brief - Iran 911 Case
brief - Iran 911 Case brief - Iran 911 Case
deniability.Iran assisted al Qaeda in another critical way just before 9/11. Two days beforeSeptember 11, 2001, the leader of the Afghan Northern Alliance, Ahmed Shah Massoud– the ―Lion of Panshir,‖ a U.S. ally, and the chief opponent of the Taliban – wasassassinated by al Qaeda members posing as journalists, and a Taliban offensive againstthe Northern Alliance commenced the next day. 9/11 Report, pp. 214, 252. Iran assistedin the assassination. ―Specifically, the Iranian Embassy in Brussels, Belgium, helped twoTunisian al Qaeda assassins obtain counterfeit Belgian passports . . . which they used toenter northern Afghanistan in the guise of journalists to interview Massoud.‖ In addition,Iran sent two men to procure the camera, which was stolen from a French journalist, inwhich the explosives used in the assassination were concealed. Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid.276; Ex. 7, Bergman Affid. 71. Massoud‘s assassination was highly significantbecause he was the Taliban‘s opposition‘s greatest hope – and he would have becomeAmerica‘s most important military ally in Afghanistan after 9/11. (Witness Y providesevidence of Iran‘s duplicity in dealing with both Massoud and the Taliban, and a possiblemotive for the Iranians‘ assistance to the Taliban-al Qaeda assassination of Massoud.)Significantly, the confession of KSM as being the sole mastermind of the 9/11attacks, ―responsible for the 9/11 Operation, from A to Z,‖ Ex. 19 – thereby suggestingthat al Qaeda needed no help from any state sponsor such as Iran – is unsupported andnot at all credible. Ex. 20, Baer, ―Why KSM‘s Confession Rings False,‖ TIME (March15, 2007). 85 The conclusion that KSM was the sole ―mastermind‖ of 9/11 is based on85 After being water-boarded numerous times, KSM confessed to scores of terrorist operations, few ofwhich actually occurred, some of which seem outlandish. He may have been boasting, or evenmentally unstable, but either way, ―[i]t‘s also clear he is making things up.‖ Id. Perhaps KSM, incustody and doubtless knowing he was never getting out, was taking credit in order to deflect the truth89
little other than KSM‘s own self-aggrandizing descriptions. And, of course, it is not trueat all, for KSM himself identified Osama bin Laden and Mohammed Atef as involved inthe development of the plan, selection of targets, and selection of the hijackers. 9/11REPORT, pp. 155-56, and p. 492, n. 40; see also Ex. 4, Kephart Affid. 75-76 andcitations therein. 86Moreover, the notion that KSM was the principal planner of 9/11 is alsoundermined by one of the Havlish experts, who, based on Israeli intelligence sources,states that ―Ayman al Zawahiri, who has been marked as the successor to Osama binLaden, was responsible for planning the attacks on 9/11.‖ Ex. 7, Bergman Affid. 69.Although Dr. Bergman was constrained from citing his source(s), his information isnoteworthy because Zawahiri is known to have been a key link between al Qaeda, Iran,and Hizballah since the early 1990s, particularly with Iran‘s intelligence service, MOIS.Ex. 7, Bergman Affid. 51, 54, 58-59, 62-63, 67; Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 170-71,280; Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 55, 81-83, 84-87, 217; Ex. 30. ―The significance ofthe personal relationship here forged between al Qaeda‘s number two [Zawahiri] and thetop leadership of the Iranian intelligence service [Ahmad Vahidi, head of MOIS] . . .cannot be overstated.‖ Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 170; see also id. 171 (MOIS chiefarranged for Zawahiri‘s release in Iran after mistaken arrest), 280 (Vahidi and Zawahiriarranged for safe harbor of al Qaeda inside Iran). (Witness Z provides additionalfrom reaching others, including perhaps, a state sponsor. Baer notes that KSM ―has also not offeredevidence of state support to al Qaeda, though there is good evidence there was, even at a low level. . . .KSM provides no details that would suggest we are getting the full story from him.‖ Id.86 Indeed, KSM‘s own al Qaeda colleagues cast doubt on his ability to conceive a masterful plan like9/11. ―Al Qaeda associate Abu Zubaydah has expressed more qualified admiration for KSM‘s innatecreativity, emphasizing instead his ability to incorporate the improvements suggested by others.Nashiri [al Qaeda member and/or full name] has been similarly measured, observing that althoughKSM floated many general ideas for attacks, he rarely conceived a specific operation himself.‖ 9/11REPORT, p. 150.90
- Page 43 and 44: every year since 1984. Ex. 3, Byman
- Page 45 and 46: Testimony of Witness X, February 23
- Page 47 and 48: unning through the contemporary Mid
- Page 49 and 50: We Know, p. 127; Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft
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deniability.<strong>Iran</strong> assisted al Qaeda in another critical way just before 9/11. Two days beforeSeptember 11, 2001, the leader of the Afghan Northern Alliance, Ahmed Shah Massoud– the ―Lion of Panshir,‖ a U.S. ally, and the chief opponent of the Taliban – wasassassinated by al Qaeda members posing as journalists, and a Taliban offensive againstthe Northern Alliance commenced the next day. 9/11 Report, pp. 214, 252. <strong>Iran</strong> assistedin the assassination. ―Specifically, the <strong>Iran</strong>ian Embassy in Brussels, Belgium, helped twoTunisian al Qaeda assassins obtain counterfeit Belgian passports . . . which they used toenter northern Afghanistan in the guise of journalists to interview Massoud.‖ In addition,<strong>Iran</strong> sent two men to procure the camera, which was stolen from a French journalist, inwhich the explosives used in the assassination were concealed. Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid.276; Ex. 7, Bergman Affid. 71. Massoud‘s assassination was highly significantbecause he was the Taliban‘s opposition‘s greatest hope – and he would have becomeAmerica‘s most important military ally in Afghanistan after 9/11. (Witness Y providesevidence of <strong>Iran</strong>‘s duplicity in dealing with both Massoud and the Taliban, and a possiblemotive for the <strong>Iran</strong>ians‘ assistance to the Taliban-al Qaeda assassination of Massoud.)Significantly, the confession of KSM as being the sole mastermind of the 9/11attacks, ―responsible for the 9/11 Operation, from A to Z,‖ Ex. 19 – thereby suggestingthat al Qaeda needed no help from any state sponsor such as <strong>Iran</strong> – is unsupported andnot at all credible. Ex. 20, Baer, ―Why KSM‘s Confession Rings False,‖ TIME (March15, 2007). 85 The conclusion that KSM was the sole ―mastermind‖ of 9/11 is based on85 After being water-boarded numerous times, KSM confessed to scores of terrorist operations, few ofwhich actually occurred, some of which seem outlandish. He may have been boasting, or evenmentally unstable, but either way, ―[i]t‘s also clear he is making things up.‖ Id. Perhaps KSM, incustody and doubtless knowing he was never getting out, was taking credit in order to deflect the truth89
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