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weapons.‘‖ Id., 39 (emphasis omitted), quoting 9/11 REPORT, p. 384. 64 ―The lack ofappropriate travel documents can delay or interrupt terrorist operational plans.‖ 65 Ex. 4,Kephart Affid. 41. As stated by the 9/11 Commission:Terrorists must travel clandestinely to meet, train, plan, case targets, andgain access to attack. To them, international travel presents great danger,because they must surface to pass through regulated channels, presentthemselves to border security officials, or attempt to circumvent inspectionpoints.9/11 REPORT, p. 384; Ex. 4, Kephart Affid. 43; see also Ex. 4 72-78.It was in the arena of international movement of the operatives that the 9/11hijackers‘ ―terrorist travel‖ operation was facilitated, in a most critical way, by theIranian government. The al Qaeda travel planners knew that a terrorist operative tryingto obtain a visa at an American embassy or consulate, or trying to enter the United Statesitself, faced serious risk if his passport showed travel to Afghanistan or Iran, which wereboth on the State Department‘s list of state sponsors of terrorism. Yet, the hijackers‘travel to the al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan was essential for success of the 9/11operation. Thus, eliminating passport evidence of entry into Afghanistan at all, andparticularly through Iran, was necessary. Ex. 4, Kephart Affid. 51-53; see Ex. 25, 9/1164 ―It should now be apparent how significant travel was in the planning undertaken by a terroristorganization as far-flung as al Qaeda. The story of the plot includes references to dozens ofinternational trips.‖ 9/11 REPORT, p. 168.65 The 9/11 operation depended on a minimum number of trained hijackers, with four required to havethe capacity to serve as pilots. Thus, denial of visas or border exclusions could have disrupted themission plans, led to mistakes by the hijackers, detection, or, even a decision to scuttle the missionaltogether. Indeed, one 9/11 hijacker was intercepted: Mohamed al Kahtani, who was to be the fourth―muscle‖ hijacker on United Flight 93, was denied entry into the United States on August 4, 2001 atthe Orlando airport. With Kahtani missing, United 93 was commandeered by only three ―muscle‖hijackers; all the other planes had four. The absence of one ―muscle‖ hijacker on United 93 may havemade all the difference, as the heroic passengers of Flight 93 fought their way through to a point atleast outside the door of the cockpit and foiled the hijackers‘ attempt to fly the plane all the way toWashington, D.C. Thus, the hijackers crashed the plane into the ground in rural Pennsylvania ratherthan into the White House or the United States Capitol. Further, according to Ramzi Binalshibh, hadOsama bin Laden and KSM learned of Khatani‘s arrest, the operation might have been canceledaltogether. Ex. 4, Kephart Affid. 41-50; see 9/11 REPORT, pp. 10-14, 248, and n. 167; Ex. 25, 9/11AND TERRORIST TRAVEL, pp. 145-46.69
AND TERRORIST TRAVEL, pp. 65-66. Moreover, al Qaeda travel planners knew that aSaudi‘s passport showing a stamp indicating travel to or through Pakistan would beconfiscated upon his return to Saudi Arabia. Ex. 4, Kephart Affid. 54; 9/11 REPORT, p.169; Ex. 25, 9/11 AND TERRORIST TRAVEL pp. 61, 65-66. 66Thus, in the mid-1990s, al Qaeda operative Mustafa Hamid ―negotiated a secretrelationship with Iran that allowed safe transit via Iran to Afghanistan.‖ Ex. 3, BymanAffid. 47; Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 216 and Ex. B-15 thereto (U.S. Department ofTreasury report, January 16, 2009). The existence of this secret network of travel routesand safe houses was confirmed by al Qaeda military chief Saef al Adel in an interviewwith Al Quds al Arabi on May 21, 2005. Ex. 3, Byman Affid. 47. Further, numerousadmissions from lower level al Qaeda members who were interrogated at the detentionfacility at Guantanamo Bay confirm the existence of the clandestine Iran-Afghanistanpassageway, managed by MOIS. See Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 115-19. 67 One alQaeda travel facilitator told a detainee that al Qaeda had ―‗total collaboration with theIranians,‘ and had its own organization in Iran ‗that takes care of helping the mujahedinbrothers cross the border.‘‖ Id., 119. (Witness Y‘s sealed testimony reveals specificinformation about the extent of IRGC and MOIS control over immigration and theairports regarding the arrivals of al Qaeda members.)66 ―The al-Qa‘ida-linked Saudi dissident al-Faqih noted that ‗before 9/11 many Saudi used Iran to accessAfghanistan‘ because ‗the Iranians kept a blind eye to this.‘‖ Ex. 3, Byman Affid. 47.67 Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière‘s investigations of a series of 1995 GIA terrorist attacks in France,including the bombing of the St. Michel metro train station in Paris, led him to discover the existenceof the clandestine passage network to and from the al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. He confirmed theexistence of the secret passage system during his investigation of Djamel Beghal for an attempt toblow up the U.S. Embassy in Paris in 2001. Ex. 9, Bruguière Declaration 22-28; see also Ex. 2,Timmerman 2nd Affid. 180-85.70
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FOREIGN STATE DEFENDANTS: ::THE ISL
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D. CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF NON-U.S. NAT
Page 15 and 16:
In order to revise its pleading to
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cooperated and coordinated with, an
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Indeed, the 9/11 REPORT notes a num
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senior Hezbollah operative. Also in
Page 23 and 24: Timmerman 2nd Affid. 124. 14Althoug
Page 25 and 26: facilitating the travel of the 9/11
Page 27 and 28: officials provided direct and mater
Page 29 and 30: after September 11, 2001, in the fo
Page 31 and 32: instrument of foreign and domestic
Page 33 and 34: Perhaps the leading expert on Iran
Page 35 and 36: INTERPOL, Edgar A. Adamson attests,
Page 37 and 38: 2. THE ROBERT BAER PUBLICATIONSForm
Page 39 and 40: Iran provided material and direct s
Page 41 and 42: Iran‘s anticipation of a retaliat
Page 43 and 44: every year since 1984. Ex. 3, Byman
Page 45 and 46: Testimony of Witness X, February 23
Page 47 and 48: unning through the contemporary Mid
Page 49 and 50: We Know, p. 127; Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft
Page 51 and 52: Department reports on global terror
Page 53 and 54: terrorist recruits from a variety o
Page 55 and 56: and al Qaeda, of the ―most formid
Page 57 and 58: predictable occurrence.‖ Ex. 6, L
Page 59 and 60: The factual reality - as found by t
Page 61 and 62: Zawahiri met with Imad Mughniyah, w
Page 63 and 64: The historic 1993 meeting in Kharto
Page 65 and 66: continuing terrorist training of al
Page 67 and 68: the issuance of INTERPOL Red Notice
Page 69 and 70: investigators concluded the operati
Page 71 and 72: symbols. Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid.
Page 73: worldwide terrorism is ―a report
Page 77 and 78: see Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 148
Page 79 and 80: that the ―senior Hezbollah operat
Page 81 and 82: actual foreknowledge of the plannin
Page 83 and 84: Thus, Iran‘s facilitation of the
Page 85 and 86: the present day. Testifying before
Page 87 and 88: January 16, 2009; Ex. 2, Timmerman
Page 89 and 90: The January 16, 2009, Treasury desi
Page 91 and 92: Indeed, Iran permitted al Qaeda to
Page 93 and 94: The fact is that many important ―
Page 95 and 96: little other than KSM‘s own self-
Page 97 and 98: terrorism operations against the U.
Page 99 and 100: of Mughniyah‘s offices in Beirut.
Page 101 and 102: provided material support to al Qae
Page 103 and 104: Walter S. Batty, Jr. (PA Bar No. 02
Page 105 and 106: APPENDICESPLAINTIFFS’ FIRST MEMOR
Page 125 and 126:
APPENDICESPLAINTIFFS’ FIRST MEMOR
Page 127:
APPENDICESPLAINTIFFS’ FIRST MEMOR
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