Perversion the Social Relation

Perversion the Social Relation Perversion the Social Relation

ideiaeideologia.com
from ideiaeideologia.com More from this publisher
10.07.2015 Views

40 Bruce Finkmost contemporary psychologists to be perverse, a mechanism that canbe clearly distinguished from repression (at least, that is what I hope toshow in this chapter). It is evidence of the functioning of this mechanism—notthis or that sexual behavior in and of itself—that leads theanalyst to diagnose someone as perverse. Thus, in psychoanalysis "perversion"is not a derogatory term, used to stigmatize people for engagingin sexual behaviors different from the "norm." Rather, it designates ahighly specific clinical structure, with features that sharply distinguish itfrom neurosis and psychosis. The analyst can agree that all human desireis essentially perverse or fetishistic in nature, but nevertheless maintainan important theoretical and clinical distinction between neurotic structure,say, and perverse structure. In psychoanalysis, perversion is not tobe viewed as a stigma but rather as a structural category.DisavowalIn a number of different texts, Freud describes a process that he refers toas Verleugnung, a term that has been rendered in English as "disavowal,"though in many ways the English term "denial" is closer to the German(indeed, the French have preferred the term déni, close in meaning anduse to "denial"). 4 Freud develops the notion to account for a curious attitudehe detects in certain young boys who, when confronted with agirl's genitals, deny that the girl does not have a penis and claim thatthey in fact see one. Little Hans, for example, watching his seven-dayoldsister being given a bath, says: "Her widdler's still quite small. Whenshe grows up it'll get bigger all right." 5Freud formulates this by saying that, in such cases, the perception orsight of the female genitals is disavowed. He notes that in certain oldermale patients, one finds a twofold attitude regarding the fact that womendo not have penises: they disavow the perception, maintaining a belief inwhat Freud terms the "maternal phallus," but develop symptoms whichseem to indicate that this perception has nevertheless been registered atsome level. It is not as if the memory of a specific perception had simplybeen "scotomized"* or in some way excised from the men's minds (as wemight very loosely think of foreclosure); we know it is still there becauseit has effects—it generates symptoms—but it is nevertheless denied. Inhis article "Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence," Freud men-

Perversion 41tions two examples of such symptoms: a man's fear that his father willpunish him (for continued masturbation), and "an anxious susceptibilityagainst either of his little toes being touched" (SE XXIII, 277-78).Described in this way, disavowal seems very similar to repression: thepushing of a memory out of consciousness, and the return of this memoryin the form of symptoms. Indeed, Freud at first tries to devise aclearer distinction between repression and disavowal by proposing thatwhat is repressed is affect, whereas the idea or thought related to it isdisavowed (SE XXI, 153). Yet this first attempt contradicts Freud's morerigorous and oft-repeated assertion that only an idea or thought can berepressed. In neurosis, an affect and the thought related to it (its "ideationalrepresentative," as Strachey translates Freud's term Vorstellungsrepràsentanz)7 become dissociated; for example, the thought representinga sexual impulse that the ego or superego considers incompatible orunacceptable is repressed, while the affect associated with it is set freeto be displaced. In the description Freud provides in "Splitting of theEgo," disavowal and repression seem to collapse into one and the sameprocess.In an article from 1938, Freud makes a second attempt to distinguishrepression from disavowal by saying that in repression one of thepatient's own sexual impulses ("an instinctual demand from the internalworld") disappears, whereas in disavowal it is "a portion of the realexternal world" (SE XXIII, 204) that disappears. To state this more rigorously:in repression, the thought associated with one of the patient'sown drives 8 is put out of mind (the quantum of libido or affect associatedwith the drive being set free to drift or be displaced), while indisavowal a perception of the "real external world" is put out of mind.This only makes matters worse, however, because the "portion of thereal external world" in question is, Freud says, the "lack of a penis." 9It should be clear that, strictly speaking, one never sees or perceives thelack of anything: one sees what is there to be seen, not what is absent.The lack of a penis (or of anything else for that matter) is not a questionof perception: there is no lack at the perceptual level—there the worldis full. 10 One "sees" nothing only if one is expecting something in particularand mentally notes its absence. Except in a totally dark room, onealways sees something; there are always photons striking the rods andcones of the eye. "Nothing" exists only at the level of thought.

40 Bruce Finkmost contemporary psychologists to be perverse, a mechanism that canbe clearly distinguished from repression (at least, that is what I hope toshow in this chapter). It is evidence of <strong>the</strong> functioning of this mechanism—notthis or that sexual behavior in and of itself—that leads <strong>the</strong>analyst to diagnose someone as perverse. Thus, in psychoanalysis "perversion"is not a derogatory term, used to stigmatize people for engagingin sexual behaviors different from <strong>the</strong> "norm." Ra<strong>the</strong>r, it designates ahighly specific clinical structure, with features that sharply distinguish itfrom neurosis and psychosis. The analyst can agree that all human desireis essentially perverse or fetishistic in nature, but never<strong>the</strong>less maintainan important <strong>the</strong>oretical and clinical distinction between neurotic structure,say, and perverse structure. In psychoanalysis, perversion is not tobe viewed as a stigma but ra<strong>the</strong>r as a structural category.DisavowalIn a number of different texts, Freud describes a process that he refers toas Verleugnung, a term that has been rendered in English as "disavowal,"though in many ways <strong>the</strong> English term "denial" is closer to <strong>the</strong> German(indeed, <strong>the</strong> French have preferred <strong>the</strong> term déni, close in meaning anduse to "denial"). 4 Freud develops <strong>the</strong> notion to account for a curious attitudehe detects in certain young boys who, when confronted with agirl's genitals, deny that <strong>the</strong> girl does not have a penis and claim that<strong>the</strong>y in fact see one. Little Hans, for example, watching his seven-dayoldsister being given a bath, says: "Her widdler's still quite small. Whenshe grows up it'll get bigger all right." 5Freud formulates this by saying that, in such cases, <strong>the</strong> perception orsight of <strong>the</strong> female genitals is disavowed. He notes that in certain oldermale patients, one finds a twofold attitude regarding <strong>the</strong> fact that womendo not have penises: <strong>the</strong>y disavow <strong>the</strong> perception, maintaining a belief inwhat Freud terms <strong>the</strong> "maternal phallus," but develop symptoms whichseem to indicate that this perception has never<strong>the</strong>less been registered atsome level. It is not as if <strong>the</strong> memory of a specific perception had simplybeen "scotomized"* or in some way excised from <strong>the</strong> men's minds (as wemight very loosely think of foreclosure); we know it is still <strong>the</strong>re becauseit has effects—it generates symptoms—but it is never<strong>the</strong>less denied. Inhis article "Splitting of <strong>the</strong> Ego in <strong>the</strong> Process of Defence," Freud men-

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!