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Perversion the Social Relation

Perversion the Social Relation

Perversion the Social Relation

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<strong>Perversion</strong> 41tions two examples of such symptoms: a man's fear that his fa<strong>the</strong>r willpunish him (for continued masturbation), and "an anxious susceptibilityagainst ei<strong>the</strong>r of his little toes being touched" (SE XXIII, 277-78).Described in this way, disavowal seems very similar to repression: <strong>the</strong>pushing of a memory out of consciousness, and <strong>the</strong> return of this memoryin <strong>the</strong> form of symptoms. Indeed, Freud at first tries to devise aclearer distinction between repression and disavowal by proposing thatwhat is repressed is affect, whereas <strong>the</strong> idea or thought related to it isdisavowed (SE XXI, 153). Yet this first attempt contradicts Freud's morerigorous and oft-repeated assertion that only an idea or thought can berepressed. In neurosis, an affect and <strong>the</strong> thought related to it (its "ideationalrepresentative," as Strachey translates Freud's term Vorstellungsrepràsentanz)7 become dissociated; for example, <strong>the</strong> thought representinga sexual impulse that <strong>the</strong> ego or superego considers incompatible orunacceptable is repressed, while <strong>the</strong> affect associated with it is set freeto be displaced. In <strong>the</strong> description Freud provides in "Splitting of <strong>the</strong>Ego," disavowal and repression seem to collapse into one and <strong>the</strong> sameprocess.In an article from 1938, Freud makes a second attempt to distinguishrepression from disavowal by saying that in repression one of <strong>the</strong>patient's own sexual impulses ("an instinctual demand from <strong>the</strong> internalworld") disappears, whereas in disavowal it is "a portion of <strong>the</strong> realexternal world" (SE XXIII, 204) that disappears. To state this more rigorously:in repression, <strong>the</strong> thought associated with one of <strong>the</strong> patient'sown drives 8 is put out of mind (<strong>the</strong> quantum of libido or affect associatedwith <strong>the</strong> drive being set free to drift or be displaced), while indisavowal a perception of <strong>the</strong> "real external world" is put out of mind.This only makes matters worse, however, because <strong>the</strong> "portion of <strong>the</strong>real external world" in question is, Freud says, <strong>the</strong> "lack of a penis." 9It should be clear that, strictly speaking, one never sees or perceives <strong>the</strong>lack of anything: one sees what is <strong>the</strong>re to be seen, not what is absent.The lack of a penis (or of anything else for that matter) is not a questionof perception: <strong>the</strong>re is no lack at <strong>the</strong> perceptual level—<strong>the</strong>re <strong>the</strong> worldis full. 10 One "sees" nothing only if one is expecting something in particularand mentally notes its absence. Except in a totally dark room, onealways sees something; <strong>the</strong>re are always photons striking <strong>the</strong> rods andcones of <strong>the</strong> eye. "Nothing" exists only at <strong>the</strong> level of thought.

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