brief - Iran 911 Case

January 16, 2009; Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 171. Zarqawi, along with al Qaedacommander Saef al Adel, escaped to Iran, staying in the houses of GulbuddinHekmatyar‘s followers, with the tacit permission of Iranian intelligence. He then ―moved. . . across the entire width of Iran . . . [and] began setting up terrorist training campsconveniently near the Iranian border, which he crossed over on a regular basis,maintaining an easy relationship with Iranian security forces on the other side.‖ Ex. 6,Lopez-Tefft Affid. 281-82 (emphasis omitted). Later, Zarqawi ―was living in Tehran . .. under the protection of Iranian security services. Zarqawi was . . . back in Iran as ofOctober 2003, where he continued to operate with the full knowledge of the regime inTehran . . . .‖ Id., 283 (emphasis omitted). ―‗Zarqawi spent more time in Iran thananywhere else after September 11 . . . .‘‖ Ex. 8, Clawson Affid. 51 (quoting noted alQaeda expert Peter Bergen)(emphasis omitted).French Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière‘s investigations established that Zarqawi‘s―group traveled through Iranian territory on a regular basis and used Iran for clandestinemeetings, activities that implied the complicity of the intelligence services of the IslamicRepublic of Iran.‖ Ex. 9, Bruguière Declaration 33. ―It was clear to me that Zarkawihad direct ties to the Iranian regime for his terrorist operations.‖ Id., 41. Indeed, one ofZarqawi‘s ―top deputies‖ arranged transport of deadly poisons from Zarqawi‘s enclave―through Iran where they had excellent contacts‖ with ―the full knowledge of theIranians‖ to destinations overseas for use in terrorist attacks. Id., 34, 37-41.2. January 16, 2009: U.S. Treasury Department Designation. A U.S.Treasury Department designation of Saad bin Laden as an ―international terrorist‖ underExecutive Order 13224 (targeting terrorists and terrorist supporters) said of the eldest son82