terrorists, purportedly under house arrest. Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 178. However,in July 2004, upon release of the 9/11 REPORT, President George W. Bush stated publiclythat <strong>Iran</strong> was still ―‗harboring al Qaeda leadership.‘‖ Id., p. 47, n. 56; see also Ex. 29.Further, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said, ―We know <strong>Iran</strong> is activelysending terrorists down through Damascus into the Bekka Valley where they trainterrorists, then engage in acts against countries in the region and elsewhere.‖ Ex. 6,Lopez-Tefft Affid. 288 (emphasis omitted). Recently, Britain‘s former prime minister,Tony Blair, confirmed the continuing critical alliance between al Qaeda and <strong>Iran</strong>. In aJanuary 2011 interview, Blair confirmed that <strong>Iran</strong> is supportive of terrorist groups andstated that the West cannot deal with al Qaeda unless it deals with <strong>Iran</strong>. Ex. 37.Meanwhile, <strong>Iran</strong> has persistently refused ―to publicly identify senior members [ofal Qaeda allegedly being held] in <strong>Iran</strong>ian custody on the grounds of ‗security . . .‘‖ and―<strong>Iran</strong> has resisted calls to transfer custody of its al-Qaida detainees to their countries oforigin or third countries for further interrogation and trial.‖ Ex. 13, 2003 Patterns ofGlobal Terrorism, U.S. State Department (released April 29, 2004); 83 see Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 90. On the contrary, <strong>Iran</strong> appears to have permitted top al Qaeda leaders,such as Saef al Adel, Sa‘ad bin Laden, and Suleiman Abu Ghaith to ―travel freely indeparting from <strong>Iran</strong>‖ when they wanted to do so, an option ―that would constitute animportant material support to al-Qaeda.‖ Ex. 8, Clawson Affid. 63; Ex. 6, Lopez-TefftAffid. 318, 320; Ex. 35, Congressional Research Service, ―<strong>Iran</strong>: Concerns and PolicyResponses (March 4, 2011), p. 48. The status quo has persisted in the years since. 8483 Ex. 13; see http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2003/31644.htm.84 See Ex. 13, Patterns of Global Terrorism, U.S. State Department 2007 edition (released April 30,2008), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/103711.htm; 2008 edition (released April 29, 2009),http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2008/122438.htm; and 2009 edition (released August 2010),87
The fact is that many important ―core al Qaeda leaders‖ and operatives are knownto have lived in <strong>Iran</strong> since September 11, 2001, including the aforementioned, as well asAbu Hafs, Abu Mohammed al Masri (a/k/a Mustafa Hamid, Ex. 30), Abu Khayr, AbuMusab Zarqawi, members of al Qaeda‘s Shura Council, and others. Ex. 6, Lopez-TefftAffid. 281-83; 297; 302-04; 306-14 (emphasis omitted); Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid.186-89, 213-219; Ex. 8, Clawson Affid. 63.In the opinion of experts, the provision of safe haven to al Qaeda members whofled the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, and later conducted terrorist operations from theirsafe haven in <strong>Iran</strong>, was done with the knowledge, approval, and assistance of the highestlevels of the <strong>Iran</strong>ian government. The provision of such safe haven comprised materialsupport for al Qaeda after the fact of the 9/11 attacks. Ex. 3, Byman Affid. 51-59; Ex.8, Clawson Affid. 52-55, 60-63; Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 179; Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 277-310.C. September 11, 2001: Al Qaeda Did Not Act AloneThe September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, andWashington, D.C. (the latter foiled by the passengers), bore all the hallmarks of an ImadMughniyah/Hizballah terrorist operation: multiple, simultaneous, spectacular suicidebombings against American symbols of power. Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 178-83. Theattacks also fit the profile of <strong>Iran</strong>‘s sponsorship of terrorism: acts that affect U.S. foreignpolicy, performed by a proxy organization (with demonstrable pre-existing relations andagreements to conduct joint terrorist operations), while preserving <strong>Iran</strong>‘s plausible publichttp://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140889.htm.88
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D. CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF NON-U.S. NAT
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In order to revise its pleading to
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cooperated and coordinated with, an
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Indeed, the 9/11 REPORT notes a num
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senior Hezbollah operative. Also in
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Timmerman 2nd Affid. 124. 14Althoug
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facilitating the travel of the 9/11
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officials provided direct and mater
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after September 11, 2001, in the fo
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instrument of foreign and domestic
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Perhaps the leading expert on Iran
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INTERPOL, Edgar A. Adamson attests,
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2. THE ROBERT BAER PUBLICATIONSForm
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Iran provided material and direct s
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