brief - Iran 911 Case

noted, ―8 to 10 of the 14 Saudi ‗muscle‘ operatives traveled into or out of Iran betweenOctober 2000 and February 2001‖ without their passports having been stamped. Id.The 9/11 Commission also found that ―[i]n October 2000, a senior operative ofHezbollah visited Saudi Arabia to coordinate activities there. He also planned to assistindividuals in Saudi Arabia in traveling to Iran during November. A top Hezbollahcommander and Saudi Hezbollah contacts were involved.‖ 9/11 REPORT, p. 240.Unnamed in the 9/11 REPORT, the ―senior operative of Hezbollah‖ is now known, asstated above, to be the master terrorist of Hizballah and Iran, Imad Mughniyah himself.Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 126-27; Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 114-17. The―activities‖ that Mughniyah went to coordinate clearly revolved around the hijackers‘travel, their obtaining new Saudi passports and/or U.S. visas for the 9/11 operation, asseveral of them did, as well as the hijackers‘ security, and the operation‘s security. Ex. 6,Lopez-Tefft Affid. 114; Ex. 4, Kephart Affid. 60-64 and Ex. A thereto. 73 By itself,the extraordinary fact that the world‘s most dangerous, notorious, and even ingeniousterrorist, a known commander of Hizballah – and agent of Iran – coordinated 9/11hijacker preparations inside Saudi Arabia is significant evidence of Iranian and Hizballahmaterial aid and assistance to the 9/11 conspirators. Mughniyah was far too important anasset to Iran and Hizballah for his involvement to be tangential or insignificant. See Ex.6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 114.The 9/11 Commission also determined that, in November 2000, ―muscle‖ hijackerAhmed al Ghamdi ―flew to Beirut – perhaps by coincidence – on the same flight as asenior Hezbollah operative.‖ 9/11 REPORT, p. 240. Again, further investigation revealed73 Witness Y provides specific corroborating testimony regarding MOIS‘ surveillance of terrorist traineesafter they left Iran to make sure that they did not talk to journalists or engage in suspicious activity.73