Friedrich_Nietzsche - Untimely_Meditations_(Cambridge_Texts_in_the_History_of_Philosophy__1997)

Schopenhauer as educatorwell knows that it is part of the essence of truth that it never accepts payor stands in anyone's service. Thus what the state has is only false'truth', a person in a mask; and unfortunately this cannot do for itwhat it so much desires genuine truth to do: validate and sanctify it.It is true that if a medieval prince wanted to be crowned by the Popebut the Pope refused to do it, he nominated an anti-Pope who thenperfonned for him this service. This might have worked then tosome extent; but for a modern state to nominate an anti-philosophyto legitimatize it will not work: for it will still have philosophy againstit as before, and now more than before. I believe in all seriousnessthat it is more useful to the state to have nothing at all to do withphilosophy, to desire nothing from it and for as long as possible toregard it as something to which it is completely indifferent. If thiscondition of indifference does not endure, if it becomes dangerousand hostile to the state, then let the state persecute it. - Since the statecan have no interest in the university other than seeing it raise usefuland devoted citizens of the state, it should hesitate to place thisusefulness and devotion in jeopardy by demanding that these youngmen should sit an examination in philosophy: it could well be, ofcourse, that the dull and incompetent would be frightened offuniversity study altogether by this spectre of a philosophy examination;but this gain could not compensate for the harm done to rashand restless youth by this enforced drudgery; they get to know booksforbidden them, begin to criticize their teachers and finally evenbecome aware of the objective of university philosophy and itsexaminations - not to speak of the misgivings which this circumstancecan excite in young theologians and as a result of whichthey are beginning to die out in Germany, as the ibex is in the TyroLI understand well enough the objections the state could haveraised against this whole way of looking at things so long as the fairgreen shoots of Hegelianism were sprouting up in every field: butnow that this harvest has come to nothing, all the expectations builtupon it have proved vain and all the barns remained empty - oneprefers no longer to raise objections but to tum away fromphilosophy altogether. One now possesses power: formerly, inHegel's time, one wanted to possess it - that is a vast distinction.Philosophy has become superfluous to the state because the state nolonger needs its sanction. If the state no longer maintains its professorsor, as I foresee in the near future, appears to maintain thembut in fact neglects them, it derives advantage from doing so - yet itappears to me of more importance that the universities should see191