in CEE states toreinvigorate projects that they had initiated at the nationallevel, but which then faltered in the face of local financialor political constraints.European Integration and Commemoration ofthe Communist PastTop-down: From Brussels to Member StatesAs suggested, the EU has been broadly reluctant to initiateor develop any top-down social or cultural projectsthat would promote the construction of a pan-Europeanmemory of communist rule in CEE. As far as the EuropeanCommission is concerned, commemoration of the pastis a matter for EU member states to pursue of their own931 See Dick Oosting, ‘The EU’s Transitional Justice Strategy: Gaps and Opportunities’, and Vesna Teršelič, ‘From Ad Hoc Measures to theStrategy of Facing the Past’, in Denisa Kostovicova (ed.), The European Union and Transitional Justice: From Retributive to RestorativeJustice in the Western Balkans (Belgrade: Humanitarian Law Center, 2009).Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional Justice94accord, under their own conditions, and -- most importantly,perhaps -- with their own money. This positionhas been made evident in responses given by Europeancommissioners to calls for the Commission to initiate,manage, and finance diverse remembrance projects (pan-European commemoration days, museums, conferences,educational programmes et alia). Specifically, in the faceof such demands, former Commission vice-president,Jacques Barrot, has recognized that ‘old Member Statesshould be made more aware of the tragic past of the newMember States.’ However, he has also been adamant that‘it is up to each Member State to find its own way of dealingwith the remembrance of…[the crimes of totalitarianrule].’ 2 Ján Figel’, former European Commissioner for Education,Training, Culture and Youth, adopted a similar lineof argument when he was invited to contribute to a Europeanparliamentary debate on ‘European Conscience andTotalitarianism’. At the debate, Figel’ acknowledged theneed to raise awareness of the crimes of communism, butstressed that ‘it is of course for the Member States to findtheir own way forward’ in the construction of collectivememories of the communist past. The Commission wouldendorse local reckoning projects, but it would not activelymanage any commemoration programmes. 3Bottom-Up: From Member States to Brussels (and Strasbourg)Despite reluctance from Brussels to initiate collectivememory projects, the accession of CEE states to the EU hasstill served to invigorate social and cultural projects aimedat fostering collective reckoning with the communist past-- from the bottom, up. That is, EU accession has givenimpetus to the revitalization of memory projects that wereoriginally conceived of, or implemented at, the nationallevel, but which then waned in the face of various localchallenges. Where those challenges came in the form of alack of local funding for reckoning projects, ad hoc accessto EU funds has provided the economic boost needed torestart commemoration projects. Where challenges tookthe form of efforts from former communist elites to mutenational debate over the need to confront the past, accessto the European Parliament has served to create a newforum for debate. And where challenges were rooted ingeneral public apathy in the face of calls for commemorationof the communist past, the prospect of EU accessionhas served to partially overturn that apathy, by creating anormative context in which it is understood that the legaciesof the communist past need to be confronted now, sothat the ‘European’ future can then be embraced. I willtreat each national-level challenge, and its transnationalsolution, in brief.Building collective memories of the past is an expensiveprocess; researchers need to be employed, conferencesfunded, educational programmes and texts redesigned, andpublic memorials constructed. While the costs associatedwith these kinds of projects would strain any state budget,commemoration projects would have placed impossibledemands on the tight budgets of CEE states. As a result,most national-level memory projects in CEE received onlyminimal state support until recently and, consequently,they faced constant funding challenges. European integration,however, has allowed local researchers and advocatesof collective commemoration to partially overcome thosechallenges by opening up new sources of funding. Onesuch source is the European Commission. Although theCommission has been wary of backing collective memoryprojects in a systematic fashion, national research institutessuch as the Romanian Institute for the Investigationof the Crimes of Communism (IICCR), 4 have been able toaccess Commission funds on an ad hoc basis, by framingparticular projects as cultural programmes and thenapplying for support from the Commission’s cultural andeducational budget, or from the budget of CommissionRepresentatives in CEE member states. The IICCR, forexample, received funds to support the organization ofa competition in which high school students were askedto speak to the question, ‘What does communism meanto me?’. Further ad hoc Commission support for IICCR/2 Jacques Barrot. Comments made during a ‘Proposed hearing of the Commission on crimes of genocide, crimes against humanityand war crimes committed by totalitarian regimes’, (European Parliament, Strasbourg, April 21 2008). Accessed online: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20080421+ITEM-015+DOC+XML+V0//EN.3 Ján Figel’. Comments made during the European Parliament debate on ‘European Conscience and Totalitarianism.’(EuropeanParliament, Strasbourg, March 25 2009). Accessed online: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20090325+ITEM-010+DOC+XML+V0//EN.4 The institution was later renamed the Institute for the Investigation of Communist Crimes and the Memory of the Romanian Exile(IICCMER).Humanitarian Law Center

Prospects and Policy Options for Restorative JusticeIICCMER projects was rolled out in 2010. 5 Althoughthese funds, until now, have been quite modest and theyhave only been provided on a project-by-project basis, EUgrants could become a reliable source of funding.A second new source of funding for collective memoryprojects has presented itself when CEE states have heldthe rotating presidency of the Council of the EuropeanUnion -- as Slovenia did in 2008, and the Czech Republicdid in 2009. In each case, the governments of the respectivestates made a significant pool of funds available forcultural and social events that were to be run throughoutthe six months of their respective presidencies. And, ineach case, anti-communist activists lobbied to have someof those funds allocated to social and cultural projectsthat were aimed at commemorating the communist past. 6Lobbying was particularly effective in the Czech case, andthe result was a significant boost in support for initiativesproposed by the Czech Institute for the Study of TotalitarianRegimes, across the first six months of 2009. 7 In March2009, for example, the Institute was endowed to organizetwo public hearings in conjunction with the EuropeanParliament: ‘How Does Europe Reconcile with its TotalitarianLegacy?’ and ‘Our Common History: A CommonEuropean Platform’. The Institute also received fundingto host a further memory-focused conference in Prague,and to organize several exhibitions and publications thatcommemorated the crimes of communism. Although theimmediate increase in reckoning activity receded withthe conclusion of the Czech presidency in July 2009, it isexpected that the Lithuanian (2013) presidency will comeunder similar pressure from anti-communist activiststo support social and cultural projects aimed at raisingawareness of the communist past. 8European integration has not only provided a financialboost to collective memory projects, it has also opened upa new, transnational political forum for public debate overthe need to confront the communist past, in the form ofthe European Parliament. Access to such a forum is important,since, over time, former communist activists in someCEE states have tried to block or discredit debates overthe communist past at the national level. In Romania, forexample, the relatively large number of former communistelites who continue to sit in parliament have gone to greatlengths to mute public debate on the communist past --even resorting to physical and verbal abuse when attemptswere made to condemn communism before the Romanianparliament in 2006. 9 European integration has allowedthose calling for commemoration of the crimes of communismto step around this kind of political opposition at thenational level, by offering them access to the floor of theEuropean Parliament (and the Parliamentary Assemblyof the Council of Europe). Thus far, there have been twofocused debates in the European Parliament on the needto condemn and commemorate the crimes of communism:one in April 2008, and a second in March 2009. In bothcases, there was far from universal agreement from MEPsover the question of whether communism should be officiallycondemned and even less agreement over whethersuch a condemnation should be made at the Europeanlevel. Nevertheless, for Central and East European MEPssuch as István Szent-Iványi (Hungary) and László Tőkés(Romania), the very activity of elevating debate on thecrimes of communism to the transnational level must bea welcome development, since it brings new voice to theircalls for confrontation with the past -- calls that had gonepartially unheard, or unheeded, at the national level. 10As the communist past becomes increasingly distant, italso becomes increasingly unclear why calls for the commemorationof communism should be attended to hereand now. As such, those who actively support confrontationwith the communist past in CEE states have faced thechallenge of overcoming local public apathy in the face oftheir calls. European integration has generated a norma-955 See the website of the Romanian Institute for the Investigation of the Crimes of Communism: http://www.crimelecomunismului.ro/ro/proiecte/proiecte_educationale/elevi/concursuri.6 The Slovenian Presidency, for example, organized a European public hearing on ‘Crimes Committed by Totalitarian Regimes’,and it produced a 316-page accompanying volume, which is available online: http://www.arhiv.mp.gov.si/fileadmin/mp.gov.si/pageuploads/2005/PDF/publikacije/Crimes_committed_by_Totalitarian_Regimes.pdf7 For a list of events hosted by the Institute during the period of the Czech presidency, see: http://www.ustrcr.cz/en/activities-eu.8 Zoltan Dujisin, ‘Communist Ideology, as bad as Nazism?’, Inter Press Service, April 6 2009. Accessed online: http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=46407.9 Vadim Tudor a încercat să-i dea afară din lojă pe Patapievici şi Pleşu’, Realitatea.net, December 18 2006. Accessed online: http://www.realitatea.net/vadim-tudor-a-incercat-sa-i-dea-afara-din-loja-pe-patapievici-si-plesu_31331.html.10 See contributions to ‘European Conscience and Totalitarianism (debate)’, European Parliament, Strasbourg, March 252009. Complete transcript of the debate available online: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20090325+ITEM-010+DOC+XML+V0//EN.Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional Justice96tive context in which that apathy has been partially challenged,so that efforts to construct a collective memory ofthe communist past have come to be seen as somethingof a policy priority. Specifically, when CEE states haveacceded to the European Union, normative pressure hasbuilt up around the idea that the European future cannotbe effectively embraced until the communist past is firstput to rest. The Romanian case speaks to ways in whichthis normative pressure has served to kick-start otherwisemoribund historical reckoning efforts at the national level.Over the 16 years preceding Romania’s accession to theEU, cultural and historical projects aimed at attendingto the communist past had been few and far between inRomania, mainly because former communist elites hadretained prominent positions in the post-communist governments.11 However, when EU accession loomed in 2006,public consensus began to build around the idea that thechapter on communism needed to be closed, before thechapter on Romania’s ‘European’ future could be opened.Within that normative context, Romania’s president andprime minister both took sudden steps in 2006 to demonstratetheir commitment to resolving the ongoing legaciesof communist rule. Specifically, within months of oneanother, President Traian Băsescu and Prime MinisisterCălin Popescu-Tăriceanu each established large-scaleresearch projects: the presidency-backed ‘Commission forthe Analysis of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania’,and the government-backed IICCR. In the case of thepresidential commission, the need to face the past, in orderto embrace the future, was evident both in the commission’sschedule and in the nature of Băsescu’s presentationof the commission’s Final Report. Despite the huge task ofproducing an official history of communism in Romania,the commission was given just six months to produce itsfindings, since the deadline for publication of the FinalReport was set to precede Romania’s accession to the EUon January 1 2007. In his endorsement of the Final Reporton December 18 2006, President Băsescu spoke of theneed for Romanians, as ‘future citizens of the EuropeanUnion’, to deal with the ‘open wound’ of the country’s communistpast. 12 With EU accession pending, that woundwas attended to in a hurry by his commission, but it wasattended to nonetheless.As the above sketch suggests, European integration hasprovided advocates of an ongoing reckoning with thecommunist past with a set of transnational tools for overcomingsome of the economic, political, and normativechallenges that they have faced in pursuing their reckoningprojects at the national level. It certainly seems thatadvocates of reckoning have themselves become aware ofthe opportunities that European integration holds out fortheir projects. This awareness was made evident at theconference on ‘European Conscience and Communism’,held in Prague in June 2008. Most of those attending theconference had long called for confrontation with thecommunist past within their respective home countries.But, in Prague, they chose to collectively shift their focus-- away from the national level, toward the transnationallevel. The need to commemorate the crimes of communismwas no longer advertised as a national obligation,which requires national-level support. Instead, the officialtheme of the conference was that, ‘Communism is a commonEuropean legacy…[and] until Europe accepts its commonpast and comprehends its common responsibility, itcannot be united.’ 13 The two day symposium culminatedin the publication of the Prague Declaration -- a documentsigned by such renowned anti-communist activists as thelate Václav Havel and (current German president) JoachimGauck, which lays out a roadmap for confronting the communistpast within a European context. 14European Integration and Legal Confrontations withthe Communist PastTop-Down: From Brussels and Strasbourg to MemberStatesJust as the European Union has proved reluctant toinitiate any top-down social or cultural programmesaimed at fostering collective memories of communism,so too have European institutions refused to implementtop-down programmes aimed at promoting a systematiclegal confrontation with the communist past. In fact, on11 Vladimir Tismaneanu, Democracy and Memory: Romania Confronts its Communist Past, Annals of the American Academy ofPolitical and Social Science, Vol.617, no.1 (May 2008):166 - 180.12 ‘Discursul preşedintelui României, Traian Băsescu, prilejuit de Prezentarea Raportului Comisiei Prezidenţiale pentru AnalizaDictaturii Comuniste din România’ December 18 2006. Available online: http://www.presidency.ro/?_RID=det&tb=date&id=8288&_PRID=ag.13 European Conscience and Communism, Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, June 2-3 2008, Cover Page.14 For the full text of the Prague Declaration see: http://www.victimsofcommunism.org/media/article.php?article=3849.Humanitarian Law Center

Prospects and Policy Options for Restorative Justiceseveral occasions, European institutions have taken stepsto actively discourage particular transitional justice processesin member states and aspiring member states. Forexample, the European Council, the European Parliament,and Europe’s secondary regional actors (the Council ofEurope and the OSCE) have all taken solid stances againstthe introduction of stringent lustration laws in Poland andAlbania.In Poland, the conservative Law and Justice Party introduceda vetting law in 2007, which required all Polesholding ‘positions of public trust’ to complete affidavitsdetailing their collaboration (or lack thereof) with Poland’scommunist-era secret police. The reach of the law was profound;it was estimated that over 700,000 Poles, from boththe public and private sectors, were set to be subject toscrutiny. Any who refused to cooperate were to be barredfrom holding their ‘position of trust’ for ten years. 15 Shortlyafter its publication, both the Council of Europe and theEuropean Parliament voiced strong objections to the law.The Council’s Commissioner on Human Rights, ThomasHammarberg, declared that the breadth and invasivenessof the law fundamentally undermined the individual rightsof Poles. 16 Members of the European Parliament weresimilarly concerned about the implications of the law forthe labour rights of Poles. They also raised concerns aboutthe application of the law outside of Poland’s borders since,on paper, Polish nationals who were working for Europeaninstitutions in Brussels or Strasbourg were also to be subjectto the vetting process. When Polish MEP, BronisławGeremek, faced the prospect of being removed from hisEuropean post for refusing to cooperate with the draconianvetting process (because he had already been investigatedand cleared by the Polish authorities several times),members of the European Parliament protested. 17 Thatprotest, along with objections from the Council of Europe,emboldened challengers to the vetting law inside Polandand, after it was brought before the Polish Constitutionalcourt, the law was struck down.More recently, the European Council and the Council ofEurope both strongly objected to attempts from the governmentof Sali Berisha to introduce the so-called ‘CleanHands’ lustration law in Albania. The law, which wasfirst aired in late 2008, would have given the governmentdiscretionary powers to dismiss any prosecutor or judgewho held such a position during the period of communistrule in Albania. Although similar lustration laws had beenpassed in other CEE states in the early 1990s, there wasconcern over the political motives that underwrote theAlbanian law, since Berisha has a track record of periodicallypurging the state administration of potential politicaladversaries. That concern reflected itself in the chorus ofdenunciation from European institutions that followedpublication of the law. The European Council immediatelyissued a demarche, in which it ‘encourage[d] the Governmentof Albania to reconsider the legal and politicalramifications of the Lustration Law.’ 18 The OSCE openlystated that ‘the law breaches several articles of the [Albanian]constitution’. 19 The Council of Europe echoed thosesentiments, by identifying specific problems with the law,such as the absence of a sun-set period on lustration andexcessively severe sanctions for those deemed to be ‘violators’.20 Although Berisha initially rejected these Europeancritiques out of hand, the law was sent to the AlbanianConstitutional Court for review.Bottom-Up: From Member States to StrasbourgAs in the collective memory realm, although Europeaninstitutions have refused to offer top-down support for9715 Cynthia Horne, ‘Late Lustration Programmes in Romania and Poland: Supporting or Undermining Democratic Transitions’,Democratization, 16:2 (April 2009): 344-76.16 ‘Assessment of the Progress Made in Implementing the 2002 Recommendation of the Council of Europe Commissioner for HumanRights’, Council of Europe, CommDH(2007)13, Strasbourg, June 20 2007. Accessed online: https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1155005&Site=COE#P423_71145; Thomas Hammarberg, ‘Lustration must not turn into revenge against former collaborators,’ Council ofEurope Viewpoints, March 19 2007.17 ‘Discussion of mandate of Polish MEP Bronisław Geremek’, European Parliament, April 25 2007. Accessed online: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&type=IM-PRESS&reference=20070425IPR05853.18 ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the EU on the Albanian Lustration Law’, Council of the European Union, 6481/09 (Presse40) Brussels, February 13 2009. Accessed online: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/106063.pdf.19 ‘OSCE: Albania Lustration Law Unconstitutional’, Balkan Insight, December 17 2008. Accessed online: http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/15625/20 ‘Council of Europe Pans Albania Lustration Law’, Balkan Insight, January 16 2009. Accessed online: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/council-of-europe-pans-albania-lustration-lawHumanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional Justice98legal and judicial confrontations with the past, there areindications that European integration is serving to reinvigoratelong-delayed processes of transitional justice,from the bottom, up. Specifically, where legal challengesrelated to the communist the past were initiated at thenational level, but then became blocked there due to theinefficiency or politicization of national judiciaries, localactors have been able to partially overcome those barriers,by moving their appeals for justice to the European level.Already, plaintiffs have been able to refer two types ofcases up to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)in Strasbourg: cases of human rights violations that werecommitted during the period of communist rule and transitionfrom communism; and cases relating to the restitutionof property that was confiscated by the state, undercommunism.Several human rights and criminal cases have recentlybeen referred up to the European level from Romania, forexample, where there have long been local barriers to theprocessing of complaints related to crimes committedduring the country’s bloody revolution of December 1989.After 20 years of intransigence from state prosecutors, anon-governmental organization that represents the interestsof ‘revolutionaries’ lodged a formal complaint againstthe Romanian state with the ECHR. In the complaint, itwas argued that families of victims of the revolution hadbeen denied the right to have their cases addressed in a‘reasonable amount of time’ -- a right that is guarded byArticle 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.The ECHR found in favour of the plaintiffs, fined theRomanian state €20,000, and called for action on the revolutiondossier. 21 By way of response, the Romanian governmentagreed to open up access to all files and recordsrelated to the revolution.The legal team from Romania’s IICCMER is also consideringtaking their allegations of abuse by officers ofRomania’s communist-era secret service, the Securitate,to the European level. Such a shift in level may be necessary,since the statute of limitations for crimes committedunder communist rule has expired in Romania, and socases such as that of Vasile Paraschiv, who alleges abuse atthe hands of the Securitate over a twenty year period, canno longer be tried locally. The ECHR, however, carries nostatute of limitations on cases that pertain to human rightsviolations or crimes against humanity. So, if the IICCMERlegal team can frame the claims they are making in thelanguage of human rights violations, they will be in a positionto bring those cases before the ECHR and, in so doing,revitalize their efforts to pursue retributive justice for thecrimes of communism. 22Romanians have also been able to use their access to theECHR as a basis for ensuring the restitution of propertythat was nationalized under communism. Romania distinguisheditself as a laggard in this area throughout the1990s, when governments failed to push through effectiverestitution laws, and even intervened to block legal processesthat were aimed at resolving restitution cases. Inthe face of that blockage, a collection of Romanians choseto take their cases on to the ECHR, which, between 2002and 2004, heard 58 Romanian restitution cases. In mostinstances, the EHCR found in favour of the claimants and,in total, the Romanian state was ordered to pay out €4.6million in compensation to those whose properties werenationalized. 23Conclusion: The Europeanization and Homogenizationof the Past?This short survey of the impact of European integration onprocesses of social and legal reckoning with the communistpast in Central and Eastern Europe has pointed to aclear trend; although the European Union has been reluctantto take the lead on efforts to confront the communistpast in CEE states, individuals and organizations withinCEE states have been able to draw European institutionsbehind historical reckoning efforts on an ad hoc basis.The immediate consequence of this trend has been a netincrease in the visibility of reckoning projects in Centraland Eastern Europe.The long-term impacts of European integration on confrontationswith the communist past are harder to gauge,but there are signs that historical reckoning within a Euro-21 ‘România a fost condamnată la CEDO pentru “Dosarul Revoluţiei”,’ Realitatea TV Online, December 8 2009. Accessed online: http://www.realitatea.net/romania-a-fost-condamnata-la-cedo-pentru-dosarul-revolutiei_691071.html22 See discussion in Mirela Corlăţan, “Rechizitoriu inutil pentru torţionarul Enoiu?”, Evenimentul zilei, June 30 2010. Accessed online:http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/rechizitoriu-inutil-pentru-tortionarul-enoiu-899431.html23 Lavinia Stan, ‘The Roof Over Our Heads: Property Restitution in Romania,’ Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics,Vol.22:2 (June 2006): 180-205.Humanitarian Law Center

Prospects and Policy Options for Restorative Justicepean context may serve to ‘homogenize’ the way in whichcommunist rule in CEE states is collectively remembered.If advocates of historical reckoning in CEE states are tocontinue drawing the support of European institutionsbehind their reckoning projects, then they will need tocontinue the process of framing the legacies of communismas a common, ‘European’ burden, which demandcommon, ‘European’ support. Such framing, which wasput into clear use in the Prague Declaration, requiresconstant highlighting of the commonalities of communistrule across Europe, and constant minimization of the greatdifferences that existed between those systems. The effectof these processes is to replace nuanced understandingsof the differences that characterized communist rule inHungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania, with ablunt understanding of communism as a homogenousform of rule -- one that spanned all of Central and EasternEurope. For CEE countries that now share a common,transnational future, there is certainly benefit in recognizingthe commonalities of their various authoritarian pasts.However, it would be unfortunate if that recognition cameat the cost of a loss of nuance in collective memories ofcommunist authoritarianism and totalitarianism in Centraland Eastern Europe between 1945 and 1989.99Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional JusticeTruth Commissions from the LatinAmerican Perspective: Challenges andLessonsEduardo Gonzalez100Truth-seeking and memory are currently regarded asessential elements of post conflict reconstruction. 1There is little dispute now that dealing with the past is animportant aspect of re-creating the narratives that a societyhas about itself and, therefore, it will have an importantimpact in the possibilities of that society to embrace a newnormative system that will encourage human rights, rule oflaw and peace. There have been many truth commissionsaround the world, and in practically every post-conflictspace, institutions such as the UN and the EU, have supportedthese institutions. There are ongoing negotiationsin Nepal to establish a truth commission. There is onetruth commission initiating activities in Kenya, one in theSolomon Islands, and one in Canada, to deal with forcedassimilation of indigenous population in that country.This is not only a practical process, but also a normativeone: the development and acceptance of the notionof a “right to the truth” is an important fact to take intoaccount. A UN declaration on the right to truth hasbeen approved in the Human Rights Council, calling oncountries that have suffered conflicts to develop theirown approaches to this right of victims of human rightsviolations. This right has been recognized not only in thatarena, but also in the jurisprudence of specific constitutionaland supreme courts across the world.The right to the truth entails the right to know what hashappened, the facts, the consequences, the context ofhuman rights violations, both by the direct victims andtheir societies: what emerged initially, in internationalhumanitarian law, as a right of individual families to knowthe whereabouts or the fate of missing and unaccountedfor persons, has evolved into a right of societies, wheremass abuse has taken place. This right, in addition to therecognition of the victims, entails also the recognition of aduty on the side of states – to fight denial, to fight revisionism,to preserve the historical basis for memory.Certainly, this is a complex concept. There are many layersof truth, and there are many versions of truth. What truthcommissions do in a celebrated dictum by Canadian writerMichael Ignatieff is to “reduce the field of the permissiblelies”, that is, to, at least, make sure that certain egregiouslies, certain egregious denials of human rights violationsare not given the floor so easily. What truth commissiondo is to propitiate the encounter of victims so that theycan share their experiences and find, in their common victimhood,the possibility to affirm certain new democraticvalues in history, now expunged from any justification ofbrutality.Truth commissions have taken place in many countriesand are taking place in many countries. However, they1 As a participant in the process of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation commission, established after the fall of Mr. Alberto Fujimori,the author presents the Latin American perspective on transitional justice.Humanitarian Law Center

Prospects and Policy Options for Restorative Justiceare still very young institutions. The first inquiry that weunderstand as a “truth and reconciliation commission”was the National Commission on the Disappearances ofPersons in Argentina, which was established over 25 yearsago. Being young, they are still very plastic institutions, i.e.flexible and adaptable to concrete local situations. Thatis why the concept and the model of a truth commissionapplied in South Africa, for example, could never havebeen applied in Chile, or in Guatemala, and certainly notin the Western Balkans.Truth commissions are still an instrument flexible enoughfor civil society and for policy makers to design them in away in which they may reflect the actual needs of victimsand those of a political process of reconciliation: truthcommissions, differently from trials, have been quitereceptive to the role of civil society to model them aftertheir needs.At the same time, we have to recognize that some truthcommissions have actually failed to achieve their objectives.Some truth commissions were launched in situationswithout the preconditions for their success. We haveseen the painful failure of an effort to create a truth andreconciliation commission in the Democratic Republicof Congo, after the peace agreements, because the establishmentof the commission included representatives ofwarlords, and victims could not trust such an effort. Wehave also seen the failure of an Indonesian truth commission,because the process was kidnapped by politicalhorse-trading in parliament. The resulting legislation wasso flawed that the legislation establishing the TRC wasfinally rejected by the constitutional court of that country.Some preconditions need to be taken into account in orderto establish a truth commission successfully. There needsto be some basic minimum of political willingness: policymakers,stakeholders, need to have at least an opportunityto build consensus around the notion of truth seeking, andthey will need to believe that the institution to be createdwill be objective enough, neutral enough, professionalenough to receive all the voices. A nascent truth commissionneeds the support of civil society and, therefore,what is happening right now with the RECOM initiative isfundamental: civil society in the Western Balkans is tryingto go beyond the traditional groups of human rights, peacemovements and victims’ groups, and reach out to otherinstitutions and other constituencies.Truth commissions have been created usually duringdemocratic spring times, during moments of actual socialmobilization. After that window of opportunity, theircreation may be more difficult. Therefore, it requires abit more support to actually engage in a process of consultationthat will mobilize other sectors. It will require aworkable mandate, realistic parameters for investigation,so that they don’t create an institution that is too unwieldyto develop the specific inquiries, and that will be able toproduce a report and recommendations in time.With this in mind, RECOM faces very concrete andunprecedented challenges. There has never been a genuinetruth commission established at a multi-country level.Truth commissions, classically, are one-country institutions,created to deal with the specific situations of thatcountry. Obviously, for RECOM it is an existential issue towork beyond one country because of the nature of the conflictthat made the former Yugoslavia collapse. But it is aclear challenge that this effort is completely unprecedented.There has been only one effort that seemed like a dualcountry initiative, which is an initiative launched by thegovernments of Indonesia and East Timor a couple of yearsago, the so called “Commission for Truth and Friendship”.However, that commission was criticized by human rightsorganizations and civil society as, basically, a politicalarrangement between the two countries to find a solutionto the atrocities that took place during the independenceof East Timor in 1999. There was a vested interest fromboth governments to create this institution and to make itwork. However, it suffered from endemic problems of lacklegitimacy and civil society support. Therefore, in effect,RECOM would be the first commission to be launched ina multi-country fashion. It has to deal with multiple narratives,multiple victimizations, often from neighbors (or toneighbors) that are now in a country next door. Ultimately,both the process to create this commission and the commissionitself are an exercise in consensus.This is the reason why this is not going to be a fast, quickprocess. In Latin America, most truth commissions werecreated by presidential decree. A short window of opportunityduring the democratic springtime was used. Takingaction was a question of months, not years. States and societieshad to deal with very concrete, very specific issues inone political entity. In the case of RECOM, the creation ofconsensus will require a longer process coming from thebottom-up.The unveiling of truth in the Western Balkans will haveto engage Europe. This is, after all, the worst conflict thathas taken place in the heart of Europe after World War II.And, this is a context that has raised incredible challenges,not just political and security challenges, but also moralones for Europe. Therefore, this is a process that needs to101Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional Justice102be international from the beginning: international in thesense of involving the countries of the former Yugoslavia,but also involving the attention of all of Europe.Hence, there are a number of specific challenges facingEuropean friends of the regional commission initiative.The first one is that policy makers in the post-Yugoslavrepublics need to feel the voice of Europe loud and clearin support of this initiative. RECOM will require a verydelicate act of political craftsmanship: it will require sevenclocks striking at once. That is extremely difficult and thatwill, certainly, require that the leaders of those countriesknow that Europe is serious about actual reconciliation,memory and justice, that it understands the latter conceptnot just as a specialized process in a tribunal, but also asa moral and cultural process in the streets, in the publicdiscourse, in the creation of historical narratives.The second challenge is that Europe needs to supportpatiently this complex, and perhaps bumpy road towardsactual consultation in the Balkans context. It will haveups and downs. There will be elections coming in Bosnia,and then in another country, and there will be oppositionfrom one sector or another, doubts and hesitations. That isin the essence of establishing a truth commission; that isexactly what happened in many other countries: the beginningsare always extremely difficult, even more for such anunprecedented institution. So, the RECOM initiative, andcertainly the groups participating in these consultations,need to feel that they are accompanied by Europe. It wouldbe a good idea to have members of different Europeaninstitutions actually observing these processes of discussionand consensus creation. It will be important for thepeople in the western Balkans to understand that theirprocesses are being taken seriously and have support.Third, and this is something where we have expressed ourinterest in continuing support to RECOM via the InternationalCenter for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), is to channelreal case information about truth commissions, aboutwhat happened in other countries, bringing to this processof consultation people who have actually participated intruth commissions, that have been in the good moments,and in the bad moments, that will be able to share expertise,and provide some humble guidance on some of theaspects of this process.And, finally, it will be very essential to recognize that theprocess to uphold the right to truth in this very, very complexregion will need to be presented in the global scene.This is, after all, a world where we have already had over30 truth commissions. That experience cannot be leftto waste: it needs to be taken to the Western Balkans toshare with the stakeholders there. But, at the same time,mutatis mutandis, the experience in the Western Balkansneeds to be taken somewhere else, because many conflictsare international in nature, and truth-seeking needs tobe international, too. It is impossible to understand theconflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone in isolation fromeach other. It will be impossible to take on a real truthand reconciliation process in the Democratic Republic ofCongo (DRC), without taking into account that the warsin the DRC involved many other African countries. Thisparticular initiative, will be essential in places like CentralAsia, the Middle East, the Great Lakes. The creation ofglobal communities of practice and debate will be absolutelyessential, and will represent one way of supportingRECOM.Humanitarian Law Center

Transitional Justice: Views of the Epistemic CommunityPART IITransitional Justice:Views of the Epistemic Community103Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional Justice104Humanitarian Law Center

Transitional Justice: Views of the Epistemic CommunityDražen LalićMy name is Dražen Lalić and I am a professor at theFaculty of Political Sciences in Zagreb. There aretwo main reasons why I am sitting here. The first reason isthe book Dealing with the Past in the Republic of Croatia:The Views and Opinions of Stakeholders and the Public inthe Post-War Period. The book was co-authored by KrunoKardov, Vesna Teršelič, head of Documenta, present atthis forum, and myself. We wrote the book after extensiveresearch into the phenomenon of dealing with the past inCroatia. In it we used different methods, both quantitativeand qualitative. Another reason why I personally wasinterested in dealing with the past, not only as a scientistbut also as a civil society activist, concerns one bizarrefact from my life. Namely the crimes committed in thespring of 1945 at Bleiburg and other sites that I learnedof in 1985, at the age of 25. I probably found out aboutthese crimes so late because I come from a family that,in the Second World War, fought on the side of the partisans– my grandfather was killed in that war becauseof his anti-fascist activities – and so these crimes hadnot been discussed in my family. Having found out aboutthem, I talked with some people, and realized that someof my friends and acquaintances had grandfathers on theother side, that is to say the Ustasha side, and also that thegrandparents and relatives of some of my friends had beenkilled in Bleiburg or at the so-called Way of the Cross. Forme this was a terrible fact, among other reasons, becausein my youth I could speak openly about my grandfather,while these friends and acquaintances of mine could notmention their grandfathers in front of most other people. Ifelt bad because of all that, both as a human being, becauseof my relationship with those friends and acquaintances,but also as an academic (at that time I had graduated fromthe Faculty of Political Sciences in Zagreb).We have all gathered here because of that, so that it neverhappens again that an academic living in a totalitariansystem, or a system that is seemingly democratic but infact totalitarian, has no knowledge of the atrocities thatoccurred, for example about the murder of prisoners ofwar without the trial. Regardless of how they behavedpreviously, no one should be killed without a trial, throwninto a pit, and the like. Most of you present here lived inthe former Yugoslavia, but the system has changed now,and we should live in a democracy, in which such crimesdo not happen, and the crimes of the past are condemned.What I said so far forms the beginning of my own understandingof Transitional Justice from the Perspective ofEpistemic Community. I have yet to define the basic conceptsof this panel discussion. I understand transitionaljustice first and foremost in terms of dealing with the past.In that great social change, which is to say in the long andcomplex transitional process of moving from authoritarianto democratic systems, we the citizens of countries thatemerged after the disintegration of the former Yugoslaviamust face the truth and justice, particularly in relation tocrimes and various acts of violence that broke out in thewars in the 1990s. Many citizens of Croatia, and I am sureof other countries as well, are in great need of this truth andjustice. In this sense, some use the concept of transitionaljustice, some the notion of determining the past, some callit overcoming the past, and I use the term dealing with thepast. The second term is epistemic community. I believethat the term subsumes a number of communities. In fact,105Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional Justice106there are different ways to obtain information and understandingof war crimes, murder and all the horrors thathappened in the wars in the former Yugoslavia. I don’t getit only from the academic community, to which I personallybelong. There are some experts among us too. Don’tthe psychologists, special educators and others who workdirectly with victims, bring knowledge of dealing with thepast? Then there are many journalists here too. Is it notthe case that these experts contribute to our dealing withthe past, especially by gathering the information and interpretingthe facts about the war? Along with the scientistsand experts, artists are engaged in this area too. As part ofthe research I have just mentioned, Vesna Teršelič, KrunoKardov and I found a subjective attitude towards the violentpast to be very important. So, the changes took placein the period after the Second World War (and the moreso after the First World War), when individual human destinieswere not as important, and these can be contrastedwith the recent past including the period of the wars inthe former Yugoslavia and other wars in recent decades, inwhich the individual has become very important. Preciselyin that regard, artists can and do make an especially bigcontribution. Many of them have helped us, as activists,to understand the problem. There is not a single activistamong us who did not see Alan J. Pakula’s Sophie’s Choiceor read Primo Levi’s Is This A Man? So, artists are veryimportant to us. In that sense, I understand epistemologyto mean different ways of collecting knowledge and awarenessof the painful war-time events and war crimes. Thisis the basic thing I wanted to say regarding the content ofthis panel topic.I take as my starting point, a sentence, in fact a motto,by a great French philosopher Michel de Montaigne, whoasked, “What do I know?” Following his question, we mayask what we know about war crimes and other unfortunateevents of wartime. And, if we look at the truth closely, wemight realize that it is equally important to ask the followingquestion: What is it that we don’t know about it?Our knowledge of war crimes is very limited. So: Whatwe know and what we do not know? The next question is:How does the social context in our country affects whatwe know and what we do not know about it? Furthermore,I think it is very important to answer the question of howto critically evaluate what we know and what we do notknow, and to base this on objective knowledge, rather thanobserving things from the perspective of our own ethnicor other communities. Finally, how can we contribute toimproving our knowledge and minimizing our ignoranceabout the past? What can our stakeholders do to help?What are political and other institutions doing to helpus – to help civil society, to help the scientific communityor the media, or society at large – to improve their knowledge?How can we encourage the authorities to assist inthe acquisition of knowledge about war crimes and violencefrom the past that will be true, based on truth andfacts, that would be fertile ground for, and serve as a basisfor, broadly-based action, not only of non-governmentalorganizations and civil society, but of a range of actorsin society? I think that without such broad and objectiveknowledge there cannot be successful process of dealingwith the past and transitional justice.Humanitarian Law Center

Transitional Justice: Views of the Epistemic CommunityDiane F. OrentlicherFor more than two decades, the international communityhas undertaken intensive efforts to assist societiesto achieve some measure of justice in the aftermath ofatrocious crimes, including through the establishmentof international tribunals. As the fields of internationaland transitional justice have developed, academic expertsand practitioners have put forth myriad claims about thevalues that measures associated with these disciplines—trials, truth commissions, reparations and other processes—couldadvance. Among them, scholars have theorized,such measures can help prevent future crimes, strengthenthe rule of law, restore core values of human decency thatwere brutally compromised by violence, foster reconciliationwithin divided societies, promote a stable transitionto democracy, and in other ways help foster social repair.Inevitably, during the early years of the contemporaryexperience with international justice, these views entaileda large measure of prediction (some say wishful thinking).Today, however, it is both possible and necessary to assessthe actual impact of institutions like the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), evenas we recognize that their impact will continue to evolve.Above all, it is important that those who have supportedor engaged in these efforts—and I include myself in thisgroup—make sure that our notions of what is importantto societies that have endured atrocities are tested againsttheir reality, their truth, their experience—particularlywhen it comes to the experience of victims.With these considerations in mind, before I joined theObama administration I carried out research in Serbiaand Bosnia aimed at understanding the impact of theICTY. A fundamental conclusion that emerged from myinterviews in these countries is that a central reason whymany Bosnian victims wanted to see the ICTY establishedwas, quite simply, to achieve justice. Perhaps this shouldnot come as a surprise. Yet the scholarly literature aboutinternational tribunals rarely acknowledges or highlightsthe importance of what many whom I interviewed inBosnia, as well as in Serbia, described as “justice for itsown sake.” Instead, the literature typically emphasizes thetypes of potential contributions of international courtsto which I have already alluded—deterrence, prevention,reconciliation, promoting the rule of law and democraticprogress—and often critiques the ICTY’s perceived failureto make measurable contributions in these areas.To be sure, when I asked people in Bosnia to describe theirexpectations of the ICTY and their perception of what ithas actually contributed, the responses I received typicallybegan with a litany of criticisms. The Hague Tribunal hasin myriad ways disappointed Bosnians’ expectations ofhow justice would be delivered. Many individuals whomI interviewed emphasized how frustratingly long trials atthe ICTY have taken, and how long they have had to waitfor justice as a result. Another commonly voiced frustrationis the relatively short sentences imposed on a significantnumber of individuals convicted by the ICTY, compoundedfurther by the early release of defendants fromprison. I also encountered deep frustration with proceedingsin which defendants represent themselves in courtand use their trials as a political platform. On this point,many are profoundly frustrated by what they see as theTribunal’s failure to control these defendants adequately.Across the years that I visited Bosnia for my study, thegreatest frustration expressed related to the protracted107Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional Justiceimpunity of Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić. Overthe years that these two men remained at large after theywere indicted in 1995 on charges including genocide,people in Bosnia would say that, as long as these tworemained beyond the reach of justice, their impunitywould overshadow everything else the ICTY had accomplished.Their belated apprehension has removed thisshadow, even if it cannot erase the harm caused by theirprolonged impunity.In larger perspective, one of the striking points thatemerged from my interviews in Bosnia is that people theredid not, for the most part, experience justice as somethingthey either received or did not achieve, but rather assomething that they experienced partially, imperfectly. Forexample, while gratified that perpetrators were broughtto justice before an impartial tribunal, many wanted theICTY to address other needs. Individuals who had lostloved ones during the conflict emphasized the importanceof acquiring information about the fate of their lovedones, and thought that perpetrators should be requiredto provide this type of information, particularly when thedefendants received reduced sentences as a result of guiltypleas.Beyond the importance attached to this particular typeof factual knowledge, many whom I interviewed said thatthey had hoped the ICTY would help spur broad socialacknowledgement that members of one’s own national orethnic group committed grave human rights violationsduring the 1990s conflict. Indeed, in both Bosnia and Serbiamany whom I interviewed had hoped that, through itsrigorous establishment of facts, the ICTY could help theirsocieties acquire a shared knowledge and acknowledgmentof what was done and by whom. Among these individuals,a large number expressed profound disappointment aboutthe Tribunal’s apparent inability to contribute meaningfullyto this goal, at least so far.But at the end of these interviews, my sources wouldalmost invariably express a strong affirmation of theimportance they attached to the basic fact that the Tribunalhad delivered justice—something they believed wouldnot have happened without the ICTY. This point could notbe reduced to any other value; instead, many victims wereemphatic about how important justice itself has been. Inshort, there was a strong consensus that the justice theICTY has delivered was far preferable to having no justiceat all—and yet more justice was necessary.108Humanitarian Law Center

Transitional Justice: Views of the Epistemic CommunityVladimir PetrovićThere is one paradox, worth drawing attention to. Itconcerns the question of participation of historiansin dealing with the past. It’s easy to see that in activities ofthis kind, with obvious exceptions, historians lead neitherin number nor in the nature of engagement, which is a bitstrange if we understand that the focus of their interest isprecisely the study of the past, and that they are trained todeal with it.Various explanations for this paradox are possible – philosophical,methodological and political. The abuse of historywas one of the key mechanisms behind the dissolution ofYugoslavia, the spreading of inter-ethnic hatred and the culminationof this disintegration into war. Not only did historiographynot do much to counter this trend – it sometimestended to greatly encourage it, something it still does. Notall historians, of course, participate in this war on memory.I am talking about a minority, but a minority that is noisyand unusually well-organized, whose views on the past arerather coherent, and whose awareness of their own nationalmission is well-focused. Such is the situation in Serbia, andit is not much better in other former Yugoslav republics. Itis only natural then that, when the question is broachedconcerning what the discipline could do to ensure that thepost-Yugoslav societies face the most unpleasant aspects oftheir recent past, there emerges a problem. How could oneexpect people who have invested their entire careers in thepolitical project to suddenly resolve to critically reflect onand question their own involvement and the political projectsin question? It happens, but not often or easily, and wecannot count on it.What to do then? In my response, I will invert the questionwith which Professor Lalić opened this panel. Heasked what it is that we actually know about the past; tothis I would add: what is it that we do not know about it?Or more precisely, what is it that we are not allowed toknow? By this I mean that it would be quite purposefulto separate the epistemic dimension of knowledge fromthe practical dimension. At the epistemic level, we cannotexpect a consensus on issues of perception, which dependon philosophical belief, even on our own emotions. Ourchance, I think, lies at a heuristic level, where we do notcare necessarily what is true, but what kind of truth someoneis trying to hide from us.According to an old saying, truth is the first casualty ofwar. Under normal conditions, a state attempts to maintaincontrol over the information it produces, somethingwe see quite well in the example of Julian Paul Assange andelsewhere. In a state of emergency, however, this instinctassumes the proportions of national interest and warpropaganda. We witnessed all this during the disintegrationof Yugoslavia and we need not dwell on it.Observe, however, an entirely different phenomenon. Theinformation explosion that followed the implosion of Yugoslaviamade cover-ups very difficult, and the establishmentof the ICTY made it actually impossible. Researchersinto this period of the past are, in fact, in a privilegedepistemic position. Documents that would otherwisenaturally and in keeping with the letter of archival law beunavailable for much longer, those that concern the workof the highest authorities, military and security apparatus,and above all the war and war crimes, have found theirway to the Hague and national courts. Many were used ascourt evidence, and thus became available to the public.In fact, so many have become available that the major109Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional Justiceresearch problem lies in their abundance, and the needfor selection, critical processing, and presentation in anunderstandable way.This is where I see the role of epistemic community, andprimarily historical science, in the process of transitionaljustice. Therefore, it is good that we have work to do. Thebad thing is that we have failed to interest enough peoplein the work, since it is a job that requires patience and asystematic approach. What can be done? Of course, wecannot tell anyone what to do, as everyone must approachthis problem according to their own conscience andknowledge. However, for my own part, I say: “What theInstitute for Modern History, where I work, is doing in itscooperation with the Humanitarian Law Center.” We arenow engaged in a joint project entitled The Yugoslav Crisis,within which we are trying to separate the documents andmaterials that are, in our opinion, most relevant to theunderstanding the break-up of Yugoslavia, war and warcrimes on its territory, in order to prepare and criticallypresent them to the public in print and electronic form.The main intention of the project is to improve our understandingof this aspect of the past, and thus strengthenthe factual basis of our discussions. I use this somewhatold-fashioned term deliberately, in order to once againstress that it will be difficult to answer the question ofwhat is true and what isn’t, but that must not stop us frompreventing the systematic attempt to hide the informationthat leads to the truth. It seems to me that the role of theepistemic community in its various branches is to opposeany such attempt.110Humanitarian Law Center

Transitional Justice: Views of the Epistemic CommunityMladen OstojićThis paper is based on my doctoral dissertation, whichconcerns the impact of the Hague Tribunal (ICTY) onthe political situation in Serbia in the period after the fallof Milošević (2000-2010). One of the most important lessonsfrom the work of the ICTY is that without the supportof local political elites, international tribunals are unableto punish the perpetrators of war crimes and promote theprocess of dealing with the past.During the nineties, the work of the Tribunal came to avirtual standstill due to a lack of cooperation from theSerbian and Croatian authorities, which to a large extentprotected war crimes indictees. After Tuđman’s death andthe fall of Milošević, the Serbian and Croatian authoritieshave gradually, under heavy international pressure, begunextraditing the Hague indictees. However, those authoritieswere not ready to publicly tell the truth about warcrimes and thus strengthen the process of dealing withthe past in their respective countries. The Hague Tribunal,on the other hand, proved quite incapable of addressingthe public domestically. And hence, the war crimes trialsbefore the Hague Tribunal were not conducive to raisingawareness about war crimes, nor did they encourage thecondemnation of those crimes by Serbian society.This outcome is often attributed to the Serbian politicalelite, which approached the Hague Tribunal pragmaticallyand justified the extradition of indictees by economicassistance received or progress towards European integration.Such ‘instrumentalization’ of The Hague (tribunal)was largely interpreted as a reflection of the nationalismof the Serbian political elite and a negation of war crimes.However, my research shows that the essential reason forthe insincere attitude towards the Tribunal was that theSerbian authorities saw the ICTY as a genuine threat to thestability and legitimacy of the state.The arrest and extradition of indictees to the HagueTribunal has threatened political stability in Serbia forseveral reasons. First, after the overthrow of Milošević, adeep gap opened within the government with regard to theextradition of the former Serbian strongman. Prime MinisterĐinđić argued for full cooperation with the Tribunal,while the then-Yugoslav President Vojislav Koštunicainsisted on respect for the existing legal framework whichprevented the extradition of the accused. Their disagreementabout the extradition of Milošević generated a splitwithin the ruling coalition. Hence, the ability of the Serbiangovernment to arrest those persons indicted for warcrimes was greatly reduced because Koštunica de factoresisted effective cooperation with the ICTY.Second, the military and security services, which had notbeen reformed after the fall Milošević, actively obstructedthe arrest of the indictees. We now know that Ratko Mladićand Veselin Šljivančanin hid in military facilities at leastuntil 2002. In addition, members of the security forcesturned against the government for fear that one day theytoo would end up in The Hague. This is why the SpecialOperations Unit (JSO) mutinied in November 2001, seekingan end to cooperation with the Hague Tribunal. Two yearslater, its members carried out the assassination of PrimeMinister Đinđić in an action dubbed “Stop The Hague”.Fearing instability, the authorities sought to persuade theindictees to surrender, rather than have them arrested.The key moment in this process was the arrest of VeselinŠljivančanin, carried out rather disastrously in June 2003.111Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional Justice112The government then introduced financial and legalincentives for indictees surrendering to the Hague Tribunal.This practice culminated in the so-called ‘voluntarysurrender’ policy, which Koštunica introduced during hisfirst mandate in 2004. Voluntary surrender involved thetransfer of indictees to The Hague with state honors. Inthe media, their surrender was presented as a contributionto the country’s European integration and the defense ofKosovo. Indictees, who received hefty sums, were thereforepresented as martyrs who went to The Hague in orderto perform their patriotic duty. Those who refused tosurrender were arrested, but their arrest was presented asvoluntary surrender.The policy of voluntary surrender led to the extraditionof sixteen indictees to The Hague within one year, but atthe same time undermined the goals of transitional justiceand led to the socialization of war criminals in society.The consequence of the voluntary surrender strategy wasthat the indictees were seen as heroes by the public, whichexplains the weak popular support for the Tribunal. Inthe past decade, just 15 percent of Serbia’s populationexpressed positive views of the Tribunal and the extraditionof war crimes indictees. 1The Serbian government extradited Milošević hoping toboost the country’s reputation in the world, expecting thatthe trial would contribute to the individualization of guiltfor war crimes. The authorities also hoped the trial wouldencourage the public to confront war crimes in Serbia, andfurther discredit the former regime and strengthen supportfor the new government. While the authorities were notready to step forward and convey information about warcrimes to the public, they expected the ICTY to do it forthem. However, the trial of Milošević showed that the ICTYwas not capable of carrying out this task, as Milošević’spopularity paradoxically rose during the first weeks of thetrial. Broadcasting of the trial only strengthened negativepublic attitudes towards the Tribunal and discredited theICTY in the eyes of the liberal political elite.Also, the trial spread fear among the Serbian authoritiesthat the outcome could imply Serbia’s responsibility forgenocide. Milošević was indicted for the crimes committedin Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina only in the fall of2001, following his extradition to The Hague. Part of theindictment regarding crimes in Bosnia charged Miloševićwith genocide, causing great concern to the authorities inBelgrade, especially as Bosnia and Herzegovina had fileda lawsuit against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forgenocide before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).Serbian politicians had expected Bosnia to give up thedispute after the fall of Milošević, but that did not happen.Had Milošević been pronounced guilty of genocide by theICTY, Bosnia and Herzegovina would have had a betterchance to win its case at the ICJ. Had that happened, Serbiawould have been the first country ever to be convicted ofgenocide. In addition to paying costly reparations to Bosniaand Herzegovina, the potential conviction would have ledto a complete collapse of Serbia’s international legitimacy.Fear of the accusations of genocide, although never voicedin public, in many ways influenced the attitude of the Serbianauthorities to the Hague Tribunal. The state secretlyprovided assistance to Milošević’s defense, which wasquite apparent at the beginning of the trial. It was laterdisclosed that this assistance had been provided throughthe Military Commission for Cooperation with The HagueTribunal, which was subsequently abolished in 2003. Inaddition, the authorities sought to withhold sensitive documentsfrom public scrutiny, especially the minutes of theSupreme Defense Council. There were many debates andmuch controversy concerning the withholding of thesedocuments and their potential impact on the outcome onthe genocide dispute. I do not want to get into that debate.What I want to emphasize here, is that Milošević’s trialfundamentally challenged the legitimacy of the state ofSerbia and the ICTY thus alienated those Serbian politicianswho were genuinely committed to justice and theprocess of dealing with the past. In that sense, the HagueTribunal narrowed the space for truth-telling in Serbia.Based on this experience, it can be concluded that futuretransitional justice initiatives will succeed only if theirpolitical consequences are fully understood. One of themain goals of transitional justice is to restore the legitimacy,credibility and trust in state institutions. If theseinitiatives have the opposite effect, they are doomed tofail. Therefore, the initiative for RECOM can only workwith the support of state authorities in the region. Thissupport will not be forthcoming if the authorities perceivethe Commission as a threat to the stability and legitimacyof state institutions.1 „Attitude toward war crimes, the Hague Tribunal and national war crimes judiciary“ („Stavovi prema ratnim zločinima, Haškomtribunalu i domaćem pravosudju za ratne zločine“), the Belgrade Center for Human Rights, OSCE and Strategic Marketing Research,April 2009.Humanitarian Law Center

Transitional Justice: Views of the Epistemic CommunityJasna Dragović-SosoMy presentation today focuses on two questions: oneis where we are in terms of transitional justice in theregion and the second is what is still lacking. More specifically,we are here today primarily because of the RECOMinitiative (despite the general nature of the Forum) and itwould be useful to reflect on where RECOM might fit intobroader transitional justice needs in the region.My colleagues have already mentioned a number of importantachievements so far and I agree with their assessment.I too would highlight the vast documentation that nowexists on the wars of the 1990s, thanks to the ICTY andother institutions—not least the NGOs, which have beenvery active in gathering information. So, concerning thepost-Yugoslav region, we really do have an unprecedentedamount of information, much of which is in the publicsphere.A second point concerns timing. In parts of the region,over the last few years there have been a number of positivedevelopments in the sphere of transitional justice—particularlyin terms of apprehending war crimes fugitives andsending them to the ICTY, as well as in terms of renewinglinks and cooperation across state borders. There is a sensethat the political climate is changing, which has a lot todo with the European aspirations of states in the region.While there are still many outstanding problems, it doesappear that there is greater official willingness to deal withthe war crimes issue—albeit, as I show in a recent article,in ways that are still defined primarily by political calculationsand foreign policy objectives (notably EU accession).Despite the obvious shortcomings of recent official apologiesand other transitional justice policies, I would neverthelessargue that there is perhaps more space now thanever before for new initiatives concerning the recent pastto emerge and capture the public’s attention.The third positive thing I would like to highlight is therole played by the NGO sector in particular, and it isgood to see that you have remained extremely active onthese issues. It is important to recognize the effort andenergy that goes into transitional justice initiatives such asRECOM despite obvious obstacles—notably the increasingtemporal distance from the events, public apathy, andofficial misgivings.This said, there are, of course many remaining problems,some of which have been highlighted in the other sessions.I was particularly interested in the session of thevictims’ organizations this morning and the lack of adequateresponses to these organizations’ very precise, oftenpractical questions and needs—from problems regardingfinancial compensation and property claims to the lack ofsustained medical or psychological care, to issues relatingto missing family members and relatives. The low level ofinterest and poor official responses to such questions areclearly an important gap in current transitional justicepolicies in the region. We have also heard about the continuingproblems with judicial reform and the insufficientrestructuring of institutions throughout the region. Allthese problems have already been highlighted in the manyreports by both international bodies and local NGOs.However, an official and authoritative body—such as aregional truth commission—could provide one possibleimpetus for change in this area. At the very least, it couldcompile such existing analyses, provide a single authoritativeassessment of these problems and indicate how theymight be tackled.113Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional Justice114A second problem that I have encountered in my work onthe region concerns the low level of public debate aboutthe past. There are many reasons for this, including thestandpoints taken by the political leaderships (which, evenwhen they implement policies relating to the past—suchas the arrests of war crimes suspects or official apologiesfor war crimes—refrain from actually discussing whathappened, who were the victims and the perpetratorsof a particular crime, and what role was played by theformer government and its security forces), as well ascivil society actors (who at times adopt overly moralisticand abstract positions about questions of collective guiltand responsibility that do not resonate with the broaderpublic). To my mind, what is sorely lacking is a factuallyinformed, “down-to-earth” debate about what happenedin the 1990s and a direct debunking of the still ubiquitousmyths surrounding collective national victimhood,international conspiracies and historical injustices—all ofwhich continue to remain the foundation of mistrust andhostility throughout the region. One of the most strikingthings to those of us who have followed the debates of thelast twenty years is how little the positions and argumentsadopted have evolved or changed over time.This is clearly an area where RECOM—if it comes intobeing—could play an important, even crucial, role. Sucha body—provided it is genuinely authoritative and representativeand with the right publicity and media attention(admittedly, these are big challenges)—could provide astarting point and a stimulus for debate. By using broadlyunderstandable and acceptable methods and cross-checkinginformation from a variety of sources, it could establisha set of crucial facts about the wars of the 1990s whichwould serve as a foundation for further debate about theregion’s recent history. If public hearings of individualactors in the region’s recent events could be organized,their social effect could potentially be tremendous—especiallywhen taking into account the lack of public trustin institutions that Eric Gordy mentioned. Such hearingswould represent a proximate, direct confrontation of thepublic with individuals’ experiences, and—judging bytheir effects in other cases—they could stimulate a level ofpersonal reckoning and emotional engagement that do notusually accompany the adoption of official documents andreports or judicial proceedings. Of course, RECOM cannotbe all things to all people, and must not be viewed as a generalpanacea; it is important to keep expectations modestand realistic. However, these are, to my mind, some of theways in which such an initiative could contribute to thedevelopment of a more engaged and more fruitful publicdebate about the past, both in the region and in individualnational contexts.Humanitarian Law Center

Transitional Justice: Views of the Epistemic CommunityChristian Axboe NielsenEvery year I tell my students in Denmark that it wouldnot be that difficult to fill an entire library with justbooks about the wars in the former Yugoslavia. It is amazing,really, how many books have been written on thesubject, which is certainly one of the most important inmodern world and European history. If there is one thingthat almost all the authors of these books agree on, it isthat nationalism was perhaps the most important causeof the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the armed conflictin the former country. I would not deny that thesis, andI still believe that it is valid to a certain extent. However,my analysis of police actions in the war in Bosnia andHerzegovina shows that the effect of nationalism is onlyone piece in a larger story. I worked for several years inthe Office of the Prosecutor of the Hague Tribunal, wheremy job was to analyze the Ministry of Internal Affairs(MUP) of Republika Sprska, as well as the co-operationbetween the MUP of Republika Srpska and the MUP ofSerbia. There, I had the opportunity to collect and studyextensively the documentation of these two institutions.By studying these documents, I concluded that nationalismfor much of the former leadership was only a meansand a cover, not the goal. Hence, when it came to thepolice, I found that the officers of various nations andnationalities who were supposed to protect Yugoslavia andprevent it from falling apart, actually began demolishingthe common state. We see a great example of this in thepractices of the old Ministry of Internal Affairs of theSocialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, precisely inthat crucial period between the first multi-party electionsin November 1990 and the beginning of the war in April1992. The then leadership of the ministry consisted ofBosniaks, Croats and Serbs, who, to a large extent, belongedto the first generation born after World War II. Serving asministers then were Alija Delimustafić, Momčilo Mandić,Branko Kvesić and others. They had all grown up in the‘golden age’ of socialism and brotherhood and unity. Someworked to protect Yugoslavia through the state security ormilitary security services, while some used the emergenceof the free market in the 1980s in order to establish smalltrading empires, and some were doing both. That’s howDelimustafić, who worked in a military canteen (a job helost because of charges of embezzlement), became one ofthe founders of a chain of retail outlets and finally theMinister of the Police.Regardless of which party they belonged to – SDA, SDS orHDZ – they were all lobbying for ‘their’ people after thevictory of these parties in the elections. In this way, professionalcadres were slowly eradicated, while in their ownparties they spread antagonism and fear of other parties.And when the war finally broke out, most of them wentto ‘their’ police, the new MUPs of Serbia, Herzeg-Bosniaand, of course, Bosnia and Herzegovina. They talked totheir own people about the impossibility of further coexistence,about existential threats, about the threat of anew genocide. Thus, Mićo Stanišić, the first Minister ofInternal Affairs of Republika Srpska, at the very beginningof the war, talks about the terrible enemy of the Serbianpeople, the “Jamahiriya of the Ustasha.”All this nicely fits into the standard narrative of nationalismand war. However, the general public of Bosnia is stillunfamiliar with many other details. For example, therewas a long telephone conversation at the beginning of May1992 between Momčilo Mandić and Mićo Stanišić, whowere at that time in Pale, with Bruno Stojić and Branko115Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional Justice116Kvesić who were in Mostar. The conversation begins in anaffectionate manner, because these are old friends talking:“How are you, brethren Ustashe? And how are you,brethren Chetniks?“ True, all four are a bit annoyed whenthey talk about where exactly to draw that line between theCroatian and the Serbian parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina,but otherwise they all nicely agree about breaking up thejoint MUP. We know that as much as the Serbs and Croatsfought in Bosnia, they did not find it at all problematic totrade while people were dying. “What do you want? Coffee,oil, cigarettes, flour? Not a problem.“ In the end therewas no problem selling weapons and ammunition to ‘theenemy,’ as long as it was economically lucrative for someindividuals. It is not by accident that Mandić fairly quicklydisappeared from the Bosnia war. He went to Dedinje, toVilla Bosanka, where as head of the Bureau of the Republiche pulled the strings.How much nationalism was a means rather than an endin the war is obvious from the actions of the most violentparamilitary groups that spread terror and death in Bosnia.Let me mention only two examples. It is well knownthat Arkan and his unit came to Bosnia where they committedterrible crimes against non-Serb civilian population.This is a text-book example where the state (in thiscase, the old federal State Security Service) knowinglyengages a notorious criminal under the following motto:if you work for us, you will no longer be a criminal, but apatriot; everything you collect from the war, will be your‘earnings.’ Thus, Arkan’s unit plundered under the officialflag. The (in)famous Special Operations Unit emerged outof Arkan’s unit. We all know how the story ends: with theassassination of Prime Minister Đinđić and with Legijaon the run, with a fake Croatian passport. The patrioticSpecial Operations Unit ended up as an international, andnot in the least bit patriotic, network of assassins and drugtraffickers.Another example are the Yellow Wasps (Žute Ose), aparamilitary unit, very active in eastern Bosnia in the earlymonths of the war in 1992. As true patriots, they participatedin the ethnic cleansing of the Drina River area. Notonly did they bring ‘volunteers’ from Serbia to the battlefield,they also brought trucks and lorries onto whichthey loaded the loot, which would then be transportedback across the Drina. Their first target was the Muslimpopulation, but when the Muslims disappeared, the maskof nationalism fell, and the Wasps began to sting the Serbstoo. Republika Srpska which had initially ‘invited’ themto Bosnia, found itself in a very uncomfortable situation,where it had to defend itself from these wasps, wolves,panthers and other dangerous animals, to which nationalismwas only an excuse for war-profiteering and for gettingrich. At the end of July 1992, the special police brigade ofRepublika Srpska had to keep Zvornik under siege in orderto finally arrest the Yellow Wasps. Most of them weretransferred to Serbia after a brief interrogation, as if nothinghad happened.Last year, I heard a press conference and, lo and behold,I had to agree with Ivica Dačić, which I had never donebefore in my life. But the gentleman clearly said, “whenTito’s Yugoslavia fell apart, the only brotherhood and unitythat survived was the brotherhood and unity of the criminalgroups, which continues to this day.” What clearlyemerges from this story, that is, from the whole story Ihave studied, is that war crimes and organized crime arethe two sides of the same coin in all republics of the formerYugoslavia. This link, as Dačić said, began at the end of theeighties, and seems to have persevered to this day in allthe Ministries of Internal Affairs of the former Yugoslavia.For me, as a historian and analyst, the search for a moreobjective – not the objective, but a more objective – historyof the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the wars inthis region, implies a serious examination of the key linksand synergies between the war and organized crime. Butwe all know very well that the future of these countriesdepends on the prosecution, not the study, of crimes andcriminals. As representatives of some organizations saidat the conference: all the perpetrators are to a large extentstill among us. Sometimes they are in senior positions inthe Ministry of Internal Affairs, the civil service and so on,and it is therefore crucial, in my view, to explore thoroughlythe systemic and structural links between organizedcrime and war crimes from the beginning of the disintegrationof Yugoslavia through to today. If we don’t work, asscholars and as prosecutors, on the further illuminationof the leading crime structures in the former Yugoslavia,we will end up with an incomplete image of history, andalso with significant problems that these societies will stillhave to face and in doing so we will have created enormousobstacles for the European future of this region.Humanitarian Law Center

Transitional Justice: Views of the Epistemic CommunityIavor RangelovThis contribution will address two issues that emergein relation to the ongoing civil society initiative forRECOM in the post-Yugoslav states and broader debatesabout restorative justice. The first issue concerns civilsociety in the region: What is the nature of civil society?What actors constitute civil society? Here the objective isto convey a sense of the diversity of civil society actors thatmight have a stake in restorative justice and the broaderprocess of transitional justice in the Western Balkans. Thesecond question that will be addressed briefly, involvesthe role of these actors in transitional justice: Should weencourage civil society in the region to engage with theissue of justice? In particular, what is the significance ofa restorative justice process such as the one we begin todiscern in the campaign for RECOM?I want to suggest that civil society in the Western Balkansshould be conceived as plural, fragmented and conflicted.There are several different ways in which one could talkabout civil society and invoke both the pluralism andconflicts that define its nature. One could highlight, forexample, the various functions that civil society actorstend to perform. A distinction can be drawn betweenNGOs engaged in service delivery that may even substitutefor the state, on the one side, and those organisations thatsee themselves as advocates for particular causes and serveas counterweight to the state, on the other. Another way tospeak about civil society is to emphasize the boundaries,or even fault lines, which mark the civil society terrain inthe region. There are national boundaries and there areethnic boundaries, which have been reinforced not only bythe vicious wars in the nineties but also by the precariouspeace that has emerged in their aftermath.One could also talk about ideological divisions in civilsociety that have often become most obvious in debatesabout transitional justice. The issue of justice and accountabilityfor the legacy of crime inherited from the ninetieshas served to highlight the intensity of political conflictover values and projects across the region. An examplethat many might remember is the rally in Split and thecounter-demonstration in Zagreb in 2001. Civil societyprotest and mobilisation was triggered by the same event(the indictment of a Croatian general for war crimes bya court in Rijeka) but advanced conflicting sets of valuesand projects for the Croatian state. In Serbia, the ongoingconflict involving human rights defenders and members ofthe so-called ‘patriotic bloc’ speaks to the same theme ofcivil society as a contested and conflicted space.What emerges from this analysis is a sense of the diversityof civil society actors in the Western Balkans: those whooperate across the region and those bound by the state orthe local community; the advocacy groups and the serviceproviders; the urban NGOs and the rural victims associations;the human rights defenders and the war veterans;the media and the public intellectuals. If all of these actorsconstitute civil society in the region, than we shouldindeed understand civil society as an arena of pluralism aswell as contestation.This relates to the second question raised here: Shouldcivil society be encouraged to engage with the issue ofjustice, and what role for RECOM in that process? Manyobservers have pointed that the issue of justice might leadto further polarization and conflict in post-Yugoslav societies.Indeed, my own analysis has conveyed the multiplefault lines within civil society itself. But I want to sug-117Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional Justicegest that the conflicting views about the past and aboutaddressing that past could also be seen as presenting anopportunity. Civil society in the Western Balkans, like civilsociety everywhere, articulates in the public domain thevarious views and grievances of citizens that already existin society, and provokes other voices to take part in theensuing debate. This is the value of the RECOM initiative,and the promise of a possible regional commission: not tosuppress social conflict and disagreement but to allow it tobe settled in the domain of politics, through public debateand deliberation, with non-violent means and respectfor the rule of law. If the consultation process of the civilsociety initiative for RECOM is anything to judge by, thetransformative potential of a process of restorative justicein the region might be even greater than what many of itsprotagonists expect.118Humanitarian Law Center

Transitional Justice from the Media PerspectivePART IIITransitional Justice fromthe Media Perspective119Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional Justice120Humanitarian Law Center

Transitional Justice from the Media PerspectiveRECOM andthe Media StrategyTihomir LozaIn legal terms, international and local efforts over thepast 15 years to prosecute those responsible for warcrimes committed in the conflicts accompanying thebreakup of Yugoslavia have been a success overall, if onerequiring some elaborate qualification. Dozens of highrankingofficials have faced largely credible trials, withjust two really important suspects, still evading justice. Yetwhen it comes to the impact of war crimes trials on politicaland social lives of the Western Balkan societies evengenerous watchers see only mixed results.It is important to understand that most of the victims ofwar crimes don’t feel they have received justice. Many ofthem live lives of poverty or social exclusion. They oftencomplain about what they see as lenient sentencing andgood living conditions of the convicts, many of whom areserving their sentences in relatively comfortable prisonsin Western countries. When convicted war criminals arereleased early, victims feel betrayed.Prosecutors at the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal in TheHague understandably focused more on the big beasts ofthe Balkan wars. Inevitably, these trials attracted muchmore attention than those of actual perpetrators. Meanwhile,most of the hundreds or possibly thousands of thosewho actually carried out atrocities are yet to face justice.Apart from reinforcing the notion that the trials are reallyabout apportioning political blame, the focus on top officialshas made it difficult for many victims to relate to thetrials as relevant to their personal tragedies.Few would argue that trials in The Hague and the regioncontributed much to reconciliation and dealing with thepast in general. Many closed cases continue to generatefresh interethnic acrimony. To take a relatively minorexample, in January 2010, in what very much looked likea moment of political madness, Croatia’s then outgoingpresident, Stjepan Mesić, reduced two sentences for crimescommitted in the early 1990s, one given to a Serb guard ata detention center where Croatian soldiers were tortured,one to a Croat colonel infamous for taking part in someof the most gruesome crimes against Croatia’s Serb community.The list of those dismayed, or even frightened, byMesić’s parting shot included Croatian veterans, formerPOWs in particular, members of Croatia’s Serb minority,and the government of Serbia.One must not here mistake reintegration with reconciliation.Despite new international and internal borders nowdividing them, the ethnic groups of the former Yugoslaviahave indeed re-established many pre-war links, in cultureand trade in particular, often to levels matching thosefrom before the war. They have achieved this despite failingto reconcile with one another. In fact, they fail to eventry to reconcile their conflicting takes on the past, which,of course, does not prove that reconciliation is unnecessary,but does perhaps reveal an intrinsic durability oflinks among them.Consider that the post-Yugoslav states have acceptedthe obligation to cooperate with the Hague tribunal andsupport local war crimes courts. But even the most liberalamong them have been careful to support war crimesprosecutions, and sell that support to their respectiveelectorates, almost exclusively under the premise thatcooperation with The Hague is good for their countries’integration into the international community, the EU andNATO in particular. At the same time, most of them providedfinancial and legal assistance to suspects and their121Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional Justice122families, not to speak of the heroes’ welcome convictsoften receive upon their release.Released early from a Swedish prison in October 2009,convicted war criminal Biljana Plavšić, a former presidentof Republika Srpska, flew home in an aircraft sent by theentity government. A few days later, ordinary Serbs warmlygreeted her in Banja Luka to the utter dismay of theBosniak parts of the country. Nor are the war criminalsforgotten, while behind bars. Children in some BosnianCroat schools write Christmas letters to Croat convicts.The failure of war crimes trials to contribute more toreconciliation of the region’s conflicting views of the pastcannot be explained away by simply pointing to the failureof the Hague tribunal and local courts to grasp the importanceof strong outreach. Sure enough, in The Hague andthe region alike, justice has often been done without beingseen as having been done. Yet an often unappreciatedstructural obstacle to a greater readiness of former Yugoslavia’sethnic groups to face the past in a constructive wayis perhaps a more important consideration in this regard.The crimes highlighted here were not committed out ofsheer hatred, though hatred was never in short supply, butin the name of political aims supported by millions. Thesewere not just any political aims, but aspirations addressingfundamental issues concerning the existence of these ethnicgroups, such as national sovereignty, borders, identity,constitutional position, or long-term security.In and of themselves, these aspirations were not necessarilyillegitimate. There was nothing illegitimate or unlawfulin principle for the Bosnian Serbs to want a separateterritory inside Bosnia or for the Croats of Croatia towant an independent Croatia or for Serbia to want to keepKosovo within its border or for Kosovo Albanians to wantindependence. Some or many of the actions committed inthe name and within the context of these aspirations wereunlawful.It is, of course, possible to argue that at least some of theseaspirations were illegal in themselves as their fulfilmentimplied the use of force, but that is a complicated argumentand one whose time has long passed.Not least, because those political aspirations have largelysurvived the conflicts. They were fully or partly realized,and as such are considered as unquestioned historicalachievements now set in constitutions, or where they werenot fulfilled, they survived on a conceptual as well as legallevel, such as in the case of Serbia vis-a-vis Kosovo. Inother words, the post-Yugoslav societies are founded – andinternationally accepted as such – on aspirations, fulfilledor not, in whose name members of these societies committedterrible crimes.When it comes to illuminating, by whatever means, thecrimes committed in the name of these aspirations, whatwe are asking these societies to do is in effect to rise abovethemselves and divorce their political aspirations fromthe crimes committed in the name of those aspirations.This is intellectually and emotionally a very demandingproposition, not just for the masses, but often for liberalminorities too.Fine, you can have your Republika Srpska, but, please,show us the mass graves that went into its making andsome empathy for the families of the victims. How aboutrebuilding some of the hundreds of mosques destroyed inthe name of Republika Srpska? Congratulations on achievingan independent Croatia! Well done! Would you mindhanding over the generals who made it possible and pleaserepair the houses they torched while chasing out thoseSerbs, who we are sure you’d be thrilled to see come back.This was never going to work smoothly, if at all.For while criminal acts were certainly not the only buildingblocks used to construct the current political map ofthe region, a rarely spoken truth is that they were indeedbuilding blocks. That’s why attempts to highlight individualresponsibility for war crimes, in court trials offormer top officials in particular, are more often than notperceived by the community from which the accused comeas assaults on the very foundations of that community.That’s why you see otherwise perfectly decent, law-abidingcitizens who would never dream of condoning “ordinary”crimes being unmoved by revelations of war crimes. Infact, people often seem able to view war crimes in abstractterms, as if they were committed in a reality of a differentorder from the one in which they live their everyday lives.In other words, while they may have served other worthypurposes, war crimes trials have not so far given satisfactionto the victims or contributed to reconciliation amongthe region’s ethnic groups.This is exactly why the RECOM initiative makes sense. Buthow likely is it that the governments in the region will signup to this proposal in the near future? Perhaps not verylikely, but not totally improbable either.The architecture of basic political sentiments in the regionwould suggest that the prerequisite for this to happen issimultaneous support for the initiative from the govern-Humanitarian Law Center

Transitional Justice from the Media Perspectivements in the two most important capitals, Belgrade andZagreb. It is virtually inconceivable that Podgorica, Sarajevo,and Pristina would fail to follow such a move. Andtheir support for the initiative without either Belgrade orZagreb on board would not amount to very much.While it is hard to picture any government in the regionembracing the initiative as a priority and of its own will,with a bit of luck and some fine pressure Belgrade andZagreb just may play ball in the end. Both countries havebeen quite lucky in choosing their leaders lately. Last summer,Croatia’s now disgraced former Prime Minister IvoSanader thought he was appointing a mere proxy as hissuccessor only to see Jadranka Kosor quickly develop intoa most formidable player capable of transforming, not onlythe fortunes of the government and the ruling party, butthe country’s entire outlook. In giving a landslide victoryin January to Ivo Josipović, Croatia gained a moderate,calm, and exceptionally brainy president. Meanwhile, nowformer Serbian President Boris Tadić was creating conditionsfor the gradual taking hold of a Serbia more decentthan the one that has usually made headlines in the recentpast. Even though this is not always easily discernablefrom developments that make daily news, there is littledoubt that the entire mainstream political sentiment isslowly but surely moving toward moderation. Tadić andJosipović both said they view the development of the Serb-Croat relationship as their priority.The region’s media, however, may be a bigger obstacle forRECOM. In fact, it can be argued that, when it comes todealing with the recent past, significant parts of politicalscenes, at least in Croatia and Serbia, are more enlightenedthan typical newsrooms in these countries. Themedia scenes are still, and will for some time be, largelydominated by editors whose mindsets were shaped duringYugoslavia’s breakdown and owners or political protectorswho have an interest in perpetuating the sentimentsfrom the 1990s, albeit in modified forms. The work ofICTY and organizations such as the Humanitarian LawCenter has gradually made the outright denial of crimes,typical of the late 1990s, implausible, so in recent yearswe have seen much less of it in the media. What we havemostly seen over the past decade in the majority of mediaoutlets is something close to indifference to war crimes.Trials and other credible accounts are either reported ina half-hearted manner, as if editors just go through themotions of recording second-rate developments, or asinfotainment, such as in the case of Šešelj or Milošević’strials, Gotovina’s hiding or indeed the return of BiljanaPlavšić. And when war crimes committed by membersof the ethnic group that the media outlet in question isaddressing are acknowledged, as they are on occasion, theacknowledgment is regularly presented in a way that itleaves the cause in whose name that crime was committedintact. Which, of course, is explicable given the nature andoutcome of Yugoslavia’s demise, but is also rather unfortunatefor efforts aimed at fostering reconciliation.In fact, the most difficult part of the problem facing aninitiative such as RECOM is that new elites controlling themedia are just not much interested in war crimes or issuesof the past, except when they can be utilized to quicklysensitize and homogenize their own camps, now no longerfor conflict, but rather for continued loyalty to the campat the ballot box, the news stand or the TV remote control.The takeover of the region’s media by different interestgroups is part of what we may want to call a state captureprocess, which, of course, is not unique to the formerYugoslavia. What is indeed different in the former Yugoslavia’scase as compared to most of the rest of the formercommunist world is the existence of a huge baggage of warcrimes and other gross breaches of human rights in recentpast that still needs addressing. A media landscape conduciveto any such effort is not in place. What’s more, thereare few reasons for optimism that this will soon change.Except that the nature of the media in general is fastchanging. What the elites formed in the 1990s control aretraditional outlets that still dominate local media scenes.That dominance will no doubt continue for some time. Yetthe advent of new media is bound to diversify those scenesas increasing numbers of consumers get their news fromthe Internet, where both production and disseminationare dramatically cheaper and will be getting cheaper still.What’s more, a lot of cost-effective new media productionis just as suitable for dissemination through traditionaloutlets, an element bound to increase pressure on themto open up their editorial approach as well. Which is alsowhere a glimmer of hope for RECOM comes from.Rather than waiting for now dominant dailies or nationalTV channels to take the issue seriously, RECOM shouldinstead unashamedly establish a strong multimedia productionof its own as well as web presence in the form ofa powerful multimedia portal, whose content will thenbe mirrored throughout the Balkan cyberspace, puttingin turn pressure on traditional outlets to take RECOMseriously.123Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional JusticeThe Role and the Duty ofthe Media in Post-ConflictReconciliationFlorence Hartmann124Transitional justice encompasses not only prosecutions,reparations, preventing impunity, and building the ruleof law, but also extends to include truth-telling, restoringthe dignity and preserving the memory of victims, buildingpeace, creating respect for human rights and democracy.Together, they create the pre-condition for reconciliation.Tools for achieving these goals include, in addition to trials,truth commissions such as RECOM, and commemorations.But such a process will always remain incomplete if itdoes not instigate changes in the historical narrative of thegroups involved in conflict. Education has long been absentfrom the transitional justice discourse. Neither the widereducation system nor the teaching of history - both what istaught, and how - has rarely been considered by the institutionsthat transitional justice has aimed to reform.Article 45 of the proposed RECOM Statute seeks a specificmandate to make recommendation on mechanismsthat will help integrate the established facts into theeducational systems of the Parties to the Agreement. Butit will take time before RECOM is established, its FinalReport issued and its recommendations implemented andtextbooks or specific materials are produced and teachersreceive adequate professional training.For the time being, an entire post-war generation hasalready been educated with different and most often conflictinghistorical narratives, in a system in which historyand education, and transitional justice have proceededon two different tracks, and where none of the tribunals,international or domestic, have included in their mandatethe production of didactic materials specifically aimed ateducation.Everyone agrees that the representation of the past, mattersin post-war societies. But so far these representationshave been often, not to say always, left in the handsof those whose aim is to maintain divisions among thegroups involved in the conflict, instead of responding tothe intense need for peace, justice, democratization andintergroup reconciliation. They have been left in the handsof those in power, tainted by their association with earlierperpetrator regimes, or simply keen to promote reconciliationas a means of public amnesia.The revision of history textbooks in the aftermath of massivehuman rights abuses tends to take a long time. Butbefore transitional justice mechanisms and their findingsimpact on educational reform, there are other means thatcan help improve public knowledge of the recent violentpast and contribute -along with civil society - to the initiationof changes to the historical narratives of the groupsinvolved in the conflict. And I am thinking here, of themedia.The media can contribute that the facts established areknown and that the accepted historical narratives do notwhitewash acts that inflicted major suffering and do notexclude the experiences of the other groups, including theviolence perpetrated by the states involved in an internationalconflict, as in the Former Yugoslavia.Very few media or journalists in this region have taken upthis task. Media have often paid a great role in engineeringviolence and mass abuses through hate speech, de-humanizationof the enemy and by promoting war policies. TheyHumanitarian Law Center

Transitional Justice from the Media Perspectivetherefore have a special duty to ‘repair’ their wrongdoingof the past by promoting the need to reduce the numberof lies that can be circulated unchallenged in public discourse,one of the most important goals of transitionaljustice mechanisms.The media can indeed contribute by proposing counternarrativesto challenge wholesale stereotypes presentamong their audience, or by offering a narrative that canbe endorsed by the different sides of the conflict and thatdoes not obliterate distinct voices even if they remain, tosome extent, contradictory.Through the coverage of the war crimes trials or theactivities of truth-telling processes, the media can helpdevelop a new framework for public discourse, discussionand analysis, in order to engage new audiences and youngmembers of the concerned societies. Especially when sofar there has been no government support for vehicles toinstitutionalize court findings, before the ICTY or domesticcourts, in schools or anywhere else.They have a great role to play in serving the goal of enhancingcritical thinking and empathy skills, the willingness toquestion simplistic models and the ability to disagreeabout interpretations of the past and their implicationsfor current social issues, without resorting to violence andnew inequities.Press coverage of trials and testimonies as well as historytextbooks are looked at by the victim groups and otheraudiences to gauge the intent of community that formerperpetrators of violence belonged to and the sincerityof their commitments not to repeat the past, as well asto assess whether a political and social group has trulychanged, to become a reliable partner in the transitionprocess.But in most cases, the media coverage instead of contributingto the strengthening of the process of awareness, oftenuse polarizing approaches and wording in the way theycover (or do not cover) the trials.Live broadcasts of war crimes trials did not provideadequate commentators to help understand the context:Instead of making a break with the violent past, the coveragecontributed often to perpetuate (by other means)the wartime stereotypes and hatred. The trials before theICTY were aimed at proving the crime as well as preventinga nation from deluding itself and from building a newmyth in which it figures exclusively as the victim but theyfailed due to the often unprofessional media coverage.Journalist training is generally weak and the commonapproach includes often uncritical thinking and lack ofindependence toward the political and institutional structures.So this emphasis on the role of the media, as an actorin the transitional justice processes, may seem idealistic.But the effort needs to be seen as a form of reparation forthe past role of the media in issuing hate speech and incontributing to the explosion of mass violence. They havetherefore a duty to contribute to addressing the contestedissues and to help bring history education and transitionaljustice on closer tracks.125Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional Justice126Humanitarian Law Center

Transitional Justice from the ICTY PerspectivePART IVTransitional Justice fromthe ICTY Perspective127Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional Justice128Humanitarian Law Center

Transitional Justice from the ICTY PerspectiveJohn HockingLast month, one day after the Tribunals 18th birthday,Ratko Mladić was finally arrested and transferred tothe Hague. His capture means that of the 161 accused,that the tribunal has indicted, now only one, Goran Hadžićremains at large. We have completed proceedings against126 accused, we currently have 34 accused persons, eitheron trial or awaiting judgment. 1 Millions of pages frompolitical and military archives have been made public bythe Tribunal. Over six thousand witnesses have walkedthrough our doors, and told their stories in our courtroomsand from these testimonies, numerous facts havebeen established about the crimes that were committedin the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. Those foundresponsible have been punished. The Tribunal’s trackrecord has surpassed even the wildest expectations of itsfounders. The ICTY turned accountability from a dreaminto a reality. The highest echelons of power are now nolonger untouchable. And this accountability is spreadingthroughout the world.But the criminal trial process, however, is not the onlyway to confront human rights violations. A wide varietyof transitional justice mechanisms provide tools for socialtransformation. Criminal justice is a critical element, butit is not the sole element. Nor should it be. Today’s forumdemonstrates exactly this.The United Nations recognizes the importance of taking abroader perspective when dealing with post-conflict societiesand it often takes the lead in this process. The formerUnited Nations Secretary General [Kofi Annan] stated thatjustice, peace and democracy are not mutually exclusiveobjectives, but rather, mutually reinforcing objectives.Approaches focusing only on one or another institution,or which ignore civil society or victims will not be effective.And this means that we have to approach these issuescomprehensively. We have to pay attention to all of theinter-dependent institutions. We have to be sensitive tothe needs of key groups and mindful of the need of complementaritybetween transitional justice mechanisms.The tribunal is an international court sited far from thelocations of the crimes, but its impact must not be limitedto the courtrooms in The Hague, and our OutreachProgramme is a key instrument of the ICTY’s transitionaljustice work. Outreach has helped the Tribunal to realizethis broader vision, as expressed by the Secretary General.Seeing justice being done is a necessary precondition forpeace, but as our mandate draws to a close, the missionof the ICTY and in particular outreach becomes moreimportant than ever. The remaining few years presentour last opportunity to ensure that the evidence that wehave gathered, the testimony of those 6,000 witnesses, thejudgments that we have rendered, that this vast wealth of1291 Figures were accurate at the time of the address. On 20 July 2011, Goran Hadžić, the Tribunal’s last fugitive was arrested making thisthe only international court to secure the arrest of all its indictees. 35 accused persons are currently on trial or awaiting judgment.”Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional Justice130objectively tested facts are made publicly available both tothe national courts and to the citizens of the region, withoutethnic or political slant.It is for this very reason that as Registrar, I have made outreacha key strategic priority during our final years. It is thework we do now that will cement our legacy. What we dotoday will define our place in history.The work of the Tribunal has always ultimately beenabout local ownership – it has been a guiding principle ofthe Tribunal’s outreach efforts. And that’s what makes ita good partnership with the RECOM initiative. RECOMopens a new chapter in the post-conflict transformationof the former Yugoslavia. It represents an alternative voiceof those who want to tell their stories without constraints,and generate debate about the past atrocities and how tocome to terms with them. It is an enterprise by the communityfor the community.Over the past quarter century, many countries have grappledwith how to deal with the tragic legacies of conflict.A number have created truth telling bodies which havebeen tailored to suit the needs of their particular society.RECOM follows this path. Experience shows that suchmechanisms have the potential to transform a society -look at the experience in South Africa, Argentina, andRwanda.Confronting the past is not a simple process and in myview it requires two elements. One is the ability to understandand accept the past. The other is accountability forthe past. Truth telling mechanisms and criminal prosecutionscan contribute to both. Truth telling initiatives suchas RECOM are more aimed towards the process of understandingthe past. Criminal prosecution, the Tribunal,local courts - they play a dominant role in accounting forthe past. Although their methods differ, ultimately theyshare the same fundamental goal, and both can and shouldcomplement each other and contribute to post-conflictrecovery.But they play a different role, they have different aims, andthey have different procedures. I’ll just highlight few ofthose differences.The ICTY’s cases focus on selected incidents where evidenceis presented, based on what is most suitable to supportthe stringent demands of the legal process. During thecourse of the Tribunal’s trials, vast amounts of evidencehas been presented and tested through this rigorous legalprocess. All of this is aimed at establishing individualresponsibility beyond reasonable doubt. The evidencebefore the ICTY is not primarily intended to produce acomprehensive record of history. It cannot do this.Truth commissions, such as RECOM, on the other handhave a different intent - to assemble a much more expansiverecord, including an analysis of the role of nationalinstitutions. This is something that cannot be done by thecriminal justice system. Truth telling processes are notsubject to the rigorous rules of admissibility of evidenceor cross examination which are fundamental for criminaltrials. This will bring benefits, but it will also bringlimitations and it is very important to recognize and fullyacknowledge this.Both processes create a record that is victim-centered. Therole of the victim in criminal trials at the ICTY is crucial.Without the witnesses and their testimony there would beno trials. Those thousands of brave witnesses who havecome to testify at the Tribunal have enabled the voice ofmany of the victims to be heard and remembered. In thiscontext, the criminal trials serve both the public and thevictims’ interest to be heard, and ultimately, punish thoseresponsible.Truth commissions place the victims even closer to theheart of the process. They aim for a full record of thesufferings. Truth telling is an essential component of individualand public healing. It happens in both contexts butunder different conditions and with different aims.Education also plays a critical role in preventing futureoppressive behavior and is critical in reinforcing respectfor the rule of law.Both criminal courts, whether they be domestic courtsor international courts and truth finding mechanismsfunction as vehicles for educating communities of pastwrongdoings. The Tribunal does this through its courtproceedings, through its judgments, and through its OutreachProgramme. Similarly, RECOM has this educationalaspect as one of its key goals - the prevention of the spreadingof lies in public.It is critical for these differences be spelled out so thatexpectations can be managed. The needs of victims candiffer dramatically from individual to individual. Notall victims will be content with criminal punishmentexpressed by a term of imprisonment. Many may feel thattheir suffering and loss cannot be compensated by suchmeans. These victims may find solace in the non-retributivemechanisms offered by truth telling bodies.Humanitarian Law Center

Transitional Justice from the ICTY PerspectiveThe region of the former Yugoslavia demands justice andreconciliation. No one institution or mechanism can alonesatisfy this need. Criminal prosecutions, be it by the ICTYor domestic courts, and alternative truth telling mechanisms- both have a key role to play. A sharp juxtapositionbetween the two mechanisms must be shunned. We musttake a holistic approach to justice and look for synergies ifwe are to build a lasting peace.131Humanitarian Law Center

Forum for Transitional JusticeForum za tranzicionu pravdu / Forum for Transitional JusticeIzdavač / Publisher: Fond za humanitarno pravo / Humanitarian Law CenterZa izdavača / For The Publisher: Sandra OrlovićUrednica broja / Editor of the Issue: Denisa Kostovicova, LSEPrevod / Translation: Stefan Stojanović, Dragan Novaković, Predrag IvanovićKorektura / Proofreading: Jonathan BoultingGrafičko oblikovanje / Graphic Design: Milica DerviševićŠtampa / Printing House: PublikumTiraž / Print Run: 500ISSN 1452-8711COBISS.SR-ID 139735820Forum za tranzicionu pravdu / Forum for Transitional JusticeBeograd, decembar 2012 / Belgrade, December, 2012132Humanitarian Law Center