brief - Iran 911 Case
brief - Iran 911 Case brief - Iran 911 Case
said, ―‘there is no question but that al Qaeda has moved into Iran, out of Iran to the southand dispersed to some other countries.‘‖ In September 2002, Rumsfeld told the SenateArmed Services Committee that Iran ―‗is currently harboring reasonably large numbersof al Qaeda,‘‖ and CIA Director George Tenet confirmed this in testimony before theSenate the following February, saying ―‗we see disturbing signs that al Qaeda hasestablished a presence in both Iran and Iraq.‘‖ Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 294 (emphasisomitted). Further, Western intelligence services reported that al Qaeda fugitives beingpursued by European security services repeatedly escaped to Iran. Id., 298. Meanwhile,al Qaeda and Hizballah were actively collaborating in Iran as well as at Hizballah‘ssanctuary in Lebanon‘s Bekaa Valley. Id., 292-94; see also 287-291.Iran eventually changed its official story on February 16, 2003, when ForeignMinister Kamal Kharrazi stated that Iranian authorities had ―‗arrested‘‖ or ―‗deported‘‖more than 500 al Qaeda members. Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 174. Still, that wasnot true. ―Iran has not cracked down fully on al-Qa‘ida operatives in the country, eitherbringing them to justice in Iran or extraditing them to the United States or their homecountries.‖ Ex. 3, Byman Affid. 57. By all accounts, ―[t]he al-Qaeda members in Irando not seem to have been that closely monitored or controlled . . . .‖ Ex. 8, ClawsonAffid. 61. None of the high-level al Qaeda operatives or their families was ever arrestedby the regime, but rather, had been transferred from ―‗blown‘‖ safe houses to more securequarters at Boostaneh Bostan, a guesthouse run by the IRGC. Ex. 2, Timmerman 2ndAffid. 175. There are no reports of any deportations or extraditions. Id., 176; Ex. 35,Congressional Research Service, ―Iran: Concerns and Policy Responses‖ (March 4,2011), p. 48.85
Indeed, Iran permitted al Qaeda to use its safe haven inside Iran to plan and directfurther terrorist attacks. According to the U.S. government and other Westernintelligence services, there have been numerous instances of al Qaeda and other terroristorganizations meeting, planning, and directing international terrorist operations from thesafety of Iranian territory. Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 281-86, 292-94, 297-300, 305; Ex.3, Byman Affid. 55; Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 179; Ex. 8, Clawson Affid. 61.In 2001-02, al Qaeda operative Ali Saleh Husain, a/k/a Abu Dahhak, while living in Iran,was given ―responsibility for operation meetings for attacks against Israel . . . .‖ Ex. 30,January 16, 2009 U.S. Treasury Designation. The U.S. intercepted communications fromsenior al Qaeda commander Saef al Adel, then in Mashad, Iran, to al Qaeda assassinationteams in Saudi Arabia just before their May 12, 2003 assault on three housingcompounds in Riyadh. Dozens, including several Americans, were killed during theRiyadh bombings and gun battles. Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 97, 99, 329-330; Ex. 8,Clawson Affid. 61; Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 177, 219. ―The general, clear andconvincing view is that the al-Qaeda leaders in Iran planned and ordered the [Riyadh]bombing, and they may well have provided the funds for it.‖ Ex. 8, Clawson Affid. 61(emphasis omitted). 82Meanwhile, Iran‘s implausible public denial that it was providing safe haven to alQaeda continued. In response to a U.S. accusation that Iran was harboring al Qaedaoperatives, in August 2003, MOIS minister Ali Younesi admitted they were present inIran, but claimed that his services were detaining ―‗large numbers‘‖ of al Qaeda82 As with the evidence of Iran‘s pre-9/11 involvement in, and sponsorship of, terrorism, evidence ofpost-9/11 terrorist acts conducted or directed by al Qaeda members from safe haven inside Iran isadmissible under Rule 404(b), Fed.R.Evid., and may form part of the bases for experts‘ opinions underRule 703, Fed.R.Evid.86
- Page 39 and 40: Iran provided material and direct s
- Page 41 and 42: Iran‘s anticipation of a retaliat
- Page 43 and 44: every year since 1984. Ex. 3, Byman
- Page 45 and 46: Testimony of Witness X, February 23
- Page 47 and 48: unning through the contemporary Mid
- Page 49 and 50: We Know, p. 127; Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft
- Page 51 and 52: Department reports on global terror
- Page 53 and 54: terrorist recruits from a variety o
- Page 55 and 56: and al Qaeda, of the ―most formid
- Page 57 and 58: predictable occurrence.‖ Ex. 6, L
- Page 59 and 60: The factual reality - as found by t
- Page 61 and 62: Zawahiri met with Imad Mughniyah, w
- Page 63 and 64: The historic 1993 meeting in Kharto
- Page 65 and 66: continuing terrorist training of al
- Page 67 and 68: the issuance of INTERPOL Red Notice
- Page 69 and 70: investigators concluded the operati
- Page 71 and 72: symbols. Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid.
- Page 73 and 74: worldwide terrorism is ―a report
- Page 75 and 76: AND TERRORIST TRAVEL, pp. 65-66. Mo
- Page 77 and 78: see Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 148
- Page 79 and 80: that the ―senior Hezbollah operat
- Page 81 and 82: actual foreknowledge of the plannin
- Page 83 and 84: Thus, Iran‘s facilitation of the
- Page 85 and 86: the present day. Testifying before
- Page 87 and 88: January 16, 2009; Ex. 2, Timmerman
- Page 89: The January 16, 2009, Treasury desi
- Page 93 and 94: The fact is that many important ―
- Page 95 and 96: little other than KSM‘s own self-
- Page 97 and 98: terrorism operations against the U.
- Page 99 and 100: of Mughniyah‘s offices in Beirut.
- Page 101 and 102: provided material support to al Qae
- Page 103 and 104: Walter S. Batty, Jr. (PA Bar No. 02
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Indeed, <strong>Iran</strong> permitted al Qaeda to use its safe haven inside <strong>Iran</strong> to plan and directfurther terrorist attacks. According to the U.S. government and other Westernintelligence services, there have been numerous instances of al Qaeda and other terroristorganizations meeting, planning, and directing international terrorist operations from thesafety of <strong>Iran</strong>ian territory. Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 281-86, 292-94, 297-300, 305; Ex.3, Byman Affid. 55; Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 179; Ex. 8, Clawson Affid. 61.In 2001-02, al Qaeda operative Ali Saleh Husain, a/k/a Abu Dahhak, while living in <strong>Iran</strong>,was given ―responsibility for operation meetings for attacks against Israel . . . .‖ Ex. 30,January 16, 2009 U.S. Treasury Designation. The U.S. intercepted communications fromsenior al Qaeda commander Saef al Adel, then in Mashad, <strong>Iran</strong>, to al Qaeda assassinationteams in Saudi Arabia just before their May 12, 2003 assault on three housingcompounds in Riyadh. Dozens, including several Americans, were killed during theRiyadh bombings and gun battles. Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 97, 99, 329-330; Ex. 8,Clawson Affid. 61; Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 177, 219. ―The general, clear andconvincing view is that the al-Qaeda leaders in <strong>Iran</strong> planned and ordered the [Riyadh]bombing, and they may well have provided the funds for it.‖ Ex. 8, Clawson Affid. 61(emphasis omitted). 82Meanwhile, <strong>Iran</strong>‘s implausible public denial that it was providing safe haven to alQaeda continued. In response to a U.S. accusation that <strong>Iran</strong> was harboring al Qaedaoperatives, in August 2003, MOIS minister Ali Younesi admitted they were present in<strong>Iran</strong>, but claimed that his services were detaining ―‗large numbers‘‖ of al Qaeda82 As with the evidence of <strong>Iran</strong>‘s pre-9/11 involvement in, and sponsorship of, terrorism, evidence ofpost-9/11 terrorist acts conducted or directed by al Qaeda members from safe haven inside <strong>Iran</strong> isadmissible under Rule 404(b), Fed.R.Evid., and may form part of the bases for experts‘ opinions underRule 703, Fed.R.Evid.86
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