brief - Iran 911 Case
brief - Iran 911 Case brief - Iran 911 Case
196-97.The 9/11 REPORT specifically concluded that, ―Iran made a concerted effort tostrengthen relations with al Qaeda after the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole. . . .‖9/11 REPORT, p. 240; Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 264. Although the 9/11 REPORT notesthat an al Qaeda detainee (―Khallad‖, see 9/11 REPORT Ch. 7, n. 120, and p. 19, supra)told American interrogators that Osama bin Laden rebuffed this overture ―because BinLadin did not want to alienate his supporters in Saudi Arabia,‖ this assertion means onlythat bin Laden, always concerned about recruiting, sought to downplay the relationshippublicly and deflect unwanted attention from an ―alliance of convenience.‖ Ex. 3,Byman Affid. 39. 62 Indeed, as the 9/11 REPORT finds, Iran, Hizballah, and al Qaedawould have extremely important and sensitive dealings over the next few months.F. Iran’s Contingency Plans for Terrorist Operations Against the U.S.Witnesses X, Y, and Z, taken together, provide significant evidence concerningIran‘s contingency plans for asymmetrical warfare, with specific evidence concerningIran‘s development, in the late 1980s, of contingency plans employing many of the sametactics as those of the 9/11 hijackers. Further, the defector witnesses testify to Iran‘sforeknowledge of the means and time of the 9/11 attacks. According to the U.S. StateDepartment‘s 1987 Patterns of Global Terrorism report, ―during the summer of 1987Iran began to formulate contingency plans for anti-US terrorist operations.‖ Ex. 13 at p.56; see Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 74. Thus, the State Department‘s 1987 terrorism reportprovides corroboration for significant parts of the sealed evidence submitted in this case.As Dr. Patrick Clawson explains, the U.S. State Department‘s annual report on62 Nor is the meaning of Khallad‘s statement to interrogators especially clear, although it does confirmthe existence of prior relations between Iran and al Qaeda. Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 112.67
worldwide terrorism is ―a report into which much effort is put, with each word beingcarefully weighed, and which is highly respected by researchers on terrorism.‖ Ex. 8,Clawson Affid. 40.VI.ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE OF IRAN’S DIRECT AND MATERIAL SUPPORT OFAL QAEDA FOR THE 9/11 ATTACKSA. Terrorist TravelThe 9/11 REPORT clearly implicates Iran and Hizballah in the preparations for the9/11 attacks. In particular, the 9/11 REPORT documents the willingness of Iranianofficials in the months prior to September 11, 2001, to facilitate the travel of al Qaedamembers through Iran on their way to and from Afghanistan, where the hijackers trainedat al Qaeda‘s terrorist training camps. 9/11 REPORT, pp. 233-36; 240-41. The 9/11Commission obtained ―evidence that 8 to 10 of the 14 Saudi ‗muscle‘ operatives traveledinto or out of Iran between October 2000 and February 2001.‖ 9/11 REPORT, p. 240.Indeed, the 9/11 Commission‘s staff ―border team‖ determined that the 9/11terrorists had engaged in a specific terrorist travel operation. In other words, not only didthe four nearly simultaneous hijackings of four commercial airplanes constitute acoordinated operation, but so did the hijackers‘ travel. Ex. 4, Kephart Affid. 37. Theimportance of terrorists‘ travel cannot be overstated 63 because, ―[f]or terrorists, success isoften dependent on travel. . . . ‗For terrorists, travel documents are as important as63 The al Qaeda planners of the 9/11 attacks understood the importance of successful terrorist travel andthe consequences of detection. ―A review of the entries and immigration benefits sought by thehijackers paints a picture of conspirators who put the ability to exploit U.S. border security while notraising suspicion about their terrorist activities high on their operational priorities.‖ Ex. 4, KephartAffid. 51, citing Ex. 25, 9/11 AND TERRORIST TRAVEL, p. 130. Two senior al Qaeda operatives,Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Zubaydah, each played key roles in facilitating travel for thegroup‘s terrorist operatives, and al Qaeda even had an office of passports, managed by then al Qaedanumber 2 official Muhammed Atef, its chief of military operations, for altering passports, visas, andidentification cards. Ex. 4, Kephart Affid. 42, 51; 9/11 REPORT, p. 169.68
- Page 21 and 22: senior Hezbollah operative. Also in
- Page 23 and 24: Timmerman 2nd Affid. 124. 14Althoug
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- Page 45 and 46: Testimony of Witness X, February 23
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- Page 49 and 50: We Know, p. 127; Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft
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- Page 59 and 60: The factual reality - as found by t
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worldwide terrorism is ―a report into which much effort is put, with each word beingcarefully weighed, and which is highly respected by researchers on terrorism.‖ Ex. 8,Clawson Affid. 40.VI.ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE OF IRAN’S DIRECT AND MATERIAL SUPPORT OFAL QAEDA FOR THE 9/11 ATTACKSA. Terrorist TravelThe 9/11 REPORT clearly implicates <strong>Iran</strong> and Hizballah in the preparations for the9/11 attacks. In particular, the 9/11 REPORT documents the willingness of <strong>Iran</strong>ianofficials in the months prior to September 11, 2001, to facilitate the travel of al Qaedamembers through <strong>Iran</strong> on their way to and from Afghanistan, where the hijackers trainedat al Qaeda‘s terrorist training camps. 9/11 REPORT, pp. 233-36; 240-41. The 9/11Commission obtained ―evidence that 8 to 10 of the 14 Saudi ‗muscle‘ operatives traveledinto or out of <strong>Iran</strong> between October 2000 and February 2001.‖ 9/11 REPORT, p. 240.Indeed, the 9/11 Commission‘s staff ―border team‖ determined that the 9/11terrorists had engaged in a specific terrorist travel operation. In other words, not only didthe four nearly simultaneous hijackings of four commercial airplanes constitute acoordinated operation, but so did the hijackers‘ travel. Ex. 4, Kephart Affid. 37. Theimportance of terrorists‘ travel cannot be overstated 63 because, ―[f]or terrorists, success isoften dependent on travel. . . . ‗For terrorists, travel documents are as important as63 The al Qaeda planners of the 9/11 attacks understood the importance of successful terrorist travel andthe consequences of detection. ―A review of the entries and immigration benefits sought by thehijackers paints a picture of conspirators who put the ability to exploit U.S. border security while notraising suspicion about their terrorist activities high on their operational priorities.‖ Ex. 4, KephartAffid. 51, citing Ex. 25, 9/11 AND TERRORIST TRAVEL, p. 130. Two senior al Qaeda operatives,Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Zubaydah, each played key roles in facilitating travel for thegroup‘s terrorist operatives, and al Qaeda even had an office of passports, managed by then al Qaedanumber 2 official Muhammed Atef, its chief of military operations, for altering passports, visas, andidentification cards. Ex. 4, Kephart Affid. 42, 51; 9/11 REPORT, p. 169.68
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