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brief - Iran 911 Case

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actual foreknowledge of the planning of the 9/11 attacks, see 9/11 REPORT, p. 241, thatfinding is unsurprising because the Commission also found that ―[a]fter 9/11, <strong>Iran</strong> andHezbollah wished to conceal any past evidence of cooperation with Sunni terroristsassociated with al Qaeda.‖ Id. That ―[a] senior Hezbollah official disclaimed anyHezbollah involvement in 9/11,‖ id., citing intelligence reports dated less than two weeksafter September 11, 2001, is, similarly, unsurprising. 75Finding no evidence, however, ―does not mean that there was no evidence to befound.‖ The further investigation conducted by Havlish attorneys uncovered specificevidence, in the form of the expert affidavits cited above and of sworn testimony byWitnesses X, Y, and Z, that <strong>Iran</strong> and Hizballah did have prior knowledge of planning forthe 9/11 attacks.Importantly, the discovery of the NSA intercepts occurred only days beforepublication of the Report and there was insufficient time to review the files thoroughly.‖Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 121; see Ex. 5, Snell Affid. 19-22. Dietrich Snell, TeamLeader of the 9/11 Commission‘s staff team investigating the 9/11 conspiracy, states inhis affidavit:This fact [that the 9/11 Commission ―found no evidence‖ that <strong>Iran</strong> orHizballah had actual foreknowledge of the planning of the 9/11 attacks],however, does not at all, in my view, undercut the conclusion that both[<strong>Iran</strong> and Hezbollah] contributed materially to the attack. First, when themuscle hijackers passed through <strong>Iran</strong>, they ―themselves probably were notaware of the specific details of their future operation . . . , an altogetherunremarkable likelihood, given the security measures employed by alQaeda‘s leadership to keep the plot under wraps to avoid detection.75 For good reasons, Snell also does not credit Binalshibh‘s and KSM‘s disavowal of any relationshipbetween the hijackers and Hizballah: ―. . . based on my experience in reading hundreds of interrogationreports and based on documented instances in which both detainees withheld information and even onoccasion engaged in outright prevarication, I do not particularly credit those denials any more than Icredit the denials of both <strong>Iran</strong> and Hezbollah of any complicity in the 9/11 attack.‖ Ex. 5, Snell Affid.,21.76

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