brief - Iran 911 Case

REPORT, p. 240. The Havlish experts reject the existence of a ―remarkable coincidence,‖id., p. 241 – actually, a string of remarkable coincidences. Unless Hizballah officialswere in fact expecting some other unknown group of travelers at the same time and placefor some unknown reason, 74 the conclusion is inescapable that Hizballah officials inLebanon and in Iran, including Imad Mughniyah, had actual foreknowledge of the 9/11attacks.It makes no sense … for senior figures of Hizballah to be carefullymonitoring the travels of three otherwise nondescript Saudi citizensunless, of course, they were engaged in preparatory acts of terrorism. Theexpectation of the young Saudis‘ arrival and the attention of seniorHizballah figures in both Iran and Beirut eliminate[] any element ofchance. Terror operations are, and must be, highly disciplined and highlyorganized. It would be totally shocking if the young hijackers were notescorted and monitored; travel facilitators are a common, indeednecessary, factor of terrorist travel. The extraordinary planning of the9/11 attack, years in the planning, affirms our conviction. Therefore, if theHizballah operatives were responsible to coordinate and assist―individuals‖ in their travel to Beirut/Iran, we can rule out coincidencealtogether.Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 117; see 114-120 (emphasis omitted). Notably, these alQaeda entries and exits through Iran‘s borders, clearly controlled by the IRGC andMOIS, were occurring precisely during the time period after the bombing of the U.S.S.Cole when, as found by the 9/11 Commission, Iran was making a concerted effort to―strengthen relations with al Qaeda.‖ Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 264; 9/11 REPORT, p.240.Although the 9/11 Commission ―found no evidence‖ that Iran or Hizballah had74 Although the Commission could not rule out the possibility of a ―remarkable coincidence,‖ 9/11REPORT, p. 241, further well-considered analysis by intelligence professionals does exactly that. SeeEx. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 117, 120. Moreover, a coincidence would be all the more unlikely where,after the October 2000 U.S.S. Cole attack, Iran actively sought to strengthen contacts with al Qaedaand given the ―strong evidence that Iran facilitated the transit of al Qaeda members into and out ofAfghanistan before 9/11, and that some of these were future 9/11 hijackers.‖ 9/11 REPORT, pp. 240-41.75