brief - Iran 911 Case

Second, as the Commission starkly acknowledged in the Report,additional facts plainly remained to be uncovered . . . .Ex. 5, Snell Affid. 22; see also Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 121.Still, according to an interview of a 9/11 Commission staff member who reviewedthe NSA material, the documents showed that the Iranian border inspectors had beenordered not to put telltale stamps in the operatives‘ passports and that the Iranians werefully aware they were helping operatives who were part of an organization preparingattacks against the United States. Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 123-24. Indeed, the9/11 Commission‘s investigation found that the conspiracy involved ―a specific terroristtravel operation,‖ Ex. 4, Kephart Affid. 37, including movement of the hijackers aroundthe globe and into the United States without their travel to al Qaeda‘s training camps inAfghanistan being discoverable. One key feature of this ―terrorist travel operation‖ was―passports with possible indicators of extremism that dated back to the 1993 World TradeCenter attack‖ carried by at least three 76 of the hijackers:Id., 67.It is probable that such an indicator was an al Qaeda ―calling card‖ usedby the broad jihadi-terrorist community in general to identify themselvescovertly, and that Iranian border authorities were aware of this covertcalling card and thus, knew when not to stamp Iranian travel stamps into alQaeda passports.As concluded by former 9/11 Commission staffer Janice Kephart:. . . the actions of Iranian border authorities, in refraining from stampingthe passports of the Saudi hijackers, vastly increased the likelihood of theoperational success of the 9/11 plot. Shielding the Saudis‘ passports fromindicia of travel to Iran and Afghanistan was perceived as essential toprevent potential confiscation of passports by Saudi authorities, and alsoto hide complicity of Iran in supporting al Qaeda.. . . .76 Only six of the nineteen hijackers‘ passports were found after the attack. Id., 31.77