Perversion the Social Relation

Perversion the Social Relation Perversion the Social Relation

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42. Bruce FinkThus, what is involved here is not perception per se—as Freud says,it is not as if there were a scotoma or black spot on the retina, impedingthe fetishist from seeing what is there to be seen, stopping him fromreceiving certain photons—but a thought related to a particular perception.Seeing is not believing.Freud's 1938 distinction between repression as related to the internalworld and disavowal as related to the external world is reminiscent ofhis 192.4 distinction between "neurotic anxiety" and "realistic anxiety."Neurotic anxiety stems from an internal danger—that is, an impulsewithin the patient that is considered inappropriate by the patient's ownego or superego—whereas realistic anxiety (which Freud also refers toas "fear") stems from a real external danger (SE XXII, 81-89). Insofar,however, as disavowal clearly involves a thought related to a perception—thatis, something generally considered to be inside the subject,part of his or her psychical reality—not a perception alone, 11 theinternal-versus-external distinction breaks down. 12 Both repression anddisavowal involve thoughts, not perceptions.Having discussed the overriding importance of psychical reality andthe social/linguistic constitution of reality compared to some sort of objectivistview of reality, I will restate Freud's distinction as follows: inrepression, the thought associated with one of the patient's own drives isput out of mind, whereas in disavowal a thought, or complex of thoughts—related to a perception of the female genitals, to the father's supposedcastration threat (issued to keep the boy away from his mother and tokeep him from masturbating), and to the patient's narcissistic attachmentto his penis—is put out of mind.A first symbolizationOne of the important things to note here is that, if what is put out ofmind is a thought, then at least a first symbolization has taken place: inperversion, something related to the father and his will to separate hisson from the mother is symbolized, and thus, in contrast to psychosis,an initial acceptance or admission (Bejahung) of the father as symbolicseparator takes place. Basing our theorization on Freud's clinical observationsabout the perverse patients he treated, we can assert that thefather is symbolized to at least some extent because of the castration-

Perversion 43related symptoms that form. 13 Yet this symbolization is not as completeas that achieved in neurosis.Since my goal here is not to exhaustively critique Freud's inconclusivedefinitions of disavowal as a mechanism that clearly differs from repression,I will first indicate what I think we can take disavowal to refer toin the context of Lacan's thought (though to the best of my knowledgeLacan never formulates it as I am going to) and then I will try to translatesome of Freud's discussions into Lacanian terms, that is, in terms of theOther and the sacrifice of jouissance. My claim here is that disavowal isa mechanism that can be clearly distinguished from repression.Like foreclosure and primal repression, disavowal concerns the father:the father's desire, the father's name, and the father's law. The threemechanisms that constitute the three essential psychoanalytic categories—neurosis, psychosis, and perversion—all concern the paternal function(typically fulfilled by a child's father in our society). This point is notnearly as clear in Freud's work as it is in Lacan's, and thus Lacan can beseen to have systematized Freud's work in this respect. 14As we saw in chapter 7, while Freud maintains that paranoia (oneof the psychoses) results from a defense against homosexual urges (SEXVI, 308), Lacan says that homosexuality is not irrelevant to the understandingof psychosis but rather a consequence of the foreclosure of theName of the Father. The defense against homosexuality turns out to bea byproduct of foreclosure, not the cause of psychosis. Similarly, Freud'snotion that the fetish object is related in the fetishist's mind to the socalledmaternal phallus is not irrelevant from a Lacanian perspective,but is, rather, understandable in terms of the father, his desire, and hislaw. Belief in the maternal phallus suggests, as we shall see, that themother's desire-engendering lack has not been canceled out or named bythe father as it is in neurosis. 15 In other words, Lacan does not considerFreud's observation irrelevant but subsumes it within a larger theoreticalframework.From a Lacanian perspective, the apparent contradiction inherent indisavowal can, it seems to me, be described as follows: "I know full wellthat my father hasn't forced me to give up my mother and the jouissanceI take in her presence (real and/or imagined in fantasy) hasn't exactedthe 'pound of flesh,' u but I'm going to stage such an exaction or forcingwith someone who stands in for him; I'll make that person pronounce

42. Bruce FinkThus, what is involved here is not perception per se—as Freud says,it is not as if <strong>the</strong>re were a scotoma or black spot on <strong>the</strong> retina, impeding<strong>the</strong> fetishist from seeing what is <strong>the</strong>re to be seen, stopping him fromreceiving certain photons—but a thought related to a particular perception.Seeing is not believing.Freud's 1938 distinction between repression as related to <strong>the</strong> internalworld and disavowal as related to <strong>the</strong> external world is reminiscent ofhis 192.4 distinction between "neurotic anxiety" and "realistic anxiety."Neurotic anxiety stems from an internal danger—that is, an impulsewithin <strong>the</strong> patient that is considered inappropriate by <strong>the</strong> patient's ownego or superego—whereas realistic anxiety (which Freud also refers toas "fear") stems from a real external danger (SE XXII, 81-89). Insofar,however, as disavowal clearly involves a thought related to a perception—thatis, something generally considered to be inside <strong>the</strong> subject,part of his or her psychical reality—not a perception alone, 11 <strong>the</strong>internal-versus-external distinction breaks down. 12 Both repression anddisavowal involve thoughts, not perceptions.Having discussed <strong>the</strong> overriding importance of psychical reality and<strong>the</strong> social/linguistic constitution of reality compared to some sort of objectivistview of reality, I will restate Freud's distinction as follows: inrepression, <strong>the</strong> thought associated with one of <strong>the</strong> patient's own drives isput out of mind, whereas in disavowal a thought, or complex of thoughts—related to a perception of <strong>the</strong> female genitals, to <strong>the</strong> fa<strong>the</strong>r's supposedcastration threat (issued to keep <strong>the</strong> boy away from his mo<strong>the</strong>r and tokeep him from masturbating), and to <strong>the</strong> patient's narcissistic attachmentto his penis—is put out of mind.A first symbolizationOne of <strong>the</strong> important things to note here is that, if what is put out ofmind is a thought, <strong>the</strong>n at least a first symbolization has taken place: inperversion, something related to <strong>the</strong> fa<strong>the</strong>r and his will to separate hisson from <strong>the</strong> mo<strong>the</strong>r is symbolized, and thus, in contrast to psychosis,an initial acceptance or admission (Bejahung) of <strong>the</strong> fa<strong>the</strong>r as symbolicseparator takes place. Basing our <strong>the</strong>orization on Freud's clinical observationsabout <strong>the</strong> perverse patients he treated, we can assert that <strong>the</strong>fa<strong>the</strong>r is symbolized to at least some extent because of <strong>the</strong> castration-

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